MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Gorbachev

TIME: December 8, 1987, 2:30 – 3:15 p.m.

PLACE: Cabinet Room, The White House

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

Ronald Reagan, President of the United States
George Bush, Vice President
Howard Baker, Chief of Staff
George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
Frank Carlucci, Secretary of Defense
Colin Powell, National Security Advisor
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)
Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Secretary of State (EUR) (notetaker)
Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)

USSR

Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary, CPSU CC
Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Aleksandr N. Yakov'ev, CPSU CC Secretary
Anatoliy F. Dobryin, CPSU CC Secretary
Vladimir M. Kamentsev, Deputy Chairman, Council of Minister
Sergei Akhromeyev, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
Yuriy V. Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
Sergei Tarasenko, Special Assistant to Shevardnadze (notetaker)
P. Palazhchenko, MFA USA/Canada Department (interpreter)

The President suggested the two leaders take up their discussion where it had left off.

Gorbachev said he would complete his presentation of that morning by adding a few words, with the President's permission.

The President invited him to do so.
Gorbachev said he believed the President felt like him and their colleagues following the signing (of the INF Treaty). The two sides had begun to discuss the key problem of reducing nuclear weapons. There was also the concern about conventional and chemical weapons. This was becoming very important. It was coming to the forefront of concern. He did not wish to overdramatize. There was no need to panic. But the Soviet side was in the process of assessing whether harm was being done to equality, to the balance of security. They had been listening to what was being said in Europe. They had the feeling in Moscow that it was hoped in Europe that we would give due attention to chemical weapons, to conventional weapons. The President and he should discuss this. They should give instructions to their colleagues to move forward.

Turning first to conventional weapons, Gorbachev recalled how the two sides had begun the process of eliminating medium-range and shorter-range missiles. The President had recalled in his remarks that he had put forward the zero option. Gorbachev said he had thought the President would then say the Soviets had appropriated the idea for themselves. But the President had put the thought in more sophisticated fashion. Gorbachev had noticed that.

But, Gorbachev went on, when they began to discuss this question there was the issue of British and French arms. They had debated it. The Soviet side had decided to set it aside. Then they had discussed missiles in Europe and in Asia. At Reykjavik it had been decided each side could retain 100 warheads, with the Soviet warheads in Asia. Later they had decided to go to complete zero. They had moved step by step. All these things had gone into the treaty the two sides had just signed.

This experience should not only help with strategic offensive arms discussions. Gorbachev continued. It should also help with conventional weapons. In the West it was said that the Soviet Union had a superiority in armed forces and weapons. In the East it was said that NATO had a superiority in weapons. And both sides were right. Each side had the data proving its case. The two sides should agree to sit down. They should see who was trying to outsmart whom, and who was serious. They should look at the asymmetries. It should be a process; they should go step by step.

Gorbachev went on that the President and he should decide to move forward toward a mandate for negotiations between the two
alliances. Perhaps they should lock their negotiators in a room. They could give them food, of course, but they would instruct them to prepare proposals. Some were saying that the Soviet Union should take certain steps even before this had been done. They said the Soviet Union had an advantage in Central Europe. No one talked about NATO's advantages in Southeastern Europe, which existed, and in an area close to the Soviet borders.

This should be put in the final document (of the Summit), Gorbachev said. They should put their cards on the table. They should think of first steps to lessen confrontation. There was the concept of corridors, of thinning out forces in certain corridors. There was the question of discussing military doctrines. They should seek a common concept of sufficiency, sufficiency for defensive purposes. He would not expand on this list. But the atmosphere created by signing the treaty was not less important than the treaty itself. The two leaders should talk about what he had suggested. This would be well received by the allies of both countries, and in Europe generally.

Turning to chemical weapons, Gorbachev said that at a certain point the British had made a valuable initiative. The Soviet position had in fact been a certain hurdle. The Soviet side therefore took major decisions. After that work went forward toward a convention to ban all these weapons, among all the participating countries, including the United States.

Then there came a slowdown, Gorbachev went on. As the Soviets saw it, someone was holding back the process. It could be either the Soviet Union or the United States. The Soviets knew it was not they. They had stopped production of these weapons. They were building, in fact completing, a facility to destroy them. It was not the Soviet side that was slowing things down. Perhaps it was the U.S. side. Perhaps there were some concerns on the U.S. side. Maybe it was the binary weapons program. The U.S. had already funded production of 155 mm. shells.

Verification was also very important, Gorbachev continued. The U.S. was still proposing verification only of state facilities. That would include all the Soviet Union's, but not all the U.S.'s. There was no equality there.

Gorbachev concluded that the final document (of the Summit) should express a common view that would make it possible to give momentum to the negotiating process. This would enrich their meeting. It would be welcomed by the peoples of Europe, the peoples of the world.
He had wished to raise these two questions, Gorbachev said, by way of concluding their initial meeting. He could confine himself to this at that point.

The President said he did not think anyone on the U.S. side did not favor more disarmament. The U.S. side thought the main priority should be to move forward in START. But if we continued on that path, we would face the question of short-range, or battlefield, weapons. It would only be possible to eliminate them if we had first restored a balance in conventional weapons. The two sides should find a way to move forward on this. But, he recalled, it was not armaments that created distrust, but distrust that created armaments.

Gorbachev commented that confidence could not grow in an empty place. The arms control process would help it grow. That was dialectics, under the Marxist approach.

Secretary Shultz said that the U.S. side wanted to work with what had been said at that meeting, about conventional weapons, about chemical weapons. That was desirable. But the question was not so much one of language as of content.

The U.S. side would like to see the mandate being worked on in Vienna finished as soon as possible, the Secretary continued. It was pretty well along. In the framework of the Vienna talks there was also discussion of human rights. The Soviet side had made proposals, the U.S. side had made proposals. It was the Helsinki framework which held all these things together. So the two sides needed to deal with all these aspects. The U.S. side wanted to do that. Then, as Gorbachev had said, the sides should proceed on to deal with the asymmetries. They should try to move toward an equal situation at lower levels. The U.S. side had some ideas. Perhaps they would parallel those of the Soviet side.

Like the Soviet side, the U.S. side made a point of moving forward as a member of an alliance, the Secretary continued. This was not something the U.S. and the Soviet Union could just do together. Most of the arms under discussion on the Western side belonged to U.S. allies. But it was true that the U.S. and the Soviet Union had important parts, and could energize things.

Gorbachev said he supported what Secretary Shultz had said concerning the linkage to allies. The working group should work on this topic during the visit. They should develop ideas. When they had done so, the two sides should consult with their allies. Then Carlucci and Soviet Defense Minister Yazov could
meet. This would move the process forward.

Secretary Shultz said he was all for meetings between defense officials of the two sides. But we had to be careful about acting as if the U.S. and Soviet sides could work things out, and then consult with allies. We could not have that. It would not work. The allies see the importance of the issues, but the two sides needed to go about it right. But they should come to grips in Vienna with all the topics that had been discussed. This meant not only a mandate for negotiations on conventional weapons but also a mandate for confidence building measures. They should get that done, in the early part of the next year.

Gorbachev said the two sides had a common view that the topic was important, and he agreed we should not rush, but he had reservations when he heard Shultz say it. The Warsaw Treaty Organization had put proposals on the table eighteen months ago. It had still not received an answer. As he had told the President, he had not come to Washington to bicker, but to do real politics. At the stage we were at, recriminations and complaints just served to delay things. Gorbachev pointed to the main negotiators, sitting at the back of the room. They had felt this on their skins, he said. One needed to be persistent to succeed.

Gorbachev continued that with regard to substance the U.S. side had said there was generally agreement. But he had one question. He did not want to link conventional disarmament to Helsinki. Helsinki included many things, human rights and other things. We should tackle conventional disarmament straight on. We should not make a package. The U.S. had made Jackson-Vanik fifteen years before. That was a package, and over fifteen years the U.S. had been unable to untie it.

Secretary Shultz said the U.S. side was prepared in the working group to discuss conventional arms in relation to the CSCE process. Our Ambassador at Vienna, Warren Zimmermann, would be there. Perhaps a subgroup could be formed to work on this problem.

Gorbachev suggested that the formulation in the statement could stress cooperation with allies; that was important. Secretary Shultz said Gorbachev had better believe it. That was, Gorbachev added, if the chairman agreed. The President said he did.

Gorbachev asked about chemical weapons. The Secretary said this was a more severe problem. For fifty years there had been a
moral consensus against them. This had been broken. It was important to try to put it back together.

Gorbachev asked if the Secretary were referring to the 1925 Convention. The Secretary said that he was. It had worked, more or less. Actually, the fact that some countries had possessed these weapons had probably had some deterrent effect. But there were now many countries which had or could have them. They had been used in the Iran-Iraq war. At the same time there was the problem of verification. There was a need for a broad consensus. But it would be hard to get.

The U.S. side thus saw both the urgency and the difficulty of the issue, the Secretary said. There was real work to do. The two sides had had excellent discussions on the topic, in the content of his meetings with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The U.S. side wanted to see progress. But it had no illusions. He suggested that they have their people work on it. This could be reflected in any statement. But the problem was genuinely difficult.

Gorbachev asked if the U.S. side saw the goal, for the two sides and for others, as speeding up the drafting of the convention. Secretary Shultz said it did, as long as we went about it realistically.

The President commented that any country with a fertilizer plant could make chemical weapons. It was an almost impossible task to know that they are not being made. Secretary Shultz said we thus had an impossible but necessary task. Chemical weapons were potentially very destabilizing. Gorbachev said there was no cause for panic.

Gorbachev continued that he wished to draw the President's and the Administration's attention to another issue. The Soviet side had noticed that in European political and journalistic circles there was discussion of how to compensate for the elimination of INF missiles in Europe. If such thinking prevailed, it would be very dangerous. The two sides should interact and take a common stand. There could be new weapons, of great new capacity. If all the talk of reinforcing or adding new forces in Europe became true, the whole process would be more difficult. This was especially true since they had agreed to eliminate INF missiles over a certain period of time.

