

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM IV
NSC/ICS-40137
Follow-on

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 8, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD R. FORTIER

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH
HOWARD R. TEICHER
JAMES R. STARK

SUBJECT: Next Steps re Libya

For this afternoon's meeting, we have several issues which require decision and further tasking:

- Emissary. We need to finalize the issue of dispatching a Presidential emissary to European capitals (London, Rome, Paris, Bonn, Hague). Shultz has said that he would prefer Dick Walters as the emissary, since Armacost is out of town and he wants Whitehead here. If Walters is to go, we need to get him down here and briefed and lay-on a Presidential aircraft. There are several related issues:
 - Shultz wants the Belgians and Italians apprised of our action in advance. If we are to do so, should Walters do it or should we use Ambassadors with Presidential message.
 - State is anxious to dispatch the Presidential messages at Tab A. There is some merit in this position, however, we believe that the rhetoric is very high already and that these messages may result in the building of opposition rather than support. We need to decide whether these should be dispatched at the meeting.
 - State has also recommended (Tab B) that we dispatch a separate PRIVACY CHANNEL cable to France -- Eyes Only for President Mitterrand or PM Chirac. Yesterday we decided not to use this channel [REDACTED]
- Replacement Carrier. Shultz supports our position on opposing movement of ENTERPRISE through the canal. He favors keeping her in the I.O.; we should seek to resolve this today. DOD/JCS have repeatedly agreed to accelerate deployment of FORRESTAL from the U.S. East Coast, which would allow it to relieve CORAL SEA in mid-May. This is an acceptable solution.

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 (B) (1)

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Declassify: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART

HLRR MD3-1398#29

BY RU NARA DATE 9/16/10

- Follow-on Actions. Most important of the issues before your group today is whether or not we are going to plan for a second (and perhaps additional) night of strikes now or are we simply going to take what action we can on Saturday, April 12, and wait for further Libyan attacks. This decision should affect our target planning since we believe that taking out Qadhafi's C³ is very important. Of equal importance is the prospect for our action leading to a political vacuum that we must be ready to take advantage of.
- [REDACTED]

- Targetting. DOD and CIA are now working well together and Charlie Allen expects to complete the target set folders this afternoon.
- [REDACTED]

✓ You should use the argument that target options must not be arbitrarily excluded. Instead, they must be available, but with any possible problems such as high collateral damage highlighted.

- Trevi Group. Meese is willing to communicate with Trevi through the current EC chair -- the Hague. All he needs is our go ahead. State supports the idea (Tab A), but it should be noted that the U.S. is not a member of Trevi (EC only). It is possible, however, that the Netherlands would be willing to invite Meese to an extraordinary session of Trevi, if we but asked. We need to decide on this at the meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the points above during the meeting this afternoon.

Approve



Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A - Cables

Tab B - Platt Memo to Poindexter of April 7, 1986