

NLRR M07-054 #32021

BY CV NARA DATE 9/11/04

SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR NST DEL ON SOVIET PROPOSAL

REF: STATE 12556 (NST INSTRUCTIONS FOR ROUND IV)

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WASHINGTON HAS COMPLETED ITS ASSESSMENT OF NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL. GUIDANCE ADDITIONAL TO REFTEL IS PROVIDED BELOW. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FOR EACH OF THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS IS BEING PROVIDED SEPTEL.

3. POTENTIAL COMMON GROUND. CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET "PLAN" REFLECT POSITIONS OFFERED BY THE US TO THE SOVIETS OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE US IS ON RECORD AS CALLING ULTIMATELY FOR THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. FURTHER, IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW THE US WOULD PROPOSE HANDLING THE ISSUE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES, WE SUGGESTED TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE SHOULD FIRST BILATERALLY MOVE TO 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS (AS WE DEFINE THEM), AND THEN WE COULD ENVISION INVOLVING NOT ONLY THE BRITISH AND FRENCH BUT THE PRC AS WELL. WE HAVE ALSO REPEATEDLY STRESSED THE NEED TO GO BEYOND NTM, AS REQUIRED, FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

4. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE WAY THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS FRAMED TOGETHER WITH MANY OF ITS ELEMENTS POSE CERTAIN SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS AND RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO MOVE FORWARD ON AREAS OF COMMON GROUND PER THE NOVEMBER JOINT STATEMENT.

FIRST AND FOREMOST, TO THE EXTENT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL LINKS THE ENTIRE PLAN TO A BAN ON "SPACE-STRIKE" ARMS, INCLUDING THE TERMINATION OF THE U.S. SDI PROGRAM, THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACCEPT SUCH AN APPROACH.

THE SOVIET "PLAN" ALSO NARROWS THE FOCUS OF NEGOTIATIONS TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY 1999, MAKING THAT A GOAL IN ITSELF. THEIR PROPOSAL DOES NOT ADDRESS THE CORRESPONDING REASONS FOR THE WEAPONS AND THE ASSOCIATED CONDITIONS THAT WILL BE NEEDED TO ELIMINATE THE UNDERLYING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OR REPLACE THE CONTRIBUTION NOW MADE BY THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS A RESULT, IT OFFERS NO SCHEDULE FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EXISTING REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND DIFFERENCES. IT CALLS FOR SCHEDULING THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, FOR EXAMPLE, BUT DOES NOT CALL FOR A CORRESPONDING SCHEDULE FOR THE SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMBALANCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. NOR DOES THE PROPOSAL ADDRESS THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF COMPLIANCE. THIS ONE-SIDED FOCUS PUTS

MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE WEST AND AVOIDS PUTTING CORRESPONDING PRESSURE ON THE EAST. IN SHORT, AS THE SOVIETS HAVE OFTEN TRIED TO DO, THIS ATTEMPTS TO SET AN UNFAIR PUBLIC FOCUS AND AGENDA.

THE SOVIET "PLAN" ALSO CALLS FOR US TO ACCEPT MANY UNACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS DURING THE FIRST PHASE, FRONT-LOADING THE DEAL, IN ORDER TO GET CERTAIN BENEFITS IN SUBSEQUENT PHASES. MANY OF THE "BENEFITS" (E.G., THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS) PROMISED IN SUBSEQUENT SOVIET PHASES PLAY MORE TO PUBLIC OPINION THAN TO REAL BENEFITS FOR THE US AND ITS ALLIES.

THE DIRECT IMPACT OF SOME OF THE SOVIET PROVISIONS WOULD BE TO DERAIL WESTERN MODERNIZATION. MOREOVER, SOME OF THESE PROVISIONS, BY SIMPLY BEING GIVEN THE STATUS OF REAL "POSSIBILITIES", COULD ACHIEVE THE SAME RESULT. IT IS NOT IN US INTEREST TO LET THE SOVIETS GAIN LEVERAGE BY MAKING THEIR OUTYEAR DETAILS APPEAR TO BE LIKELY POSSIBILITIES.

5. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, US DEL, IN CARRYING OUT AGENDA OF REFTTEL, SHOULD:

(A) MAINTAIN FOCUS AND PRIORITY ON EXECUTING THE MANDATE AGREED AT THE LAST SUMMIT TO PURSUE AREAS OF COMMON GROUND--50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS, APPROPRIATELY APPLIED AND AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT;

(B) CONTINUE TO REJECT ELEMENTS OF THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN OFFERED BY THE SOVIET SIDE AND REJECTED BY THE US;

(C) WITH THE SPECIFIC EXCEPTIONS NOTED IN THE INF AREA, REJECT ANY IDEA OF NEGOTIATIONS ON FUTURE STEPS OR PHASES, NOTING THAT THIS WOULD BE PREMATURE AND WASTE TIME, AT BEST;