(At this point, at 3:00 p.m., Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh and Disarmament Department Director Viktor Karpov took their places at the table.)
The President commented that it was here that we needed to take the most steps to create trust. There was a legacy of mistrust because of Soviet expansionism. Gorbachev commented that compared to American expansionism the Soviet side's was a small child. The President responded that the U.S. side did not think so. There had been four wars in his lifetime, and the U.S. had not gained an inch of territory.

Under the U.S. system, the President continued, it was not enough just to say something. You had to do something. We had people here from every part of the world. There was thus a kind of dual loyalty. The first question asked was what you were; more and more people had to name three or four places. There was a pride in where one's parents and ancestors were from. They were proud of them, as well as of being American. So there were elements in our country that had big resentments over what happened where they had come from. Signing the treaty was therefore not enough. There was also the question of getting it ratified.

Gorbachev said the Supreme Soviet was even larger than the Senate. It had some 2000 members. He expected ratification would be a sharper process than usual. It opened up many questions. There was the question of why the Soviets had been so generous toward the Americans. They were eliminating four times as many missiles. But it used to be that parity had been recognized. So the question was why it was being broken. The Soviets would need to tackle this even before the formal ratification process. It was not easy to take the first step toward disarmament. People asked how it was possible to have disarmament with the U.S. when the Soviet Union was ringed with U.S. bases. People asked how Gorbachev could bow down to the U.S., and do more.

Gorbachev continued that he had just seen a recent Gallup poll in the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It had been an independent poll. It had shown that there were not many enthusiasts for the treaty in the Soviet Union. About half the Soviet people had expressed certain doubts. After all the Soviet government had said the principle should be equal security. That was one reason why he had brought Dobrynin along; he was head of a commission in the Supreme Soviet. So was Ligachev. But he thought he would have Dobrynin with him.

The President said that Gorbachev's comments underlined the need for trust. If Gorbachev genuflected before him, he would stomp his foot. Gorbachev said he was not referring to himself.
personally. He was one thing. But pride was a matter for a nation. He represented a nation. We had to deal with each other on the basis of equality, of respect, of taking each other's concerns into account. We needed to make real policy.

The U.S. side accused the Soviet side of all sorts of sins, Gorbachev went on. What was needed was to look forward instead. During the forty-five years since the War so much had piled up that if we just went on with complaints -- on the Soviet side there were all sorts of doctrines to complain about, the Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Carter Doctrine -- we would put each other on trial. This was not the constructive policies people wanted. Gorbachev advised the Vice President to reflect on that. Unless policy reflected what people wanted, you could win an election, but not succeed in the long term.

The President commented that the U.S. side welcomed moves toward democratization in the Soviet Union, toward glasnost.

Gorbachev replied that he wished to say a few words about that. It was people's greatest wish to go to bed and wake up in the morning to see everything changed for the better. But even in fairy tales the heroes had to go through trials, and in real life things were even harder. He would continue to fight conservatism. He would continue to fight those who sought to shackle people in dogma. But he would also fight adventurists. There were the equivalent of the Red Guards in China, who wanted to push ahead without thinking.

It would not be easy, Gorbachev said. But the present leadership had taken a firm stand to move along that path. Certain politicians, perhaps Matlock, were looking for an opposition. There was opposition, in every single Soviet. It would be foolish to deny it. They were children of their times. But of political opposition there was none. There would be debates. There would be differences of views, and exchanges of views. But he could assure the President and his colleagues that the Soviet side would be moving ahead toward democratization. That was, if the U.S. would permit them to do so. He asked the American side to let the Soviet side do it their own way.

The President said there was a U.S. President who had once said something very profound. That was Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In America there had also been people who had thought that government should have more control of people. Roosevelt had asked where, if people did not have the capacity to run their own lives, we would find among them the tiny group that could run not only their own lives but those of others.
He did not want to offend Gorbachev, the President continued, but he had recently talked to a U.S. scholar who had visited Gorbachev's country. On his way to the airport he had had a taxi driver, a young man finishing his education but also driving a taxi because he needed money. The professor had asked the young man what he was going to be; he had replied that he had not yet decided. The professor got to the Soviet Union, and there he had had basically the same conversation, with a taxi driver finishing his education, but also driving a taxi. When he had been asked what he would be, he had replied: "They haven't told me yet."

Gorbachev said he knew the President liked anecdotes about the Soviet Union. It was indeed a country rich in anecdotes. He had only one request: that the President not ask Matlock to collect anecdotes for him. This would stop relations entirely; that would be the biggest joke.

Secretary Shultz asked if he could get a word in edgewise. People were waiting for the working groups to start. There had been discussion of strategic arms that morning. Notes had been exchanged; there were things to work with. Gorbachev and the President had also had a discussion about conventional and chemical weapons, so that was additional material. There was one area that had not been touched on. Perhaps they could reach it the next day. That was regional issues. (Gorbachev interjected agreement.) Here the Secretary assumed the working group would plow in without guidance from the leaders' discussion.

Gorbachev said he would welcome that. Bessmertnykh and Ridgway knew their respective positions. The Secretary joked that the problem was that they knew the positions of both sides.

Gorbachev said the Soviet side intended to conduct a more businesslike discussion of regional issues with the President and his colleagues. But there was too little time for it that day. They could get into it the next day.

Secretary Shultz said that as self-appointed housekeeper, he might also mention the nuclear testing statement as something to issue the next day. It would be good to have a continuing flow of things out of the meeting. Gorbachev said the two sides should look at it.

Gorbachev said he had made a note to himself that morning. His thought was that in discussing the ABM Treaty, where the two sides agreed on a non-withdrawal period, they should say not only, as the Soviet proposal had it, that if one side violated
the ABM Treaty the other side would have the right to resume increasing offensive weapons, but that if one side violated it the other side would have the right to end its moratorium on ASAT weapons, i.e. not only to resume production of offensive arms but also to resume ASAT production. That would be an equal obligation for both sides.

Secretary Shultz said it was not clear to him what Gorbachev meant by a moratorium on ASAT. Gorbachev said the Soviet side had been observing such a moratorium since 1983; of course it was unilateral. The Secretary said that our moratorium was imposed by Congress. Gorbachev said he knew that; but in actual fact it was a moratorium. The Secretary said he now understood what Gorbachev was driving at.

Secretary Shultz continued that in his view the ABM Treaty deserved discussion in the working group, and perhaps also back at the main table: the President had important thoughts on it.

Gorbachev asked if they should call it a day for the time being. Or perhaps the President wished to make suggestions on strategic weapons that day. The President replied that he did not.

The Secretary asked if it were agreed to begin the arms control working group at 4:00 p.m. Shevardnadze asked if it would take place at the State Department, and the Secretary confirmed that it would.

Gorbachev concluded that in the previous two hours they had made an important event. It was a bridge to the future. The Soviet side was ready to build it over. By the time the President came to Moscow the two sides of the bridge should be locked together. The President said they should meet in the middle. Gorbachev said he agreed fully.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 9, 1987
Time: 10:35 - 10:45 a.m.
Place: Small office next to Oval Office, White House

U.S. Participants: President Reagan
D. Zarechnak, interpreter

USSR Participants: General Secretary Gorbachev
P. Palazhchenko, interpreter

The President started the meeting by passing to the General Secretary a baseball from Joe DiMaggio (who had attended the State dinner the previous evening) for his (and the President's) autograph. Gorbachev indicated that he had heard of the request, and was glad to comply.

The President then told the General Secretary that in the coming two days they would be working hard to set in motion the other things that needed to be accomplished in order that the people on both sides could work hard in the winter and spring to make a summit in Moscow possible next summer. He indicated that he would be prepared to keep his people working at this, in addition to what the two of them would discuss this morning and tomorrow.

The General Secretary replied that he welcomed this, and that it was not only his feeling, but also that of the Soviet leadership, to continue to work at these issues, and to make the process even more dynamic, not only in the main area of arms control, but in other areas as well, in order to prepare a good visit by Reagan to Moscow which would also be productive and important.

Gorbachev continued that a good time for the visit, when it was not too hot, would be the early summer, perhaps early June or late May. This would allow time for the process of ratification and also would allow for time for a lot of work to be done on a new document on strategic arms and other issues.

The President agreed.

Gorbachev continued that in his conversation with Mrs. Reagan the other night, he had indicated that a program could be arranged which would include time for meetings between the President and himself, meetings of working groups, but also one or two days during which the President and Mrs. Reagan could see the country.
The President replied that that would be nice. He could not agree to a date, however, until he knew when some other things would be taking place, e.g., the Economic Summit, which usually occurs in early summer. So he would need some time before agreeing to a date. But he did want to go to Moscow.

The President said that this visit had been a rather short one, but perhaps some time before the President left office, the General Secretary and Raisa could return, not for a Summit, but simply to see the country, and California specifically, since one has not seen America without seeing California.

Gorbachev agreed that this was a good idea, and that there should be regular meetings between the leaders of the two countries, and not always official visits. If we wish to restructure our relations and improve our dialogue and cooperation, all these things could be done in a more normal way, including visits to the U.S. to get to know the country. Such a trip would be important to get a deeper knowledge of the U.S., and would be a possibility.

Drafted by: D. Zarechnak
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MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation

Attached is a draft Memorandum of Conversation on the President's December 9, 1987, 1:35-1:45 pm, meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.

Melvyn Levitsky  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
As Stated.

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
DECL: OADR
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Time: 10:55 am to 12:35 pm, Wednesday, December 9, 1987
Place: Oval Office

Participants

U.S.
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Carlucci
Sen. Baker
NSC Advisor Powell
EUR/SOV Director Parris
(Notetaker)
NSC Staff Member Ermarth
(Back-up Notetaker)
Mr. Zarechynak
(Interpreter)

U.S.S.R.
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV
FornMin Shevardnadze
Politburo Member Yakovlev
CPSU Secretary Dobrynin
Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko
(MFA Officer)
MFA Officer
(Back-up Notetaker)
Mr. Palazhchenko
(Interpreter)

* * * *

The meeting was preceded by a ten minute one-on-one with only interpreters present.

