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United States Department of State

Director of Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20520

October 6, 1982

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MEMORANDUM

TO: OSD - Dr. Fred Ikle
JCS - BGeneral Elmer Brooks
CIA - Dr. Douglas George
NSC - Maj. General R. Boverie
ACDA - Dr. James Timbie

Attached is the approved version of Dr. Rostow's talking points on INF for his forthcoming trip to Europe. There were several last-minute modifications to the two paragraphs in question.

Jonathan T. Howe
RADM, U. S. Navy

Attachment:
As stated

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EUROPEAN CAPITALS

October 10-22, 1982

The trip has two purposes: (1) to continue the regular cycle of consultations by the Director with the Allies at the political level on the whole arms control agenda; and (2) to brief heads of government and foreign ministers on a highly confidential basis about the state of the INF and START talks.

The Director's consultations of this kind began during the fall of 1981 at the urgent invitation of the German Government and have continued at irregular intervals since. They normally consist of meetings at the senior working level with arms control officials and undersecretaries in foreign and defense ministries, and individual meetings with Foreign Ministers, Ministers of Defense, and Prime Ministers, as proves to be convenient. In most cases, the Director also gives a lecture or two at institutions like Chatham House, meets the press, appears on television and radio, and gives interviews.

Beyond the consultative element of the trip -- which remains essential -- the Director's principal object at this time is to reinforce European opinion

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in support of the Administration's arms control policy in general and both elements of the NATO two-track decision and INF position in particular. European opinion must be convinced that our position remains sound and defensible; that we are not "rigid" or "insincere", but are actively interested in outcomes which strengthen NATO security and reduce the risk of war; and that any failure to reach agreements would be the fault of the Soviet Union.

About INF specifically, the Director will say (only in meetings with Allied Foreign Ministers or Prime Ministers)

- In the INF negotiations, we are continuing to seek Soviet agreement to the position which has been worked out in close consultation within the Alliance. The central point of our position is a reduction of INF missiles on both sides to zero.
- Our goal is to focus on the most destabilizing systems in the first instance and to achieve equality through asymmetrical reductions in Soviet ballistic missile forces or through US force modernization or through a combination of both.
- The Soviets continue to propose a much different

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approach, designed to prevent the GLCM and Pershing II deployments in Europe, while permitting the Soviets to retain -- perhaps even to enlarge -- their present SS-20 force in and near Europe, and expand it in the East. They continue to propose covering Allied forces, sea-based forces and dual capable aircraft.

- We shall continue to reject the Soviet proposal that agreement be confined to Europe. It would be no contribution to security to export a grave security problem from Europe to Asia.
- The atmosphere in the INF talks is serious and professional. Our negotiators have been able to sort out what is important to both sides. This is a necessary step for progress in negotiation. We continue to believe that the zero-zero INF solution is the best possible outcome for both sides. Some of us have had indications that the Soviets may want to explore alternatives. As the President made clear in his speech of November 18, 1981, and subsequent statements, we are prepared to negotiate seriously and will consider in good faith any proposals the Soviet Union may choose to make.

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- Unfortunately, the Soviets have not yet indicated any interest in movement towards a more reasonable position based on the principle of deterrence. On the contrary, they continue to reiterate their earlier positions with considerable vehemence. We are, however, not closing off channels of communication.
- We will, of course, let you know if we detect serious Soviet interest, and consult as soon as there is anything to consult about.
- It is possible that the Soviets may make approaches to you. We should appreciate reports from you on any exchanges you may have with the Soviets on these or related matters. Allied cooperation in this regard has been excellent, and is greatly appreciated.