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CLASSIFICATION

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

June 2, 1987

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On March 4, 1987 you directed me to reconvene the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism to review our policy for combatting terrorism and to evaluate the effectiveness of our current program. That review has now been completed.

I am pleased to report that the Task Force has reaffirmed that our current policy as articulated in the Task Force report is sound, effective, and fully in accord with our democratic principles and national ideals of freedom, justice, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. That policy, however, needs re-emphasis and its provisions and purposes need careful explanation to the American people.

Americans must understand that our actions in preventing and responding to terrorism are part of a conscious policy and an integrated national program that was spelled out in detail in the report to you a year and a half ago. In following the policy and the program we have been effective in countering terrorism. Hence, our commitment to that policy has been, and will continue to be, beneficial. The mistakes involved in our contacts with Iran caused a temporary reduction in credibility which has been regained as our resolve has become apparent. Indeed, our programs of practical cooperation with friendly states -- intelligence sharing, training and assistance -- have expanded and grown stronger in recent months.

In this program review the Task Force has focused primarily on an item-by-item review of the effectiveness with which each of the Task Force recommendations have been implemented. Where any new concerns or issues emerged, they were examined in the review process.

Overall we have found progress has been excellent and the improvement in our counterterrorism capability has been evident in the results. Most of the taskings have been completed. Others of a continuing nature are being effectively

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managed. In a few cases -- usually requiring the cooperation of foreign governments -- our final objectives have not yet been attained, but the efforts of the Administration have been vigorous and sustained. These situations were not unanticipated.

A detailed evaluation of the effectiveness with which the original recommendations have been implemented is forwarded as a classified enclosure to this letter-report. When the remaining work noted in these evaluations is completed, our program will, in a technical sense, fulfill the resource requirements of our national policy.

Although this remarkable progress is praiseworthy, I must emphasize that our vulnerability to terrorism, though reduced, has not been eliminated. This is a critical point which must be conveyed to the American people. Democratic societies are by their nature more vulnerable to terrorism than others. As a practical matter, in the face of extensive worldwide international terrorist activity, the United States will certainly continue to be a principal target of terrorists. Because of the growing experience of the terrorists and the sophistication of their methods, human casualties and property losses to American citizens and US interests regrettably will continue to occur. When we suffer these losses at the hands of terrorists, we must be prepared to minimize the impact.

Except in the case of a catastrophe resulting from biological, chemical or nuclear terrorism, the gravest threat is the potential political impact: a short term crisis, reduced American credibility in the eyes of others, and an upsurge in activity by terrorists who believe they have succeeded.

We can minimize the political effects of a successful act of terrorism against the United States so that it will not upset or cast doubt on our process of government or our leadership. To do this we must emphasize at all levels of government that adherence to our policy, our program, and our procedures is most important. Only in this way, by demonstrating resolve and consistency in dealing with the threat, can the political impact be blunted.

Evidence has demonstrated that our policy for combatting terrorism has been effective when carried out with consistency and supported by the expanded resources we are devoting to it. According to the latest statistics for 1986, the year following the issuance of the Task Force Report, the number of Americans who died worldwide as the result of terrorist incidents declined to 12 from 38 in 1985. Also, working unilaterally or with friendly nations we took preemptive action in several hundred instances to stop possible terrorist


acts against Americans and American interests. Finally, of special note is that only one American was killed in the United States by terrorists in 1986 and that a dozen intended terrorist acts in the U.S. were avoided due to the efforts of our counterterrorist agencies.

We should also highlight our effective efforts to deal with state-sponsored terrorism. Although terrorist incidents had been increasing for several years, there was a noticeable drop in Mideast-related, state-sponsored, terrorism in Europe in the second half of last year. This resulted from our strike on Libya last April, the expulsion from Western Europe of Libyan "diplomats" and "businessmen", and increased surveillance and intelligence. These actions produced good effects, thus showing that carefully chosen military action combined with cooperation with our Allies can be beneficial. In concert with other nations we have also selectively applied diplomatic pressure to good effect. Tightened airport and travel security has also contributed to fewer hijackings and incidents.

The best approach to a terrorist incident is to prevent its occurrence. Hence, we and our friends and allies have devoted increased attention and resources to identifying, tracking, and apprehending terrorists, and through courageous judicial actions to effectively prosecuting, convicting and punishing the terrorists as the criminals they are. This quiet, unspectacular, but very effective, police and intelligence work combined with a determined judicial process has resulted in a significant decline in international terrorist incidents and an increase in the numbers of terrorists in custody around the world. These successes have been the direct result of a step-by-step application of our policy.

I am convinced that we are doing a better job in combatting the terrorism now than we were seventeen months ago when the Task Force submitted its report. I am equally convinced that we must do better. As we increase our efforts we as a nation should not exaggerate either the threat, or the limited damage that terrorists can do to us and to our society. To do so only plays into the terrorists' hands by increasing their political impact. We must, therefore, emphasize good intelligence, careful police work, international cooperation, judicial process, and a controlled approach to public handling of terrorist incidents. Only in this way can we stop and then extinguish this criminal menace to all civilized societies.