THE PRESIDENT opened by noting that the day before had been a proud one. But as the General Secretary himself had said, the two leaders had to keep working.

The President said he wanted to return to some of the subjects the two had talked about in their first meeting, especially the relationship between strategic offense and defense. The two sides' experts had met the day before on START and had had a good discussion. The U.S. had stressed two important issues: verification and counting rules. On verification, our ideas

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built on what we had learned from the INF negotiation. Counting rules were also important. Issues like sublimits could not be decided until we knew exactly how different types of weapons were to be counted. However, the President was encouraged by Soviet willingness to compromise between 4800 and 5100 ballistic missile warheads. Were it possible to come to agreement on this, the President would be prepared to be forthcoming on an ICBM sublimit. (Gorbachev made a note at this point.)

The President noted that the Soviet side had also discussed sea-launched cruise missiles and had suggested new ideas for their verification. The General Secretary had also expressed a readiness to examine verification of mobile missiles. The U.S. appreciated Gorbachev’s suggestions, and, while we had some doubts, we were willing to study his concepts.

Moving to a discussion of the U.S. defense and space position, the President noted that the arms control working group was taking up these issues that day. Each side seemed to understand the other’s position on START, but this wasn’t true in Defense and Space. The President wanted to urge that the two sides move together in a direction in which they were already going separately.

Specifically, he indicated that, if it were possible to agree on a treaty reducing strategic arsenals by 50 percent and preserve the opportunity for effective strategic defenses, the two sides would stand on the threshold of a new and stronger regime of strategic stability. Offensive nuclear weapons had helped to keep the peace for over forty years. But now it was necessary to look to the future. The President and Gorbachev held awesome responsibilities. Their only means to avoid nuclear war was to be prepared to strike each other’s homeland with devastating consequences, not only for their countries, but for the world. Their successors, and, more importantly, their peoples, deserved better. For his part, the President wanted to strengthen peace by finding new ways to save lives rather than threaten to avenge them. Providing a better, more stable basis for peace was the central purpose of SDI.

The President pointed out that effective defenses against ballistic missiles could strengthen stability in a number of ways. First, they would significantly increase uncertainty about whether missiles could penetrate defenses to destroy the other side’s capability to retaliate. This would become even more important after a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms.
Second, defenses would provide an alternative to accepting massive devastation if a missile were ever launched in error or against either side by another country.

Third, defenses could reinforce arms reductions. Fifty percent reductions, combined with increasingly effective defenses, could offer a real hope of protecting people, not just weapons.

Finally, defenses would underwrite the integrity of arms reductions by reducing the advantages of cheating.

In short, the President noted, the combination of effective defenses and a 50 percent reduction in strategic arsenals would establish a whole new concept of strategic stability. It would by the measure people in the U.S. held most important -- by removing any incentive to strike first in a crisis. But it would also improve stability by the measure the Soviet military held most important -- by ensuring that neither side could be surprised by the military advances of the other. Thus we could improve strategic stability by both U.S. and Soviet standards.

The President observed that he had noticed Gorbachev's March 1, 1987 remarks in Pravda, which focused on the issue of deployment. The President considered that the right approach. He was therefore prepared to negotiate with Gorbachev a period during which neither side would deploy strategic defenses beyond those permitted by the ABM Treaty. The length of the period could be agreed once the terms were settled. At Reykjavik, Gorbachev had talked of ten years. The President believed it would be possible to agree on the length of the period once the terms were settled.

Moreover, in order to reassure Gorbachev that the Soviet Union would not be surprised by events during the non-deployment period, the President was also prepared to commit to a package designed to increase predictability for both sides. He would ask Carlucci to describe that package in a moment. In brief, however, the President was offering Gorbachev predictability during a non-deployment period of certain length. In return, the President needed to protect the existing U.S. -- and Soviet -- right to conduct, in the words of Marshal Grechko, "research and experimental work aimed at resolving the problem of defending the country against nuclear missile attack." Both sides needed a clear right to deploy defenses after that period.

The U.S., then, was seeking a separate, new treaty of unlimited duration that could go into effect at the same time the START treaty went into effect. This second treaty would contain a period during which both sides would commit not to deploy
defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty. After that period of time, both sides would be free to deploy such defenses without further reference to the ABM Treaty, after giving six months notice of intent to deploy. During the non-deployment period, both sides would have the right to pursue their strategic defense programs, conducting research, development and testing, including testing in space, as required. Their negotiators in Geneva could explain in detail the U.S. concept of deployment.

As Gorbachev would see, the President was trying to create a future in which the two sides would have reduced strategic offensive arms by 50% and could pursue their respective strategic defense programs as common elements in a new regime which Gorbachev had called "strategic stability." In that context, the President had taken special note of the General Secretary's interview with Tom Brokaw the week before, in which Gorbachev had acknowledged the existence of a Soviet analogue to SDI. This was a step in the right direction.

This then, was a summary of the U.S. position, the President concluded. He would ask Secretary Shultz to comment in further detail.

SECRETARY SHULTZ handed out a Russian text of what he described as elements on which negotiators in Geneva might build.

First, he noted, there would be a period of time during which both sides would commit not to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty. The Secretary noted in this connection the President's remark that it would be possible to agree on an appropriate time period.

Second, after that period, both sides would be free to deploy defenses not currently permitted by the Treaty after giving six months notice of an intent to deploy and without any further reference to the ABM Treaty.

Third, during the non-deployment period, both sides would have the right to pursue their strategic defense programs, conducting research, development and testing, including testing in space, as required.

Fourth, to enhance strategic stability, promote predictability, and ensure confidence that prohibited deployments were not being undertaken during the non-deployment period, the U.S. proposed that the two sides meet regularly to do three things:

--- Exchange programmatic data and briefings on each side's
strategic defense programs:

-- Arrange for agreed mutual observation of strategic defense tests and visits to strategic defense research facilities;

-- Arrange for intensive discussions of strategic stability to begin not later than three years before the end of the non-deployment period.

The Secretary added that all of this should be seen in light of the fact that the period in question would span several Presidential terms. The relevant research would be going on. No one could tell what the situation would be at the end of the period. The two sides would, however, have an opportunity to discuss matters in the context of what was taking place at the time.

The Secretary suggested that Carlucci briefly describe the type of confidence building measures (CBM's) the U.S. had in mind under its proposal.

SECRETARY CARLUCCI explained that such CBM's would be designed to give each side the predictability it needed. The U.S. had earlier put proposals for "open labs" on the table in Geneva, but had received no response. There were other things which could be done. There were things which would make it possible to observe research in space. The U.S. would be prepared to open up such facilities as Livermore Labs and Stanford Research; the Soviet side might be prepared to open up its own facilities, such as those which produced chemical lasers.

With respect to joint observation of actions in space, the U.S. was aware of the Soviet near-space vehicle. We had our shuttle. If, for example, the U.S. sought to conduct a sensor experiment in space, the Soviet near-space vehicle could be maneuvered close enough to satisfy Moscow that no offensive weapon was being tested. Such activities could be undertaken without compromising the security or integrity of the programs involved on either side. Carlucci noted that Marshal Akhromeyev was scheduled to visit him at the Pentagon that afternoon. Carlucci had invited Gen. Abrahamson to brief him in detail on U.S. space defense CBM ideas.

THE PRESIDENT, noting that Gorbachev had probably heard enough from U.S. representatives, invited the General Secretary to share any reactions.

GORBACHEV said that he did, in fact, have a few words in response. First, he could not on the level of principle
support the proposal the President had just outlined. The thrust of that proposal was to invite the Soviet Union to join the U.S. in undertaking a kind of SDI program. Gorbachev had said before Moscow had no intention of developing its own SDI; he had even urged the President to renounce the program. If the U.S. proceeded, the Soviet side had made clear it would develop a response. But that response would take a different path from SDI.

What then, were the proposals of the Soviet side? The ABM regime had worked well for fifteen years. True, some concerns had been expressed with respect to compliance with the Treaty, including in the recent past. But a mechanism for dealing with such problems existed in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), which had worked well in the past. Such concerns could be discussed and removed. But in fact both sides had basically observed the Treaty in the past.

But now we were entering a new phase, a phase of reducing strategic offensive arms. Not only would it be necessary to continue to observe the ABM Treaty, it should be strengthened — as had been agreed at Reykjavik — through a commitment not to withdraw from the Treaty as strategic offensive arms were reduced. On the basis of such an approach, which presumed an interpretation of the Treaty consistent with that which had been used since Day One of its existence, it would be possible to begin work on the specifics of reducing strategic arms by 50%.

The President, Gorbachev noted, had himself said that SDI was not up for negotiation. If he were now proposing to structure the two leaders' discussion of strategic offensive arms reductions by linking that subject to SDI, Gorbachev had to say it would be a slow process. It would take time first of all just to define SDI. Space was a new area for both countries; there were no criteria for making judgments. Both sides would be groping in the dark. Such an approach would lead the dialogue down a blind alley.

Gorbachev underscored that he objected in principle to SDI. If America wished to pursue the program, that was its business — to the extent its activities were consistent with the ABM Treaty.

But if there was a real desire for accommodation on both sides, the Soviet approach was a practical one. Taking into account the U.S. desire to implement SDI, Moscow simply proposed that neither side use its right to withdraw from the Treaty for ten years. Two to three years before the end of that period, there
could be a discussion of what to do next. If the U.S. had decided to deploy SDI, it could say so. But during the ten years of the period the Soviet side would have the assurance that, while strategic offensive arms were being reduced, the U.S. would observe the ABM Treaty and not use its right to withdraw. This was something the two sides could agree on.

