

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 107-054 #32022

BY CU NARA DATE 9/11/07

SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR INF NEGOTIATING GROUP ON SOVIET PROPOSAL

REF: (A) NST GENEVA 00464 (INF ASSESSMENT CABLE);
(B) STATE 12553 (INF INSTRUCTIONS FOR ROUND IV)

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WASHINGTON HAS COMPLETED ITS ASSESSMENT OF NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL, HAS CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE VIEWS OF OUR ALLIES AND APPRECIATES NEGOTIATING GROUP INPUT/RECOMMENDATIONS.

3. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR ZERO US AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILES IN EUROPE WITH NO BUILDUP IN UK AND FRENCH FORCES PROVIDES THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASSERT SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF US/SOVIET EQUALITY. HOWEVER, AGREED CONSTRAINTS ON UK AND FRENCH FORCES, AS WELL AS ON OUR EXISTING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION WITH US ALLIES ARE PRECONDITIONS FOR THE PROPOSAL WHICH REMAIN UNACCEPTABLE.

4. SINCE THE SOVIET UNION APPEARS TO HAVE MOVED MORE IN INF THAN ELSEWHERE, AND IN KEEPING WITH THE COMMITMENT IN THE SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT TO ACCELERATE PROGRESS AND TO SEEK A SEPARATE INTERIM INF AGREEMENT, A US COUNTERPROPOSAL IS APPROPRIATE. OUR OBJECTIVES IN PRESENTING THIS COUNTERPROPOSAL ARE TO:

--ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT APPARENT SOVIET MOVEMENT: SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF PRINCIPLE OF US/SOVIET LRINF EQUALITY; AND ACCEPTANCE OF A ROLE OF OSI AND OTHER MEASURES BEYOND NTM IN VERIFYING THE AGREEMENT, AND DEFERRING UK/FRENCH PARTICIPATION.

--PRESS THE SOVIETS TO REACH AND IMPLEMENT AN INF AGREEMENT, CONSISTENT WITH US PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES, WITHOUT LINKAGE TO ISSUES IN OTHER AREAS AND SDI.

--PRESS THE SOVIETS ON ISSUES WHERE THEY ARE SILENT, PARTICULARLY THE NEED FOR REDUCTION OF SOVIET SYSTEMS IN ASIA, AS PART OF AN INF AGREEMENT.

--PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM APPEARING MORE COMMITTED TO DEEP REDUCTIONS THAN IS THE US. OUR ZERO/ZERO PROPOSAL HAS BEEN ON THE TABLE SINCE 1981 AND WE SHOULD STRESS THIS.

5. INF NEGOTIATING GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING PROPOSAL TO SOVIET SIDE. US INF NEGOTATING GROUP SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE US CONTINUES FIRMLY TO BELIEVE THAT THE BEST SOLUTION REMAINS THE GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF THE ENTIRE CLASS OF US AND SOVIET LAND-BASED LRINF MISSILES. WE ARE PREPARED PROMPTLY

TO NEGOTIATE AN EFFECTIVE, VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT TO THAT END, WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS. HOWEVER, SINCE THE SOVIET UNION HAS THUS FAR REFUSED TO JOIN US IN MOVING IMMEDIATELY TO SUCH A GLOBAL, ZERO/ZERO SOLUTION, THE US PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING:

--IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET OFFER OF A NEAR TERM ZERO-ZERO OUTCOME IN EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES IS OFFERING A PROPOSAL THAT WOULD PERMIT A ZERO-ZERO OUTCOME BOTH IN EUROPE AND ASIA, AND GLOBALLY AS WELL, BY THE END OF 1989, IF THE SOVIET UNION WILL AGREE. IN THIS REGARD, THE UNITED STATES PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING CONCRETE PLAN TO ACHIEVE THIS AIM.

