SECRET VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

WH06591 SECTION 01 OF 02

DELIVER TO THE AMBASSADOR AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

1. THE LETTER BELOW HAS BEEN SENT DIRECTLY TO THE CHANCELLERY.

2. QUOTE.

SEPTEMBER 10, 1983

DEAR HELMUT,

I DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR STEADFAST SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE'S DUAL TRACK POLICY ON INF.

OUR PREFERENCE FOR THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF U.S. AND SOVIET LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES REMAINS UNCHANGED. THIS PROPOSAL REMAINS THE OPTIMAL OUTCOME FOR THE U.S., FOR NATO, FOR EUROPE AND, I BELIEVE; FOR THE SOVIET UNION. AT THE SAME TIME, IN THE INTEREST OF EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES, WE HAVE ACTIVELY
Pursued in Geneva an interim agreement that would provide for equality in this category of weapons. Both of these proposals have been presented to the Soviet Union.

Regretably, the Soviets have yet to offer a serious response. They have not acknowledged the requirement for equality between the United States and Soviet Union or offered a serious alternative of their own. While General Secretary Andropov's most recent statement on INF has some positive elements, it falls far short of the Alliance's needs in reducing the SS-20 threat. It repeats unacceptable Soviet demands for compensation for British and French forces, for a ban on U.S. deployments, and for the exclusion of SS-20 missiles in the Asian USSR.

In addition, the brutal Soviet downing of the Korean Airlines jet, the Soviets' contempt for expressions of world outrage, their effort to mask the truth, and their callousness towards the victims of this tragedy and their families, have seriously damaged the international environment in which the Geneva talks take place. Let me reassure you, however, that despite this damage, my profound commitment to reaching agreement in Geneva remains undiminished.

While the Soviets have not yet chosen to follow a course in the negotiations that would lead to agreement, it remains crucial that Western publics understand that the United States and its allies are making every reasonable effort to achieve agreement. This will be especially important in the current negotiating round at Geneva, the last before United States deployments actually begin. Thus, I have been examining what further steps we might take to move the talks forward. This review, which is now well along, has profited from the ideas and concerns expressed by your representatives in recent meetings of the NATO Special Consultative Group.
I AM WRITING TO SEEK YOUR PERSONAL VIEWS BEFORE I REACH ANY FINAL DECISIONS. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE CRITERIA AND PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN THE ZERO/ZERO AND INTERIM AGREEMENT PROPOSALS REMAIN VALID AND NECESSARY FOR AN EFFECTIVE INF AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, IN ADVANCING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT PROPOSAL LAST MARCH, I DECIDED TO LEAVE CERTAIN ELEMENTS UNSPECIFIED IN ORDER TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY FOR AMBASSADOR NITZE TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR PROGRESS. IN THE COURSE OF THE FALL ROUND, IT MAY PROVE USEFUL TO ELABORATE FURTHER ON THE INTERIM AGREEMENT PROPOSAL, AND I BELIEVE WE SHOULD PREPARE TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO DO SO. OUR OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY AND IMAGINATION OF ITS OWN, TO SHOW OUR OWN PUBLICS THAT OUR PROPOSALS ARE CONCRETE, COMPREHENSIVE AND EQUITABLE, AND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE HAVE CREATED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR AGREEMENT, IF THE SOVIETS ARE INTERESTED IN A FAIR OUTCOME.

IN THIS LIGHT, AMBASSADOR NITZE COULD INITIATE THIS COURSE BY PRESENTING GENERAL STATEMENTS REGARDING THE SUBSTANTIATIVE ELEMENTS ADDRESSED BELOW. IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, GREATER DETAIL COULD BE ADDED AS APPROPRIATE. OUR OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO POSITION OURSELVES SO THAT WE WOULD HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THE U.S., IN CONCERT WITH ITS ALLIES, HAD MADE A COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT BEFORE DEPLOYMENTS Began.

