SYSTEM II 90124

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Feb. 16, 1886

Dear Mr. Several Secretary

your letter of Dec. 24, 1985 was most thoughtprobability and I would like to show my reactions
with you. I have of course also received your
letter of Jan. 14, 1986, and will be responding
to it shoutly. However, since the substance of the
latter is already in the public domain, I believe
it is need to head our private communications reporte.
Although the issues overlap, I would hope that our
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attitudes on some of the fundamental questions.

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WASHINGTON

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Mr. Heneral Secretary, in the spirit of condor which is essential to effective communication, I would add another proint. You speak often of "space strike weapons," and your representatives have defined these as weapons which can strike targets in space from earth and its atmosphere, and weapons in space which can strike targets in space which can strike targets in space or on earth. I must ask, "What country has such weapons?" The answer is, only one: The Societ Union. Your ABH system deployed around Moscow can

WASHINGTON

strike targets beyond the atmosphere and has been tested in that more. Your co-ordital anti-satellite weapon is designed to destroy satellites. Furthermore, the Soviet Union began research in defenses utilizing directed energy before the United States did and resems well along in research (and—incidentally—some testing outside laboratories) of lasers and other forms of directed energy—

I do not point this out in reference or suggest that there activities are in violation of agreements. But if we were to follow your logic to the effect that what you call "space strike weapons" would only be developed by a country planning a frist strike, what would me think? We see the Soviet Union devoting enormous resources to defensive systems in on effort which antedates by many years our own effort and we see a Soviet Union which has brief up its and we see a Soviet Union which has brief up its counterface weapons in number for grater than our own. If the only reson to develop defensive weapons is to make a disarring first strike possible, then clearly we should be even more concerned than we have been

We are concerned, and despension. But not become you are developing — and unlike us deploying — defensive uniperary. We are concerned one the fact that the Soviet Union for Some reason has chosen to deploy a much larger number of weapons suitable for a disarring first strike than has the United States. There may be reasons for this other than actually seeking a first-strike advantage, but we too must look at capabilities rather than intentions. And the fact is that we are entain you have an advantage in this area.

Frankly, you have been misinformed is your specialists say that the missiles on our Tribent submarines have a capability to destroy hardened missiles silves — a capability your 55-18 desimitely has. Eurent Trident missiles lack the capability for such a table. They could be used only to retaliste. Nor is the Perening III which cannot even reach most loviet strategic weekens, a potential frist-stribe weaken. Its short flight time

WASHINGTON

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In any event, we have both agreed to the principle of a 50% reduction of necessar arms. Implementing that agreement is swelly the first task of our negotiators at Ideneva. Let me stress cruce again that we remain willing to reduce those weapons systems which the Soviet Union finds theatening so long as the Soviet Union will reduce those which pure a special threat to the United States and its Oblies. Our proposals in November included beginficult movement on our part in this direction and were a major step to accommodate your concerns. I hape that your negotiators will be empowered to respond to these proposals during the current sound and to engage us in identifying which strategic systems are to be included in the 50% reduction.

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their country, and the restoration of a genuinely

sovereign, non-aligned state. Such a result would

have an immediate positive effect on US,—Soviet

relations and would help about the way to progress

in many other area.

The problem of superpower military involvement in lived disputes is of course not limited to the tragic conflict in Afghanitan. And I must very consider that some went actions by your government are most discouraging. What are we to make of your sharply increased willten support of a level distator who has distanced a war of terrorism against much of the rest of the world, and against the United States in particular? How can one take & oviet declarations of opposition to terrorism seriously when combunted with such actions? And more importantly, are we to conclude that the Soviet Union is ser reclules in reshing to extend its influence in the world that it will place its prestige (and even the lives of home of its citizens) at the mercy of a mentally unlaborated local desport?

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WASHINGTON

make is that we must find a way to terminate the military involvement, direct of water, of both our Countries in these disputes, and avoid spreading such involvement to new areas. This was the good of the freshood I made last O stober. Let us encourage the specifies to these conflicts to begin negotiations to find political solutions, while our countries support the process by agreeing to terminate the flour of weapons and war material wito the area of conflict.

