

Introduction

- The next round of the START negotiations, Round III, is scheduled to begin on February 2nd.

- The purpose of our discussion today focuses on the US approach to Round III.

- While there are a number of specific issues that call for attention today, most--if not all--are driven by one central issue.

-- That issue is, should we table a Basic Elements paper as proposed by Ed Rowny, during this upcoming Round?

- In order to be able to decide to table such a paper, we must first consider and decide the following four basic questions:

(1) Would tabling a Basic Elements paper, which would outline in broad terms not only the US approach to Phase I limits but also its treatment of Phase II issues, of necessity cause us to change the existing US phased approach to START negotiations? If so, is this in the US interest?

(2) What should be the US position on certain key remaining elements of the US position--specifically, how should we treat Phase II limits on bombers, cruise missiles, and throw-weight?

(3) Given that we can agree on the remaining elements of the US position and reflect them in the draft Basic Elements paper prepared by the Interdepartmental Group, does the paper proposed meet US requirements? Is it in our interest to table it at this time?

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BY and, NARA, DATE 11/9/05

(4) What latitude with respect to the Basic Elements paper should we provide to the Delegation? Do the draft instructions provided by the IG contain the proper degree of latitude?

- The papers which the START IG has provided walk us through these issues roughly in the order that I have suggested. Unless there is any general discussion, I would propose that we accept the agenda for today's discussion implied in the questions I have posed for consideration and move directly to a consideration of the first IG paper--the paper entitled "Major Issues for the Third Round of START."

(Turn to Tab A.)

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MAJOR ISSUE -- Phasing

- The first issue we face with respect to this paper is the issue entitled Phasing.

- The paper states that, as recommended by the US START delegation, all agencies agree that we should move away from our current approach of negotiating Phase I issues before Phase II issues and that we should be willing to discuss all issues comprehensively but only on the condition that the Soviets are willing to be equally comprehensive by addressing seriously all of what are now described as Phase II issues (e.g., direct limits on throw-weight) and not merely the issues of greatest interest to the Soviets (e.g., cruise missile limits).

- The paper then frames the current issue as a disagreement over whether the US should propose to implement START reductions in two discrete phases, or whether there should be a single phase of reductions.

- When I read the options provided, I find that the first option does propose eliminating the notion of phases entirely (which is consistent with respect to the way the issue is stated in the introduction of the paper).

- My reading of the second option, however, indicates that ~~it is~~ <sup>THE SECOND OPTIO
MAY NOT BE</sup> apparently not consistent with the introduction. It is, in fact, a lot closer to maintaining the distinction between phases that currently exists in the US START position than implied by the introduction to this part of the paper.

- If I could relate this issue back to the subject of the Basic Elements decision, I would do so as follows: **DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED**

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- Those supporting Option 1 (No Phases) would argue that if we are to be effective in tabling a Basic Elements paper, we must be prepared to collapse the "phases of negotiation." In their view, since the Basic Elements paper would put all US-proposed limits (both Phase I and Phase II) on the table, we should be prepared to step away from the current US position in which both cruise missiles and direct throw-weight limits are deferred to Phase II. Unless we do so, we risk losing our leverage generated by the Soviet interest in cruise missiles, while insuring that direct throw-weight limits get relegated to some later discussion.

-- Option 1 would certainly be a change in the basic US START position.

- Those supporting Option 2 (Keep separate Phases) seem to be arguing that in tabling the Basic Elements paper, our intent is simply to "show a little ankle" on the Phase II issues of cruise missile and direct throw-weight limitations. They argue that we can do so without altering the basic US position even though we table the Basic Elements paper if we do not authorize negotiations on Phase II items until we progress further in achieving our Phase I goals. The paper also indicates that one major concern some have with collapsing the Phases is that it places the direct limit on throw-weight at or below current US levels on the table for immediate negotiation. This, some argue, could be counterproductive at this point.

