I was pleasantly surprised today when my “google alert” for Ronald Reagan sent me an article from Focus Taiwan titled “U.S. senators introduce bill to prevent changes to ‘Six Assurances'“. I guess I was surprised because it’s been a while since I reread what I wrote in Chapter IX: The United States & China, Part I of my book, The Reagan Files 2025: The First Term (abridged) which covers some of the discussions leading up to the “Six Assurances”.
Here’s a little sneak peak into my research…..
CHAPTER IX: THE UNITED STATES & CHINA, PART I
James Lilley, a career CIA officer and the top-ranked China expert in the U.S. government, was assigned to the National Security Council when Reagan came into office. To get Reagan and his team up to speed on China, he prepared a summary of “the secret files covering bilateral talks between the Nixon and Ford Administrations and the Chinese in the period 1973 through the Ford visit in December 1975.”
According to Lilley, Watergate on the American side and the “dominance of the Gang of Four and the imminent fall of Deng” on the Chinese side “inhibited action on moving the relationship ahead.” “During this period of time,” Lilley wrote, “the Chinese again controlled the tone and the mood of the meetings. All the meetings took place in China. The Chinese, sensing American weakness at home and in Vietnam, attacked U.S. positions which they felt were vulnerable and sought to put the U.S. on the defensive.”When Reagan assumed office, according to Haig, “Sino-American relations…were in a fragile state.” Haig blamed it on the previous administrations (Nixon, Ford and Carter) who were unwilling to supply China with the aid the Chinese leaders so desperately wanted to modernize like the United States. “By 1980,” Haig noted, “having received nothing that she had expected to receive, China found herself with a $2.8 billion trade deficit with the United States.” Additionally, Haig also noted, “China was disappointed that her relationship with the United States had not produced a solution to the question of Taiwan.”President Carter attempted to solve the issue of Taiwan, an island 100 miles off the coast of China that had separated from China in 1949 when Chiang Kai-shek fled the mainland. The United States quickly recognized the government in Taiwan as the true government of China. President Nixon’s visit and the subsequent Shanghai Communique set the stage for President Carter’s decision to reestablish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. But President Carter and the United States Congress would not do so without some assurances for Taiwan. Those assurances came in the form of a mutual defense treaty and an agreement to sell arms and other military equipment to Taiwan regardless of mainland China’s consent. The Taiwan Relations Act, signed a few months later in April 1979, formalized the American commitment to arm Taiwan despite vigorous protests from China.Taiwan quickly tested the American commitment asking to purchase advanced F-16 fighter jets and almost $100 million worth of parts. The Reagan Administration had yet to respond when the still new president met with Ambassador Chai Zemin and noted diplomat Ji Chaozhu on March 19, 1981 at the White House. The Chinese promptly reminded President Reagan that China was committed to the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. “The question of arms sales is a very sensitive issue and this involves Chinese sovereignty,” Ambassador Chai told the President. “We hope you will approach this problem with prudence. We cannot accept future arms sales. We hope that you will consult with us before taking any action to avoid any negative effect on our relationship.” President Reagan, not ready to concede any ground, responded that he would take this into account “in selling defensive arms under the Taiwan Relations Act.”
A little over two months later, with Secretary Haig scheduled to leave for China the following week, President Reagan brought the NSC together on June 4 to finalize Haig’s instructions for the China trip. The meeting quickly turned to bickering over arms sales to Taiwan.
HAIG: On the issue of arms sales to Taiwan, Secretary Weinberger would like to insert that only if we are asked will we tell the Chinese that we have not made a decision yet on such issues as the advanced aircraft. Secretary Weinberger feels that we should not volunteer this information.
WEINBERGER: We don’t want any indication that Taiwan sales take place after consultations with the People’s Republic of China. We can tell them that they can read about it in the papers after we decide. We don’t want to get them involved.
ALLEN: Yes, and I am concerned about what is meant by “quiet improvement” in the last line as applied to the Air Defense System.
HAIG: We cannot live in a dream world on this. They are going to ask the questions on arms sales to Taiwan. I’ve just seen the Chinese Ambassador, and I know they are going to ask the question. They want to know what we are going to do as far as Taiwan arms sales are concerned and they will surely raise it.
WEINBERGER: Then we are agreed that this will not be done unless the Chinese ask us.
HAIG: We don’t want to rub dirt in their face. This is not a theological question. Deng sits on a shaky throne, and we do not want to contribute to his demise. What are we doing to try to prove our manhood here?
REAGAN: I don’t see where we have to consult with China on this issue.