Mr. Henseel Secretary, there remain many parints on which we still disagles, and we will probably never reach agreement on some of them. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the critical problems can be rolled if we approach them in the proper manner. I have the feeling that we gradually are finding some additional from that we gradually are finding some additional fromts on which we can agree, and would happe that, by concentrating on practical solutions, we can give greater momentum to this process.

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When you announced to the public the ideas centeried in your litter of Jeanuary 14, I made a statement evelcoming them. Our study of that mercape will shortly be completed and when it is I will be responding a feerifically to the points you made in it. Mancy foins me in sending our best regards to you and your wrife.

Sincerely Ronald Rogan

DRAFT REPLY TO HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Your letter of December 24, 1985, was most thought-provoking and I would like to share my reactions with you. I have of course also received your letter of January 14, 1986, and will be responding to it shortly. However, since the substance of the latter is already in the public domain, I believe it is well to keep our private communications separate. Although the issues overlap, I would hope that our informal exchange can be used to clarify our attitudes on some of the fundamental questions.

I agree with you that we need to set a specific agenda for action to bring about a steady and -- I would hope -- radical improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. I suggested two such topics in my previous letter, and I would hope that we can identify others as ripe for immediate progress. For example, some of the obstacles to an agreement on intermediate-range missiles seem to be falling away. I would also hope that rapid progress can be made toward agreement on a verification regime that will permit a global ban on chemical weapons.

Regarding arms reduction in general, I agree with you that we must make decisions not on the basis of assurances or intentions but with regard to the capabilities on both sides.

Nevertheless, I do not understand the reasoning behind your conclusion that only a country preparing a disarming first strike would be interested in defenses against ballistic missiles. If such defenses prove feasible in the future, they could facilitate further reductions of nuclear weapons by creating a feeling of confidence that national security could be preserved without them.

Of course, as I have said before, I recognize that adding defensive systems to an arsenal replete with weapons with a disarming first-strike capability could under some conditions be destabilizing. That is why we are proposing that both sides concentrate first on reducing those weapons which can be used to deliver a disarming first strike. Certainly, if neither of our countries has forces suitable for a first strike, neither need fear that defenses against ballistic missiles would make a first strike strategy possible.

I also do not understand your statement that what you call "space strike weapons" are "all purpose" weapons. As I understand it, the sort of directed-energy and kinetic devices both our countries are investigating in the context of ballistic missile defense are potentially most effective against point targets moving at high velocity in space. They would be ill-suited for mass destruction on earth, and if one were planning to strike earth targets from space, it does not seem rational to resort to such expensive and exotic techniques. Their destructiveness can

never approach that of the nuclear weapons in our hands today. Nuclear weapons are the real problem.

Mr. General Secretary, in the spirit of candor which is essential to effective communication, I would add another point. You speak often of "space strike weapons," and your representatives have defined these as weapons which can strike targets in space from earth and its atmosphere, and weapons in space which can strike targets in space or on earth. I must ask, "What country has such weapons?" The answer is, only one: the Soviet Union. Your ABM system deployed around Moscow can strike targets beyond the atmosphere and has been tested in that mode. Your co-orbital anti-satellite weapon is designed to destroy satellites. Purthermore, the Soviet Union began research in defenses utilizing directed energy before the United States did and seems well along in research (and -- incidentally -- some testing outside laboratories) of lasers and other forms of directed energy.

I do not point this out in reproach or suggest that these activities are in violation of agreements. But if we were to follow your logic to the effect that what you call "space strike weapons" would only be developed by a country planning a first strike, what would we think? We see the Soviet Union devoting enormous resources to defensive systems, in an effort which antedates by many years our own effort, and we see a Soviet Union which has built up its counterforce weapons in numbers far greater than our own. If the only reason to develop defensive weapons is to make a disarming first strike possible, then clearly we should be even more concerned than we have been.

We are concerned, and deeply so. But not because you are developing -- and unlike us deploying -- defensive weaponry. We are concerned over the fact that the Soviet Union for some reason has chosen to deploy a much larger number of weapons suitable for a disarming first strike than has the United States. There may be reasons for this other than actually seeking a first-strike advantage, but we too must look at capabilities rather than intentions. And the fact is that we are certain you have an advantage in this area.