(D) MAKE CLEAR THAT IN US VIEW THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF¹ NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIRES CONDITIONS THAT INCLUDE CORRECTING CONVENTIONAL AND OTHER FORCE IMBALANCES AND PROBLEMS, EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION FOR FUTURE AGREEMENTS, AND FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR TREATY OBLIGATIONS (FYI. AT POLITICAL LEVEL WE WILL BE RAISING OTHER IMPORTANT CRITERIA SUCH AS PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN WAYS THAT ALLOW FREE CHOICE WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE AND A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ORIENTATION AND AMBITIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. END FYI);

(E) ALSO MAKE CLEAR US VIEW THAT ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOES NOT OBTAIN THE NEED FOR NON-NUCLEAR DEFENSES, PARTICULARLY TO PROTECT AGAINST CHEATING OR BREAKOUT BY ANY COUNTRY: AND,

(F) PROBE THE SOVIET OFFER ON VERIFICATION IN A MANNER WHICH DOES NOT PREJUDICE US OPTIONS FOR, OR SOVIET RESPONSIVENESS TO, SPECIFIC MEASURES WHICH THE US WILL BE PRESENTING.

6. IN CARRYING OUT ABOVE, US DEL SHOULD DRAW ON FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) AGREE WITH THE GENERAL GOAL OF MOVING TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHEN POSSIBLE, CONSISTENT WITH OUR OVERALL REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY AND STABILITY.

(B) NOTE THAT THE US HAS PROPOSED AND CONTINUES TO ADVOCATE A PROCESS BY WHICH THE US AND THE USSR WOULD TAKE THE FIRST STEPS BY IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF BOTH SIDES APPROPRIATELY APPLIED AND BY PROMPTLY NEGOTIATING AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT. WHEN US AND SOVIET FORCES ARE REDUCED, AND ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS ARE UNDER DISCUSSION, WE CAN ENVISION SUBSEQUENT STEPS WHICH COULD INVOLVE THE UK, FRANCE AND THE PRC SO THAT ALL CAN MOVE TO ZERO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A BALANCED AND STABLE MANNER. (FYI. THIS APPROACH WAS SPECIFICALLY PROPOSED TO THE USSR BY THE US DURING THE PREPARATIONS FOR AND DURING THE RECENT SUMMIT. END FYI.)

(C) OUR IMMEDIATE FOCUS SHOULD REMAIN ON PROMPT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE FIRST STEPS OF THIS PROCESS, ESPECIALLY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS APPROPRIATELY APPLIED AND AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT.

(D) TO APPROPRIATELY APPLY THE PRINCIPLE OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTION AND TO ACHIEVE A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT, WILL REQUIRE SERIOUS NEGOTIATION. THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES ON THE ELEMENTS OF AN EQUITABLE OUTCOME. THE RESOLUTION OF THESE DIFFERENCES AND THE FINDING OF COMMON GROUND IS THE AREA IN WHICH BOTH SIDES MUST NOW FOCUS THEIR NEGOTIATING EFFORTS IF THE GOAL FOR THIS STEP IS TO BE ACHIEVED. IT IS AN AREA IN WHICH REAL NEGOTIATIONS CAN TAKE PLACE AT THIS TIME. WE SHOULD BOTH AGREE THAT THIS SHOULD BE OUR FOCUS. THIS IS IN KEEPING WITH THE COMMITMENT TO ACCELERATE EFFORTS TO FIND COMMON GROUND MADE AT THE MOST RECENT SUMMIT. IT IS ALSO CLEARLY THE FOUNDATION UPON WHICH BOTH WE AND THE SOVIETS AGREE ALL ELSE MUST BUILD.

(E) THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON WHAT SPECIFICALLY WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN ITS SUBSEQUENT PHASES CONTAINS MUCH WITH WHICH WE CANNOT AGREE AT THIS TIME. FOCUS ON SUBSEQUENT PHASES WOULD SIMPLY DIVERT TIME AND TALENT FROM THE IMMEDIATE WORK AT HAND ON THE IMMEDIATE STEPS (UPON WHICH BOTH SIDES AGREED AT THE SUMMIT).

(F) THE U.S. IS PLEASED THAT THE SOVIET UNION RECOGNIZES OUR LONG-HELD POSITION THAT VERIFICATION OF NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS IS A CRITICAL ELEMENT. IN PURSUIT OF GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S OFFER TO COME TO TERMS ON ANY NECESSARY VERIFICATION MEASURES, WE WILL BE PROPOSING SPECIFIC VERIFICATION PROCEDURES TAILORED TO THE SPECIFIC WEAPONRY LIMITS WE SEEK. THESE DETAILS WILL BE PRESENTED IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE VERIFICATION REGIME WHICH INCLUDES THE USE OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AND COOPERATIVE MEASURES BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SUCH AS ON-SITE MONITORING/INSPECTION AND DATA EXCHANGES.

IN THIS CONTEXT, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT POLITICAL TRUST IN VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE BE REBUILT THROUGH DEMONSTRATED CHANGES IN THOSE SOVIET TESTING PRACTICES THAT NOW IMPEDE VERIFICATION AND THROUGH THE CORRECTION OF OTHER FORMS OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING AGREEMENTS. !!