Sincerely,



George Bush

Enclosure: As Stated

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 1

SUBJECT: National Program for Combatting Terrorism

DISCUSSION: The Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism was directed by NSDD 179 to review and evaluate the effectiveness of current U.S. policy and programs on combatting terrorism. In the process of this review it was found that elements of the overall national capability for combatting terrorism were distributed throughout a number of departments and agencies within the Executive Branch. This in itself is not inappropriate, as each office has assumed responsibilities for combatting terrorism appropriate to the mission or objectives of their department or agency. However, it is not currently possible to go to any one single source to determine where all components of the national effort repose. ~~(U)~~

All of the component parts of the national program for combatting terrorism should be collected into a single set of documents, where the various components can be identified as to purpose, responsible agency, resources available and assets required. Such a formal statement of a national program for combatting terrorism is required if the total effort is to be properly coordinated at the national level. Today the national program is not properly expressed in such a way. ~~(U)~~

RECOMMENDATION: A comprehensive listing should be established that incorporates all of the diverse elements and components of the national program for combatting terrorism. This document should be so constructed as to facilitate the management and coordination of the total interagency program at the national level. ~~(U)~~

The compilation of program elements prepared by the Task Force to establish the baseline of the existing national program for combatting both domestic and international terrorism will serve as the initial list. ~~(U)~~

The programming document for combatting terrorism will be maintained by the NSC staff in conjunction with OMB and the Departments of State and Justice. ~~(U)~~

REVIEW EVALUATION

The relatively simple, but still fundamental, step of assembling in one document all resource information about the component parts of the national program for combatting terrorism had not been done at the time the Task Force met. ~~(S)~~

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There is now an adequate programming document which contains listings of all resource allocations. This document is being maintained by the NSC staff and is updated annually by OMB in accord with the recommendation of the Task Force. The document is a reference document which does not establish budget levels or commitments. Agencies involved in the counter-terrorism (CT) effort can, and should, consult this document when necessary. ~~(S)~~

The Task Force concludes that this recommendation is being fully implemented and that the maintenance of this program document should be continued. ~~(S)~~

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 2

SUBJECT: National Policy for Combatting Terrorism

DISCUSSION: There should be a national policy on terrorism clearly expressed to serve as guidance for the program for combatting terrorism, the counterterrorism strategy, and the tactics for dealing with terrorist incidents. There could be both public and classified versions of this policy statement. Currently statements of U.S. Government policy toward terrorism are included in several national security documents. These existing policy statements may be sufficient and suitable for the purpose, but they should be reviewed to ensure that they provide the necessary guidance for both the development of the national program for combatting terrorism and a strategy to implement the national program. (U)

RECOMMENDATION: A National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) should be promulgated to supersede NSDDs 30, 138, 179, and 180 and to serve as guidance in all national matters concerning terrorism. This new NSDD should include policy statements along the following lines:

"The U.S. Government is opposed to domestic and international terrorism and is prepared to act in concert with other nations or unilaterally when necessary to prevent and/or respond to terrorist acts." (NSDD 179 and NSDD 180). (U)

"Terrorism is a problem shared by all nations. We will work intensively with others to eliminate the threat of terrorism to our way of life. States that practice terrorism or actively support it, will not be allowed to do so without consequence. (NSD 138) State-sponsored terrorist activity or directed threats of such action are considered to be hostile acts and the U.S. will hold sponsors accountable. Whenever we have evidence that a state is mounting or intends to conduct an act of terrorism against us, we have a responsibility to take measures to protect our citizens, property, and interests." (NSDD 138) (U)

"The U.S. Government will make no concessions to terrorists. It will pay no ransoms, nor permit releases of prisoners or agree to other acts which might encourage additional terrorism. It will make no changes in its policy because of terrorist threats or acts. The U.S. is determined to act in a strong manner against terrorists without surrendering basic freedoms or endangering democratic principles. The USG encourages other governments to take similar strong stands against terrorism." (Ambassador Oakley's speech) (U)

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REVIEW EVALUATION

At the time the Task Force met, there was no single National Security Decision Directive incorporating all basic elements of our national policy on countering domestic and international terrorism and outlining our response to the terrorist threat. The Task Force felt that the guidance contained in several NSDDs should be combined and updated. Also, in accord with the policy detailed in the Task Force report itself, certain policy elements should be contained in the revised NSDD. (S)

The Task Force concludes that:

-- NSDD 207 implemented the recommendation of the Task Force by amending and modifying NSDDs 30 and 138. It contains policy guidance to carry out the policies of the United States Government in combatting terrorism. (S)

-- This current policy is considered valid, comprehensive and consistent with our democratic concepts of government, principles of human rights, and international law. (U)

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 3

SUBJECT: Strengthening Coordination in Combatting Terrorism

DISCUSSION: The organization for combatting terrorism must be compatible with the overall organizational structure of the U.S. Government, be capable of administering the programmatic aspects of the national program for combatting terrorism, be able to generate a counterterrorist strategy, and provide the operational capability for dealing with terrorist threats and incidents. The existing organization utilizes the interagency approach in the form of the Lead Agency concept. The principal components of this interagency approach are:

- (1) the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, which formulates policy, manages the program, and generally outlines the counterterrorism strategy.
- (2) the Terrorist Incident Working Group, which generally operates in a tactical fashion to resolve threats and incidents in an operational context.
- (3) the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, which ensures that all of the resources of the intelligence community are focused on this problem.
- (4) ~~the assignment of Lead Agency responsibilities to the Department of State for terrorism overseas, the Department of Justice/FBI for terrorism within the United States, and the FAA for aircraft hijackings. (S)~~

RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations set forth in NSDD 30 should be retained with the following modifications:

1. There will be established on the National Security Council staff a position dedicated full-time to the national program for combatting terrorism, which will:
 - a. Be supported by a small staff.
 - b. Serve as Executive Director of the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG).
 - c. Be responsible, in conjunction with OMB and the Departments of State and Justice, for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.