WEINBERGER: Regarding modernizing of their aircraft, how would we respond to Chinese demands on this issue?
ALLEN: I believe that General Jones has a comment on replacement aircraft.
JONES: When people talk about replacement aircraft in arms sales, they are talking about the F-5E and the F-104, not the F-5G. The F-5G is implied in the previous statement.MEESE: It seems to me that this commentary here, if expressed the way it is now stated, could appear to preclude the decision (that we have not yet made) for instance on the F-16. We have to sell aircraft as some models in Taiwan are fast wearing out.
ALLEN: The last sentence again deals with “quiet improvements” in the air defense system.HAIG: We have really only one pending case which involves the air defenses. There is a CIA analysis that effective ground air defense systems could be a better way to defend Taiwan.
REAGAN: We don’t have to tell them that.
HAIG: The current language here commits us to the F-5G.
MEESE: I believe that we should inform the Chinese so that they not get upset. There should be no decision by the end of this year, and aircraft sales will be next year, and the President will have to make that decision.
WEINBERGER: I endorse all of the rest of the paper.
REAGAN: I wouldn’t like to have anybody worry about the fact that we have no foreign policy.
SCHNEIDER: We have requests for seven types of equipment that the Taiwan people have askedfor which are already in train. This includes items such as Armed Personnel Carriers. What should we do about these?
HAIG: We move very slowly, by the end of the year. There is the improved Chapparal missile. We are committed to this in terms of commitments for contractors already underway. We are going to have to replace and modernize prudently, but defensively in character.
ALLEN: Under the Taiwan Relations Act this has to be defensive.
HAIG: Then we favor reconciliation and regard growth of interests favorably. The process should be peaceful, and we should not get in the middle. I know we will have pressure from the Chinese for us to get Taiwan together with them.
REAGAN: I would not want to feel that if China wanted to use force they could use force, and that any language here could be misinterpreted by them in this regard.
ALLEN: The Chinese say, according to the Chinese newspaper Guangming Ribao and their new English language paper, that the Taiwan Relations Act is null and void. They say that those sections which are counter to the Joint Communique are irrelevant. You, Mr. President, made it clear to both Ambassador Chai and Ji Chaozhu that you intend to carry out the Taiwan Relations Act. I believe it is important that Secretary Haig reaffirms that the Taiwan Relations Act is something that you intend to implement. With all the words they have used against it, if we say nothing, they will assume that they have carried the day.HAIG: We abide by the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act. We have posturing by both sides, including by Taiwan in The New York Times. The Chinese will challenge the Taiwan Relations Act, but we will have to live by it, and we will specifically address it.
BUSH: We did have frank discussions with Deng, and we have not retreated from this. The President made it clear to Ji and Ambassador Chai. This is a major thing to them.
REAGAN: Then we should add that if the subject is raised, we will inform the Chinese that this is the law of the land. If they can cancel our laws, we can cancel their income tax.
"We don’t dump Taiwan,” the president reassured his diary that night. The following week, on June 10, President Reagan brought the NSC back together for one last chance to discuss China.
ALLEN: There are several items on the agenda today, Mr. President. The Secretary departs for China this evening and you’ll see in front of you the guidance that he is taking with him. Secretary Haig, would you please go over the purposes for your trip?HAIG: Yes, this is going to be an important trip. We expect a lot of public posturing on the Chinese part concerning our policy, especially toward Taiwan. They are going to tell us we can’t do this or that with Taiwan. But the facts are that the Chinese Ambassador himself informed me that I would not be embarrassed on the trip. (Redacted sentence.) The problem has to do with timing and notification. We expect about between $700-$800 million a year in military assistance to Taiwan to continue. We have to finesse issues such as the F-16 and the other sophisticated weapons that they want. The point I am making, Mr. President, is that we are not going to change our procedures on their behalf.Mr. President, you should also know that I think the most important objective is to talk about our strategic concerns, namely the Soviet threat and the Pakistan issue. We just learned that the Chinese have agreed to help Pakistan in the event of an attack, which is a very explicit form of cooperation.CASEY: (Five lines redacted.)HAIG: Jim Buckley is on the way to Pakistan. The Department of Defense has come up with a package we think can be very helpful.ALLEN: Mr. Secretary, we will be hearing from you on a day-to-day basis, I presume.
REAGAN: Isn’t it true that you are refueling in Taiwan?
WEINBERGER: There has been a certain reluctance on the part of the Air Force to draw down stocks for Pakistan. There’s a limit to what we can do. Turkey, Belgium, Spain, and Greece are all making demands on our Air Force and our pipeline. We have a real problem.HAIG: Cap has gone the extra mile on this. If we get an answer of “peanuts” for what we are offering, we are in trouble.
