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April 23, 1988

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4/28MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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SUBJECT: The Secretary's Fourth Meeting with Shevardnadze

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NSC:CP

TIME & PLACE: April 22, 1988, 9:00 - 10:15 a.m., Foreign
Ministry Guest House (Bol'shoi Osobnyak),
Moscow

S/S

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.USSR

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
 Colin Powell, The President's National Security Advisor
 Paul C. Nitze, Special Advisor to the President
 Max Kampelman, Counselor of the Department of State
 Jack F. Matlock, Ambassador to the USSR
 Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)
 Ronald Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
 Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (EUR) (notetaker)
 William Hopkins (interpreter)

Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
 Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister
 Anatoliy Adamishin, Deputy Foreign Minister
 Yuriy Dubinin, Ambassador to the U.S.
 Viktor Karpov, Department Head, MFA
 Viktor Chervov, Soviet General Staff
 Aleksei Obukhov, NST Negotiator
 Sergei Tarasenko, Special Assistant to Shevardnadze (notetaker)
 Soviet interpreter

Also present on the U.S. side: Gen. Edward Rowny, Special Advisor to the President; Dr. William Graham, OSTP; Gen. William Burns, ACDA; VADM Jon Howe, OJCS; Amb. Henry Cooper, D&S Negotiator; Amb. Reid Hanmer, START Negotiator; Amb. Allen Holmes, AS (PM), State; Col. Robert Linhart, NSC Staff; [REDACTED] Troy Wade, DOE; Charles Thomas, DAS (EUR), State; Dr. James Timbie, D, State; Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter), State.

 Ambassador Nitze gave the first presentation, the report of the START/Defense and Space Working Group:

There were a number of positive elements of our exchanges yesterday:

- The U.S. side asked the Soviet side to put forward a text of an agreement on Defense and Space. The Soviet side did so, and now we are in a position where both the United States and the Soviet Union have tabled drafts of an agreement and a protocol. There are

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major differences over the content of these documents, but now we should be in a position to develop a Joint Draft Text in Geneva for review by the Minister in May.

- The Soviet members of the Working Group asked a number of questions concerning the U.S. proposal that the sides not object to each other's space-based sensors. The U.S. responded to these questions, and we had a good discussion with Gen. Chervov on this subject. As a result, the Soviet Union should have a better understanding of this question. We look forward to the considered response of the Soviet Union to the proposal the United States has made.
- We had an extended discussion of the outstanding questions concerning ALCMs and heavy bombers. The United States put forward ideas for distinguishing long-range nuclear-armed ALCMs from other ALCMs. The Soviet side said it would study this proposal and respond at a later date.
- The United States put forward the first data on our ICBMs, SLBMs and Heavy Bombers, and we discussed the numbers at some length. We look forward to receiving reciprocal data on such Soviet forces.

These positive elements notwithstanding, Nitze said, he could not report significant progress toward agreements on START or Defense and Space:

- On ALCMs, the Soviet side did not respond positively to the major move the U.S. made last month in raising the number of warheads to be attributed to nuclear ALCM heavy bombers from 6 to 10. The Soviet side continues to propose to count each aircraft with a theoretical maximum number that would substantially overstate the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs properly attributable to them. The Soviet position walks away from the agreement recorded in the Joint Statement issued on December 10, 1987, that the ALCM limitations would be on nuclear ALCMs.
- On SLCMs, the Soviet Union continues to propose constraints on SLCMs without effective verification. We put forward the concept of declarations as a solution, but did not receive a positive response.
- On sublimits, the Soviet side continues to link agreement to a 3300 sublimit on ICBM warheads to a

comparable sublimit on SLBM warheads. This approach is unacceptable because it does not recognize the first strike potential of ICBMs.

- On Defense and Space, the Soviet side continues to refuse to incorporate into the agreement the standard right to take action to protect supreme national interests, saying that such a situation should not arise. The Soviet draft agreement would expire at the end of the non-withdrawal period, and thus could not give either side the right to decide its course of action after the period, as agreed in the Washington Joint Statement. And the Soviet side continues to refuse to clarify the Joint Statement, proposing to repeat the statement with no clarification. As a first step toward resolution of these problems, we propose that the Delegations in Geneva develop a JDT from the proposals both sides have now put forward.

Overall, there were extensive and substantive exchanges on a broad range of subjects related to the Nuclear and Space Talks. The U.S. put forward some new ideas. The Soviet Union tabled a new text, but did not offer any new ideas to resolve the outstanding differences, Nitze concluded.