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d. Provide, on behalf of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, both program coordination and policy recommendations regarding the national program for combatting terrorism, working through the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) and the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) and coordinating with appropriate Cabinet offices and Agency heads.

e. Serve as Co-Vice Chairman, with the Department of Justice, of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism. ~~(S)~~

2. The duties of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism in the Department of State should include serving as:

a. Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, with the assistance of a small secretariat staff for direct coordination with the NSC.

b. Vice Chairman of the Terrorist Incident Working Group.

c. Principal Administration spokesman for national policy dealing with combatting international terrorism. ~~(S)~~

3. Normally, the TIWG will remain in session for international terrorist incidents in which the United States has a substantial interest, utilizing principals and alternates from the various departments and agencies as required. ~~(S)~~

REVIEW EVALUATION

Every aspect of the program review has contributed convincing testimony that the current organization for combatting terrorism is sound, effective, and fully consistent with the established concepts of government operations within the executive branch. Working experience with the interagency approach has shown it to be efficient and highly workable with no anomalies. There is a solid understanding among all of the participating agencies for the lines of authority and responsibility. There is proper accountability built into the organizational structure. Only when the process has not been followed have serious mistakes been made. This is the strongest evidence that the organization and procedures are the correct ones and should be strengthened as recommended by the Task Force, and no substantive or functional revision should be undertaken. ~~(C)~~

It appears that the ongoing restructuring of the interagency committee structure directed by the Tower Commission will not change in any major way the functioning of the interagency process for dealing with

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terrorism. This being the case, the Task Force considers that the recommendation has been implemented. ~~(C)~~

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 4

SUBJECT: Coordination of Public Diplomacy/Statements During Terrorist Incidents (U)

DISCUSSION: The basic elements of U.S. policy and response guidelines should be delineated at the initial phase of a crisis situation to all U.S. Government policy makers and spokesmen. The process for issuing specific guidance and the rapidity and coordination required to adjust public diplomacy during an ongoing incident is deficient. Additionally conflicting remarks by senior U.S. officials can suggest disarray when unity is needed, compromise intelligence resources, and create political distress with friends and allies throughout the world. Precision is more important than responding to the media's pressures for a comment. (C)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The TIWG, at its initial meeting in reaction to a terrorist incident, should provide specific guidance to be followed by all U.S. Government spokesmen during the contingency. Legal issues must be carefully considered to ensure that press statements are not made which would jeopardize a criminal investigation or an eventual prosecution. (C)
 - The guidance should be appropriately cleared and communicated to the President through the White House Press Office. (U)
 - The guidance should be communicated by all members of the TIWG to the applicable responsible activity within each organization. Lead agency responsibility concerning international or domestic terrorist statements should be clearly delineated. TIWG composition should be structured to include appropriate expertise. (U)
 - The Deputy White House Press Secretary should be responsible for managing government statements and for insuring detailed and timely implementation of the guidance including any restrictions on statements by other agency spokesmen. (U)
 - Congressional Affairs Bureaus should be quickly provided guidance in order to help keep interested members up to date. (U)
2. At each step of the TIWG's deliberations, when further information is received, the situation significantly changes, or new actions are decided upon or planned, the guidance should be reviewed,

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updated and distributed as outlined above. (U)

3. The Public Diplomacy Working Group of the IG/T should:

- With NSC approval, provide updated general U.S. policy guidelines for public diplomacy aspects of dealing with terrorism and insure dissemination to all concerned Government press offices and diplomatic posts abroad. This Public Diplomacy manual should be maintained and updated by staffs of respective operations centers. (U)
- Initiate a system for real time monitoring and analysis of the media during the incident to minimize damage from potentially harmful press reports, such as describing troop movements, misinformation and disinformation. Insure a rapid distribution of this information to U.S. Government official spokesmen and diplomatic posts abroad. (U)
- Assign a representative to work closely with the Deputy Press Secretary to develop and coordinate proposals with the working group for approval by The White House. (U)
- Insure that the Public Affairs Incident Management Subgroup is activated at a very early stage in the crisis. (U)
- Insure that a dedicated communication system for public affairs information exists between key facilities. (U)

REVIEW EVALUATION

The coordination of public statements during terrorists incidents appears to be good. The spokesmen of the various agencies work closely together and the guidance from the TIWG has been adequate. Guidance is reviewed, updated and distributed as the incident progresses. The work of the IG/T during an incident is also effective and responsive to the demands of the situation. (S)

The Task Force concludes that this recommendation has been implemented. It particularly endorses the utilization of a press liaison officer attached to the State Department Task Force during an incident to ensure a coordinated press line. (S)

Particular attention must be paid, however, to explaining U.S. policy and practices in countering the terrorist threat even when there is no

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incident in progress. This needs to be done on a priority basis in the future. This is treated in greater detail in Recommendation 28 below.
~~(S)~~

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 5

SUBJECT: Policy for Active Response to Terrorist Threats and Incidents

DISCUSSION: There has been persistent public criticism that the USG is incapable of or lacks resolve for taking action in the case of a terrorist threat or incident. On the other hand, public opinion polls have shown that the majority of Americans are opposed to actions in response to terrorism that would endanger the lives of hostages or cause casualties to innocent bystanders. Obviously these two public attitudes are incompatible. This is a principal dilemma faced by the American public in dealing with terrorism -- Americans abhor terrorism but do not know what should be done about it. (U)