- This interpretation of the Basic Elements issue in Option 2 would mean that tabling the Basic Elements would not necessarily involve a shift in the basic US START position at this time.

- All this being said, I would invite comment directed to three basic questions:

-- Do, as the paper's introductory section states, all agencies agree that at this time we should move away from our current approach of negotiating Phase I issues before Phase II issues?

-- Is my characterization of the impact of this issue on the tabling of a Basic Elements paper correct? (and)

-- Would any agency like to add to the rationale provided by the paper on this issue?

(Permit agency views to be presented.)

(After some discussion, ask the agency most strongly advocating Option 1 to describe what it thinks this option, if approved, would specifically permit the Negotiator to do with respect to direct limits on throw-weight and limits on cruise missiles.)

(After response, ask if other agencies supporting Option 1 agree with this characterization.)

(After response, ask the agency most strongly advocating Option 2 the same question.)

- Well, I think this clarifies the differences over this issue.

- If there are no other comments, could we move to the other issues treated in this first paper.

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BY smf, NAME, DATE 11/9/05

Talking Points for January 25 NSC Meeting (8)

Limits on Heavy Bombers and ALCMs

- The START IG paper notes that all agencies now agree that we cannot propose a heavy bomber limit below 350 in either a single phase approach or in the second phase of our current US approach.

- The paper provides three options:*

(1) a limit of 350 bombers to be included in both phases of the current US position or as the bomber limit should phases be collapsed;

(2) a combined missile/bomber aggregate set at 1200 with a missile sublimit of 850 (thus allowing a side to trade ballistic missiles for bombers, but not vice versa);**

(3) an option which assumes that the current US "phased" approach is maintained and calls for maintaining a goal of bomber force reductions in phase II without specifying a number.

* ALL OPT. ARE US "BOTTOM L NOT TACTICAL NEGOTIATION OPENING

* THIS WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE CURRENT US POSITION. - MOVES US TO AN ENHANCED LIMIT (LIKE SAC) INCREASES RISK OF A TOTAL WEAPONS (CHARGES) AGGREGATE

- Related to this is the treatment of limits on Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs). Here two options are provided:

(1) limit ALCMs indirectly through limits on the number of bombers but provide no direct limits on ALCMs themselves; and

(2) limit the average loading of heavy bombers to 28 ALCM and limit the maximum loading of existing bombers to 20 ALCMs on existing bomber types.

- Agency positions are reflected on the chart on the bottom of page 6 of the paper. ***

- Are there any changes in agency views or would any agency like to elaborate on its position on these two related issues?

*** ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS:
1. TO JCS - DOES THE 350 BOMBER LIMIT + LOADING LIMITS (28/20) WHEN TAKEN IN CONTEXT WITH 5000 BALLISTIC WEAPON LIMITS, PROVIDE SUFFICIENT CAPABILITY TO EXECUTE

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Talking Points for January 25 NSC Meeting ~~(S)~~

BY any, NARA, DATE 11/9/15

Limits on Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs)

- Here the paper identifies five options:
 - (1) propose no limits on SLCMs;
 - (2) ban all nuclear SLCMs;
 - (3) limit SLCMs by means of a limit on the number of ships that could carry SLCMs (a platform limit);
 - (4) limit SLCMs to equal levels by limiting not only the number of ships that could carry SLCMs, but also the average number each ship could carry;
 - (5) continue to study the problem and either:
 - tell the Soviets that we are interested in limiting SLCMs but do not yet have a specific proposal, or
 - express no willingness to limit SLCM at this time, rather turn the discussion to verification should the Soviets press us on SLCM limits.

- You will note that with this range of options, the paper does not reflect where any agency's position may be.

- Could we ask for agency positions and rationale on this critical topic, and could we start with the military view? * **

General Vessey, where do the JCS come down on SLCM limits?

(Ensure that each agency has the opportunity to state its position and rationale for the record. This may be our only opportunity to capture these views prior to the decisions needed for Round III.)