Shevardnadze thanked Nitze. He said he had not known his delegation was so bad.

Obukhov said both sides agreed there should be a separate agreement on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. There was now agreement to develop a joint draft text. The Soviet side had stressed the need to accurately reflect the language agreed on December 10, 1987. It had presented a document in response to the U.S. request; it reproduced the Washington statement in an appropriate form. The Soviet side hoped for practical progress, but this could only come if the letter and spirit of the Washington language was preserved.

The U.S. had presented some ideas on space-based sensors, Obukhov continued. The Soviets had asked questions, and hoped for progress. The secret was strict compliance with the ABM Treaty, not U.S. sensors that also had ABM functions.

The Soviet side had pressed for U.S. responses on key issues involved in a START Treaty. The U.S. had presented some ideas on ALCMs, and it was positive that the U.S. was willing to consider all of them nuclear-armed, but the Soviet side noted that under the U.S. proposals most U.S. aircraft and their armaments would not be affected. The Soviet proposal was to limit all ALCMs on a mutually acceptable

basis. It had proposed to differentiate among bombers, through external observation of bases and inspection of equipment. There had been no U.S. answers to Soviet proposals in other areas. The Soviets had proposed to exchange data on all components of strategic offensive weapons. There had been no progress since the data the U.S. proposed to exchange was selective. All questions were to be pursued in Geneva.

Shevardnadze asked if there were any questions. The Secretary suggested they hear the reports of all the groups first; then there could be additional discussion.

Shevardnadze asked about nuclear testing. Ambassador Paul Robinson reported. In the working group they had completed all the work on the conduct of the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE). The evening before the text had been conformed for Russian and English and found acceptable. The annex on detailed plans had not been entirely completed, but they had agreed to submit the initial agreement for the approval of the Ministers, and complete the annex in Geneva for signature of the whole agreement as soon as possible. At Semipalatinsk it had been agreed that a new satellite hole would have to be drilled, and the plan could be carried out. They had agreed there should be a new PNET protocol for signature at the summit.

Palenykh reported that the two sides had agreed in the working group to complete all the necessary documents for the JVE, including the draft agreement on the conduct of the experiment. They had agreed they should complete all annexes and appendices as soon as possible, and most were ready. It could be signed when they were all prepared, and that should be in the next weeks. They had agreed on nuclear explosions at Semipalatinsk in August, and in Nevada in July, with specific dates yet to be finalized. Concerning the protocol to the 1976 Treaty, the Soviet side had the latest U.S. text and the additional text of the Soviet side. They would need to reach agreement on how all this should be reflected in the statement to be issued at this meeting, in the next hour or so.

The Secretary said the nuclear testing people should be given a gold star. Shevardnadze said he would agree when they had finished.

Shevardnadze asked about chemical weapons. Ambassador Holmes reported that he and Batsanov had reviewed the work of the Geneva delegations. He had said the U.S. would address the Soviet proposal for a multilateral data exchange when the Soviet Union matched the extensive data the U.S.

had provided the CD, including data supplied by Ambassador Friedersdorf that week. The U.S. had agreed in principle to the multilateral experiment on inspecting commercial facilities, when the details would be ready. He noted Soviet agreement to hold a review conference in the eighth year of an agreement, and to reach equal levels during that year. The sides agreed efforts were needed to stem CW proliferation.

Holmes reported that the Soviets had wanted a separate statement on CW at the summit, while the U.S. preferred a passage on CW in a larger statement. The atmosphere of the talks had been constructive.

Batsanov agreed that the tone had been constructive. The U.S. had accepted the idea of a test of verification of non-production had commercial chemical industry facilities. There had been interesting discussion of challenge inspection. The principle is one of no refusals, but the U.S. is resisting this in the convention; it keeps open the possibility of refusal. The Soviets had taken a number of steps toward the U.S. concerning the number of inspections and provision of data before the convention was signed. They had agreed to treat CW in a section of the draft joint statement. There were a number of questions unresolved, but hope for progress in the future.

Shevardnadze asked about conventional weapons. Thomas reported that the sub-group had reviewed the status of the Vienna talks. They had agreed there should be an early balanced outcome of the talks, and a rapid start to negotiations on conventional stability. They had agreed that systems were not to be excluded on the basis of dual capability. The Soviets had suggested the formulation "conventional and other payloads;" the U.S. had responded that Soviet concerns could be resolved among the 23. The U.S. had responded to the Soviet proposal for an early data exchange by saying that the U.S. and the Allies welcomed the concept, but not outside the framework of negotiations. The Soviet proposal for a conference on naval activities had been referred to capitals for consideration.