As for SDI research, it could continue, and the U.S. could decide what to do after ten years. If the U.S. were to violate the ABM Treaty during that period, the Soviet side would be released from any obligation to continue reductions, and would have the right to build and perfect weapons, as well as to cancel its anti-satellite (ASAT) moratorium. But that would occur only if the U.S. decided to deploy SDI.

The Soviet Union, for its part, did not want a new sphere for the arms race. It did not want to deploy SDI. Moscow did not know what, precisely, it wanted to do in the areas involved.

Therefore it proposed a straightforward approach: 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms; agreement on a period of non-withdrawal; observance of the Treaty as it had been observed in the past. As for SDI, the U.S. could do research. Should it ultimately decide to deploy, that would be up to the U.S., but after the termination of the withdrawal period. This proposal would make it possible to implement 50% reductions in strategic weapons in the context of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and to continue research. Before the end of the ten year period, there could be a discussion.

For the Soviet side, it would be less expensive to explore ways other than through SDI-type deployments to ensure its security. Thus, SDI was not acceptable from a political standpoint; it was not acceptable from a military standpoint (as it was destabilizing); it was not acceptable from an economic standpoint. It could wear out the Soviet economy. It was up to the U.S. to decide if SDI made sense for itself in economic terms: the Soviet Union had decided it did not. Should the U.S. decide to deploy SDI at the end of a non-withdrawal period, Gorbachev warned, the Soviet side would have to respond. But that response would be less costly than SDI.

Gorbachev suggested in conclusion that the two sides seek a solution which enabled the U.S. to develop SDI, but would do so in a way which did not make SDI an obstacle to progress in the reduction of strategic arms. Gorbachev had outlined the Soviet proposal for guaranteeing peace. For the U.S., the answer was SDI. For the Soviet Union, the answer was different: nuclear
disarmament; maintenance of the ABM regime; and no extension of the arms race to space.

THE PRESIDENT volunteered an answer of his own. It was possible to proceed immediately with 50% reductions. Any other options were years ahead for both sides. It would be better not to link the two concepts. The discussions thus far had revealed some common ground. Let the working groups go to work. But one issue should not be made hostage to the other.

As for SDI, the President offered a counterargument to Gorbachev's suggestion that the program would step up the arms race. The President saw it as essential to the realization of the dream of a non-nuclear world. The secret of nuclear weapons was spreading inexorably. If the U.S. and Soviet Union ever reached the point where they had eliminated all their nuclear arms, they would have to face the possibility that a madman in one country or another could develop a nuclear capability for purposes of conquest or blackmail. The situation was not unlike that after agreement had been reached to ban the use of poison gas. People had kept their gas masks. There would always be a need for a defense. The U.S. and Soviet Union could eliminate their nuclear arsenals without fear of nuclear attack by other countries if they had a reliable defensive shield.

In this context, the President had been encouraged by Gorbachev's acknowledgment of a Soviet program akin to SDI. He was grateful for Gorbachev's words because a future based on an ability to counter any attack would be based on real stability, not the stability that came from the ability to destroy.

GORBACHEV observed that the American press had distorted the thrust of his remarks to Brokaw. He had not said that the Soviet Union had its own SDI. He had said that the Soviet Union was engaged in many areas of basic research, including some covered on the U.S. side by SDI. He had not gone beyond this. He had added, moreover, that the Soviet Union would not deploy SDI, and had urged the U.S. not to do so. The Soviet Union would find a different path. The U.S. would not draw the Soviet Union into an SDI program.

On the other hand, if the U.S. wanted to reduce strategic arms, it would have to accept a ten-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. At the end of that period, the U.S. could decide what it would do. The Soviet side could accept that, although it was definitely against SDI.
As for prospects for a START agreement, Gorbachev expressed his readiness to cooperate and respond to the major U.S. concerns. Moscow was ready to reduce heavy ICBM's by 50%. As for sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM's), he had yesterday shared his ideas on verification with the President. He was also ready to look again at the sublimits question. So, he was ready to work to achieve a treaty. But if the President wanted to link that process to SDI, if it had to involve SDI, there would be no START treaty either with the President or his successors.

SECRETARY SHULTZ asked if he might describe a possible work program, in view of the previous discussion. Both sides, he noted, seemed to be committed to achieving a START agreement. Work was already underway among experts.

The Secretary clarified that the President did not mean to suggest that a START treaty be linked to Soviet acceptance of SDI. In fact, he had said there should be no linkage to anything.

GORBACHEV interjected that a START treaty had to be linked to the ABM Treaty.

THE SECRETARY continued that the question was not one of whether the Soviet Union liked or did not like SDI. Neither side could tell the other how to see its own defense. But the proposal Gorbachev outlined seemed on the surface not to be inconsistent with what the U.S. wanted.

For its part, the U.S. side believed that the proposal the President had made was consistent with the ABM Treaty. Mr. Gorbachev might not agree with that assessment. But the point was that it made no sense to set out down a certain path when both sides knew they did not agree on what, superficially, they seemed to agree on. The President had proposed a means of ensuring that their we were sure what we meant.

The Secretary recalled that the Soviet side had asked for predictability. The President's proposal would guarantee that there would be no deployments against the Soviet Union for a certain period. The President had said it should be possible to agree on the number of years such a period would last. He had also said that, when the period ended, either side could do what it chose.

The question remained, what would happen in the meantime? We had tried to get at that question through the means that Carlucci had described. These would give the Soviet side confidence in what the U.S. was doing. We would hope Moscow
would reciprocate by permitting similar access.

The President's proposal had also incorporated the Soviet idea that, before the end of the agreed period, there would be agreement in advance to discussions of the situation created as a result of strategic reductions and the results of research to that point. This discussion would take place several years in advance of the end of the period. While each side would have the right to do what it wished at the end of the period, this discussion would allow both to take into account facts which had emerged in the interim. This could have an impact on the ultimate results.

So, the Secretary continued, the President's proposal was not an effort to link Soviet acceptance of SDI to a START treaty--even though we could not understand why Moscow was opposed to SDI. Rather, it was an attempt to give the Soviet side greater confidence that it understood what was going on on the U.S. side. But to agree on radical reductions of strategic arms, based on an understanding of the status of the ABM Treaty both sides knew in their bones was not shared, made the U.S. side uncomfortable and was probably unwise. That was why we hoped that Akhromeyev would listen to what Abramson had to say. Who knew? Perhaps the two of them would come up with something new.

GORBACHEV asked why the U.S. could not accept the Soviet formula: 50% reductions in strategic arms, a ten-year non-withdrawal period; discussion two to three years before the end of that period on what to do next. This was a simple approach. There was no reason to encumber the discussion of 50% reductions.

SHEVARDNADZE interjected that it was important to consider another factor--if the President were to pay a return visit to Moscow, there had to be a decision on what such a visit might produce. Shevardnadze had been operating on the assumption that the purpose of the visit would be to sign an agreement on 50% reductions in strategic arms in the context of the preservation of the ABM Treaty for an agreed period, as he and the Secretary had publicly stated. This had been the basis for all their discussions. If the two sides started to open up philosophical questions about what might happen years from now, the President's visit could not be crowned by signature of an agreement.

That was why it was critical, Shevardnadze said, to define the parameters of observance of the ABM Treaty in the context of 50% reductions. If the question were consigned to experts, there would never be a decision. A key issue was to decide on
the duration of the non-withdrawal period. Another was limits on SLCM's. The size of those limits and their verification could be discussed, but a decision was needed.

Finally, Shevardnadze continued, there could be no question of the INF Treaty becoming the end of the process. It could not stop. Nuclear proliferation was a growing problem, which made it all the more important to maintain the momentum of nuclear arms reductions. The President's visit could provide a major stimulus to this effort. As for SDI, it was not and had not been a subject for discussion. Secretary Shultz had made clear it was the President's program. But there was a need to clarify certain questions or there would be no START agreement.

DOBRYNIN reiterated Gorbachev's point that the ABM Treaty had worked well for fifteen years. Now the U.S. seemed to be proposing that, at the Washington summit, the two leaders in effect announce that this treaty of unlimited duration would cease to be. That was the effect of the President's proposal: there would be three years of negotiations, and then there would be an open arms race.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the Soviet side was forgetting something. Prior to Gorbachev's assuming office, there had been violations by the Soviet side of the ABM Treaty. The Krasnoyarsk radar was the principal example. But there were other differences of interpretation. We believed that the Treaty allowed research into weapons which it did not specifically address. The Treaty had dealt with ABM interceptor missiles; it did not ban research into and development of other systems not even envisioned at the time. SDI clearly was covered by the clause which covered other physical principles. It was not an interceptor missile. But there were real questions of when the Soviet side would begin to abide by the ABM Treaty.

SECRETARY SHULTZ proposed that he seek to outline areas where broad agreement seemed to exist.

First, the two sides agreed on the concept of a period of time -- as yet undecided -- when there would be no deployment of antiballistic missile systems beyond what was permitted by the ABM Treaty. There was agreement that, at the end of the period, either side could do what it chose to do. The U.S. had sought to pick up on the Soviet proposal that there should be agreement in advance that the two sides would discuss problems of strategic stability well before the period ended.

Where there was no agreement was on the question of what
actions could be undertaken during the period in question. The U.S. would have no problem agreeing to the formula, "the ABM Treaty, as signed and ratified," because it considered its SDI program to be consistent with that concept. The Secretary said that he had heard that Gorbachev was tired of hearing Grechko quoted back to him, but stressed that that was part of the record. The point he was making was that the two sides differed on such questions of interpretation.

GORBACHEV interjected that these differences had emerged only in 1983. Prior to that, there were no differences, as Congressional hearings and Pentagon reports made clear. Only after SDI had been proposed did the U.S. seek to make the Treaty fit the program. A lawyer had been found to make the case. But, as Bismarck had said, a lawyer could be found to justify anything. What was going on was obvious to everyone. The U.S. should have more respect for the Soviet side than to expect that they would not see through this.