Frankly, you have been misinformed if your specialists say that the missiles on our Trident submarines have a capability to destroy hardened missile silos -- a capability your SS-18 definitely has. Current Trident missiles lack the capability for such a role. They could be used only to retaliate. Nor is the Pershing II, which cannot even reach most Soviet strategic weapons, a potential first-strike weapon. Its short flight time is not substantially different from that of the more capable -- and much more numerous -- Soviet SS-20's aimed at our European Allies whom we are pledged to defend and most of whom have no nuclear capability of their own. Our forces currently have a very limited capability to strike Soviet silos, and we are improving this capability only because we cannot accept a

situation in which the Soviet Union holds such a clear advantage in counterforce weaponry. Even if we are required to complete all planned deployments in the absence of an accord which limits them, they will not match the number of Soviet weapons with a first-strike capability.

If our defense and military specialists disagree regarding the capability of the weapons on the other side, then by all means let us arrange for them to meet and discuss their concerns. A frank discussion of their respective assessments and the reasons for them could perhaps clear up those misunderstandings which are not based on fact.

In any event, we have both agreed to the principle of a 50% reduction of nuclear arms. Implementing that agreement is surely the first task of our negotiators at Geneva. Let me stress once again that we remain willing to reduce those weapons systems which the Soviet Union finds threatening so long as the Soviet Union will reduce those which pose a special threat to the United States and its Allies. Our proposals in November included significant movement on our part in this direction and were a major step to accommodate your concerns. I hope that your negotiators will be empowered to respond to these proposals during the current round and to engage us in identifying which strategic systems are to be included in the 50% reduction.

So far as defensive systems are concerned, I would reiterate what I wrote before: if your concern is that such systems may be used to permit a first-strike strategy, or as a cover for basing weapons of mass destruction in space, then there must be practical ways to prevent such possibilities. Of course, I have in mind not general assurances but concrete, verifiable means which both sides can rely on to avoid these contingencies, neither of which is a part of United States strategy or planning. I honestly believe that we can find a solution to this problem if we approach it in practical fashion rather than debating generalities.

I would like nothing more than to find, by our next meeting, an approach acceptable to both of us to solve this problem. But I believe that will require two things: accelerating negotiations to reach agreement on the way to reduce offensive weapons by 50%, and discussion of concrete ways to insure that any future development of defensive sytems cannot be used as a cover for a first-strike strategy or for basing weapons of mass destruction in space. Aside from these broader issues, I believe that your recent proposal brings settlement of the problem of intermediate-range missiles closer and that there are improved prospects for agreeing on effective verification measures in several areas.

Regarding regional conflicts, I can see that our respective analyses of the causes are incompatible. There seems little point in continuing to debate those matters on which we are bound

to disagree. Instead, I would suggest that we simply look at the current situation in pragmatic terms. Such a look would show two very important facts: that the Soviet Union is engaged in a war in another country and the United States is not. And furthermore, this war is one which is unlikely to bring any benefit to the Soviet Union. So why is it continued?

Certainly not because of the United States. Even if we wished we do not have the power to induce hundreds of thousands of people to take up arms against a well trained foreign army equipped with the most modern weapons. And neither we nor any country other than the Soviet Union has the power to stop that war. For who can tell the people of another country they should not fight for their motherland, for their independence and their national dignity?

I hope, as you say, that there is an open door to a just political settlement. Of course, we support the U.N. process and hope that it will take a practical and realistic turn. However, 1985 was marked by an intensification of conflict. I can only hope that this is not what the future holds.

As I have said before, if you really want to withdraw from Afghanistan, you will have my cooperation in every reasonable way. We have no desire or intent to exploit a Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan to the detriment of Soviet interests. But it is clear that the fighting can be ended only by the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the return of Afghan refugees to their country, and the restoration of a genuinely sovereign, non-aligned state. Such a result would have an immediate positive effect on U.S.-Soviet relations and would help clear the way to progress in many other areas.

