

NLS M1343 #2~~SECRET~~BY onl, NARA, DATE 11/8/05 BASIC ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT
ON THE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

I.

Each Party will reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms to equal levels and complete the reductions required to achieve these levels within (a specified period of time) after the entry into force of the agreement. Specifically, each Party will:

- A. Limit to no more than 5,000 the number of warheads on its deployed ballistic missiles;
- B. Limit to no more than 2,500 the number of warheads on its deployed ICBMs;
- C. Limit to no more than 850 the aggregate number of its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs;
- /D. Limit the number of its heavy bombers to no more than [400] [an agreed number];7
- /D. Limit to no more than [1200] the number of its heavy bombers and deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs;7 *
- E. Limit to no more than 110 the number of its deployed heavy ICBMs and to no more than 210 the aggregate number of its deployed heavy and medium ICBMs;
- F. Limit the aggregate number of its non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs to no more than an agreed percentage of its aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs.

* If the second alternative D is chosen, we would propose 1200 rather than 1250 (850 + 400) for tactical reasons, since the Soviets would almost certainly seek to drive this number upward. Even with the lower number, we could have 400 or more heavy bombers if desired.

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II.

Each Party will carry out the reductions called for in Section I in accordance with agreed procedures for dismantling or destruction and with schedules which provide for equal intermediate ceilings at two-year intervals following the entry into force of the agreement.

III.

Neither Party will develop, produce, flight-test, or deploy new heavy ballistic missiles.

IV.

Neither Party will develop, produce, flight-test or deploy ICBMs with more than 10 reentry vehicles nor develop, produce, flight-test or deploy SLBMs with more than 14 reentry vehicles.

V.

Neither Party will [develop, produce,] flight-test or deploy reentry vehicles with a mass greater than approximately 200 kilograms on new ballistic missile systems. For new types of ballistic missiles the combined weight of the number of reentry vehicles assigned thereto must be greater than 50 percent of the missile's throw-weight.⁷

VI.

Each Party will undertake constraints on non-deployed ballistic missiles in addition to the limit on non-deployed

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missiles in Section I. These will include a ban on ICBM rapid reload capability, a ban on excess ICBMs and hardened storage facilities at ICBM complexes and limits on the quantity and location of ground support equipment. In addition, each side will destroy missiles that have been retired to achieve the 850 deployed ballistic missile limit, destroy missiles of types which are no longer deployed, dismantle or destroy launchers associated with deployed missiles retired to achieve the 850 deployed ballistic missile limit, and store all non-deployed missiles in designated storage facilities.

/VII.7

[or add appropriate provisions from below as a continuation of Article I]

[Beginning on _____,] [Following completion of the reductions called for in Section I,] each Party will carry out additional reductions and limitations. Specifically, each Party will:

- A. Limit the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ballistic missiles to no more than [_____]
[1.8 million] kilograms;
- B. Destroy all its heavy ICBMs and dismantle or destroy all its launchers for heavy ICBMs;

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(NOTE: The following two paragraphs would be included if the U.S. decides to propose limits on ALCMs and SLCMS)

C. Limit its air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) so that:

1) Each heavy bomber shall carry no more than 30 ALCMs.

OR

2) The total number of ALCMs shall not exceed the product of 28 and the number of heavy bombers. In addition, no more than 20 ALCMs shall be deployed on any existing type of heavy bomber.

D. Limit its sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMS) so that:

1) Neither side shall deploy nuclear-armed SLCMs.

OR

2) SLCMs shall be deployed on no more than _____ vessels.

OR

3) SLCMs with ranges greater than 150 km shall be deployed on no more than _____ vessels.

4) Nuclear-armed SLCMs [with ranges greater than 150 km] will be deployed on no more than _____ vessels, with an average of no more than _____ such SLCMs per vessel.

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E. Carry out possible further reductions, as agreed during implementation of the limitations and reductions called for in Section I, in: the number of warheads on its deployed ballistic missiles and the number of warheads on its deployed ICBMs; [the number of its heavy bombers; the aggregate number of its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs] or [the number of its heavy bombers and deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs].7

OR

VIII.7

In addition to the above reductions, the Parties will consider the possibility of further reductions in the categories of strategic offensive arms referred to in Article I.7

VIII.

Each Party will carry out the reductions called for in Section VII of this document in accordance with agreed dismantling or destruction procedures and with schedules which provide for equal intermediate ceilings at specified intervals.

IX.