If the U.S. wanted 50% reductions, Gorbachev reemphasized, there had to be a commitment of 10 years on the ABM Treaty. There would be nothing on SDI before that in any case. The issue was not that complex. But the U.S. side was trying to make things "foggy."

THE PRESIDENT replied with some feeling that it was not he who was making things foggy. He wanted to make things clear. He did not want to talk about links to SDI, but about 50% reductions, about how the Hell the two sides were to eliminate half their nuclear weapons. He wanted to talk about how the two leaders could sign an agreement like the one they had signed the day before -- an agreement which had made everyone in the world so damned happy it could be felt in the room at dinner the night before. "Let's get started with it," he concluded.

GORBACHEV said he was ready. The two leaders should make clear that they were working on agreed reductions and were making progress. They should also indicate that, as they began this important process, they reaffirmed their commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years. This should not be a problem. The period could be for nine years if that would help.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the issue be set aside for a moment. He felt there had been some progress. There was agreement on the concept of a certain period. There was agreement on what should happen at the end of that period. The two sides were not there yet on actions were to be permitted during that period, but that could be worked. But there was
clear agreement on the need for major cuts in strategic arms. Indeed, the Secretary had felt electricity on this point. That was the place to start.

GORBACHEV said he would like to return for a moment to the issue of SLCM's. If this question were not resolved, he warned, there could be no agreement. The Soviet side had outlined clearly its position. What was the U.S. stand on this issue?

THE PRESIDENT said he thought this was a matter for experts. GORBACHEV said that they would be unable to do anything without guidance from the top.

SECRETARY SHULTZ reminded Gorbachev that the U.S. had problems with the verification of SLCM's. The General Secretary had said the day before that the Soviet side had some ideas for dealing with verification. We were ready to study them. If we could be satisfied that they were workable -- and that was a big question -- this would be a realistic basis for proceeding. At this point, the Secretary concluded, he was not in a position to respond to Gorbachev's proposal for a SLCM ceiling of 400 missiles.

GORBACHEV noted ironically that the U.S. had no answer on this and other issues he had raised, only more demands of the Soviet side. But this was not the kind of momentum that was needed. The U.S. was simply squeezing more and more concessions out of its partner. Verification of SLCM's should be more of a problem for Moscow than Washington, Gorbachev pointed out, in view of the U.S. advantage in numbers of SLCM's. Once there was agreement on a number, the verification problem could be resolved. If it proved impossible to satisfy the U.S. on verification, the Soviets would remove their insistence on a numerical limit.

SECRETARY SHULTZ repeated that the U.S. would study the Soviet SLCM proposals.

GORBACHEV replied, "good," adding that the conversation had been a good one. It had made it clearer what both sides wanted. Gorbachev emphasized in closing this phase of the discussion the importance he attached to reductions of strategic arms -- a key issue in the relationship, and one which required a responsible approach from both sides. Obviously, no agreements were possible except on the basis of equality.

THE PRESIDENT said jocularly that he, for one, had no desire to
come to Moscow to be disappointed.

GORBACHEV said he had not meant to suggest any linkage. If the President wished to come to Moscow without a START agreement, he would be welcome. But he should say so. For his part, Gorbachev felt that there was, in fact, a common understanding that the visit should be marked by the signing of an important document. The Soviet side wanted to push toward that goal. If the President was operating from a different set of assumptions, all he had to do was say so. The Geneva negotiators would probably be just as glad to spend their time playing soccer. But Gorbachev assumed that the Administration shared his assessment that an agreement was possible. The President's visit would be an important one; but if he wished to finesse the question of a treaty, he should say so.

SECRETARY SHULTZ observed that Gorbachev had heard with his own ears what the President had said on that count. For himself, he could assure Gorbachev that, whenever he (the Secretary) went off to meet with Shevardnadze, the President made clear in no uncertain terms what he wanted the Secretary to accomplish. The Secretary thought the President had made his views on a START agreement pretty clear to the General Secretary as well a moment before.

GORBACHEV acknowledged that this was important. But one had to decide beforehand in building a bridge whether it should go across a divide or alongside it. The Soviet approach was that there should be a good treaty by the time the President came to Moscow. If there was another view in Washington, it would be best to make that clear. In Russian, Gorbachev recounted, there was a saying: "If you respect me, don't make a fool of me. Tell me what you want."

THE SECRETARY quipped that he hoped this didn't mean GORBACHEV was giving up. GORBACHEV replied that, on the contrary, that was why he had urged against any link between START and SDI. There should be a good treaty by the time of the President's visit.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought that was what he, himself, had said earlier. He had said that the two sides should be seeking to eliminate strategic weapons. So one objective, whether or not the U.S. deployed SDI, would be 50% fewer missiles. But this should only make the two sides more interested in defense, since they would both become more vulnerable to other nuclear states.

GORBACHEV replied that it would be a long time before that was
a problem, since even after a 50% reduction, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. arsenals would still vastly outweigh those of other states.

Responding to a suggestion by Secretary Shultz, THE PRESIDENT suggested a brief discussion of regional issues. These issues, he noted, would greatly influence the long-term character of the two sides' relations and their immediate future as well.

Afghanistan was at the top of the U.S. list. There were more Soviet troops in that country than when the President had entered office. The U.S. and Soviet Union had had extensive discussions about Afghanistan. We understood each others' point of view. The President welcomed Gorbachev's declarations of intent to withdraw. But it was long since time to act on these declarations. This would signal the beginning of a new era in East-West relations and in international affairs generally.

The nature of the conflict meant that a settlement depended mainly on the Soviet Union, the President continued. The U.S. would do its part to help if the Soviet Union actually withdrew. The U.S. and other governments could help assure that Afghanistan did not become a threat to Soviet security. The U.S. was prepared to do its part to ensure the emergence of a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan. It was time, now, here, at the summit, to set dates certain for the starting and ending of the withdrawal of Soviet forces, so that all troops were out by the end of 1988.

The President said he also wanted to address the Iran-Iraq war. The two sides needed to return to the pattern of cooperation which was reflected in their joint support for UNSC Resolution 598. The President was worried that subsequent Soviet policies were a departure from that cooperation, that they encouraged Iranian intransigence and belligerence. The day before, the Iraqi foreign minister had said that Iraq accepted Resolution 598 in all its parts. Iran was still undercutting the process. Now was the time for the President and Gorbachev to lend their weight to the process for the sake of the potential impact on the Iran-Iraq war, and for the sake of the dignity and future status of the Security Council itself. The U.S. and Soviet Union should be moving forward together on a second resolution. But since Iraq was going along with the UN, a boycott of Iran could help end the war.

Finally, the President mentioned Berlin, which he felt could be the site of positive developments. The President said he felt Gorbachev could and should tear down the Wall that day. But,
in any case, the U.S. and Soviet Union should take smaller, practical steps to ameliorate the division of the city and to symbolize their mutual desire to overcome the division of Europe in a humane and stabilizing way. The U.S. had been working with the British and French on such proposals, and would soon present them to the Soviet Union. The President hoped for a positive response. He also urged that there be an end to shooting incidents involving the two sides military liaison mission activities -- acknowledging that such actions did not take place on Gorbachev's orders.

GORBACHEV noted that his list of priority regional questions coincided perfectly with that of the President. In general terms, he continued, Moscow was convinced that -- whether in Central America, Kampuchea, Afghanistan or the Middle East -- there was increasing support for regional political settlements. This new phase showed up in expanded contacts between opposing groups, in an upturn in political reconciliation, in a search for coalitions. A situation was developing, in short, where U.S. - Soviet cooperation could produce results. Indeed, if the two leaders could express their willingness to work together to resolve some of the issues involved, it could have a major impact.

On Afghanistan, Gorbachev noted, the Cordovez process had produced agreement on instruments regarding non-interference, on guarantees by the U.S., U.S.S.R., Pakistan and -- desirably, at least -- Iran. There was also agreement on the return of refugees; although this was primarily a matter for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could make a contribution. The withdrawal of troops was the only remaining issue.

On that point, Najib had made a proposal -- on which Moscow had been consulted -- that Soviet forces be withdrawn within twelve months, with a proviso that this timetable could be reduced. But the start was linked to the process of national reconciliation, specifically with the establishment of a coalition government.

It was up to the Afghans to decide the composition of that government. As for Moscow, it shared the view that Afghanistan should be independent and nonaligned. The Soviets recognized that Afghanistan could not be considered a "socialist" country. There were too many non-socialist characteristics: a multi-party system, tribalism, capitalists and clerical elements. The Soviets were realists. They did not want to try to make Afghanistan socialist.

They could not, of course, be indifferent to the situation
there. There was a 2,000 mile common border. But he could assure the President that the Soviet Union wanted no bases in Afghanistan, nor any presence which would affect the strategic situation in the region. Instead, it wanted to complete the process of withdrawal on the basis of negotiation and national reconciliation.

The Afghan government, Gorbachev said, was taking a realistic approach. It had expressed its willingness to share up to 50% of government portfolios, including that of prime minister, with the opposition. The U.S. and Soviet Union could not make the necessary trade-offs. But if the Soviet side used its influence in Kabul, and the U.S. worked through those with whom it was in contact -- and, Gorbachev noted matter of factly, he knew the President had received opposition leaders -- it might help the two groups become reconciled to one another.

As for the withdrawal of Soviet forces, Gorbachev said that two events should coincide: the onset of withdrawals; and the end to "your" transfer of arms and financing of the opposition. From Day One of the withdrawal, Gorbachev volunteered, Soviet forces would engage in no operations except in self-defense. If the President could agree on that, the U.S. and Soviet sides could cooperate to resolve the problem. Moscow had no intention of seeking to leave behind a regime acceptable to itself alone. It would have no problem with a non-aligned and independent government. So perhaps he and the President should reach a "gentleman's agreement" that the Soviets would talk to Najib, and the U.S. to the opposition.