THE SUBSTANTIATIVE ELEMENTS OF THIS APPROACH WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

1. THE PERSHING II SYSTEM MUST BE RETAINED SHORT OF SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE ZERO/ZERO OUTCOME. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ASSURE THE SOVIETS AND WESTERN PUBLICS THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT INVOLVING SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS FROM CURRENT SOVIET AND PLANNED NATO DEPLOYMENT
LEVELS, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO APPORTION, IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER, THE REDUCTIONS OF PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. THIS OFFER SHOULD HELP MEET THE SOVIET CONCERN THAT THE PERSHING II REPRESENTS A PARTICULARLY SERIOUS THREAT TO ITS SECURITY. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH OUR AGREEMENT IN NATO THAT A MIXED FORCE OF BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILES PROVIDES THE BEST DETERRENT.

2. WE SHOULD OFFER, IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR EQUAL, GLOBAL LIMITS ON LRINF MISSILES, TO CONSIDER A U.S. COMMITMENT NOT TO OFFSET THE ENTIRE SOVIET GLOBAL LRINF MISSILE DEPLOYMENT BY U.S. DEPLOYMENTS OF LRINF MISSILES IN EUROPE. TO IMPLEMENT THIS, I WOULD AUTHORIZE AMBASSADOR NITZE, IN THE CONTEXT OF SUCH A GLOBAL AGREEMENT, TO EXPLORE IN GENERAL TERMS SOVIET VIEWS ON ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING 918
SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SIT434  AN011562

DISTRIBUTION: JP RLPH SIT LEHM SMRS /06

OP IMMED
DE [redacted] 6592 2532231
O 102319Z SEP 83 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

WH6591 FINAL SECTION OF O2

THIS COMMITMENT. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, RETAIN THE RIGHT TO DEPLOY
LRINF MISSILES ELSEWHERE TO REACH THE GLOBAL CEILING. SUCH A MOVE
WOULD MEET A MAJOR STATED SOVIET CONCERN WHILE MAINTAINING THE INTE-
GRITY OF OUR GLOBAL APPROACH.

3. WHILE WE MUST CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON LRINF MISSILES AS THE
SYSTEMS OF GREATEST CONCERN TO BOTH SIDES, WE SHOULD BE PRE-
PARED TO CONSIDER PROPOSALS INVOLVING US AND SOVIET LRINF AIRCRAFT
THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH ALLIED CRITERIA FOR AN INF AGREEMENT.
THUS, I WOULD AUTHORIZE AMBASSADOR NITZE TO EXPLORE IN GENERAL
TERMS POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON LONGER-RANGE INF AIRCRAFT, AND
TO INVITE THE SOVIETS TO OFFER THEIR VIEWS ON HOW SUCH A
LIMITATION COULD BE FORMULATED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK WHICH
ADDRESSES EQUAL VERIFIABLE LIMITS ON U.S. AND SOVIET LRINF
AIRCRAFT AND WHICH DOES NOT DEGRADE NATO'S CONVENTIONAL
DETERRENT. AS WITH THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF OUR APPROACH, THIS
WOULD DEMONSTRATE U.S. FLEXIBILITY IN MEETING A MAJOR SOVIET
CONCERN WHILE UPHOLDING OUR CRITERIA FOR AN INF AGREEMENT.

THROUGH THE END OF THE YEAR, WE MUST WORK CLOSELY TO ENSURE
THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENTS TAKE PLACE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT MAKING THEM UNNECESSARY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST CONTINUE TO PURSUE VIGOROUSLY THE NEGOTIATING TRACK OF THE 1979 DECISION. WE MUST ALSO USE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE THAT OUR DEEP COMMITMENT TO SUCCESS IN GENEVA IS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD.

IT WOULD ENORMOUSLY ASSIST OUR REVIEW IF I COULD HAVE THE BENEFIT OF YOUR VIEWS ON THE ABOVE PROPOSALS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. WHILE TIMING OF ANY MOVES REMAINS TO BE DETERMINED, I KNOW YOU WILL AGREE THAT IT IS MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER THAT WE AGGRESSIVELY PURSUE AN INF AGREEMENT THAT FULFILLS OUR CRITERIA. I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR RESPONSE.

RON