NSSD 1-82, Part III, Section B

The Role of Allies and Others

Conclusions

1. A strong unified NATO is indispensable to protecting Western interests. To attain this goal, the US must press for implementation of key conventional enhancement programs and INF modernization. We must also continue to promote improvement in integrated logistical support (e.g., host nation support -- HNS). For its part, the US must maintain its NATO commitments for forward deployment and early reinforcement.

2. While encouraging all NATO Allies to maintain and increase their contributions in Europe, we should specifically encourage those Allies who can contribute outside Europe to allocate their peacetime marginal resources preferentially to dual-purpose capabilities which could support both out-of-area and European missions. We likewise should urge such Allies to share the political and military burdens outside Europe, including being prepared to fight along side of (or instead of) the US.

3. Outside Europe, the US will place primary reliance on regional states to deal with non-Soviet threats, providing security assistance as appropriate. The US will remain the primary power for directly resisting the Soviets. If no other reasonable alternative exists, the US should also be capable of intervening militarily in regional or local conflicts. The effectiveness of US military capabilities for either Soviet or other contingencies will depend on access to facilities en route and in the region of conflict, and on other tangible forms of support (e.g., HNS and prepositioning).

4. In Southwest Asia, the US will support the development of balanced and self-contained friendly regional forces and will emphasize assistance to certain key states for regional contingency roles.

5. In East Asia, the Japanese should be encouraged to contribute more to their own and mutual defense efforts (including economic assistance), although we should not now ask Japan to expand its defense responsibility beyond the protection of sea lines of communication out to 1000 nautical miles. We should assist the ROK to become increasingly self-sufficient in its own defense capabilities, while maintaining the current US-ROK division of labor (predominantly Korean ground forces and predominantly US tacair); and we should work to facilitate increased defense cooperation between Korea and Japan, although it may not be achievable in the near-term. We can also act to enhance the durability of the US-Chinese security relationship, although significant improvement in Chinese military capabilities to oppose the Soviet Union can only come if and as China can devote substantial additional resources of its own for that purpose.

End of Conclusions
The Role of Allies and Others

**Summary**

The US must increasingly draw upon the resources and cooperation of our allies and friends to oppose growing Soviet and Soviet surrogate military power, and to protect interests threatened from other sources. While our ability to translate cooperation with allies and friends into an effective counter to Soviet threats offers us an important strength, our dependence on such cooperation is a potential vulnerability at which the Soviets will continue to probe.

**Europe**

A strong and unified NATO is indispensable to the protection of Western interests. To attain this goal, the US must seek measurable, real increases in annual NATO defense spending. Additionally, we should maintain—in concert with our Allies—strong conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces to provide a full spectrum of deterrence and defensive capabilities. We should also press for Alliance implementation of key conventional enhancement programs and continue to move forward on the INF modernization program, while pursuing an INF Agreement in Geneva. At the same time, the US should adhere to its own NATO commitment for forward deployed forces and early reinforcement forces and capabilities.

In addition, to improve further Alliance military capabilities and the efficiency of resource allocations, we should pursue with our Allies the development and production of interoperable and/or standardized armaments. As a further cooperative effort, we have obtained or are seeking host nation support (HNS) and Allied civilian airlift/sealift to support the reinforcement and resupply of Europe.

However, rather than attacking NATO directly, the Soviets are more likely to pursue aggressive policies outside Europe where there is less risk of superpower confrontation, while at the same time hoping to erode Alliance political consensus. The region in which events could most severely test Alliance cohesion is Southwest Asia (SWA).

Our strategy with respect to out-of-area threats, therefore, should be to encourage all Allies to maintain and
increase their contributions in Europe while specifically encouraging those who can contribute outside Europe to allocate their marginal resources preferentially to capabilities which could support both out-of-area and European missions. En route access is a function that many NATO nations can contribute. Certain Allies can also provide security, economic, and training assistance, peacetime military presence (including participation in combined exercises), and capabilities (including both combat forces and air and sealift) for military operations in the event of hostilities in the region. In our bilateral relations with Turkey, we should seek a satisfactory outcome of the Collocated Operating Base negotiations and further progress on the Turkish military modernization effort to prepare the ground to draw the Turks more deeply into Southwest Asian security planning and to gain support for using their bases for Southwest Asian contingencies. Security assistance represents a vital ingredient for promoting Turkish force modernization and gaining Turkish cooperation in Southwest Asian contingencies.

