United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Colin L. Powell - National Security Advisor
FROM: E. Rowny -- S/ART

SUBJECT: From Now to the Summit

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

* Soviet behavior in Ministerials and Geneva indicates they are not serious about an acceptable START Treaty by the summit.

* The Soviets will use the Reykjavik ploy again, fostering the impression that START is "do-able" by the summit, thereby putting the heat on us, and on SDI in particular.

* We must broaden the debate: stress the four part agenda while raising the serious US-Soviet differences in arms control. The "success" of the Moscow summit must not hinge on arms control.

* We must focus on the issues, not the calendar. It would be a great disservice to the President and the country to conclude a START Treaty in which we did not have full confidence.

STRATEGY AND OVERVIEW:

With the date for the next summit now set, we must realistically assess the situation. The lack of progress at the March ministerial, because the Soviets came empty-handed, shows that they are not so interested in completing arms control agreements by the next summit that they will accommodate key US interests. If they were, they would not have squandered in Geneva and the Ministerials the valuable time between the Washington and Moscow summits.

In Geneva, Soviet foot-dragging in START, and their almost catatonic behavior in Defense & Space, show that they hope to bypass Geneva, using the ministerial meetings to put the squeeze on us. They will continue to try to raise public expectations for a START Treaty, promoting the idea that one is achievable by May. They will also try to blame us and SDI if no START agreement is reached, precisely the ploy they used after Reykjavik. This is classic Soviet negotiating, and should surprise no one.

Our interest lies in controlling public expectations, and in foiling the Soviet scheme. We must not permit Ministerials to attempt to do the work which should be done in Geneva. If the Soviets persist in their pattern, we must expose it to the public. We must make sure now that the public and the allies understand that finishing a START Treaty is not just a matter of time -- that there are important substantive disagreements rooted in each side's view of the role of nuclear weapons.

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Further, any blame for failure to reach a START agreement due to linkage to D&S issues must fall squarely on the Soviet Union, not on SDI. Otherwise, the Soviets will achieve one of their top priority strategic objectives -- stigmatizing SDI. We must point out substantive disagreements in START, and make it clear in D&S that START reductions will not be contingent on SDI.

Finally, we must not allow the idea that the success of the Moscow summit hinges on arms control. Our four pillar agenda has been making some progress recently, and nothing could be better for the US than to promote balance in the US-Soviet relationship by having a Moscow summit that is not an "arms control summit."

START

Prospects: We must conclude from the limited time available and the Soviet attitude that, though possible, it is unrealistic to expect to conclude a START Treaty in our national interest by the summit. The problem is greater than the formidable but purely technical task of preparing the documents. The problem is one of (1), continuing, fundamental differences on substance between us and the Soviets; and (2), more importantly, of valid, conflicting US national security interests which should not undergo a forced reconciliation for the sake of making the Moscow summit more "successful." The summit will be a success simply by taking place; a START Treaty will affect US capabilities essential to extended deterrence, and will shape US strategic forces for decades. We must work deliberately and dispassionately. Our guiding principle should be to focus on the issues, not the calendar.

The Dilemma: Two compelling national security interests place us on the horns of a dilemma in START. On one hand, effective deterrence for the future demands that we acquire a mobile ICBM force, and deploy long-range conventional cruise missiles. There is broad support in the Congress for mobile ICBMs, and fifty-three Senators have recently said that conventional cruise missiles are vital to our deterrent.

On the other hand, our standards of verification in arms control may not be compatible with our other security interests, and for some types of weapons may not be attainable. This is especially true of mobile ICBMs and cruise missiles. Admiral Crowe has pointed out that the problems cannot be resolved by assigning more resources to them. The Soviets will attempt to force us to buy intrusive verification (especially of SLCMs and ALCMs) that will be unacceptable as well as ineffective, drive us to compromise our verification standards (on mobiles), and offer us fig leaf solutions that sacrifice important future capabilities like long-range conventional cruise missiles. Any of these outcomes will result in hell to pay in the Senate.

Our experience with the Senate in INF should be an object lesson in what to expect on START. INF zeroes out the weapons it covers, bans production and testing, and provides for unprecedented,
intrusive verification. The Senate has nevertheless raised a number of serious questions regarding its verifiability.

Yet INF verification is truly child's play compared with START. START verification is not only far more difficult, but far more complex as well. It will involve many times the number of inspections and the cost -- and in the Senate's view many times the importance -- of INF. As one Senator said, START deals with "real bullets." The recent report of the Select Committee on Intelligence shows that the difficulties of START verification are recognized.

It would be a great disservice to the country and a discredit to the President to replay SALT II by delivering to the Senate a START Treaty in which we did not have full confidence. To do so would open a divisive debate in the United States over security and arms control, undercut the confidence of our Allies, and cause damage to the President's approach of patience, strength, and realism that would benefit only the Soviets.

**Defense & Space:**

We are on the right track in D&S: continuing to press the Soviets on outstanding differences, and on clarifying the relationship of the D&S and START Treaties. Gorbachev is saying that there must be clear linkage, that is, unless we agree to their interpretation of what we can test they will not follow through with START reductions. But the more dangerous and more likely scenario is that they will opt to sign a vague Defense and Space agreement, which they will subsequently argue means what they want it to mean. We cannot submit a START Treaty to the Senate and expect it to be ratified if it has a bailout clause of any direct or implied linkage to SDI.

To counter this, we must continue to be forthcoming with the Soviets without compromising our basic goals. We should stress our desire for an independent START Treaty, for predictability measures, and to accomodate the Soviets on a period of non-withdrawal. Above all, we must stress the valid, important, and attainable goals we have for SDI. This provides the best means to pursue START while we protect SDI from the inevitable pressure for a "grand compromise."

The Soviets will bring pressure to bear against SDI through a variation of the Reykjavik ploy, i.e., try to make it appear that SDI or the ABM Treaty is the only thing holding up START. If we fail to insulate SDI from this pressure, the Soviets will win the victory they have long sought -- to stigmatize SDI as poisoning the US-Soviet relationship, and blame the US for the lack of progress.

Our best course lies in broadening the agenda to diffuse the pressure. In arms control, we must make it clear that, in US interests, verification of mobile ICBMs, of ALCMs, and the BICM issue are treaty stoppers on a par with SDI. At the summit, Afghanistan and other regional conflicts should receive the highest priority.