THE PRESIDENT said that the problem with the scenario Gorbachev had described was that one side would be left with the army, while the other would have to give up its arms. The resistance could not be asked to do this. All the Afghan people should have the right to settle matters peaceably. One side should not have a monopoly of force.

GORBACHEV reiterated that an early solution to the Afghan problem was now possible. He suggested that the issue be discussed further by experts. THE PRESIDENT agreed.

On the Iran-Iraq war, GORBACHEV said he saluted U.S. - Soviet cooperation in the adoption of UNSC Resolution 598. Such cooperation was to be valued all the more because it was so rare. The question now was how to move things in the region in the direction of a settlement. The President knew what kind of people "those guys" in Iran were. It was not a simple matter.

The Soviet Union, for its part, had no desire to create
problems for the U.S. in the region. Moscow sought instead a means which would enable the U.S. to move away from its current exposed position without harm to its interests. The Soviets had no interest in seeing things get out of control, or in seeing U.S. economic and other interests in the region suffer. The fact that there was a convergence of U.S. and Soviet interests on this point should help them to find mutually acceptable approaches.

What the Soviets feared, on the other hand, was a situation in which the Iranians felt themselves to be cornered and resorted to extreme measures. The Iranian leadership's ability to inspire their population to remarkable efforts had been proven. The Islamic fundamentalism to which they appealed transcended the Gulf conflict.

The Soviets therefore felt that every effort should be made to exhaust the potential of UNSC 598. If Moscow became convinced that nothing else would work, it would accept a second resolution. But Iran's capacity for rash actions if pushed into a corner had to be kept in mind.

Gorbachev therefore suggested that a "real" force be established on behalf of the UN to implement 598. This would allow the U.S. to reduce its presence without prejudice to its image or interests. The resolutions provision for resort to "impartial bodies" might also have some potential. In conjunction with use of the UN military staff committee it might prove an effective means of dealing with the situation.

In any case, Gorbachev reiterated. Moscow had no desire to undermine American prestige or interests in the region. Rather, it wanted to work with the U.S. to determine if there means which had not been exhausted to ensure full implementation of 598. If all else failed, he repeated, the Soviet Union would support a second resolution. But Gorbachev felt that the first still had untapped potential.

In a final comment on the Gulf, Gorbachev pointed out Iran's proximity to Iran, noting that, were Moscow to press too hard on the war with Iraq, it could complicate the Soviet position in Afghanistan.

SECRETARY SHULTZ said he hoped it would be possible to discuss this issue further later in the afternoon, or at some other point during the General Secretary's visit. GORBACHEV agreed.

Responding to THE PRESIDENT's reminder that the two leaders needed to join their wives, GORBACHEV indicated he had one
additional point to raise. Handing the President a folder, he recounted that North Korean leader Kim II Sung had asked that he convey to the President a personal message on the establishment of a "buffer zone" on the Korean peninsula. Gorbachev said he would not read the four-point proposal, which, he emphasized, Kim had asked be closely held. The initiative had not been shared with all members even of the North Korean leadership.

THE PRESIDENT accepted the folder.

SECRETARY SHULTZ used the opportunity to urge that Gorbachev consider a positive reference in any joint statement to the Olympic movement.

GORBACHEV replied that Moscow wanted the Olympic games to take place, but urged that some events be held in the North. The International Olympic Committee was working on the issue. It should not become a political question.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Working Luncheon with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Shultz
Secretary of Defense Carlucci
Chief of Staff Baker
Director Wick, United States Information Agency
Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Ridgeway
U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack F. Matlock
Mark Parris, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State (Notetaker)
John Herbst, Director, Office for Policy Development, NSC (Notetaker)

General Secretary Gorbachev
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Aleksandr Yakovlev, Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary for Ideology, Propaganda, and Culture
Anatoly Dobrynin, Central Committee Secretary and Chief, International Department
Chairman Kamenets, Foreign Economic Commission
Central Committee General Department Chief Boldin
Chief Administrator of the Central Committee Kruchina
Ambassador Dubinin (t)

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: December 10, 1987, 12:40 PM - 2:10 PM
Family Dining Room (L)

While walking from the Oval Office meeting, which ended at 12:15 p.m., to the Family Dining Room, the President emphasized to Gorbachev the necessity of Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. The President noted that the occupation was possible due to the Soviets' extensive support and urged them to use their influence with Hanoi. Lunch began at 12:40. (s)

Gorbachev began by continuing the discussion of Afghanistan from the recently concluded Oval Office meeting. He suggested that the Joint Statement adopt the language on Afghanistan prepared by
the working-group. That was enough. He suggested that the Soviets and Americans work together on Afghanistan. He said that he had decided to address this particular issue because he felt the President had responded coolly to yesterday's discussion. Now he felt the President was receptive, and business-like; and this opened up possibilities of a more useful discussion. (3)

Gorbachev said that maybe the Joint Statement should mention that there had been a discussion of very acute regional problems, an in-depth discussion, regarding Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia. The first thing many people worldwide would want to know was whether the President and the General Secretary had paid attention to regional issues. Gorbachev stated that he would really like to work together with the President to resolve regional conflicts. (5)

The President said that perhaps for the Joint Statement we could note agreement that the Soviet Union would stop supplying arms to Nicaragua. (3)

Gorbachev responded that the Joint Statement could say that the two sides accepted and supported the Contadora process and the Guatemala accords; that they agreed to look at practical measures which would contribute to the Guatemala Accord process. Gorbachev added that in the process of working together, the Soviet Union was ready to stop the supply of arms to Nicaragua. This applied to all except "light arms," or "small police arms." Gorbachev said, however, that this should not be included in the Joint Statement. (5)

Secretary Shultz noted that the President was anxious to get regional issues on the table. So the President had cut in toward the end of their conversation earlier in the day to make sure that they were mentioned. Secretary Shultz said that on the basis of general observations by the President and the General Secretary, the working groups had the opportunity to exchange ideas. Shultz said that these groups had reported to the Foreign Minister and himself yesterday; and, after that, he and Shevardnadze had agreed on the regional issues language for the Joint Statement. (5)

Shultz remarked that he and Shevardnadze thought it not wise to go into detail on each regional issue. Were we to do this, we would argue over the language and people in the areas affected would not take it well. Shultz added that we should build on the rising quality of our regional issues discussions to work together in practical ways. (5)

Gorbachev noted his agreement and said that there was not much in the Joint Statement concerning regional issues. He expressed the wish to share his impressions regarding the American response to his proposals yesterday. (5)
Shultz then said he felt the working group had made progress in clarifying the Soviet view that withdrawal from Afghanistan and national reconciliation need not be linked. This was necessary because national reconciliation would take a great deal of time. Also, in the end, this was something the Afghan people must do among themselves. Understanding this delinkage would help pave the way for the next Geneva round, which should concentrate on the unresolved issue of Soviet withdrawal.

Gorbachev responded that Soviet withdrawal was definitely linked to an American obligation to cut off support for opposition forces on the date Soviet troop withdrawal started. As of that date, Soviet troops would no longer engage in military operations and the ceasefire would go into effect. Gorbachev emphasized the importance of the American and Soviet sides' using their influence with the parties to the Afghan conflict to promote national reconciliation. He said that the Soviet side would tell Najib— and the American side should do the same with the opposition forces—that the creation of a coalition government was their affair. They should find a balance of concessions.

At the same time, Gorbachev continued, both the Americans and Soviets should say that they did not want the new Afghanistan to be led by either a pro-American or a pro-Soviet government. Afghanistan should be neutral and nonaligned. Of course, Gorbachev added, this was just his projection of how things would develop. Gorbachev noted that the situation could develop differently. The Soviets would withdraw and the United States could continue financial and military support for the opposition forces. This would lead to increased tension. Gorbachev said that he did not see how the Soviets could withdraw forces in such circumstances. There must be linkage of withdrawal and non-interference.

Gorbachev suggested that after the meeting the two sides move the questions to a practical footing. He said that this would be well-received by public opinion.

Secretary Shultz said that as he and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze discussed following the meeting of the working group yesterday, the Soviet side welcomed American readiness to reaffirm support for the Geneva agreements. This resolved the non-interference issue. The missing piece in Geneva remained the timetable for a troop withdrawal.

Gorbachev interjected "that there must be an end to American support for the opposition forces at the same time." If there was agreement on this, Gorbachev said, let us declare it. If the American side needed more time to think this over, it should take it. But the Soviet side wanted to engage in specific action. Gorbachev added that action here would demonstrate American sincerity in addressing the Afghan problem. It would also help the Soviets judge American intentions regarding other regional conflict situations.
Secretary Shultz responded that both the United States and the Soviet Union accepted the Geneva agreements. These agreements covered the issue of outside support. According to the agreements, after the signing of the accords, a troop withdrawal would begin; and 60 days after this, American support would cease.

Gorbachev rejoined that he understood three points in the Geneva agreements were settled. The fourth point remained to be settled.

Shultz noted that the linkage of national reconciliation and troop withdrawal had been a problem; but now Soviet statements indicated that there was no such linkage, and the American reaffirmation of support for the Geneva accords meant that we could devote our attention to the fourth point, a timetable for troop withdrawal. This could get the process moving.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze remarked that there was no linkage "in effect" between troop withdrawal and national reconciliation. He added that national reconciliation would be a long process.

Gorbachev said that the Soviet side had already confirmed this. He then asked if we could state that after the Summit we would begin work to consider practical, concrete measures with the parties concerned.

Secretary Shultz agreed.

Gorbachev then proposed that the Joint Statement on regional issues mention that Afghanistan was discussed.

When Secretary Shultz noted that Afghanistan was already in the statement, Gorbachev suggested that it mention other regions discussed, such as Cambodia, South Africa, and the Middle East.