A more sophisticated criticism within this general public attitude is that the U.S. Government at least ought to be consistent in the actions taken in response to terrorism. Again, this is an unrealistic demand because acts of terrorism are by their very nature so varied as to circumstances of time, location, jurisdiction, and motivation that consistency in the response is impossible. Reactions must be tailored to the individual circumstances of the episode. (U)

Nevertheless, it is essential that some positive steps be taken to reassure the American people that U.S. policymakers will ensure consistency by using a standard reference during incidents to develop response options. Sample criteria for developing response options might include the following:

- Adequacy of information
- Reliability of intelligence
- Status of forces for preemption, reaction, or retaliation
- Ability to identify the target
- Host country cooperation or opposition
- International cooperation
- Legality in both domestic and international terms
- Risk analysis: What is acceptable risk?
- Probability of success (including definition of "success")
- Proportionality of forces and damage to the terrorist act
- Political reaction of allies
- US public attitude
- Probable media reaction
- Potential for collateral injury to those other than the terrorists
- Conformance with national policy and precedence
- Conformance with national standards of morality and ethics
- Timeliness of the response. (U)

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In addition, a major effort to educate the American people in the many ramifications of using force in responding to terrorism could be accomplished initially through the Task Force's unclassified public report. Such an explanation of the tradeoffs involved in the use of force in preempting, reacting to, and retaliating against a terrorist threat or incident could cover points such as the endangering of hostages, the death of innocent people, the alienation of allies through the violation of territorial rights and the destruction or damage to their property and facilities; complicating the hostage situation through the possibility of prisoners being taken from the reaction forces, the potential loss of life and equipment in a military operation in reaction; and, the invitation to reprisal operations by the terrorists or their allies or hosts. ~~(U)~~

RECOMMENDATION: The IG/T should prepare, and submit to the NSC for approval, a realistic set of criteria within which the key decisions on the use of force in preemption, reaction, and retaliation can be formulated. By addressing each threat or incident within this policy framework, a consistency in response can be attained by the TIWG, SSG, or other decisionmaking body. ~~(C)~~

REVIEW EVALUATION

The paper which the IG/T was to submit to the NSC has been drafted, but never formally submitted, nor reviewed by the NSC staff. The Task Force concludes that this final step should be taken to complete this recommendation.

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 6

SUBJECT: Response Options to Terrorism

DISCUSSION: There has been a publicly expressed concern that at the time of a terrorist incident, the National Command Authorities (NCA) do not have available an extensive list of pre-planned options for response alternatives. The popular perception is that given the unique and individual nature of terrorist incidents, the planners commence their development of alternative actions without the benefit of extensive pre-planned research. ~~(U)~~

The unique nature of terrorism, and the often one-of-a-kind character of a terrorist act, drastically limits the opportunity for set solutions or pre-planned options. Nevertheless, it would appear to be useful to establish an encyclopedia of options that could be reviewed in the development of the USG's plan of action. Clearly such a list of options would serve as an aide memoir rather than as a specific course of action in most cases. It would provide an additional tool which would expedite the development of a plan of action. ~~(S)~~

RECOMMENDATION: The NSC will maintain a list of current options for response to terrorist threats or incidents. This collection will be developed by the NSC in consultation with the IG/T and the TIWG. These options should represent the widest range of actions imaginable, covert as well as overt, in order to give our nation the ability to act with a reasonable chance of success when and if required, in a variety of possible scenarios. No options should be excluded because of a low likelihood of employment. This range of capabilities should better prepare the USG to respond appropriately to terrorist incidents more promptly and hopefully with better preparation. ~~(S)~~

REVIEW EVALUATION

This recommendation envisaged a system entailing an encyclopedia of options which (1) catalogued response options and developed op-plans for general contingencies and (2) developed a compendium of past experiences, lessons learned, and potential actions in combatting terrorism. ~~(S)~~

The NSC and JCS developed a range of options for a follow-on strike on Libya. They also developed plans for responses to Syrian-sponsored terrorism contingencies. Finally, extensive study has been done by JCS, CIA and the NSC staff of possible responses to contingencies in

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Lebanon and Iran. (S)

The Task Force concludes that this recommendation is being carried out and that work needs to be continued. The response options list needs to be comprehensive, all inclusive and regularly updated. The spirit of the recommendation requires that all action agencies participate in the formulation and updating the "options catalogue." This product should be reviewed and used by counterterrorism policy makers, planners, operators and intelligence analysts on a continuing basis in order to become an essential check list and useful tool for the key players in the counterterrorism community. (S)

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 8

SUBJECT: Current Policy Regarding Operational Security of CTJTF (S)

DISCUSSION: The U.S. public, our allies, and our adversaries, including terrorists, are not adequately aware of U.S. competence or resources committed to combatting terrorism. Current policy requires a system of cover, security and classification concerning all aspects of CTJTF. A public affairs strategy designed to announce U.S. counterterrorist capabilities both domestically and overseas while stringently protecting missions, tactics and procedures does not currently exist. Additionally, much of the protected information concerning counterterrorist forces has reached the media and the public domain. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), working in conjunction with the NSC staff and the Public Diplomacy Working Group should develop a comprehensive public affairs strategy for counterterrorist forces. Additionally, a perception management program which incorporates OPSEC, PSYOP and deception should be developed by JCS, in coordination with CIA and State, and forwarded to the NCA for review and approval with subsequent distribution to appropriate agencies. (S)

Care must be taken not to imply targeting the U.S. populace in a PSYOP campaign. The focus of the program must be to preserve U.S. CT capabilities and how and when these forces might be used. (S)

