

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

Tuesday, March 24, 1981
 2:00 - 4:00 p.m. (2 hours)
 The Situation Room

*and again
 Thursday
 at 2 -*

FROM: Richard V. Allen

I. PURPOSE

The President will chair a meeting of the National Security Planning Group at 2:00 p.m. on Tuesday, March 24, 1981. Agenda items will include (1) Strategy in Southern Africa, (2) Nicaragua, and (3) Embassy Security. (S)

Participants will include the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Counsellor to the President, the Chief of Staff to the President, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Deputy Chief of Staff to the President, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. (S)

The meeting is for principals only. (S)

II. BACKGROUNDA. Strategy in Southern Africa

The situation in Southern Africa requires urgent action on two issues: 1) whether we should continue to support the UN-sponsored negotiations for the independence of Namibia; 2) how to curtail Soviet influence in Angola, manifested by the Cuban troops there. (S)

In pursuit of these objectives, Secretary Haig recommends we do the following:

- Support efforts of the UN, the Contact Group and the so-called Frontline states to arrange Namibian independence, but argue that internationally supervised elections in Namibia should await

~~SECRET~~

Review on March 24, 1986

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS MOZ-014#1By LOT, NARA, Date 11/21/05

~~SECRET~~

the creation of a constitution that specifies minority rights, protection of private property and neutrality (the latter with an international guarantee). (S)

- Strengthen Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA group through public support [REDACTED] so that he can harass the Cubans in Angola, as part of a broader strategy of pressing the MPLA into dealing with Savimbi and getting rid of the Cubans. (S)

B. Nicaragua

Nicaraguan arms flown into El Salvador seem to have slowed down compared to the very heavy arms flow from October through January. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In the meantime, the Nicaraguan government is looking for new methods for infiltration. It does retain large stocks of weapons in the country. It continues to provide training and support for Salvadorean guerrillas. It provides command and control for the insurgency from Managua. (S)

There currently are 44 US employees and 36 dependents in the US Embassy in Managua. Also, there are 4,000 American citizens remaining in Nicaragua. (S)

The Sandinistas leadership is pleased with their twice-used tactic of using out-of-uniform militia to form mobs designed to intimidate opponents. (S)

After cutting of US aid, the Sandinistas could use the same tactic against our Embassy. (S)

C. Embassy Security

In the FY 1980 budget, \$7 million was provided to begin a special program for security enhancement at US embassies overseas. In the wake of the


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Iranian takeover of Embassy Tehran, the security enhancement program was increased to \$35 million in FY 81 and \$60 million in FY 82. Nonetheless, doubts persist as to the ability of the US to protect its overseas representatives, and we should ensure that all reasonable steps are being taken. (S)

III. QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

A. Strategy in Southern Africa

- Isn't the first half of the strategy, creating a constitution, defeated if this approach is promptly rejected by a large majority of African states? Is there a reason to believe our Western allies will be solidly behind such an approach? (S)
- Won't the South Africans and moderate Namibians reject any constitution unless they receive some rather concrete guarantees from the West? They have seen and will cite constitutional guarantees for minorities and property built into other African constitutions at the time of independence, only to see them disappear after a few years. What kind of guarantee can we really offer? (S)
- Given South African and moderate Namibian belief that the UN, including the Secretariat, is firmly biased in favor of SWAPO, what role will the UN play in drawing up a constitution? (S)
- Are we agreed that there is a crucial linkage between the withdrawal of Soviet-Cuban military forces from Angola and independence in Namibia, with the withdrawal to come first? (S)
- Do we have the resources to monitor an alleged withdrawal to confirm that it really is taking place? (S)
- In broad terms, what are the parameters for the 

B. Nicaragua

If there is going to be a rescue mission,

- Who will pay for it?

~~SECRET~~

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(c)

~~SECRET~~

- How fast can it be carried out, since the Embassy is not very secure? (S)
- What can be done for the 4,000 US citizens? (S)

C. Embassy Security

- Local security forces are the best defense against violent acts directed toward US embassies. Are we pressing foreign governments to plan for and provide adequate assistance in times of crisis -- or is this a nettlesome issue relegated to the bottom of the diplomatic heap? (S)
- Is State receiving sufficient resources to discharge its embassy security function? (S)
- Should new instructions and missions be given to the Marine Corps embassy detachments to adjust to changed circumstances? (S)

~~SECRET~~