To Shevardnadze's question, Grinevskiy said the statement had been agreed, and he had nothing to add. Shevardnadze asked how their work would be reflected in the joint statement. Grinevskiy said there would be a positive assessment in the overall statement, and a statement of readiness in the negotiations this year. (Chervov said under his breath that that could only be decided by the 23.)

Grinevskiy reported that in principle dual-capable systems were not to be excluded from the negotiations, and the discussion had been about how to express this. The U.S. did not accept the Soviet proposal, and thought the matter should be dealt with in Vienna. Shevardnadze wished to confirm that the U.S. welcomed the concept of early data exchange but wanted it within the framework of the negotiation. Grinevskiy said the U.S. position was for data exchange right at the start of negotiation. Thomas noted that the NATO communique mentioned tanks and artillery, showing that dual-capable systems were not in principle excluded. The topic was one for discussion in Vienna among the 23. The U.S. was for data exchange, but in the context of the negotiation. The language for the joint statement had been exchanged the night before: it called for an early, balanced outcome to the review talks.

Shevardnadze said that sounded most innocuous. The Secretary commented that "early" was important, and "balanced" was also important. Shevardnadze and he had talked about human rights at length. He sensed that with a real push in that area we could conclude. Shevardnadze said a push was needed in all areas, all baskets.

Shevardnadze asked about regional affairs. State Policy Planning Director Richard Solomon reported that the working group discussions to that point had focussed principally on the situation in the Persian Gulf, and the Arab-Israeli peace process. The group had found some general areas of convergence, yet also continuing divergence in matters of detail and implementation. There had been no sense of urgency.

Solomon said they had briefly discussed the dangerous military trends in the region, with the proliferation of ballistic missiles and chemical capabilities which made the environment increasingly ominous. Combined with the rise of fundamentalism, we may be facing a much more threatening future unless we can begin to defuse tensions and settle the conflicts in the area. The two sides agreed on that diagnosis.

On Iran-Iraq, Solomon continued, the group had discussed ways to bring about early implementation of UNSC 598. Unfortunately, the discussions seemed simply to repeat what each side had been saying over the past several months. The U.S. side felt there had to be greater effort to bring pressure to bear on Iran to end the war by finally adopting a second resolution. It had suggested a joint U.S.-Soviet call on the Secretary General to make an assessment of

whether Iran and Iraq accepted or rejected 598, as a basis for moving on the second resolution. Unfortunately, it had found reluctance on the Soviet side to embrace that view in a joint statement.

The group had had long and detailed discussions on the Middle East peace process, Solomon reported. While the sides again seemed to share the principle of making progress toward peace, their approaches diverged on two basic issues.

The Soviet side still seemed to favor an authoritative conference, with a plenary capable of making continuous proposals and recommendations. The U.S. side saw that approach as giving the parties an excuse and a pretext to avoid the burden of taking tough decisions and to hope the plenary would take care of things for them.

The sides also disagreed on the role of the PLO, Solomon said. Put simply, the U.S. side believed that if the PLO had to have an independent role in a conference, there would be no conference.

Solomon said the U.S. aim was to put together a process that could get negotiations started, and begin to build hope in the area. Without a process, trends would worsen, strengthening the fundamentalists and others opposed to making peace.

Solomon reported that the Soviet side had expressed interest in discussing Cyprus; the U.S. had responded that this was an inappropriate issue for U.S.-Soviet discussion.

The working group had yet to discuss Southern Africa, Cambodia, the Korean peninsula and Latin America, Solomon said.

Shevardnadze asked if the Secretary had questions. The Secretary said he thought Ethiopia, as they had discussed it in Geneva, needed to be on the list. Shevardnadze said he had it marked on his list.

Shevardnadze said the human rights people had just come in, and seemed raring to go.

Ambassador Richard Schifter (AS/HA, State) reported that the sides had spent the previous four days in intensive discussion of human rights and humanitarian concerns. The talks had been divided into two parts: a round table on institutional issues, and a working group on specific cases.

In their round table discussions, Schifter said, the sides had reached tentative agreements on two sets of future exchange programs. First, they had agreed to suggest to their respective health departments an exchange program on forensic psychiatry. Second, they had agreed to recommend to their respective justice departments a series of further round tables on specific topics relating to human rights and the rule of law, to be rounded off by exchange visits by judges, prosecutors and lawyers engaged in legislative drafting related to human rights.