Objectives of the perception management program should be:

- To preserve essential secrecy about U.S. military counterterrorist capabilities and how forces might be deployed and employed during training and exercises. (S)
- To provide options to support crisis resolution short of using force, preserve essential secrecy of force preparations, movement and U.S. intentions; gain the initiative, surprise and superiority when forces are used; and, when necessary, support the security and withdrawal of forces. (S)

REVIEW EVALUATION

Final resolution of this recommendation is still pending although it has been the subject of active consideration in the past seventeen months. (S)

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The intention of the recommendation was to make it easier to refer to the U.S. capabilities for military response to terrorist threats and actions. This in turn should improve the confidence of the American people and our friends and allies that we do indeed possess the capability to effectively use force in reaction to terrorism, and through this more positive reference to our military counterterrorist force, more effectively deter terrorist groups and the states which may sponsor terrorism. ~~(S)~~

In fact, we have conducted extensive consultations with over 26 nations, during which we have outlined in detail the American counterterrorist force which is prepared to assist them during an incident should they request it. (See Recommendation 16.) ~~(S)~~

The existence of JSOC as the U.S. counterterrorist force is an "open secret" - having been the subject of a rather technically accurate movie -- and is referred to regularly in the press. ~~(S)~~

This is not considered to be a critical issue, but it should receive periodic review to avoid unnecessary efforts in an attempt to preserve secrecy when it is no longer in the best interest of the overall terrorist program. ~~(S)~~

This recommendation therefore should be placed on the agenda of the OSG for further consideration. ~~(S)~~

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 9

SUBJECT: U.S. Presence Abroad

DISCUSSION: The threat posed by terrorism to U.S. interests, personnel and property abroad, and acceptance of its likely continuation, has led to a number of actions designed to harden the target and/or reduce it in size. Those efforts have not been fully coordinated, nor have all agencies fully participated. ~~(U)~~

In a few high-threat posts, the difficult decision to remove dependents has been made and implemented. On occasion, only children have been sent home, a measure which automatically removes some parents as well. When matters become quite serious, major staff reductions have taken place. All of these actions are in response to actual or anticipated terrorist acts, usually after the fact, and are intended to limit the exposure. This reaction may represent partial achievement of the terrorist's goals, but the costs and consequences, real or perceived, of successful attacks on employees and/or dependents are probably and potentially far greater, particularly if nothing significant was done in advance to lessen the danger by, for example, cutting back wherever possible. ~~(U)~~

The "bricks and mortar" approach, making U.S. installations and residences more difficult to attack, is very expensive. Further, its effectiveness is limited to the extent that not all threatened agencies or persons are, can be, or are willing to be included in the protected building/area. Since terrorists will seek soft targets, successful efforts to protect one facet of the U.S. presence may result in increased danger for another in the same city. ~~(U)~~

RECOMMENDATION: The Department of State should direct Ambassadors in all designated high-threat areas to institute a thorough review of the personnel requirements of all Agencies represented in-country, in order to reduce the exposure of personnel and facilities to terrorist attacks to the minimum consistent with effectiveness. The review should carefully examine the question of hardening all Embassy-related facilities, or including them within a security perimeter, regardless of practices prevailing elsewhere. The Department of Defense should direct the appropriate CINCs to undertake similar reviews for their commands. ~~(U)~~

The NSC should create an interagency committee of all agencies with representation abroad to report to the NSC the results of each agency review, so that appropriate reductions of personnel abroad can be ordered. (U)

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REVIEW EVALUATION

Responding to the Task Force urging, the USG has decreased its exposure abroad to the minimum consistent with effectiveness. (C)

The Department of State and the Department of Defense conducted a study of US exposure abroad. 8.4% of overseas positions were eliminated or relocated with an emphasis on drawing-down at high security threat posts; staffs were trimmed in 20 small countries; 7 posts were closed; programs were restructured to make them less people-intensive; 12 DATT/Security Assistance positions are being merged; and restraints placed on travel. (S)

The Task Force concludes that this effort has been satisfactorily completed. However, the cognizant agencies should establish a procedure which continues to monitor levels of US exposure overseas so that senior decisionmakers will be able to respond to changes in the security environment. (S)

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 10

SUBJECT: Policy on Passports/Documentation for Government Employees

DISCUSSION: Following the hijacking of the Kuwait Airbus to Tehran and TWA 847 to Beirut, several Government agencies, departments, and services issued incomplete and conflicting guidelines and rationale regarding passports and/or travel documentation to be carried by Government employees when traveling commercially. Cover and back-up documentation and associated policy for dependents require further consideration. An important aspect of this issue is the need to educate government employees and their dependents on the cover they should present during travel. They must be able to explain their tourist passport, reason for travel, and travel plans as part of the cover. For example, passports of military dependents are stamped "No Fee Passport - Military Dependent". In most countries employees entering the country for permanent assignment. Airline tickets list official government travel offices as the issuing agent.
~~(S)~~

RECOMMENDATION: The Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, in conjunction with the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism, should institute a review of policy, guidance, and training currently in effect regarding travel documentation. Realistic, consistent guidelines should be established and promulgated through all the agencies concerned. ~~(U)~~

REVIEW EVALUATION

The Department of State established a working group to formulate a government-wide directive and attempted to improve information to travelers on security and risks of terrorism. Seven recommendations were forwarded to the NSC for interagency review on November 26, 1986.
~~(S)~~