ALLEN: One further point – do you want to take a letter from the President to the Chinese? What about from the Vice President? Would it be helpful?
HAIG: It is always good to have a letter from the President. You are the best judge as to whether we do this.
ALLEN: We will provide a letter for you this afternoon.With the letter in hand, Haig understood the assignment. “The President instructed me to tell the Chinese leaders that the United States was following a comprehensive policy to counter expansionism by the U.S.S.R. and its proxies, and to emphasize the permanent nature of the American presence in Asia,” he recounted in his memoir. Additionally, Haig continued, “I was charged with exploring the question of finding a modus vivendi on Taiwan, including the parameters of unofficial relations and arms sales.”Haig came bearing diplomatic gifts and quickly pushed the visit into a positive direction with the offer to help make sure China would receive advanced technology and military equipment. That was not enough. The Chinese also wanted at least what they believed President Carter had offered: $2 billion in Export-Import Bank credits. The Chinese also secured an agreement that Premier Zhao would visit the United States with a visit by Reagan to follow.With Haig’s promise that “they would have the full support of the Reagan Administration”, the Chinese then broached the difficult subject of Taiwan telling the Secretary of State that “China had been tolerant, but there were limits”. Reagan, not one to respond well to threats, or a Secretary of State that had promised more than he had authorized, addressed the Chinese warning square on the next day during his third presidential press conference aired live on television and radio around the world. When the questions invariably got to China and Taiwan – specifically one reporter asked if the “lifting of the lethal arms sales shipments to China” affects our relationship with Taiwan – Reagan almost literally lit Haig on fire from the White House when he declared his intent to “live up to the Taiwan Relations Act”. Haig was puzzled. “The timing suggested that, in carrying out his instructions, I had somehow got out in front of him on our China policy,” Haig explained in his memoir. According to James Lilley, who was also in China with the secretary of state, Haig, had, in fact promised more than he was supposed to by disclosing Reagan’s intent to sell upgraded military equipment to China before he had a chance to tell Taiwan. Reagan had no choice but to reassure Taiwan the next day that he would not be foregoing the Taiwan Relations Act as the Chinese hoped. The Chinese, according to Haig, were so bothered by the remark that they snubbed him later at the airport sending a low-level official to ask” Who makes American foreign policy? Why are there always such surprises”?
THE AUGUST 17 COMMUNIQUÉ
As frustrated as the Chinese likely were with the lack of clarity from the Reagan Administration early on, that didn’t stop them from continuing talks. And to Reagan and Haig’s credit, the gesture to remove restrictions on the transfer of technology to China combined with dangling the possibility of selling them modernized military equipment proved just enough to overcome the differences on arms sales to Taiwan. The Chinese, on September 30, opened the door with a “Nine Point Proposal” for the reunification of Taiwan including reciprocal talks and an opportunity for the Taiwanese leaders to participate in the national government. The government in Taiwan quickly rejected the proposal declaring “that reunification can only take place after the mainland abandons communism.”Reagan would soon have his first chance to personally show Chinese Premier Zhao just how tough he could be when they crossed paths at the Cancun Summit on October 21. Over the next few days Reagan would meet with perhaps a dozen heads of state, with most meetings scheduled for 30 minutes. The Reagan-Zhao luncheon would be Reagan’s only meeting scheduled for at least an hour underscoring the importance Reagan placed on improved relations with China.“With Zhao,” Allens’ briefing memo for Reagan on the Cancun Summit noted, “you should stress the importance of moderation and success at Cancun as the best way to dramatize the exclusion of the Soviets and the world’s repudiation of Soviet actions in the Third World, particularly in Afghanistan and Indo-China.” According to Howell Rains report for The New York Times from Cancun on October 22, Zhao was more focused on the Nine Point Proposal for reunification with Taiwan. According to Rains, Reagan did not back down when the Chinese insisted on a moratorium for arms sales to Taiwan. The conversation continued exactly a week later with the visit of Vice Premier Hung to the white house.Hung proposed “talks on settling the Taiwan issue” and dangled the importance of improved U.S.-Chinese relations to counter Soviet expansionism. Before accepting, President Reagan once again showed his resolve to support Taiwan.