In the working group, Schifter continued, the sides had begun and would continue an exchange of information on specific cases. They had noted some progress, and looked for further progress in the near future.

Schifter concluded that the discussions took place in a cooperative spirit, even when they dealt with very difficult problems.

Glukhov said the Soviet side agreed with what had been reported. They had pursued the objective of preparing the human rights aspect of the summit so that it could contribute to political relations between the two countries. They held discussions with a view to speeding up the resolution of issues. They had developed a sentence for the joint statement. Shevardnadze asked if he had heard only one sentence. Glukhov replied that there was only one, but it was a good one.

Turning to the Secretary, Shevardnadze said that because the Secretary had asked, he (Shevardnadze) had asked that a paper be prepared for him on the freedom of Jews to choose a route of exit from the Soviet Union without a specific point of destination. It showed that Jews could buy a ticket to go anywhere. Visas and papers were issued by the Dutch Embassy, which represented Israel. The Soviet Union had no responsibility for whether they went to Israel or some other country. This policy had been in effect for about a year.

The Secretary said he appreciated what Shevardnadze had said. It sounded consistent with our principle of freedom of choice.

Shevardnadze asked for a report on bilateral affairs discussions. He understood a lot of hard work had been done.

MFA USA and Canada Department Acting Director Viktor Sukhodrev read the following report:

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The discussions in the working group on bilateral questions in U.S.-Soviet relations had their traditionally concrete character and took place in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere. They basically concentrated on questions more or less connected with the upcoming summit meeting in Moscow.

First, the talks identified a number of documents which could be prepared for signature in the context of the Moscow summit meeting. The expectations of the two sides in this regard practically converge, with insignificant variations. The progress which has taken place since the Minister met in February in Moscow was noted.

In our judgment, it is possible to note with a certain degree of confidence two intergovernmental agreements -- on maritime search and rescue and on cooperation in the field of transportation -- and also the program of cooperation and exchanges for the years 1989-1991. We envisaged the negotiations beginning in two to three weeks on radionavigation and cooperation in the area of science and technology with optimism. In our view one can foresee that it will be possible to agree to the appropriate intergovernmental agreements.

There is also a realistic chance of reaching a long-term agreement on fisheries. The negotiations between Soviet and American experts underway in Washington should clarify the situation in that regard. According to the Soviet delegation, American insistence on a series of positions clearly unacceptable to the Soviet side is an obstacle to reaching agreement.

Second, participants in the working group agreed that one needs to begin thinking about the parameters of a possible summit concluding document. It seemed provisionally acceptable to take the December 10, 1987, joint summit statement as a model as regards the bilateral affairs portion.

In addition there were assessments of the administrative-consular talks which concluded day before yesterday. The Soviet side expressed its disappointment with the positions taken by the American side on practically all the questions discussed. There was special dissatisfaction with the fact that the American side was unwilling to resolve questions connected with the working conditions of Soviet diplomatic representatives in the U.S. Despite the fact that a series of such questions were raised in the personal letter of the Foreign Minister of the USSR to the Secretary of State of the U.S., not one was resolved over a long period.

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This is a question of creating normal living and working conditions for Soviet people on American territory. It is hoped that the Secretary of State will be active in the resolution of this humanitarian question.

The Secretary said that perhaps the matter should be turned over to Ambassador Schifter.

Simons said he had a few comments and perhaps a few nuances to add to the report. In general terms, he agreed with it. It was true that the atmosphere of the talks was constructive.

With regard to cooperative activities, Simons went on, the two sides had in fact reviewed the range of transactions and negotiations underway with a view to identifying those that, on their merits, seemed the most promising in terms of early progress and conclusion. There had been considerable agreement as to what those were, which was noted in the report. With regard to what the report called science and technology, there was a difference in terminology; this was what the U.S. side called basic sciences. With regard to exchanges, the prospects for working out a new three-year program of implementation under the agreement signed by the President and the General Secretary in Geneva in 1985 seemed good. In that connection, however, as he had said at the last Moscow ministerial, the U.S. side was strongly interested in agreement to establish reciprocal cultural/information centers in the two capitals. That would be an important and striking step.

