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TALKING POINTS ON INF

-- The INF negotiations are unique, in the sense that our most important objective is not to secure Soviet agreement, but to sustain European support for our INF policies.

-- If we sustain European support we will be able either to deploy INF, or to secure an arms control agreement, or do both.

-- If we lose European support, we will have neither deployments, nor an arms control agreement. The Soviets will have won a great victory, the Alliance will be fragmented, and the credibility of the United States leadership eroded.

-- It is thus particularly important that, whatever we do in the INF negotiations, we do primarily with an eye to sustaining European support for the basic principles of the December '79 decision -- that NATO will deploy if it must, and secure an equitable arms control agreement if it can.

-- Most of our European Allies, and all of those who face deployment in their countries this year, want to see an early new U.S. proposal. They want us to keep the total elimination of U.S. and Soviet missiles an ultimate objective, but they would not wish us to impose a requirement that the Soviets accept ultimate reductions to zero as a precondition to any interim agreement which provided for equal U.S. and Soviet levels above zero.

-- Whatever we decide with respect to further steps in the INF negotiation, it will be important that we consult closely with our Allies, particularly the basing countries, and that we not present them with any surprises.

*Charles F. Brown
Amb. Brussels*

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The European view is obviously moving towards the perception that our 0 - 0 position is inflexible and the Soviets more flexible.

If we move to an intermediate position we should do so in a positive way that does not seemingly include an inflexible pre-condition.

No surprises - We should give our allies (especially basing countries) at least one week's advance notice so they might consider and be prepared to deal with individual political and PR aspects of the move.

The announcement should come by way of a Presidential Speech (i.e. like the November 18, 1981) and be timed for consumption during prime time in Europe.

The announcement (speech) should include some reference to our allies and their contributions to the intermediate offer being made. In other words let's share the credit.

Your previous consultations which included passages for use during your speech before the American Legion was not only wise but very much appreciated. A similar approach is very desirable.

*Charles Price
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