

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

July 30, 1982

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: INF Package

INTRODUCTION. This memorandum and Paul Nitze's reports which are attached to it outline a possible compromise agreement that could break the deadlock in the INF negotiations in Geneva. For several months, Ambassador Kvitsinskiy has been hinting broadly both to Paul Nitze and to me that a compromise was desirable, and that we should produce it. With my full backing, and in accordance with his instructions, Paul has been working out a possible plan, whose basic structure we reviewed several times. Paul has discussed the possibility privately with Kvitsinskiy, as he has reported by cable. Paul and I believe the plan satisfies the principles which animate your speech of November 18, 1981, although it is not a zero-zero scheme. It does meet what seem to be the main Soviet objections to our proposal as they have emerged in the Geneva negotiating process.

Paul and Kvitsinskiy discussed Paul's draft package deal on July 16. Paul modified it in the light of Kvitsinskiy's comments, and the two men have agreed on it as a trial balloon each one will recommend to his government. They agreed that the plan can be presented by each as the proposal of the other. They also agreed that the proposal is personal, disavowable, and has no official status. Kvitsinskiy has told Paul that he talked to Gromyko about his conversations on a possible compromise. I have been fully informed and went over Paul's papers with him before his meeting with Kvitsinskiy of July 16.

In short, the compromise presented here is an American response to a strong Soviet signal. It is a modification of your plan of November 18, 1981, but satisfies all the criteria of that plan. It would enhance our security and that of our

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allies, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific, by achieving significant (and unequal) reductions in the most destabilizing class of Soviet weapons, their ground-based intermediate range ballistic missiles. It would be welcomed by our allies. There is no need for me to comment on its political implications at home.

If the Soviets subsequently back away from this suggested compromise we will at least have established that we have negotiated seriously and in good faith. This will be invaluable to us in both the United States and in Europe in securing support for our INF deployments.

#### Status of Negotiations

The U.S. has proposed elimination of the Soviet SS-20 missiles and older SS-4's and SS-5's in return for cancellation of our plans to deploy the Pershing II and the ground-launched cruise missile. The US proposal would prohibit all such missiles wherever located, would not limit aircraft or sea-based systems, and would not include or compensate for third-country systems. The US Delegation tabled a draft text to implement our proposal in February, has described the US approach in great detail, and has provided data to support our position.

The Soviets have made a quite different proposal. They propose a prompt moratorium, which would prohibit deployment of the PII and GLCM, but would permit the Soviets to maintain their present forces. This would be followed by a reduction in the aggregate number of medium-range missiles and aircraft in Europe on each side to 300. British and French systems would be included, as would US carrier-based aircraft. Only systems in Europe would be constrained, except that missiles not included in the 300 would be withdrawn out of range of the inner-German border. The net effect of the Soviet proposal would be to prevent deployment of the US PII and GLCM and reduce our tactical aircraft in Europe to a token level, with little or no constraint on the SS-20 and other modern Soviet forces in or near Europe, and none in the Eastern part of the Soviet Union. The Soviets tabled a draft text for their approach in May.

Each side now understands the other side's approach and underlying rationale. The present question is whether to attempt to seek a package that could result in a near-term agreement. All agree that the US should not make any substantive change in its position except in the context of an overall package that would be the basis for an agreement. Otherwise, the US would simply weaken its bargaining position with nothing in return.

Proposed Package

On the basis explained in the introduction to this memorandum, Paul Nitze and Ambassador Kvitsinskiy have agreed to refer to their governments the following package:

- A ceiling of 225 medium-range missile launchers and aircraft in Europe by 1987 (SS-20, 4, 5, Backfire, Badger, Blinder, on the Soviet side, and PII, GLCM, FB-111, even though it is not in Europe, F-111 on the American side.)
- Of these 225 systems, no more than 75 can be missile launchers. The US would not deploy PII; the Soviets would not deploy GLCMs. The Soviets would be limited to 3 warheads per SS-20 launcher; the US to 4 warheads per GLCM launcher.
- SS-20's in the Far East would be frozen at the present level-90.
- No constraints on British and French forces or sea-based forces, or ALCMs.
- A number of important supplementary provisions described in the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy memo, including the point that "the inclusion of Backfire and FB-111 in this agreement is without prejudice to their possible treatment in START."