All of the preceding provisions will be carried out in accordance with agreed definitions, counting rules, and type rules, which would specify for the purposes of the limitations set forth in the agreement:

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- The definitions of systems to be limited;
- The relationship among deployed ballistic missiles, ballistic missile launchers, ballistic missile warheads, and ballistic missile throw-weight;
- Criteria to distinguish between deployed and non-deployed ballistic missiles;
- Physical and performance criteria to distinguish between existing types and new types of ballistic missiles;
- Criteria for inclusion of aircraft as heavy bombers;
- Criteria for inclusion of cruise missiles; * and
- Agreed numerical values to distinguish among and define light, medium and heavy ICBMs.

X.

For the purposes of providing assurance of compliance with the preceding provisions each Party will use national technical means of verification, supplemented by specific, agreed cooperative measures.

- Interference with agreed verification measures or with national technical means of verification will be prohibited, as will concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement by agreed measures or by national technical means.

* On the basis of subsequent decision, any ALCM limit will be clarified to determine whether it applies to nuclear-armed ALCMs or all ALCMs with ranges greater than 600 km.

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- Encryption of telemetry during flight-testing of systems limited by the agreement will be banned and additional specific provisions regarding access to flight-test data will be adopted.

Prior to signature of this agreement, each Party will provide data to the other for the purpose of establishing an agreed and substantial body of data concerning their strategic arms subject to limitations by the agreement.

- These data will reflect specific numerical values for characteristics of weapons systems covered by the agreement.
- This data base will be agreed during the course of the negotiations and established upon signature of the agreement and thereafter will be updated every six months.

XI.

The agreement embodying these provisions will be of agreed [long-term] duration subject to review at specified, regular intervals and will be subject to withdrawal after six months' prior notification if a Party decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. Each Party will be free to propose amendments at any time which, like the agreement itself, will be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.

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Talking Points for NSC Meeting on January 25

Draft Delegation Instructions

- As with the Basic Elements Paper draft, these instructions include quite a few brackets that will have to be revised to reflect decisions on issues already discussed.
 - With the exception of the bracketed language, does anyone have any problems with the way the instructions are framed?
(After any discussion)
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Conclusion

- Based upon today's discussion, we will draft the necessary decision document for you, Mr. President.
- Once you make the necessary decisions on the key issues we discussed during the first half of the meeting, we will have the Basic Elements Paper and draft Instructions corrected to reflect those decisions.
- If there are no further comments, I suggest we all wish Ambassador Rowny the best for the upcoming round and adjourn.

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NLS M/1343 # 3

BY anf, NARA, DATE 11/0/05

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NLS M1343 #4

BY smj, NARA, DATE 11/6/05

January 20, 1983

SUBJECT: Instructions for Round Three of START

1. SECRET - entire text.

2. This message provides guidance to the U.S. Delegation for the third round of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) with the USSR beginning February 2. It supplements instructions for previous rounds.

3. The overall objective for round three is to continue elaborating and promoting U.S. proposals for a START agreement. Specifically, the Delegation should:

-- Reinforce U.S. positions already tabled, emphasizing key principles on which they are based;

-- Introduce additional elements of the U.S. position, and thus demonstrate the comprehensive and serious nature of our approach;

-- Respond to Soviet proposals, pointing out the weak points of their positions;

-- Press for further details and clarifications of Soviet positions;

-- Seek the formation of working groups to facilitate discussion of detailed issues; and

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-- Work toward early agreement on confidence-building measures.

4. Basic Elements. If and when the Delegation considers it tactically advantageous to do so, it may table a document presenting the Basic Elements of a START agreement, along the lines of the text contained septel. In determining the specific language and contents of the document, the Delegation has the flexibility, unless otherwise instructed below, to include blank spaces, general formulations, or numerical values different from those contained in internal guidance when it judges that such approaches would facilitate the achievement of US negotiating objectives as reflected in the Delegation's internal guidance. The Delegation should stress that the elements presented in the document constitute a balanced and integrally related package, and that they must be discussed comprehensively (i.e., we will not consider constraints on cruise missiles in isolation from matters of concern to us, such as limits on throw-weight).]

5. Phasing. [to be provided.]

6. Confidence-building measures. Delegation should promote U.S. proposals on CBMs (as outlined in delegation's instructions-- State 320662). In particular, it should, in parallel with negotiations on a START agreement, seek a prompt, separate, bilateral agreement on the notification of ballistic missile

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launches and major exercises. The delegation should develop a draft of such an agreement and provide it to Washington for review. In developing its draft, the Delegation should draw upon existing guidance as well as the following elements:

A. Types of exercises to be notified. [to be provided]

-- Other exercises if the side conducting the exercises believe they may be of concern to the other side.

