



MEMORANDUM

ACTION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 26, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: HOWARD R. TEICHER *HRT*

830 SUBJECT: *27: 25*

Draft NSDD on Lebanon and Middle East

I have reviewed the draft NSDD on Lebanon and the Middle East. While I believe that the framework is correct, one principal policy initiative is absent: It does not adequately deal with the need for the United States and its allies to attack terrorist infrastructure in the Middle East.

There can no longer be any doubt that our lack of vigorous response or an activist strategy to defeat the terrorism of the last several years against Western interests has contributed to an environment where such actions are taken with almost no fear of Western reprisal. Indeed, state-sponsorship of terrorism, as illustrated by the CIA study on "Syrian use of Terrorism as an Instrument of State Policy," can only be expected to grow unless we act forcefully now. At a minimum, United States forces cooperating with our European and Middle Eastern allies, should wipe out terrorist infrastructure wherever it may exist inside Lebanon; moreover, the government of

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I, therefore, strongly recommend that a subsection of the NSDD should be included that directs immediate planning of a covert and overt strategy to destroy terrorist infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean area. **FOIA(b) (1)**

Recommendation

That you agree to include in the NSDD a subsection directing the preparation of an operational strategy to destroy terrorist infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean area.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

- cc: Geoffrey Kemp
- Don Fortier
- Phil Dur
- Ollie North
- Ken deGraffenreid

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NLS *F99-047/2 #172*

By *AMJ*, NARA, Date *3/9/06*

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Interagency Agreement and Differences on US-Israeli
Political-Military Cooperation

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(5)(e)

JPMG. The November 22 SIG reached agreement on offering to establish a Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) to discuss scenarios for pol-mil cooperation. The JPMG would be led by State (with DOD participation), it would first meet in January, and its establishment would be announced during the Shamir visit.

[REDACTED]

Exercises.

[REDACTED]

Israeli Facilities Survey. Once we agreed with Israel on a division of labor under various scenarios, and in the context of the military-to-military talks, we would take any appropriate specific steps to update the data base from previous surveys.

There was disagreement on four issues, and we need Presidential guidance prior to the arrival on Sunday, November 27, of Prime Minister Shamir:

- o The extent of our commitment now to pol-mil cooperation with Israel as illustrated by the scope of combined exercises and extent of prepositioning;
- o FMS financing of offsets in commercial contracts;
- o Continued suspension on shipment of cluster munitions;
- o Production technology for [REDACTED]

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NLRR M08-D987 #56250
BY FW NARA DATE 5-18-10

US Commitment Now to Politico-Military Cooperation with Israel

Scenarios. There is interagency agreement on the planning scenarios that we would discuss with the Israelis in politico-military talks. There is also interagency agreement on US policy in these scenarios. Specifically, with respect to Soviet/Syrian threats to Israel either across the Golan or in Lebanon, the US would be prepared to make a proportionate response, including military measures if necessary. For example, if Soviet-manned surface-to-air missiles became part of an Israeli-Syrian conflict, the US would take appropriate action to limit or curtail Soviet involvement, including the provision of whatever additional military equipment Israel needed to neutralize the SAM threat.


There is disagreement, however, about how we should prepare in advance of hostilities to implement our declaratory policy in Syrian-Soviet scenarios. Do we want to initiate an active, forward leaning policy to begin now to implement our commitment to pol-mil cooperation with Israel, or do we want to continue our more cautious policy of implementing our commitment in the form of assistance and support at the time of crisis? The basic policy question is illustrated by the issue of whether the US should use Israeli facilities for enroute access and prepositioning.

Prepositioning.


DoD believes

Israeli Facilities. There is interagency agreement that Israel's combat forces would not be used in Gulf contingencies, but there is disagreement over the extent to which Israeli facilities should be used for enroute access and whether we should preposition material there for Southwest Asia contingencies.

State believes



DoD believes



These two issues--prepositioning for Soviet-Syrian contingencies and enroute access and prepositioning for Southwest Asia contingencies--exemplify the basic question that must be addressed. State supports moving forward now to implement our commitment by telling Shamir that our pol-mil cooperation would move toward use of Israeli facilities for enroute access and prepositioning for Soviet/Syrian contingencies in Lebanon and Soviet contingencies in the Persian Gulf.


DoD does not believe that the lack of a specific commitment to preposition other than medical items would inhibit the forward movement of our political-military cooperation. Defense supports an evolutionary process, beginning with joint planning talks to define more specific requirements for

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prepositioning and other areas of possible cooperation. Through this process we already have defined our medical prepositioning requirements and would be prepared to address other items, e.g., consummables, in joint military planning talks with Israel.

FMS Financing of Offsets in Commercial Contracts



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Israeli economy for Sinai relocation (these unused funds had been available since 1979 and 1981). These transfers, added to the \$250 million made available for the LAVI, result in a \$750 million infusion into the Israeli economy.

Defense believes that, should Israel be exempted, we should work with Congress to achieve concurrence for Israel and other countries (i.e., we should apply the same policy to all countries).

