## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 4, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD REGAN

FROM:

JAY KEYWORTH

SUBJECT: Vice President

Vice President's European Trip; and Draft Legislation for SDI/European Participation

As we move now well into the second term, two questions continue to be asked of the President's Strategic Defense

Initiative:

O Aspin's "Where are we going with this?" request for a grand strategy.

o Abshire's "How will we manage the Alliance?" request for allied participation.

Aspin's question is slowly but surely being answered by people like Paul Nitze with his three-phased strategy of Research; Negotiated Transition; and Defensive Rebalance at dramatically reduced offensive levels.

Abshire's question, however, has come to be a sore sticking point within NATO -- and getting more so. I've just returned from several trips to Europe. Over a considerable time I have watched British, French, and German support for SDI go from an enthusiastic high in January (when a 20-month Administration silence was ended by a series of clear Presidential statements of support), to a period now of surly dissatisfaction. While the Europeans continue to ask for clear definition of SDI purpose, it is their role in any SDI effort that has become their greatest concern. We have sent terribly confused signals here. We speak of partnership, but offer subcontractor status. We speak of cooperation, but put insurmountable barriers in its path. We speak of alliance, but appear in their eyes to hold out only a vassal relationship.

The Vice President is tentatively being sent into this situation next month. After lengthy conversation with him last week, we both agreed that he cannot go to Europe without clear and unmuddled prospects of real SDI cooperation. With such prospects, his trip could succeed in rallying the Alliance. Without them, we risk embarrassment to both the President and Vice President, and accelerating a breakdown from which it will be exceedingly difficult to recover.

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One of the most effective signals we could send would be a bipartisan resolution -- with full support from the White House -- clearly defining our cooperative intentions. No other single action could, within the time available, provide the dramatic leverage needed by the Vice President on his trip.

Dick Allen sees this as well; and has prepared draft ammendment language to this effect (attached). I strongly recommend we consider such an ammendment to be in our best self-interest. Through it we can reestablish constructive bipartisan dialogue on SDI within the congress, send a clear message to both ourselves and our allies, and arm the Vice President for what can be a watershed trip to an otherwise very vulnerable Europe.

Attachment