This package represents an attempt at a balance of US and Soviet interests that meets essential US requirements. It has a number of advantages for the US:

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- The Soviets would dismantle about two-thirds of the SS-20's now deployed opposite Western Europe, and eliminate the older Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missiles without replacement with modern systems. While no INF agreement alone can remove the nuclear threat to Western Europe, since Soviet strategic systems can also threaten Europe, the agreement would represent a substantial reduction in the most destabilizing missiles in Europe.
- The reductions of SS-20's in Europe would be accomplished without increasing the number of SS-20's in the Far East. The threat would not be shifted to our allies and other interests in the Far East.
- There would be no significant decrease in our conventional capability in Europe.
- Only US and Soviet forces would be limited; there would be no reduction in or compensation for British and French nuclear forces.
- The US would fulfill its commitment to negotiate an agreement which would reduce the SS-20 threat. This would almost certainly lead to agreement by our Allies to deploy the agreed number of ground-launched cruise missiles on their territory without major domestic opposition. Without an agreement, many of the basing countries face formidable opposition to deployment and the outcome is very much in doubt. The deployment of American retaliatory missiles on European soil still capable of targeting Moscow would be a major step toward reducing the risk of war in Europe by making clear to the Soviets that any conflict, conventional or nuclear, risks escalation against the Soviet homeland.
- The agreement would demonstrate that substantial asymmetric reductions in Soviet forces to equal levels are feasible and practical, and that our arms control program leads to agreements that are vastly preferable to a freeze, which would continue the present high and unequal levels.

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- Such an agreement would constitute an extremely helpful precedent for the START negotiations, especially in focusing primarily on the most destabilizing class of weapons.

The disadvantages of this approach are:

- It would require major changes in our position on several key issues -- it is not zero/zero, it includes certain aircraft, and it would be focused on but not confined to the European region.
- It would result in the cancellation of the Pershing II deployment, and deployment of a smaller number of GLCMs than we now plan. Only the Soviets could have intermediate range ballistic missiles. (We could, however, replace the present Pershings with the Pershing IB, which would have all of the advantages of the Pershing II except the longer range.) Soviet sensitivity to the implications of Pershing II seems to be a significant factor in the dynamics of the negotiation.
- The Soviets would retain a sufficient number of SS-20's to target all of the major military installations in Western Europe. The SS-20 would continue as an important and visible presence in Europe.
- Verification of the number of SS-20 missiles deployed would be difficult and would require cooperative measures.

#### Next Steps

If you wish us to explore the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy trial balloon and I recommend in favor of such a course, I suggest that you reestablish the Committee of Principals which was the principal focus of arms control policy discussions during the 1960s. That Committee consisted of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of ACDA. That Committee functioned well in the past.

In order to minimize the possibility of leaks -- a critical element of this situation -- it is nearly indispensable now. Such a group could study the proposal Paul Nitze has brought back, and promptly advise you on how to handle the Soviet response when it comes.

We hope that the Soviet response will be positive, although they can be expected to propose changes. If they were to reject the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy suggestion, and if, at some point in the future, the Soviets should accuse the US publicly of stonewalling in these negotiations, we could refer to this initiative to make clear to European and American publics that the US has made good-faith efforts to reach an agreement. If the Soviet response is negative, and they do not wish to pursue further this approach, the US should hold to its current position.

If the Soviets respond constructively, the US will need to decide how to proceed on a number of questions of substance and procedure:

- Paul will need to be authorized to pursue this approach further with Ambassador Kvitsinskiy.
- The Soviets will almost certainly propose changes in the package. Should the US also seek changes for tactical and substantive reasons, or both?
- At what point should we consult with the basing countries and other Allies on this matter (including the Pacific allies and other nations)?

My preliminary recommendations on these questions are:

- If the Soviets respond constructively, Paul should be authorized to explore an INF agreement on the basis of the proposed package.
- The US should propose changes of its own in the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy package to strengthen our bargaining position in the negotiations. One or two possible changes are probably desirable in any event.

- We should make clear our verification requirements. No agreement will be possible without this crucial element which must be addressed forcefully and early on in any discussions.
- Establishing the Committee of Principals mentioned earlier which should meet periodically to make recommendations to the President on this extremely sensitive proposal.
- After the US has received a Soviet response and formulated its own position, we should brief the basing countries on the broad outline of our approach.
- Exchanges on the package between Paul Nitze and Ambassador Kvitsinskiy could commence before the scheduled resumption of the INF negotiations in Geneva on September 30, depending on the timing of a Soviet response. Exchanges on the package could be conducted in parallel with the work of the Delegations, although a decision on this point would depend a good deal on Soviet preferences.