Suspension on Shipment of Cluster Munitions

Israel used cluster munitions in 1982 in violation of our 1971, 1976, and 1978 bilateral usage agreements. In October, Secretary Shultz denied an Israeli request to lift the embargo, but asked for further information on the suspension's impact on Israel's readiness. The Secretary also said if shipments are to resume we need a definitive guarantee against further violations. Israel's defense attache has told us that the suspension has caused a shortage of essential ammunition, that Israel is moving to an all cluster munition artillery force, and that Israel could accept any usage limitation we wished to impose. Our grounds for imposing the embargo in 1982 were solid, but we are committed to Israel's security and would not pursue a policy that seriously undermined Israel's defense readiness.

Defense is wary of lifting the suspension on cluster munitions given Israel's previous violations of its 1971, 1976, and 1978 usage agreements.

State is prepared to tell Shamir now that we will lift the suspension, provided we can formulate a usage agreement containing the definitive guarantee required by Secretary Shultz.

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industrial base, retain jobs in the US and avoid pressures for subsequent release to NATO and Pacific allies. Moreover, as the LAVI design effort has just begun, and production would not begin until approximately 1988, we do not need to address transfer until approximately 1987.

State supports the release of production technology for the manufacture of composite components in Israel, and to so announce during the Shamir visit. A major objective of the LAVI project for the Israelis is to assure they have an internal aircraft production capability, not simply a way to replace old fighters with new ones. If replacement were the only issue, the Israelis could purchase a US aircraft, such as the F-16XL, which would have more capability and probably cost less than the LAVI program. In any case, State firmly believes the Israelis could not sell to a third country unless the US approved. The type of production techniques which would be used for LAVI will not be unique in the 1990s, and other countries currently developing such capability (e.g., the British, the Swedes for the JAS fighter, France, and Japan) also have sophisticated composite production technology. Moreover, Israel (which already makes composite components for the F-16s) will learn a fair amount about how to make the LAVI components during the approved design stages. Denying them the right to do it in Israel will cost them significant time and money until they can do it themselves. Approving the license would enable production to begin in about 2 to 3 years following approval.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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ACTION

October 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SIGNED

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: NSDD: Lebanon and the Middle East

Issue

Whether to approve the attached National Security Decision Directive on next steps in Lebanon and the Middle East.

Background

As you know, there is great urgency to move forward with a range of decisions on the Middle East including next steps in Lebanon, our relations with Israel, the peace process, and our policy toward the Iran-Iraq war. The Iran-Iraq question is being considered in a separate paper we hope to have ready for decision by the end of the week.

This memorandum deals with Lebanon and strategic relations with Israel and the peace process. At Tab A is the State memorandum which we discussed at the NSPG, October 18th. Attached at Tab B is Cap Weinberger's response reflecting the views of the Defense Department. While there is a great deal of agreement as to the nature and purpose of our Middle East policy and the directions we should take in the near term, there remain some outstanding differences about implementation. This is particularly true in the case of our future relations with Israel. Put crudely, George is prepared to go ahead with a new strategic dialogue with Israel and offer them more military assistance without demanding specific quid pro quo. Cap and the Chiefs insist that there be "something in return" for reestablishing close military dialogue with Israel particularly more Israeli flexibility on the peace process, withdrawal from Lebanon and an end to opposition to our arms sales to the Arabs particularly Jordan.

The draft NSDD that we have prepared (Tab C) attempts to compromise most of these differences but on balance comes down more in favor of George's position than Cap's. Nevertheless, I believe it is essential that Israel desist from opposition to our arms program to Jordan and that we get a promise from them to this effect.

The draft NSDD calls for specific actions in three areas: 1) within Lebanon; 2) isolating Syria and helping the moderate Arabs; 3) improving relations with Israel. In Lebanon, the NSDD

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cc Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

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BY RWJ NARA DATE 5-18-10

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recommends that we continue to support Lebanon but put pressure on Gemayel to compromise with dissident Lebanese factions to draw them away from the Syrians. We also urge that Lebanon work closely with Israel to restore Lebanese civil authority in the south and that Israel be much more flexible on its own withdrawal schedules. We also urge Israel to be more assertive with respect to infiltration especially from Palestinians and Iranians. We continue our support for the May 17th agreement. On the Syrian issue, we argue that the best way to isolate Syria is to continue our close cooperation with the moderate Arabs. In practice this means military arrangements particularly with Jordan. From the communications that you have had with King Hussein, it is clear that our credibility is on the line if we do not take stronger steps to get our programs approved in Congress. It is also recommended that we explore ways to exploit the confusion in the PLO in the hope of resurrecting the September 1 agreement by encouraging Hussein to enter into negotiations with Israel. On Israel two issues are important: strategic cooperation and the peace process. While going ahead with many items in the strategic arena the Israelis want, we also insist that Israel stop its active campaign against our arms sales to the Arab states. On the West Bank and Gaza, we recommend restating in stronger terms our opposition to the settlement policy and urge Israel to improve the quality of life for the Palestinians on the West Bank.

Recommendation

OK

No

RR

_____ 1. That you review memoranda from George and Cap at Tab A and B.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RR

_____ 2. That you approve the draft NSDD at Tab C.

Approve Ronald Reagan

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab A - Shultz paper
- Tab B - Weinberger response
- Tab C - NSDD

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