--BY THE END OF 1987, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD LIMIT THEIR LAND-BASED LRINF MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE TO 140 LAUNCHERS EACH, WITH THE SOVIET UNION MAKING CONCURRENT PROPORTIONATE REDUCTIONS IN ASIA. [FYI: DETAILED GUIDANCE FOR THIS PORTION OF THE PLAN, EXCEPT FOR THE TARGET COMPLETION DATE, IS AS OUTLINED INITIALLY IN NSDD 195 AND AS SUPPLEMENTED BY NSDD 206. END FYI.] WITHIN THE FOLLOWING YEAR, BOTH SIDES WOULD FURTHER REDUCE THE NUMBERS OF LRINF MISSILE LAUNCHERS REMAINING IN EUROPE AND ASIA BY AN ADDITIONAL 50 PERCENT. FINALLY, BOTH SIDES WOULD MOVE TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THIS CATEGORY OF WEAPONS BY THE END OF 1989.

--ASSOCIATED WITH THIS PLAN, THERE WOULD BE A PARALLEL SERIES OF GLOBAL LRINF MISSILE WARHEAD CEILINGS UNDER WHICH THE US RETAINS THE RIGHT TO GLOBAL EQUALITY. AS SOVIET SS-20 LAUNCHERS ARE REDUCED, THE LAUNCHERS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED MISSILES AND WARHEADS WOULD BE DESTROYED. US SYSTEMS IN EXCESS OF THE LAUNCHER LIMITS CITED ABOVE COULD BE WITHDRAWN TO THE US UNLESS, OR UNTIL, THEY WERE ALSO IN EXCESS OF THE EQUAL GLOBAL WARHEAD CEILING ASSOCIATED WITH THE LAUNCHER REDUCTIONS THEN BEING IMPLEMENTED, IN WHICH CASE THEY WOULD BE DESTROYED (WHILE PROTECTING A RIGHT TO CONVERT PERSHING II MISSILES TO PERSHING I MISSILES).

--ALSO, UNDER THIS PLAN, SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN BOTH EUROPE AND ASIA WOULD BE CONCURRENT AND PROPORTIONAL.

--THESE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITS WOULD INVOLVE US AND SOVIET SYSTEMS ONLY. THERE WOULD BE NO AGREED CONSTRAINTS ON THE FORCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OR FRANCE.

THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD ALSO BE ASSOCIATED WITH AN EQUAL SHORTER-RANGE INF (SRINF) CEILING AT CURRENT SOVIET LEVELS OR TO FREEZE SRINF AT BOTH SIDES JANUARY 1, 1982, LEVELS. THIS CEILING WOULD BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED BY THE END OF 1987.

FINALLY, THE UNITED STATES WILL BE PROPOSING SPECIFIC VERIFICATION PROCEDURES TAILORED TO THE SPECIFIC WEAPONRY LIMITS WE SEEK. THESE DETAILS WILL BE PRESENTED IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE VERIFICATION REGIME WHICH INCLUDES THE USE OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AND COOPERATIVE MEASURES BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SUCH AS ON-SITE MONITORING/INSPECTION AND DATA EXCHANGES.

FYI: BECAUSE THE SOVIET UNION HAS FAR MORE SUCH MISSILES AND ASSOCIATED WARHEADS THAN DOES THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THAT THIS WOULD MAINTAIN A SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN LRINF MISSILES WELL INTO THE REDUCTIONS PERIOD. THEREFORE, THE UNITED STATES WOULD INSIST THAT IT HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE ITS MIX OF PERSHING II AND GLCM DURING THE REDUCTIONS PERIOD AND WOULD INSIST THAT THE LEVEL OF WEAPONS ON LAUNCHERS POSSESSED BY THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE REDUCTIONS CONSTITUTE ALSO A GLOBAL CEILING. THIS WOULD PERMIT RETENTION OF SOME US LRINF OUTSIDE EUROPE CONSISTENT WITH THE DECLINING GLOBAL CEILING. END FYI.

6. EXCEPT AS MODIFIED ABOVE, PREVIOUS GUIDANCE REMAINS IN EFFECT. IN PARTICULAR, OUR NOVEMBER 1, 1985 PROPOSAL ON INF REMAINS ON THE TABLE. !!