(When all agency views are heard, if no further discussion, turn to the treatment of the other issues in this paper.)

*ADDITIONAL QUESTION ** - for JCS/DoD - discussions up to this point have highlighted the benefits SLCMs offer to US, have we done a full net assessment - comparing benefits from limits to the Soviets and potential benefits*

* REASON FOR ASKING FOR A SHORT SUMMARY OF HOW THE JCS PLANS TO EMPLOY SLCM IF DEPLOYED, THEN ASK FOR JCS POSITION ON OPTIONS.

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Talking Points for the January 25 NSC Meeting

Remaining Issues in First Paper

- For the remaining three issues in this first paper -- limits on mobile ICBMs, phase II throwweight ceilings, and throwweight counting rules -- the START IG has been able to provide to us consensus recommendations on each issue.

- Unless there are additional comments anyone wishes to make on these three subject, I would suggest that we accept the IGs recommendations.

(After any further discussion)

- Could we now look briefly at the two remaining documents:

-- the Basic Elements Paper, and

-- the draft instructions for the delegation.

(Go to TAB B for Basic Elements Paper talking points.)

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Talking Points for NSC Meeting on January 25

Basic Elements Paper

- The START IG has also provided us with a draft of the "Basic Elements Paper."

- You will note that it contains quite a bit of bracketed language.

- Our intent would be to resolve this language to reflect the decisions reached on the issues that we have previously discussed.

- If the language is so corrected, do any agencies feel that this Basic Elements paper should not be tabled during the upcoming round?

(After any discussion of this point -- we would anticipate some objection from the JCS to tabling the paper at this time)

- Does any agency have problems with any of the unbracketed language in the paper as written?

(After any discussion)

- Ambassador Rowny, could you describe how you would plan to use this paper if approved for tabling during the round? *

(After Ambassador Rowny's description)

- Do any agencies have reservations about the Ambassador's approach to using this document if approved for tabling?

(After any discussion)

- Given the above discussion, do any agencies prefer this document not be used?

(After any discussion)

- Let's finally turn to the draft instructions.

(Turn to TAB C)

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* ADDITIONAL QUESTION - TO ROWNY, HOW SPECIFICALLY WOULD YOU USE THE NUMBERS PROVIDED IN THIS DRAFT? WOULD YOU TABLE ANY (OR ALL) OF THE NUMBERS? WOULD YOU ADJUST TACTICAL NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY?

NOTE - IF THERE IS ANY CONTROVERSY OVER ROWNY'S FLEXIBILITY

Talking Points for NSC Meeting on January 25

Draft Delegation Instructions

- As with the Basic Elements Paper draft, these instructions include quite a few brackets that will have to be revised to reflect decisions on issues already discussed.
 - With the exception of the bracketed language, does anyone have any problems with the way the instructions are framed? *
- (After any discussion)

Conclusion

- Based upon today's discussion, we will draft the necessary decision document for you, Mr. President.
- Once you make the necessary decisions on the key issues we discussed during the first half of the meeting, we will have the Basic Elements Paper and draft Instructions corrected to reflect those decisions.
- If there are no further comments, I suggest we all wish Ambassador Rowny the best for the upcoming round and adjourn.

* THERE ARE A FEW TECHNICAL ISSUES THAT WILL STILL REQUIRE ADDITIONAL WORK

1. P3, PARA 6A - A DEFINITION OF A "MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISE" STILL IS NOT COMPLETE. JCS WANTED MORE TIME TO FRESH OUT
2. P5, PARA 9 - ISSUE OF ADDING A CONSTRAINT TO INCLUDE LIMITS ON THROWWEIGHT TO PAYLOAD RATIOS STILL NEEDS RESOLUTION
3. P6, PARA 11 - DISCUSS BANS ON SURFACE SHIP BASED BALLISTIC MISSILES, SEA BED BASED MISSILES, AND EARTH ORBITING SYSTEMS. THIS NEEDS FURTHER REVIEW

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... THE DECISION TO