REAGAN: May I add: first, we are pleased that China is stressing peacefully resolving differences between China and Taiwan and we hope this will result in reunification…We are committed by law and are honor-bound to carry out our laws, the Taiwan Relations Act, which was passed by Congress. This calls for delivery of purely defensive arms. And as you proceed with peaceful efforts there will be a decrease in the need of weapons. But the Soviets are such a great threat to all of us that minor disagreements between the U.S. and China cannot be as important as standing firm in the face of Soviet expansion.
HUANG: Being a statesman, you will consider that the obstacle to Sino-U.S. relations is, in fact, arms sales which are not in the overall strategic interest. …
REAGAN: Yes.
HUANG: In-depth discussions are called for in order to settle this issue. As long as the U.S. makes its decisions which are responsive to China’s demands, the Chinese will act in coordination with you and relations will be smooth. One talk session will not be enough to settle the issue, and we need continuing talks to settle the issue. We point out that while the two sides are meeting in seeking a settlement of arms sales to Taiwan, if the U.S. in defiance of this situation unilaterally makes weapons available to Taiwan, no matter what the level of the arms are, or no matter what the quantity or quality of these arms, or whether they are up to the Carter level of arms, China is bound to act strongly and relations will stagnate and retrogress cannot be avoided….
REAGAN: These talks will continue. I want you to know we are sensitive to your needs and will be prudent and discreet with what we have to do. This cannot be settled here…
“Experience tells the Chinese that tough tactics can work on Americans,” Lilley reflected after the meeting. “The Chinese believe they have a strong constituency in the U.S. Government, in the press, among academics who will support the strategic relationship with Peking at the expense of Taiwan. The Chinese believe our current Administration leaders want it both ways and the Chinese are trying to force a choice – Peking or Taiwan. They want to restore the strong Peking tilt which has existed since 1971.” Lilley thinks the real target is the advanced aircraft sales to Taiwan. “They want to block this. They can live with other sales eventually no matter what they say now… we should resume arms sales quietly to Taiwan after several weeks on a graduated schedule, releasing some items Taiwan has requested.”Reagan confided to his diary that night: “China is virtually delivering an ultimatum re arms to Taiwan. I don’t like ultimatums. We have a moral obligation and until a peaceful settlement is reached between the mainland and Taiwan we’re going to meet that obligation.”
JANUARY 7, 1982NSPG 33: Taiwan
3:30 -4:30 PM; The Situation Room/Declassified (2018)
CLARK: Mr. President, we have one agenda item for discussion today, and that is to determine what type of replacement aircraft to provide to Taiwan. Involved in this overall decision are several lesser considerations.At the meeting today, we would like to provide you enough information to make a decision on: (1) the continuation of F-5E coproduction; (2) Whether we should transfer the used F-104G aircraft from West Germany to Taiwan; (3) Whether we should reaffirm, on a close-hold basis, our intention to sell other defense equipment to Taiwan; and (4) Whether we should approve the opening of a new office by the Taiwan Government in the United States.Al, would you please begin the discussion?
HAIG: I want to caution attendees of the bureaucratic pitfalls attendant with the decision which must be made – the need to notify Taiwan and the PRC simultaneously; the need to consult with the House Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and the need to consult with Congress as a whole. Senator Percy is expecting consultations on the issues and the ultimate decisions. We agreed to do so, but he has been telling his colleagues that he expects consultations before the decision. I bring this up because we need to prevent leaks at all costs, and we need to have a comprehensive game plan.There is also some time urgency to getting on with the decision, since the Chinese are refusing to discuss collaboration on sanctions toward Poland until they have a firm U.S. commitment regarding the sale of arms to Taiwan after a date certain. At the same time, the U.S. has proceeded with the sale of spare parts, as we should have.There are pros and cons of the issues and options. I have reluctantly concluded that the best decision is to stick with the continuation of the F-5E coproduction line plus the provision of some used, all-weather aircraft. In other words, the United States should not expand the “state of the art” package for Taiwan.Chancellor Schmidt has also warned me of the dangers of “reverse ping pong”. He mentioned, as evidence, the increasingly anti-U.S. rhetoric, the messages to U.S. allies regarding this issue, the reduction of Chinese troop deployment along the PRC-USSR border, the talk of return to the Soviet Union. Assessments of the intelligence community also concur with the observation of the dangers of reverse ping pong. At the same time, however, we have the right to sell Taiwan those items necessary for defense purposes as authorized by the Taiwan Relations Act. Those needs should be determined by the professional military.Having said the above, I feel that the best the U.S. can do is to stick with the F-5E coproduction line. One has to take a careful assessment of what is happening in the Peoples Republic of China: the issue is not just Taiwan, but rather the entire U.S. relationship with the PRC, which is a profound strategic event.A few minutes later the conversation circles back to arms sales to Taiwan.