Turning to living and working conditions for diplomats, Simons said these had been mainly discussed in what the U.S. side called the Bilateral Review Commission. Discussion had been detailed and intensive. A whole range of issues was involved. The U.S. side understood the Soviet side's disappointment at what it had been possible for the U.S. side to do in responding to the Soviet side's desires. But though it understood it, it did not think the disappointment justified. Both sides had desires for their embassies and consulates general. Both sides wanted a normal, decent life for their people. It was a question of working away at the specific issues. The U.S. side intended to do that, and it assumed the Soviet side did too.

Shevardnadze asked if the problem with science and technology was just the title of the agreement, or was more basic. Sukhodrev said it had to do with the concept. But there was a Soviet delegation going to Washington, and there was reason to be optimistic. Simons noted that the U.S. side

was working to provide the Soviets with a definition of what we meant by basic sciences. Sukhodrev said the question was well on its way to resolution. Simons agreed.

The Secretary said he had an additional point to make. The two sides had had their last discussion of the Pacific maritime boundary in October 1987. Since then we had been reviewing the results. We were now in a position to advance additional ideas. We were willing to host a new round of talks, as early as the week of April 25. He knew this was a short notice, but he understood Mr. Rybakov would be in Washington anyway, and perhaps he could extend his stay. Shevardnadze said that would be no problem. He was prepared and ready to do that. The Secretary suggested that the matter be put on his schedule.

There was also the question of consulates, the Secretary went on. In 1985 the President and the General Secretary had agreed to open new consulates in Kiev and New York. We had been struggling with this since that time. There were complications, including lack of money for new missions. We were now thinking that that meant moving to establish consulates by the end of the year. It would be hard to make them fully secure. Our expectation was therefore that we would operate what we called an unclassified consulate, at least initially. We would need Soviet assistance in obtaining office space. He understood the Soviets had given one of the buildings envisaged for us to the FRG. We had not expected that, but it was perfectly within Soviet rights to do so. We were thinking of having five or six people working by the end of the year. Obviously this would be reciprocal with New York. If the idea was acceptable, we could perhaps flesh it out in the weeks ahead and announce it at the Moscow summit. He would be looking at sites in Kiev where our people might work and live the next day.

Bessmertnykh said he would add that locations of interest to the U.S. side in Kiev had not been transferred to the FRG. Sukhodrev explained that the working facilities and apartments had not been given to anyone. But the U.S. had renounced the building set aside for a residence at Gorkiy Street 15 in March 1980. The Soviets were ready to give a residence on Pushkin Street. It was now occupied by the Red Cross, but the Soviets were ready to give it. The building given to the FRG had been given up by the U.S. when it broke the contract.

The Secretary said he had just wanted to register that we would be working on this. We were consulting with the Hill, and there were many questions. But the way to answer them was to raise them and start working through them. Shevardnadze said he had personally talked to Ukrainian

leaders about it. They had confirmed to him that they had two or three variants to offer. There would be no problem with facilities. The numbers should be resolved on the basis of reciprocity.

Shevardnadze asked the Secretary if he wanted to comment on the reports they had heard. The Secretary said they showed that the process the two of them had evolved, of interplay between the ministers and working groups, continued to be productive. There had been some progress in all areas. But there was plenty of work to do.

Shevardnadze said he agreed they had evolved a very successful work format. Other ministers were now proposing to adopt it. They might end up with fewer problems than working groups. The highly qualified experts had helped them out very well. He had followed the reports with attention. They had worked hard and usefully, and he would ask them not to stop. As for his meeting with the General Secretary, they might come up with some new elements and nuances. There was work on the joint statement to do, on its tone and substance. The world was following what they were doing, and how they were preparing the President's visit. So the content and tone of the statement was of some importance.

Second, Shevardnadze went on, he felt they should ask their negotiators in all areas to intensify their work. The negotiators in Geneva, in Vienna, the others should be more active. In listening to the reports, he had the impression that a good base was emerging. They were enriching the substance with new proposals before the President's visit. But there was a great deal to be done. Perhaps not everything could be finished, but much could be done before the visit.

Third, he went on, they should set up a permanently functioning mechanism of consultations in all areas, including bilateral and regional, pointing to the summit joint document. They should use those consultations more intensively.

On regional issues, Shevardnadze said, he would ask the experts to focus on Kampuchea. Yesterday they had talked about Korea and Latin America generally. Perhaps by the time the meeting with the General Secretary was over they might have some material for the joint statement.