Shultz noted that most of these were included.

Shevardnadze remarked that Central America had been discussed and was not in the Joint Statement. So it should be added, as should southern Africa.

Gorbachev said that this would show the responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union—the degree of responsibility incumbent on us in handling regional conflicts.

Secretary Shultz said that the Joint Statement noted the dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States should have as its goal "to help the parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions that advance their independence, freedom, and security." Shultz added that our discussion on regional issues had been getting better and better.
Central Committee International Department Chief Dobrynin suggested that the President and the General Secretary give instructions to improve this language even more, perhaps by adding regular consultations.

Noting the hectic pace of the past three days, Gorbachev asked the President if he had been able to look at the proposal Gorbachev had passed along from North Korea.

National Security Advisor Powell answered that the proposal was currently being staffed; so there was no response yet.

Gorbachev said that he could tell the North Koreans that he had fulfilled their request by giving the President their proposal, and that it was now being reviewed at the staff level.

Powell noted that we would handle the proposal in a private manner as Gorbachev had suggested. Gorbachev remarked that the North Koreans wanted it that way. And the President, by immediately placing it in his coat pocket, showed that he too wanted to play it close to the vest.

Shultz then said that the United States might propose to respond to the North Koreans through Moscow--perhaps through Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

Gorbachev agreed. He then asked for the Administration's evaluation of the Gulf situation following yesterday's discussion. Gorbachev said that he was asking this in a straight-forward way, since it seemed that someone was pushing the Administration to rush steps without considering what might happen. This could lead to a situation that would not be satisfactory either for the Americans or the Soviets. Gorbachev thought that the UN had not used all of the potential of Security Council Resolution 598. Gorbachev said that he was not trying to procrastinate. He knew that decisive action was needed. In an aside Gorbachev then noted it had been decided yesterday that some aspects of the conversation should be handled in a confidential manner.

Secretary Shultz said that he saw the situation as follows: the Iraqi side had unambiguously said it would accept 598. Iran was almost impossible for UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to talk to, never mind to get something out of. According to our intelligence, Iran had adopted a strategy of putting off the Security Council.

Gorbachev agreed that Iran probably had such strategy; it would be hard to say anything else.

Shultz then said that UN Secretary General de Cuellar was totally frustrated. De Cuellar felt it was now up to the Security Council to act. Shultz said that this led us to conclude that the Soviet term as Chairman of the Security Council should be a
decisive one. Shultz suggested that the Soviets and the Americans work to energize the Secretary General in his mediation role pursuant to resolution 598. Shultz noted that we could aid the UN Secretary General's effort if we seriously started work on a second resolution. Shultz said that it would be useful to announce work now. This could be done by our Ambassadors at the UN. We could agree to instruct them to start. Shultz gave two reasons for this. The first was that this represented our best chance to have the UN Secretary General achieve progress on the Iran-Iraq War. Secondly, we must worry about the dignity and credibility of the Security Council, and not allow Iran to make it look foolish. (5)

In Gorbachev's view the American and Soviet sides thought basically the same about this. Gorbachev requested that the two sides make precise calculations regarding prospects in the Gulf. He said that he would very much like cooperation in the Security Council. He added that this could create a precedent for cooperation elsewhere--Afghanistan, the Middle East. (5)

Secretary Shultz agreed regarding the importance of cooperation. He remarked on his presence in the Security Council chamber when Resolution 598 was passed last July. He said that each government went around the table and spoke, and then voted. All hands were raised. All had the sense that it was a very special moment. (5)

Gorbachev said that he saw new elements on the Gulf war. These had to be sorted out. Gorbachev noted in this connection the new statement by the Iraqi Foreign Minister--that Iraq was no longer against parallel implementation of all paragraphs of Resolution 598 (including that of an investigative body into the origins of the war). In Gorbachev's view, this represented fundamental movement. (6)

Secretary Shultz noted that Iraq accepted 598 in all its parts; (6)

Shevardnadze remarked that Iran said the same. (5)

Secretary of Defense Carlucci discussed the American military presence in the Gulf, noting that Gorbachev had raised it several times. Carlucci said that it was important to say here that the U.S. had no plans to change its current posture in the Gulf. We were currently escorting our 20th convoy, and most of these convoys had proceeded without incident. (6)

Gorbachev then asked if it was necessary to have that many ships in a convoy operation. (5)

Carlucci answered that we had now reached a steady state; so we were looking at ways to change the mix and the number of ships which would still enable us to deal with the risks. He said he was sure Gorbachev would agree that so long as American forces were in the Gulf, they must be able to defend themselves if attacked. Carlucci then noted that American forces were in a
fully defensive posture; they represented no threat to Iran at all. If, however, our forces were attacked, or if it appeared that they would be attacked, they would take the appropriate defensive measures. But there would be no offensive operations, except in retaliation.

Gorbachev said that he wanted to be clear on this. As he understood it, Secretary Carlucci had said that, since the situation was now "steady," the Americans were looking at ways to reduce their presence in the Gulf.

Carlucci responded that he did not want to predict that there would be reductions. But we were looking at ways to meet the threat in the Gulf. If it seemed possible to reduce, we would do so because we did not wish to deploy more ships than the situation warranted; everything depended on the level of threat.

Gorbachev then noted, with pleasure, that dessert was served, and dessert was the favorite course of the meal for Americans. Gorbachev joked that last night the President and he had no choice but to eat all of their dessert. They decided to do so and then engage in self-criticism.

The President agreed.

Gorbachev then remarked that he feared contacts between the Soviet and the American military had become more vigorous than his own with the Administration. According to Gorbachev, Marshall Akhromeyev had said that in his conversations at the Pentagon, it had been agreed to expand military contacts to keep pace with political ones. Gorbachev affirmed the importance of this suggestion. He said that this was consistent with the statement of the President that the Soviets and the Americans had no intention to fight—or be at war with—each other. So the military should try to establish an atmosphere of trust.

Secretary of Defense Carlucci noted that the Soviets and the Americans should talk with each other regarding defense doctrines such as military sufficiency.

The President then said that this discussion of military cooperation came at a perfect time. Chief of Staff Baker had just brought him a poster of a meeting on the Elbe between a Soviet and an American soldier at the end of World War II. The President said that the American soldier was now retired from the military and the Soviet soldier was part of the Summit delegation. The President said it would be wonderful if the two could meet.

Soviet Ambassador Dubinin interjected that the Soviet and American soldiers had met three days ago at the Soviet Embassy and now there was a second picture of them together.
The President said that we would have to get that picture to go along with this poster. (U)

When Chief of Staff Baker said it would be wonderful if the President and the General Secretary would sign the poster, both the President and the General Secretary agreed. (U)

USIA Director Wick said that he had met at USIA with Politburo member Yakovlev and the heads of TASS, Novosti, and Gosteleradio. All had agreed and affirmed that there would be not only arms reduction, but also an end to disinformation. There was agreement to have joint meetings to determine where instances of such disinformation appeared. (C)

Gorbachev said that, in other words, both sides spoke against psychological warfare. (C)

Only with verification, Wick answered. (C)

Shevardnadze joked that disarmament would come faster than agreement on this. (C)

The President then remarked that Director Wick should have said "dovervai and proverbai." (C)

Gorbachev then referred to his meeting with Congressional leaders. He noted that in the United States, there were many complaints and suggestions regarding Soviet human rights practices. Gorbachev said that this was "very unnecessary." He then mentioned a proposal he had made to the Congressional group: that the Supreme Soviet and the Congress organize seminars or colloquia on human rights. These should be conducted in a constructive fashion. The American side would present its analysis and the Soviet side would reciprocate concerning the human rights situation both in the Soviet Union and the United States. Then all of these questions would be discussed. However, human rights questions must be placed on a responsible footing. It would be unacceptable for one side to assume the role of a prosecutor and the other side that of the accused; or one side the role of the teacher and the other that of the student. Gorbachev emphasized Soviet readiness to discuss human rights constructively. (C)

Gorbachev said that soon he would be saying goodbye to the President and the President's colleagues. Gorbachev said he had arrived at the conclusion that the third summit had been a landmark. It had witnessed important agreements and other questions had been discussed intensively. Most importantly the atmosphere had been good. There had been more elements of mutual understanding. Gorbachev said that he would like to pay tribute to the contribution of the President toward making this a successful summit, as well as to the contributions of other American participants. Gorbachev added that he would like the momentum achieved at the summit to continue. He then said that...
on his way to the White House lunch he had ridden with Vice President Bush. He had looked out the car window and seen Americans responding warmly to what had happened in the negotiations. When the car had stopped at a red light, he jumped out of the car and had had a spontaneous conversation with some passersby. When it was time to go, he did not want to leave the conversation.

Chief of Staff Senator Baker interjected that this was known by American politicians as "working the crowd."

Gorbachev remarked that he had always had this style--throughout his entire career. He said that he had become well known around the world over the past two years because of his position. Before that, however, he had spent his entire career in the provinces. He had developed this style then and there was nothing to change. He then commented that there was more common sense in the provinces than in a nation's capital. He quipped that if our ambassadors reported information based only on sources in the capital, he would have to seriously question their reporting.

The President responded that he agreed more completely with this than with anything else the General Secretary had said over the past three days. The President said that he often wondered what would happen if he and other leaders closed the doors of their offices and quietly slipped away. How long would it be before people missed them?

Gorbachev responded that in his case, within 56 days of his "disappearance" earlier this year, people had begun to say that he was dead or had been dismissed; in fact, he had done good work during this period on many things, including the visit to the United States.

Chief of Staff Baker said that the conversations between the President and Gorbachev had given him the impression that, as politicians, they were alike in many ways:

-- They were strong personalities;
-- They knew what they believed;
-- They knew where they wanted to go.

Baker added that this augured well for our two countries.

Gorbachev agreed. He said that he did not often hear such complimentary assessments. Most people tried to see the problems, but that was Yakovlev's and Wick's department.