-- In presenting these criteria, the Delegation is authorized to provide examples of exercises that would be notified, drawing on U.S. exercises listed in the IG report dated

B. Notification Procedures for major exercises.

-- The delegation should propose a semi-annual exchange of planned exercises [in addition to the notification 3-5 days in advance of individual exercises.]

-- The notification should include the designation of the exercise, if any; the general purpose of the exercise; the type or types, and numerical strength of the forces of the Party engaged in the exercise; the area and estimated month and duration of the exercise; and if possible, additional relevant information, particularly related to the components of its forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces.

-- There should be provisions for raising questions and for seeking additional information related to observed military

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exercises, as well as for providing additional information on a voluntary basis.

C. Allied forces

-- The Delegation should make clear that the exercise notification measure does not apply to allied forces participating in joint exercises.

7. Backfire. The delegation should make clear to the Soviets that we continue to believe that Backfire has inherent intercontinental capabilities and must therefore be included as a heavy bomber in START. The Delegation may point out that the US is disappointed that the Soviet Delegation has not responded to our questions regarding the October 28 "flight profile". At its discretion, the Delegation is authorized to probe the Soviets more directly on the profile. (FYI. More direct questions will be provided septel. End FYI).

8. Non-deployed missiles and reconstitution. Delegation should seek Soviet acceptance of the constraints on non-deployed ballistic missiles that it introduced during the second round. In doing so, the delegation is authorized to draw upon the following additional guidance.

-- The U.S. proposal for a ban on the development, testing or deployment of a rapid reload capability for fixed ICBM launchers would apply without any geographic restrictions (i.e.,

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not only at ICBM complexes).

[-- The delegation is authorized to clarify that neither the U.S. proposals on rapid reload/reconstitution nor our proposed confidence-building measures would apply special restrictions on flight testing from operational ICBM and SLBM launchers.]

-- The delegation may point out to the Soviets that special provisions will need to be worked out to permit some missiles or missile components retired to meet the ballistic missile ceilings to be used for [space launch purposes.]

9. Definitions, counting and type rules. The Delegation is authorized to draw on the following additional guidance.

-- [Definition/counting rule for throw-weight]

-- [Possible criteria for defining future bombers as heavy bombers]

-- [On the basis of the delegation's recommendation in START II-011, the delegation is authorized to propose that, for new types of ballistic missiles, the combined weight of the number of reentry vehicles assigned thereto must be greater than 50 percent of the missile's throw-weight.] [FYI. Washington will shortly provide guidance septel on the question of the payload to throwweight ratio for new types of ballistic missiles. End FYI.]

10. Mobile ICBMs. The delegation should continue to take the position that, if mobile ICBMs are to be permitted under START, their deployment would have to be accompanied by cooperative

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measures capable of ensuring effective verification. The delegation should also continue to seek Soviet views on how they would plan to verify mobile ICBMs. The delegation is authorized to state that any START agreement permitting mobiles would have to provide for a range of measures specifically designed to ensure effective counting of mobile systems.

- [11. The delegation is authorized to accept a ban on the development, production, testing, or deployment of:
- surface-ship based ballistic missiles or launchers;
 - seabed-based missiles or launchers; and
 - earth-orbiting systems, including fractional orbital missiles.]
12. [Guidance on earth penetrators, soft landers, and MaRVs.]
13. Verification. [Guidance on access to flight-test data.]
14. Delegation should inform the Soviets that the encryption on the recent flight of their new ballistic missiles (the latest ICBM and latest SLBM) would impede verification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty we are now seeking to negotiate. The Delegation should make the following points: The Soviet Union has argued for retention of the SALT II obligations regarding telemetry denial. The fact that, under these obligations, the Soviet Union has undertaken such encryption, which the Soviet Union argues is consistent with SALT II, illustrates the inadequacy of the SALT II provision and its unsuitability as a

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basis for a new agreement. All encryption of telemetry must be prohibited in START. (FYI. Delegation should be aware that this issue will be raised in the continuation of SCC-XXII, and should, therefore, make sure that its handling of this issue is consistent with our efforts in the SCC. END FYI).

[15. Data Base Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Delegation is authorized to proceed along the lines recommended in START II-069.]

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