The Task Force concludes that this recommendation needs to be fully implemented. The NSC staff should take the necessary steps to see that the interagency review is completed, the directive approved and/or amended, if appropriate, and disseminated for action. ~~(S)~~

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 11

SUBJECT: U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

DISCUSSION: Several recognized authorities have indicated that the U.S. infrastructure is extremely vulnerable to acts of terrorism or sabotage. Examples include the computerized banking system, power grids, and communications networks. Sources claim what is needed is a long-term program of security enhancement to minimize the effects of terrorism or sabotage against these facilities. Most sources agree that while there does not appear to be an immediate threat, the ease with which infrastructure targets can be attacked with potentially catastrophic results make them lucrative for terrorists in peacetime and vulnerable during open hostilities. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: Consistent with its responsibilities to develop federal program policy guidance and plans to cope with national emergencies, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under auspices of the IG/T, should take the lead to identify the extent to which these infrastructure assets are vulnerable. This effort should include proposed near- and long-term programs to rectify what appears to be a potentially serious national security problem. In order to implement this recommendation and for purposes of continuity in related future programs, FEMA should become a permanent member of the IG/T. (S)

REVIEW EVALUATION

FEMA conducted preliminary studies of the vulnerability of critical elements of the US infrastructure to terrorist attacks. The project is just beginning. Detailed studies are needed. The Task Force found evidence accumulating that demonstrates that such threats are real and growing. One NIE postulates a major potential threat in the next 5 years. (S)

The Task Force concludes that:

- The IG/T should take the lead in defining nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) terrorist threats.
- This effort must be given a priority for personnel and resources, and the work accelerated.
- The Department of Justice, as the lead agency for domestic terrorism, needs, in concert with FEMA, to determine how best to cope

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with domestic NBC threats. ~~(S)~~

-- Consideration should be given to contracting out the necessary studies. A status report by the IG/T to the NSC should be done in 30 days and any necessary follow-up work should proceed expeditiously following that report. ~~(S)~~

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 12

SUBJECT: Hostage Family Liaison

DISCUSSION: Government agencies have dealt with the sensitive question of liaison with the families of their employees who are taken hostage with somewhat uneven results. Responsibilities for the necessary contacts, information flow and guidance have generally gravitated to the relevant geographic bureau in the State Department, or to the affected service in Defense, for example, and this effective process should continue. (U)

At the same time there should be a clear-cut delineation of who is responsible, staffed and equipped on a permanent, agency-wide basis to handle liaison with the families of persons who are not employees, but for whom the Government assumes some responsibility when they become hostages. At present, this is done in State's Bureau of Consular Affairs. In recognition of the humanitarian and potential political importance of families of hostages, they should have a point of contact that can provide both needed information and, of perhaps equal significance, assurances that senior levels of the Administration are involved. ~~(U)~~

After the initial shock of a family member being taken hostage, families become increasingly frustrated and tend to blame the government -- not the terrorists -- for not doing enough to get the hostages back, even if that entails giving in to the terrorists' demands. Pressure from the families builds to see the highest levels of the government, including the President. Meetings with hostage families can place the Administration in a "no win" situation. At best it can buy a small amount of time, before the hostage families feel even more frustrated that seeing a senior official has not helped to return their family member. Unresolvable frustration could lead to the families taking advantage of confidences shared by the official in an effort to use the media to further their single, all-consuming purpose. ~~(U)~~

RECOMMENDATION: The point of contact for day-to-day liaison with the families of American hostages who are not U.S. Government employees should normally be the Bureau for Consular Affairs in close coordination with the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism, who as Chairman of the State Department Hostage Family Working Group has more direct knowledge of ongoing government efforts to secure the release of the hostages. Senior officials should state as a matter of policy that to meet with families of hostages during a hostage crisis could prolong it and thus delay return of the hostages by giving the terrorists the media visibility they thrive on as well as the belief that their demands are being

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considered. In addition, Presidential freedom of action in resolving the terrorist incident in the best interests of the country may be restricted. The Administration should resist demands for such meetings, emphasizing instead an increased outreach effort: a highly contact-oriented liaison program of visits, hot-lines, information on private sector counseling services, and a personal contact assigned for each family to keep them fully informed of current developments and to keep in touch with them even when nothing is new. In this way the families will know that Washington has the hostages' interests as a priority concern, and there should be less family pressure for meetings with senior government officials. (C)

REVIEW EVALUATION

The Department of State has enhanced its procedures to improve liaison with hostage families. Hostage families are satisfied with the progress and results. A senior officer is assigned as a point of contact for the families and contacts the family each week. 24-hour telephone numbers are available to the families. Families are provided counseling and assistance when in Washington. Finally a plan of action for dealing with hostage families has been submitted by State to the NSC following an NSPG which discussed the issue. (S)

The Task Force concludes that State has satisfactorily completed the action. The NSC staff has completed its review of the proposed plan of action and promulgated it to all agencies concerned. State should continue to monitor the needs of the hostage families, their changes in circumstances, and continue to be sensitive to family concerns. In addition, the Department of State should periodically review the hostage family liaison program and procedures. (S)

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 13

SUBJECT: Protection of Foreign Dignitaries in the United States

DISCUSSION: The Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security (Inman Report) noted fragmentation of responsibilities and duplication of effort in the protection of foreign dignitaries and missions in the United States. Noting the advantages of centralization, the report recommended "...the ultimate transfer of protective responsibilities of all foreign officials to the Diplomatic Security Service." However, the principle of reciprocity has been firmly established in the protection of visiting heads of state for the past 15 years -- they get protection from the same agency as does the President of the United States (i.e. the U.S. Secret Service). For political rather than security reasons, this system may not be reversible. Moreover, the liaison relationship benefits of discharging this duty are extremely helpful to the Secret Service in their primary function of protecting the President and Vice President during trips abroad. (C)