CASEY: I want to return to the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. The intelligence community has studied both the political and military aspects of this issue and determined that there is no military need for an advanced fighter aircraft in Taiwan’s inventory now. It is expected that Taiwan could maintain a strong deterrent throughout the 1980s by acquiring more F-5Es and F-104G aircraft which are now in its inventory.Politically, Beijing would be certain to downgrade relations with the U.S., across the board, if the U.S. were to sell either of the two aircrafts known as the F-X (the F-16/79) or the F-5G. Beijing would also precipitate some form of similar action if the U.S. were to decide upon an upgraded version of the F-5E.Taipai would be disappointed in a decision by the U.S. not to sell Taiwan an F-X but would accept the decision so long as additional F-5E’s and F-104G’s were provided, accompanied by reasonable assurances that the U.S. remains committed to continuing the supply of necessary defensive military equipment.
WEINBERGER: I believe Taiwan needs the F-5E, not the F-5G. The PRC does not, at this point, have the ability to overrun Taiwan.I also agree with Secretary Haig regarding the PRC reaction to the U.S. decision. I do not think they are bluffing in this instance. My only worry is that Taiwan will reject the sale of the F-5E. I don’t think that will actually happen. The manner in which the decision is relayed to Taiwan will be important.
GEN. JONES: The Joint Chiefs think rebuilding the U.S. military with the Chinese is the overriding concern from a military perspective. At the same time, however, the issue of how the decision is handled is extremely important. The Chinese are emotional on the subject of Taiwan. We concluded that Taiwan does not need the F-X, and that the F-5E is sufficient. Indeed, from a deterrent standpoint, the F-5E is better than the PRC’s current F-8.
BAKER: Will the decision be conveyed before or after the Party Congress?HAIG: I feel that if the decision is favorable from the PRC point of view, the sooner it is relayed, the better. If the decision is to upgrade, however, I would recommend that it be made and announced after the conclusion of the Party Congress. I want to stress, again, the need to prepare a detailed game plan before the President makes his decision. I will have a plan for the President tomorrow.
REAGAN: What type of planes do the PRC have?
GEN. JONES: The Chinese have some Soviet MIGs. They are also now making their own, specifically the F-8.
REAGAN: I am certain that Prime Minister Lee of Singapore is a friend of the U.S. With his good contacts with both the PRC and Taiwan, he will be happy to assist the United States in this matter as necessary.
The next day, in his diary, Reagan recorded that he sent a team “to Peking to tell them at first hand we’re going to sell F-5Es and some F-104’s to Taiwan. We’re softening things a little. Taiwan really wants the more advanced F-5Gs – they’ll have to come later.”
Reagan’s firm stance defending Taiwan but flexible approach to arms sales would soon pay off with a stunning achievement in U.S.-Sino relations that summer. First, on April 5 Reagan sent a letter to Chairman Deng reiterating his commitment to the one China policy. “We will not permit the unofficial relations between the American people and the people of Taiwan to weaken out commitment to this principle,” he wrote Deng. Then to follow up Reagan sent Vice President Bush to China to tell the Chinese that he would not back down from militarily supporting Taiwan but could show flexibility in other areas. The Chinese, who were still insisting on a moratorium of arms sales to Taiwan, seized the chance to work with the United States on other area of Sino-American relations as well as continue to push for a moratorium. Taiwan, naturally, wondered what all this meant for them. Reagan knew as much and as negotiations with mainland China continued over arms sales to Taiwan, Reagan secretly sent Lilley to Taiwan in July to convey what came to be known as his Six Assurances, a sign to Taiwan that it was not being abandoned by the Reagan Administration.
Reagan’s “Six Assurances” to Taiwan
July 14, 1982
In negotiating the third Joint Communique with the PRC, the United States:
1. has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan;2. has not agreed to hold prior consultations with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan;3. will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing;4. has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act;5. has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan;6. will not exert pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC.The eventual agreement, the August 17 Communique, declared American support for Chinese sovereignty and an eventual reduction in arms sales to Taiwan as long as China maintained a peaceful policy toward Taiwan. Reagan the same day, August 17, also signed a secret memorandum on the 1982 Communiqué repeating that his commitment to reduce arms sales to Taiwan was contingent on “the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC differences. It should be clearly understood that the linkage between these two matters is a permanent imperative of U.S. foreign policy…Both in quantitative and qualitative terms, Taiwan’s defensive capability relative to that of the PRC will be maintained.