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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II  
90513

April 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
From: George P. Shultz *G.P.S.*  
Subject: Accelerating the Negotiations on Lebanon

Phil Habib has concluded that we have reached a basic decision point in the Israel-Lebanon negotiations. We can either push forward to bring them to an early conclusion, or accept the prospect of an impasse followed by protracted negotiations. I believe it is vitally important to our interests in the region that we not allow these negotiations to drag on. Both sides, however, have frozen their positions on the major outstanding issues; some new impetus will be required to force the pace of decision. Both Phil and Sam Lewis recommend that I come to the area for this purpose.

Consequently, I would like your authorization to visit the Middle East within the coming few days for the purpose of pushing to conclusion the agreement between Israel and Lebanon.

### Trip Strategy

Phil was particularly concerned, when we talked to him Wednesday, that the situation and atmosphere in Lebanon were in danger of deteriorating. He believes a trip by me would inject new urgency into the process. Habib believes it would be useful to inform the Lebanese and Israeli governments of my proposed visit on Saturday, before the Israeli Cabinet meeting Sunday. We would then announce the visit from the White House. I would plan, first to stop over in Cairo to see Mubarak and meet briefly with our Ambassadors in the area to keep them up-to-date with respect to both the peace process and Lebanon. With Mubarak I would reaffirm our solid support for Egypt and seek his support for the resolution of bilateral differences that would allow us to proceed with construction of military facilities at Ras Banas and closer security cooperation in other respects as well. I would then travel to Israel and, following a clear declaration of purpose to Prime Minister Begin, begin a shuttle between Lebanon and Israel to push through the agreement. At an appropriate stage, I might also visit Damascus.

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- 2 -

Outstanding Issues in Lebanon

The major unresolved issues in the Lebanon negotiations include the role of Saad Haddad, UNIFIL, mutual recognition, Israeli liaison officers with Lebanese forces in the south, and trade relations (particularly Lebanon's agreement to end its participation in the Arab boycott of Israel). I believe I can propose reasonable solutions to these problems, but the Israelis will have to show greater flexibility on Haddad.

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I would also like a reaffirmation of your previous approval to offer both Israel and Lebanon an additional contingent of U.S. troops to participate in peacekeeping activities in connection with the withdrawal of Israeli and other foreign forces from Lebanon, but not in the South. In connection with approving the additional \$251 million we have requested for Lebanon, the Congress is now requiring that we obtain its authorization for any troop increases. We have worked hard to ensure that this does not mean prior approval. It seems clear, however, that additional U.S. forces, along with additional European contingents, will be needed to ensure successful withdrawals.

The U.S.-Israeli Relationship

As we recently discussed, I would also plan to use the occasion of my visit to Israel to have a serious in-depth discussion with Prime Minister Begin about putting our relationship on a more cooperative long-term

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- 3 -

basis. Recognizing that some of our differences may be unbridgeable, I would like your authorization to engage the Prime Minister in such a discussion. The objective would be to reestablish the basic sense that we share fundamental common interests; this would relegate differences to a lower plane and provide a positive framework and atmosphere for their resolution. In this respect, I would like your confirmation that I may inform Prime Minister Begin that, if Israel agrees to the new relationship which we are proposing, the U.S. would (a) welcome visits by Prime Minister Begin and Defense Minister Arens to Washington as soon as mutually convenient times can be arranged, and (b) be prepared to transmit the F-16 package to Congress as soon as an agreement between Lebanon and Israel had been reached. (We would not, in other words, hold up the F-16 package until Syrian and PLO concurrence on withdrawal had also been obtained).

I will also plan to discuss frankly with Prime Minister Begin and his associates:

- a) the new opportunities that our failure to reach rapid agreement on Lebanon is opening for the Soviet Union in the region;
- b) the importance of resolving potentially corrosive differences in Egyptian-Israeli relations, such as Taba; and
- c) the possibility of Israel agreeing to some confidence-building measures on the West Bank and Gaza (improvements in health and education conditions, for example) in order to restimulate the interest of Palestinian leaders in the occupied territories in the peace process. Inter alia, Israel should see it in its interest to bolster Jordan's supporters, as opposed to the PLO's, on the West Bank and Gaza.

#### The Peace Process

The focus of my trip will be almost exclusively Lebanon. But, while we pursue this goal, we will want to keep the pressure on our Arab friends to position themselves--and the PLO--behind King Hussein for real movement once a Lebanon agreement is settled.

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- 4 -

Therefore, I will gather our Ambassadors to the key Arab states in Cairo at the start of my trip, make certain they understand where we are headed, and send each back to convey to his host government our determination to complete the Lebanon negotiations very quickly and, thereafter, to turn our full attention to implementing your initiative.

We will let the Arabs know that while we tackle the Lebanon issue we expect them to be actively preparing to support King Hussein's entry into the peace negotiations, or risk being seen to be unhelpful. Delivering the PLO to this course is their problem and they should understand that your substantive position will not be changed in order to entice Arafat.

If time permits, I may visit some other Arab capitals, but only to reinforce this message that the next move in the peace process is theirs. With Israel, also, we will stress your determination to pursue the September initiative. We may want to strengthen our messages to key Arabs, particularly the Saudis, by casting them as messages or letters from you. I will suggest language once we are agreed on the general approach.

#### Conclusion

I look forward to meeting with you privately in the next day or so, hopefully at a time when Cap could be available, to go over the contents of this memorandum and how we handle any public announcements with respect to it.

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