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Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I see your letter as a confirmation of the importance of the relationship developed between us, as evidence of your good feelings. Indeed, along with significant political results, our meeting in Moscow has been given an encouraging human dimension - not only in terms of our personal liking for each other, but also in terms of warmer relationship between our peoples and their more correct perception of each other.

The importance of all this transcends even the US-Soviet dialogue, whose regularity and pithiness are highly appreciated by our allies and the world community at large.

Raisa Maximovna and I have warm recollections of the hours that we spent in an open and spontaneous give-and-take with Mrs. Reagan and yourself. We are very pleased that you had an opportunity to see our people, speak with them, feel their sentiments and see that they sincerely want to build relations with America in the

spirit of friendship, understanding and cooperation. The Soviet people, in turn, have met you up close and have come to appreciate your good will, and your role in everything that has been accomplished by our two countries together.

We are sending you a photo album. May it remind you and your wife of the remarkable days you spent in the Soviet Union, days that are destined to be part of history.

With our best wishes to Mrs. Nancy Reagan and yourself.

Sincerely,

Mikhail GORBACHEV

**THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON**

June 23, 1988

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *eps*
SUBJECT: Discussion with Soviet Ambassador

Soviet Ambassador Dubinin called on me today before his return to Moscow this weekend for the Party Conference and summer holidays. He delivered a letter to you from General Secretary Gorbachev which I am attaching. Dubinin promises the photo album in a day or so.

Dubinin also delivered a letter from Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to me on the Middle East, which, among other things, agrees that a meeting between Assistant Secretary Murphy and his counterpart, Polyakov, would be useful. We have proposed July 21-22.

Dubinin expressed the hope that the Geneva talks would get off to a good start when they resume July 12, and I told him we were working hard with our negotiators to make that possible. I assured him that our instructions from you were to make progress where possible, and noted that both candidates to succeed you are broadly in favor of 50% reductions in strategic arms, as is the American public. I also told Dubinin that we planned to keep pushing in all the other arms control areas, including conventional stability, chemical weapons and nuclear testing. With regard to the latter, I reminded Dubinin that there should be no delays in the Joint Verification Experiment, inasmuch as we needed to submit the TTBT and PNET verification protocols to the Senate in August if they were to be ratified in this Administration.

On regional issues, I told Dubinin about my plans to visit Southeast Asia and Central America this summer, and said I would communicate with Shevardnadze after those trips if it was useful to do so. On Cambodia, I pointed out that both we and the Soviets agreed that a return of a Khmer Rouge regime was not what we sought for that country. On Central America, I noted that our differences were sharper. On southern Africa, I hoped we would see some reflection of our Moscow discussions at the Cairo meeting.

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Dubinina asked me about the Toronto meetings, and I briefed him, referring him primarily to the public statements, but also explaining how you had described the Moscow summit to your counterparts in Toronto. I wanted that to get back to Gorbachev, and I think it will.

Dubinina raised the question of Soviet prisoners of war from Afghanistan. The Soviets are trying to account for their missing in action, and know some Soviet soldiers have resettled here. We will proceed cautiously, making sure not to hand over to the Soviets any information the war veterans do not want them to have. I made it clear we had no intention of leaning on anyone to go home, or to stay, for that matter. We may be able to provide information in some cases.

Dubinina said he had Moscow's answer to your short list of special human rights cases. The picture is mixed. Among the emigration cases, five (including the Zieman, Charney and Tufeld cases that we already knew about) are resolved, but four are held up by "knowledge of state secrets," and a technicality is invoked in the Gordievskaya case of interest to the British. The Stolar case was not mentioned. The other seven political cases are in various states of consideration of a pardon or parole. We are still analyzing the list, which holds out hope of further progress, but I told Dubinina I considered it an interim response.

Finally, I suggested that, as has been the practice, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze might plan to come to Washington just prior to the opening of the U.N. General Assembly in September, for meetings with us. I told Dubinina I thought it would give a healthy impetus to the work of the U.N.G.A. if we met -- and were seen to meet -- productively beforehand. But the prime purpose, and the reason I think Shevardnadze should also call on you, would be to move the substance forward.

Attachment

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