RECOMMENDATION: To retain the appearance as well as the fact of reciprocity, the current system in which the Secret Service provides protection for visiting heads of state when on state, official, or private visits to the U.S. should continue. However, in order to reduce some of the fragmentation and duplication problems identified (correctly) by the Inman Panel, the Secret Service responsibility should be broadened slightly to include visiting heads of state "and their accompanying spouses." This addition would preclude the overlap in responsibility that exists now in which the head of state is protected by the Secret Service but the head of state's spouse is protected by the State Department. (C)

REVIEW EVALUATION

The Treasury Department now protects spouses of visiting heads of state, via the United States Secret Service. (S)

The Task Force concludes that this recommendation has been satisfactorily completed. (S)

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 14

SUBJECT: Research and Development for Combatting Terrorism

DISCUSSION: In some cases research and development (R&D) for combatting terrorism has tended to fall between agencies. Each agency tends to fund R&D projects of principal value to itself. Because of lower relative priority, some proposed terrorism-related projects have fallen below the funded threshold. Others that have been funded, tend to duplicate projects funded by other agencies. In an attempt to coordinate government R&D for combatting terrorism, two different interagency committees have emerged: the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) and the IR&DC (Intelligence Research and Development Council), a DCI committee working with the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT). A subgroup of the IR&DC completed a study in October 1985 of R&D requirements for intelligence collection and support for counterterrorism and identified a budgetary shortfall of \$70 million per year for the next three years. Coordination between these two interagency groups has not been complete, although cooperation is steadily improving. The TSWG has identified an unfunded deficiency of \$29 million per year over the next five years. In the past, agencies tended not to assume funding responsibilities for proposed R&D projects. The TSWG has proposed supplemental funding for the projects, but reprogramming of existing or budgeted funds may be required. Recent interagency discussions have identified the Inman Panel supplemental budget request for the Department of State as an appropriate vehicle for funding the R&D deficiency. The bottom line is that R&D to combat terrorism is inefficiently funded -- multiple-agency funding of some projects and underfunding of others.

(S)

RECOMMENDATION: The NSC and OMB staffs should increase their coordination oversight of R&D related to terrorism. This coordination would reduce the incidence of duplication in the funding of terrorism R&D projects and the likelihood that worthwhile R&D projects to combat terrorism go unfunded because of interagency disputes over funding responsibility. (S)

REVIEW EVALUATION

The coordination of interagency R&D for counterterrorism has been excellent progress since the original report. Under the strong leadership of the Departments of Defense and Energy, the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) of the IG/T has established a sound R&D

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program which addresses both operational and intelligence research requirements. There are currently sixteen priority projects being researched. At the behest of the IG/T these projects were recently reviewed in detail by four eminent scientists from the private sector. Selected with the help of the White House Scientific Advisor, these distinguished individuals were quite impressed the type of projects selected and the manner in which they were being researched. (S)

However, the TSWG R&D program will fold this September if the Congress does not provide FY '88 funding. No funds were provided in FY '87, and FY' 88 monies could well be a casualty of Congressional efforts to cut the Department of State's FY ' 88 budget. Cancellation of this successful and important interagency R&D program will forfeit the research investment in fourteen of sixteen current projects. More importantly, cancellation will threaten the future effectiveness and perhaps even the existence of one the IG/T's most successful interagency efforts. (S)

The Task Force concludes that:

- Implementation is satisfactory and needs to continue.
- The TSWG deserves strong Administration support.
- As an interagency program, its funding should be highlighted as a separate line item in the State Department's budget.
- A special effort should be made to underline the importance of this issue to the Congress so that adequate funding can be provided by that body. (S)

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 16

SUBJECT: Country Team Briefings

DISCUSSION: A terrorist incident often forces an Embassy Country Team to deal with the variety of resources the USG has committed to combat terrorism. The Ambassador may be required to present potential options or describe our capabilities to the host nation. Prior knowledge of USG policies, resources and capabilities will ensure a quick transition to the necessary crisis management. ~~(C)~~

RECOMMENDATION: The Department of State should arrange for and require that all Ambassadors, DCMs, Chiefs of Station, and Military Attaches be briefed on USG policies, resources and capabilities committed to combatting terrorism. The briefing should be provided in conjunction with a risk assessment of the particular country and region. ~~(C)~~

REVIEW EVALUATION

Substantial measures have been taken to brief select senior host country leaders, U.S. ambassadors and other Government personnel sent overseas. The Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism now meets with all new American Ambassadors before they proceed to their post to discuss our counterterrorism policy in general and to review our country-specific objectives. The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) has augmented its Ambassadorial Seminars with special sections on USG policy and resources committed to combatting terrorism. Similar courses for Deputy Chiefs of Mission are scheduled for this summer. ~~(S)~~

The State Department offers its Coping with Violence Seminar to all USG employees going overseas. Many senior personnel from other agencies attend these courses. CIA and DOD brief their own personnel being posted abroad. ~~(S)~~

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security is revising its Emergency Action Planning (EAP) Manual to include generic descriptions of U.S. counterterrorist capabilities and the procedures for requesting U.S. assistance during a terrorist incident. Understanding of these procedures will be observed during periodic exercises of embassy Emergency Action Plans. ~~(S)~~