Fifth, by the next summit bilateral affairs should be more active, Shevardnadze continued. Two or three agreements seemed to be emerging. If agreement could be reached on science -- the term was not that important -- that would be good. It would be good to have a number of bilateral things

signed at the summit. It would be a new phase in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. Until then they had concentrated on security issues, regional issues. They should keep doing that, but give new attention to the bilateral area.

The groups had done good work, Shevardnadze concluded. Of course, he added smiling, guided by the ministers.

The Secretary asked Ambassador Ridgway to comment on the status of the joint statement. Ridgway said she and Bessmertnykh had basically worked up to then through proxies. All the working groups had made their contributions. There were numerous brackets, but they were usually questions of organization and not of principle. They would take account of what happened during the day. It would be a brief but informative report that conveyed the atmosphere of commitment to intensive work toward the summit.

Shevardnadze said he could imagine two problems. First, how to characterize some aspects of the meetings. Second, how to deal with the fact that some groups had not yet given in material, but would finish only after the meeting with the General Secretary.

The Secretary suggested they meet in a small group format. Shevardnadze agreed.

(All participants left except the Secretary, Powell, Matlock, Ridgway and Simons on the U.S. side, Shevardnadze, Bessmertnykh, Dubinin, Karpov, Tarasenko and MFA official Evgeniy Glusov on the Soviet side.)

The Secretary said he had two items to raise.

The first concerned economic relations. When one considered the groups that had been to Moscow the previous week, he said, the government and business groups, there had been worthwhile and good meetings. The U.S. hoped to see an evolution toward stronger trade and investment. We were glad there were three joint ventures, with others interested in joint ventures. The huge turnout had been a good sign.

He did not know what should be expressed at the summit on this subject, the Secretary went on. Secretary Verity had brought back the Soviet proposal. We had looked at it. It was a lengthy document, and we had looked at it. But we did not think it would be an appropriate document for the summit. He had wanted to tell Shevardnadze that, because the General Secretary had highlighted the matter at his

dinner with the businessmen. We did not think our relationship was ready for it, and it gave us problems with the Jackson-Vanik amendment to conclude what would look like a trade agreement. The Secretary said he, the President and others were very interested in this side of the relationship. There had been a big swing upward in interest. It had been a good set of meetings.

The second item was whether there should be another ministerial meeting before the summit. He believed they should have one, the Secretary said. He did not know what progress they would be making. He could see a few items. They would have additional material to discuss. But both for substance and the picture they would present, they should make every effort to do and prepare as much as possible. Perhaps they could focus the meeting on the summit. They were going through difficult subjects, and perhaps additional progress could be made. But it was important to point to what would make the summit worthwhile for the Soviets and for us.

With regard to location, the Secretary continued, it would be normal for Shevardnadze to come to Washington, and we would be glad to have him. But he, the Secretary, was also prepared to go to Geneva. That might be taken as a signal that they would possibly complete a START and an ABM Treaty. The probability was not high, but they should not give up. Not giving up kept the people working hard. And if they did not achieve it before the summit, they would have to sustain the effort after the summit, to take advantage of the immense progress that had been made. They had talked about dates in mid-May the last time they had met. He was looking at May 11-12, but they would have to work that out. He would need to start in the afternoon of the 11th, since he had something the evening of the 10th in Washington.

Shevardnadze said the economic document they had proposed had concerned principles. But they could avoid being too hasty. Something like that took analysis. They could treat the topic in a section of the summit document if they were not ready for a big document. They were moving forward with some big projects. Hammer was involved; he was not just a politician. Third countries were also interested.

Concerning the ministerial meeting, Shevardnadze said that in principle he did not object. He suggested the Secretary discuss it with Gorbachev, taking account of his meeting with him. Gorbachev would have his concept of the President's visit. Shevardnadze said he personally thought a meeting would be useful. On the date and place he would perhaps get back to

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the Secretary. He had had some events planned. He could convey his answer to the Secretary through Dubinin, or through the Secretary's ambassador in Moscow. It would be hard to finish without another meeting. He agreed it would be hard to complete a START treaty before the visit. But miracles did happen.

The Secretary noted that at their press conferences they would be asked about another ministerial. They should be able to answer yes or no, even if they had no date to offer. Shevardnadze said they should consult the General Secretary, and then decide.

Shevardnadze said he thought they had covered all the ground. It had been a useful meeting, even though there had not been dramatic breakthroughs. The visit preparations were good, and there had been sound progress. It had been a good meeting. *MS*

Drafted:EUR:TWSimons, Jr.
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