The President agreed with Gorbachev, joking that he could never understand why Gorbachev opposed him on so many things.

Gorbachev rejoined that the areas of agreement would increase and disagreements decrease, provided both sides moved.
The President said he would like to return to the subject of Iran. He commented that some of his harsh feelings toward Iran had come from the fact that in 1978 he and the First Lady had visited there for several days. They had shopped for rugs in the bazaar. The President said that he was still trying to get even.

Noting that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had left the lunch to compare the final draft of the Joint Statement, Chief of Staff Baker said he would go and see if it was ready.

The President remarked that he and the General Secretary had the right to feel good about the summit. When they had first met in Geneva, the President had told Gorbachev that their was a unique situation. They represented two countries that could initiate another world war. Or, they could make sure that there would not be another world war.

Gorbachev remembered this and agreed with the President.

The President noted too that both he and Gorbachev had problems with bureaucracy.

Gorbachev also agreed.

The President then remembered a World War II incident when he was in the military. There was a warehouse full of filing cabinets full of obsolete records. He had asked, going up the chain of command, for permission to destroy these documents in order to make space for current records. The answer came down through the chain of command that the request was approved--so long as copies were made of the records to be destroyed.

Gorbachev said that the President's anecdote reminded him of a joke about Russian business. Someone bought a case of Russian vodka; that person emptied the bottles by pouring out the vodka. He then returned the bottles for money which he used to purchase more bottles of vodka. This was Russian business. He then noted that this was an old joke, 30 maybe 40 years old.

The President recalled the joke of a man who was driving down the road and spotted a chicken running alongside his car. The man sped up, yet the chicken ran right alongside of him. Then the chicken went into high gear, passed the car, and turned off on a side road. The driver of the car followed down that side road, saw a farmer and stopped to ask him if he had seen a chicken pass by. The farmer said he had seen the chicken and, in fact, had raised it. The driver asked if it was true the chicken had three legs. The farmer said yes, explaining that both he and his wife liked to eat chicken legs. Then they had a son, who also liked to eat chicken legs. So the farmer had decided to raise a chicken with three legs. The driver then asked how the chicken tasted. The farmer told him that he did not know; he had never been able to catch it.
Gorbachev then mentioned the Russian writers Ilf and Petrov. They wrote humorous, satirical novels. They left as a heritage notebooks consisting of thoughts and ideas for writing future books. Gorbachev said he particularly liked one idea in these notebooks. A man was accused of driving a government-owned car to a public bath. To defend himself, the man said that he had not been to the bath for two years. Gorbachev said that the same could be true of our governments. We would not want to be in the position of defending ourselves by saying that we have done nothing when we should have acted.

On this note, the luncheon ended, at 2:10.
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2 LISTED ON THE WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.
CASES OF SPECIAL INTEREST

NAUM MEIMAN
LEYLA GORDIYEVSKAYA AND FAMILY
ABE STOLAR AND FAMILY
ALEXANDER LERNER AND FAMILY
BENJAMIN CHARNY
YURY SHUKHEVYCH
VLADIMIR AND IZOLDE TUFELD
YURY AND TATYANA ZIEMAN
DIVIDED SPOUSES: MARIYA JURGUTIENE, VLADISLAV KOSTIN, PETRAS PAKENAS, SERGEY PETROV
BLOCKED MARRIAGES: TATYANA ALEXANDROVICH, YEYKENY GRIGORISHIN, LYUBOV KURILLO
"The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50% reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty and related documents during the next meeting of Heads of State in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the Joint Draft Treaty text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the Joint Draft Treaty Text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50% reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the Joint Draft START Treaty text worked out in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1600 nuclear offensive delivery systems, 6000 warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed bomber counting rule; and an agreement that the reductions will result in a 50% reduction in Soviet ballistic missile throwweight which will thereafter not be increased. As priority tasks, they should focus on the following crucial issues:

(a) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. These are to include a ceiling of 4800 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total, and a further sub-ceiling of 3300 on the number of ICBM warheads.

(b) The counting rules governing the number of long-range (i.e., with a range over 1000 kilometers), nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. With respect to B-1, B-52, BEAR-H and BLACKJACK bombers equipped for long-range, nuclear-armed ALCMs, this number shall be six per bomber. Other heavy bombers which are not equipped for such cruise missiles, including BACKFIRE, shall be counted in accordance with the bomber counting rule agreed at Reykjavik. There shall be agreed rules governing how many ALCMs shall be attributed to future heavy bombers equipped for long-range, nuclear-armed ALCMs.
(c) The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The number of warheads attributable to each type of United States ballistic missile shall be:

- PEACEKEEPER (MX): 10,
- MINUTEMAN III: 3,
- MINUTEMAN II: 1,
- TRIDENT I: 8,
- TRIDENT II: 8,
- POSEIDON: 10.

The number of warheads attributable to each type of Soviet ballistic missile shall be:

[TO BE PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET SIDE]

These numbers shall be subject to verification by on-site inspection. There shall be agreed rules governing how many warheads shall be attributed to future types of ballistic missiles covered by START.

(d) Building upon the provisions of the INF Treaty, the measures by which the provisions of the START Treaty can be verified will, at a minimum, include:

1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the Treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this Treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force.

2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the Treaty.

3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to conform to the agreed limits.

4. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities to confirm the output of these facilities.

5. Short-notice on-site inspection of:
   (i) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;
   (ii) locations where systems covered by this Treaty remain after conforming to the agreed limits; and
   (iii) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

6. The right to short notice, on-site inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of START systems could be occurring.
7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

8. Measures designed to enhance observation of START-related activities by national technical means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party."

Defense and Space

"The President and the General Secretary also discussed the status of negotiations relating to Defense and Space issues. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to expedite work on a Joint Draft Treaty Text in a new separate treaty which could enter into force at the same time as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms. They also agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva first to identify areas of agreement and disagreement in the Joint Draft Treaty Text and then to accelerate work toward resolution of the areas of disagreement."

Krasnoyarsk

"To support their efforts to negotiate new agreements, the sides agree that construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, which has been halted by the Soviet side, will not be resumed and that the radar will be dismantled in a verifiable manner."

Instructions to the USSR and U.S.A. Delegations with respect to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and an accord on compliance with the ABM Treaty

As a result of their discussions in Washington from December 7 to 10, 1987, M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, have approved the following instructions to the Delegations of the USSR and the U.S.A. at the Geneva Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms.

1. The sides agree to reduce and limit their ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM and SLBM warheads and heavy bomber armaments in such a way that five years after entry into force of the Treaty Between the USSR and the U.S.A. on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and thereafter, the aggregate numbers not exceed for each side:

(a) 1600 ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers;
(b) 6000 warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers;
(c) within the framework of 6000 warheads the relative proportion between warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers will be as follows for each side:

ICBMs - from 3000 to 3300 warheads;
SLBMs - from 1800 to 2000 warheads;
Heavy bombers - from 800 to 900 warheads, including ALCMs, and other nuclear arms, with heavy bombers equipped only for bombs or missiles with a range under 600 km. being counted as one warhead.
Within the limits of the above aggregate numbers the USSR will reduce its heavy ICBM launchers to a level not to exceed 154, which means a limit of 1540 warheads for heavy ICBMs. The aggregate throwweight of ICBMs and SLBMs in the USSR will be reduced by approximately 50 percent and will not be built up after reductions during the duration of the Treaty. This will be recorded in a unilateral statement of the Soviet side.

Outside the limits of the above aggregate numbers each side will limit the number of deployed nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise-missiles with a range above 600 km. to a level of 400. The sides shall assume the obligation to deploy such SLCMs only on two types of submarines and not to deploy them on any surface ships.

Verification measures of strategic offensive arms reductions and limitations will guarantee full confidence of the sides that the obligations assumed by them under the Treaty are strictly observed. These include the use of national technical means, on-site inspections and cooperative measures.

2. The sides agree to record in the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms or in a protocol thereto the obligation not to use the right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty during at least ten years. In any event, this obligation should have the same legal status as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms itself.
In this connection, the ABM Treaty will continue to be of unlimited duration, and will remain in force after the aforementioned ten-year period, unless the sides decide otherwise.

In the event of concerns on the part of one of the sides that an action of the other side might be inconsistent with the provisions of the ABM Treaty, as it was signed and ratified in 1972, the sides shall consider and settle these concerns in the Standing Consultative Commission. In this regard, an exchange of information could be provided for, as well as inspections in connection with those facilities and systems which give rise to suspicion that they might be inconsistent with the provisions of the ABM Treaty.

If in the course of implementation of the 50-percent reductions of strategic offensive arms, or after completion of those reductions, one of the sides begins practical development of an ABM system for the defense of its country or engages in some other obvious violation of the provisions of the ABM Treaty, and the use of agreed procedures does not lead to correcting the situation on a mutually acceptable basis, the other side will be released from compliance with its obligations regarding the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.
Upon completion of the 50-percent reductions of strategic offensive arms, two to three years before the end of the agreed ten-year period, the sides shall begin negotiations with respect to their future obligations in the ABM area, having in mind ensuring predictability with respect to the development of the Soviet-U.S. strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability and a lesser threat of outbreak of nuclear war. If the sides deem it advisable, such an accord could enter into force before expiration of the ten-year period.

In order to establish in a more precise way the joint approach to compliance with the Treaty, the sides may agree upon a list of devices (with specific maximum characteristics) which it would be prohibited to put into space. This would mean that both sides would have the right to develop and test, including in space, those devices which are enumerated in such a list, provided that their characteristics are below the agreed parameters.

3. The aforementioned provisions will form the basis for the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and an accord on compliance with the ABM Treaty; the sides shall undertake to complete their preparation as soon as possible and in any event in such a way that the Treaty could be signed during the visit of President Ronald Reagan to Moscow in 1988.