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NLS 300-147#1405

MEMORANDUM

BY LOJ NARA DATE 6/23/06

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5:00 p.m.

February 8, 1983

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INFORMATION

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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD T. BOVERIE *B*

SUBJECT: Ambassador Nitze's Discussions with  
Vice President Bush

This is a "quick and dirty" rundown on Ambassador Nitze's proposals to the Vice President, as reflected in the attached message. (I first saw the message a few minutes ago, and want to get something to you before you depart at 6:00 p.m.)

Nitze's Proposal

Ambassador Nitze's basic idea is to move off zero-zero in order to demonstrate to the Europeans that we are exploring all reasonable opportunities for an agreement. In brief, Nitze proposes the following:

- Both sides limited to 144 LRINF missile launchers in Europe by December 31, 1987.
- Both sides limited to 72 LRINF missile launchers outside Europe by December 31, 1987.
- Aircraft with ranges comparable to LRINF missiles would be limited to 150 on each side.
- There would be collateral constraints on shorter range missiles.

My Quick Observations

His new proposal is likely to be more acceptable to U.S. agencies than his earlier "walk in the woods" proposal. Reason: his new proposal permits deployment of the Pershing II. (The earlier proposal precluded the Pershing II, and permitted deployment of only the GLCM.)

In my opinion, the Soviets would not accept this new proposal because: (1) it would legitimize Pershing II deployments; (2) there would be no compensation for British and French systems; and (3) intrusive measures would be needed for verification.

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Talking Points

You could use the following talking points with Ambassador Nitze:

- If the President would like to explore initiatives for finite levels as an interim step enroute to zero-zero, we should certainly consider your approach as a prime candidate.
- How do you believe the Soviets would react to such a proposal?
- How do you believe the various U.S. agencies (State, OSD, OJCS, ACDA and CIA) would react to this idea?
- I will discuss this with the Vice President, to see how your idea would relate to what he uncovered in his one-on-one discussions with chiefs-of-state.

--With regard to timing of any change, Chancellor Kohl has made it clear to us that he believes no change should be considered until after the German elections.

--Beyond that, it would seem to me that we ought to hold in reserve any change until closer to the deployment dates so as to be able to hold public opinion at the right moments.

--How would you see the Soviets reacting to the concept of counting launchers instead of missiles. (Our GLCM launchers have four missiles on them; Soviet missiles have three warheads on them. Thus it would appear to be to their advantage to count missiles while it suits us better to count launchers. It be more viable as a long-term proposition to count neither--but instead to count warheads.)