Southwest Asia (SWA)

We should support the development of balanced and self-contained forces in regional states to deal with local and regional threats, with emphasis on certain key states for regional contingency roles.

We should size and structure US forces for contingencies involving the Soviets and publicly portray those forces as intended for such missions. In Soviet contingencies, regional states can provide certain types of logistical support, and both regional states and external allies can augment our combat capabilities and provide en route or in-theater access to facilities. We should also recognize that in preparing to fight the Soviets, we will be maintaining a hedge against the possibility of having to intervene in local or regional contingencies.

Given current political realities and military requirements, we should concentrate on access, improvement of facilities, HNS, and prepositioning in Egypt and Oman. In Saudi Arabia, we should seek through contingency discussions to identify the facilities and support which would be available to deploying US forces. We should also continue to examine the possibility of facilities access and HNS in Pakistan for both regional contingencies and Soviet aggression against Pakistan. Israeli capabilities could provide a considerable
benefit during direct Soviet attacks in SWA or in a US-Soviet war which involved hostilities in the Mediterranean.

However, because the Soviet threat is not paramount in the eyes of many of our regional friends, their willingness to appear closely associated with the US is limited by the political vulnerability of some governments in the region, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the closeness of US-Israeli relations.

East Asia and the Pacific Basin

The increasing Soviet threat in East Asia when other demands on US forces (e.g., Persian Gulf) also are increasing dictates greater reliance on each regional state to provide for its own defense, with US security assistance where required. However, recent fears of US withdrawal from the Pacific -- now quiescent -- could resurface quickly if US pressure for greater local/regional defense efforts were seen as a ploy for reducing US forces and commitments.

Japan is willing to be responsible for its self-defense and for protection of the US-Japanese sea lanes out to 1000 nautical miles. We should not now ask the Japanese to assume any active defense roles beyond this geographic area. We should, however, develop a broad strategy for seeking a substantial increase in Japanese defense efforts. We should also continue to press Japan to bring its POL, munitions, other war reserve stocks, and related infrastructure up to full inventory objectives.

We can act to enhance the durability of the US-Chinese strategic relationship, but significant improvement in Chinese military capabilities to oppose the Soviet Union and tie down additional Soviet resources can only come if and as China can devote substantial additional resources of its own to that purpose. We should seek closer US-PRC security coordination regarding Thailand and Pakistan. The US and the PRC might also cooperate to service the Soviet equipment of states we wish to disengage from Soviet arms relationships.

Our policy toward the ROK should seek to make that country increasingly self-sufficient for its defense capabilities, backed up by a continued US force presence, a US security guarantee, and a steady, reliable security assistance program. Additional economic assistance from Japan would be helpful. We should also work to facilitate increased defense cooperation.
between Japan and Korea, although such cooperation may not be realistic in the near future.

In Southeast Asia, the US relies primarily on local states to deal with internal instability supported by US security assistance as necessary. Should external threats or externally supported security problems require direct outside assistance, the US would in the first instance look for ways to support the threatened government with the forces of other states of the region, while seeking to maintain US flexibility to deal with direct Soviet threats.

Latin America

The primary Soviet threat in this region emanates from Cuba. In a major contingency or war with the Soviet Union, US forces would be responsible for neutralizing Cuba (and if necessary Nicaragua) as a potential base for operations against the US or its lines of communication. In the South Atlantic and Pacific, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile might contribute to the defense of vital sea lines of communication.

The US would prefer to rely upon local states to deal with local insurgencies. Should local forces fail to stem insurgent efforts, we probably cannot depend upon the support or direct intervention of external allies, although we should seek to keep the remaining UK, French, and Dutch presence in the region. US military forces therefore represent the essential backup. In some instances, we may seek facilities access (e.g., Honduras) to allow us to project power into the region.

Africa

Morocco, Egypt, Somalia, and Kenya have already offered to provide facilities access to ensure that Western interests can be defended with US and/or Allied rapid reaction forces.

We will rely primarily on local and regional forces, to respond to most local and regional threats. We must, however, be prepared to act directly against Libya should the situation warrant it. In former colonial areas, we expect the former colonial power, if appropriate, to take the lead where external assistance is necessary. US lift and logistical support for either Allied or regional security and peacekeeping efforts would probably be necessary.

End of Summary