Interagency teams have briefed senior host country and embassy officials in 26 high threat countries in the Persian Gulf, Middle East, Africa, Central America and South America. These briefing

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focused on U.S. counterterrorism policies and the U.S. assistance available to host governments and embassies during a crisis. More detailed briefings of U.S. incident response capabilities have been given to British, German and Italian leaders. ~~(S)~~

The Task Force concludes that implementation has been satisfactory, but needs to continue to be given emphasis. In particular embassies need to be regularly instructed and exercised in terrorist incident responses. ~~(S)~~

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 17

SUBJECT: International Agreements for Combatting Terrorism

DISCUSSION: To deal successfully with international terrorism, treaties and agreements are required to facilitate the cooperative efforts among the nations upon whose sovereign territory the terrorist incident may have occurred, those nations whose citizens and properties may be involved, and those nations through which terrorists may proceed for deployment or escape. Such international agreements should as a minimum contain provisions to permit and expedite the exchange of intelligence information concerning terrorism; the investigation of terrorist threats and incidents; the apprehension and prosecution of suspected or known terrorists; and the extradition of known terrorists. (U)

Although there is much interest among likeminded nations for such international agreements, progress in reaching the agreements has been slow or non-existent. One of the difficulties appears to be that the achievement of an international multilateral treaty on terrorism that would be strong enough to be of practical utility, is probably not realistic. A multilateral treaty would necessarily be reduced to the lowest level of commitment of the least cooperative signatory. (C)

On the other hand, a broad multilateral treaty could be useful as a demonstration of the breadth of commitment throughout a spectrum of nations to the condemnation of terrorism as an international crime against society. (U)

To achieve more practical agreements in such areas as extradition, police cooperation, intelligence sharing, and the combined use of forces, bilateral treaties appear to be more feasible. A bilateral agreement which contains all of those provisions for cooperation that the two signatories can readily concur in can be consummated quickly. Such bilaterals need not be delayed by attempting to achieve cooperation in difficult areas. (U)

The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-83) calls upon the President to encourage the international community to focus attention and secure cooperation against terrorism world-wide. The law further provides the sense of the Congress for the President to negotiate a treaty to incorporate a variety of procedures to improve international procedures to combat terrorism. Consequently, it would appear that there are advantages in both the multilateral and bilateral approaches to cooperative agreements to combat terrorism. (U)

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RECOMMENDATION: Recognizing the fundamental importance of international cooperation to develop effective long-term deterrence to terrorism, the Department of State should vigorously continue efforts designed to obtain it. These should include:

1. Seeking general resolutions or agreements, subscribed to by as many countries as possible, which keep the attention of governments and people throughout the world focused on the need to combat terrorism. These resolutions should be sought in the United Nations as well as in more specialized organizations, such as those concerning civil aviation, maritime affairs and tourism, with a view toward creating an international consensus to take effective action against terrorism. (U)

2. The negotiation and ratification of binding international conventions, such as those concerning hijacking, hostage taking, and protection of diplomats, where there are possibilities for success. The negotiation and ratification of executive approval of treaties or formal agreements on a more limited multilateral or bilateral basis on cooperation against terrorism, either generally or in specific areas such as civil aviation or extradition. (U)

3. Agreements of a less formal nature on more effective multilateral and bilateral cooperation, such as that undertaken with the seven countries of the Economic Summit, or the bilateral real-time cooperation arrangement worked out with Israel, Italy, Canada and Great Britain. (U)

4. A special effort by all U.S. Government agencies to improve the international record on implementation of existing agreements to combat terrorism. (U)

REVIEW EVALUATION:

Considerable progress has been made over the past year in increasing international awareness of the threat of terrorism and fostering international cooperation to combat it. Progress reflects both U.S. efforts and the reaction of many countries to acts of state sponsored terrorism which ultimately led to the April 15, 1986 bombing of Libya and imposition of sanctions against Libya and Syria by Western Europeans, the U.S. and others. It is still unclear whether this cooperation will continue to advance in light of recent U.S. arms sales. Initial impressions suggest that it can, particularly in operational, non-political areas. (C)

In 1986, the UN passed its strongest resolution yet condemning

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terrorism. In a similar manner the Security Council adopted a U.S. sponsored resolution against hostage taking. ~~(U)~~

At U.S. urging, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is developing a new protocol for the suppression of unlawful violence at international airports which will supplement the Montreal Convention. ICAO has also accepted a U.S. proposed "security article" for member states to incorporate in their bilateral air transport agreements. The U.S. has initiated already a major renegotiation effort to include such "binding" language in its own bilateral agreements. Over 30 countries have agreed formally or have demonstrated an interest adopting acceptable new security measures. (Also see Recommendation 21.) ~~(C)~~

Cooperative efforts to combat terrorism progressed well in the EC and the Council Of Europe during 1986. U.S. cooperation with both these organizations also increased measurably on terrorism issues as it did in the Summit Seven context among member countries. Overall, EC member responses against Libya (April) and Syria (November) were unprecedented, demonstrating a clear resolve by all but one member (Greece) to work together against state sponsored terrorism. ~~(C)~~

Another positive development is that the Attorney General has had direct participation with Trevi and the FBI has assigned a counterterrorist agent full time to Interpol. The Tokyo Summit issued a strong statement against terrorism and called for the expanding the provisions of the Montreal Convention to encompass all forms of terrorism affecting civil aircraft. ~~(C)~~

The Task Force concludes that efforts to advance international cooperation against terrorism should be continued, particularly in NATO where progress to date has been disappointing. ~~(C)~~