The problem of superpower military involvement in local disputes is of course not limited to the tragic conflict in Afghanistan. And I must say candidly that some recent actions by your government are most discouraging. What are we to make of your sharply increased military support of a local dictator who has declared a war of terrorism against much of the rest of the world, and against the United States in particular? How can one take Soviet declarations of opposition to terrorism seriously when confronted with such actions? And, more importantly, are we to conclude that the Soviet Union is so reckless in seeking to extend its influence in the world that it will place its prestige (and even the lives of some of its citizens) at the mercy of a mentally unbalanced local despot?

You have made accusations about U.S. policy which I cannot accept. My purpose here, however, is not to debate, but to search for a way out of the pattern by which one of us becomes militarily involved, directly or indirectly, in local disputes, and thus stimulates the reaction of the other. This transforms what should be of local concern into a U.S.-Soviet confrontation, what should be said, we believe it is the Soviet Union which has acted

without restraint in this respect. You say it is the United States.

But agreement as to who is to blame is not necessary to find a solution. The point I would make is that we must find a way to terminate the military involvement, direct and indirect, of both our countries in these disputes, and avoid spreading such involvement to new areas. This was the goal of the proposal I made last October. Let us encourage the parties to these conflicts to begin negotiations to find political solutions, while our countries support the process by agreeing to terminate the flow of weapons and war material into the area of conflict.

Mr. General Secretary, there remain many points on which we still disagree, and we will probably never reach agreement on some of them. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the critical problems can be solved if we approach them in the proper manner. I have the feeling that we gradually are finding some additional points on which we can agree, and would hope that, by concentrating on practical solutions, we can give greater momentum to this process.

But we do need to speed up the negotiation process if this is to occur. Therefore, I hope you will instruct your delegations in Geneva, as I have instructed ours, to roll up their sleeves and get seriously to work.

When you announced to the public the ideas contained in your letter of January 14, I made a statement welcoming them. Our study of that message will shortly be completed and when it is I will be responding specifically to the points you made in it.

Nancy joins me in sending our best regards to you and your wife.

Sincerely,

WASHINGTON

CECRET/SENSITIVE

February 15, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT:

Reply to Gorbachev's Handwritten Letter

Issue

Whether to reply to Gorbachev's handwritten letter of December 24. 1985

Facts

Gorbachev answered your handwritten letter with one of his own dated December 24, 1985. You have also received a more formal letter dated January 12 making proposals for a three-stage process for the elimination of nuclear weapons by 1999.

Discussion

The handwritten letter was obviously the more personal one, particularly since Gorbachev immediately announced the content of his letter of January 12 and wrote in the same vein to several other Chiefs of State. Therefore, it would be appropriate to answer the two letters separately, keeping the handwritten exchange more personal, private and direct. I think it is important to give a specific reply to the handwritten letter both to sustain this private exchange and to reply to some of the unacceptable allegations in it. This can be done without getting into the details of his letter of January 12.

The proposed draft at Tab A attempts to achieve the following:

-- It answers the principal arguments advanced by Gorbachev against SDI, implicitly reminding him that Soviet programs are such that his arguments can be turned against him, while still leaving the door open to concrete negotiation of legitimate issues.

-- By separating the reply to his handwritten letter from that to his "public" letter of January 12, the draft indicates clearly, without saying so, that the use of "proposals" for propaganda is not helpful to the negotiating process, and that such "proposals" will not be given the status of private messages.

Declassify on: OADR

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-- By devoting special attention to regional conflicts and Afghanistan in particular, it lays the ground for a linkage of restraint in these areas to the reduction of nuclear weapons beyond the initial 50 percent. It also includes a strong statement regarding Soviet involvement with Qaddhafi, based on the danger posed to the Soviet Union by his unpredictability. (This is a factor the Soviets probably worry about, and it will not hurt to play on it a bit.)

You will note that the draft contains no mention of the Washington summit. Given the Soviet delay in suggesting a firm date -- or reacting in any way officially to our proposal made in early December -- I think it is desirable to avoid showing any exceptional eagerness. Also, in his letter, Gorbachev made no mention of the meeting other that to say that he considered the correspondence "a very important channel" for preparing for it.

One other small matter is that Gorbachev did not pick you up on your effort to develop a less formal salutation. (You had written "Dear General Secretary Gorbachev," while his reply was addressed "Dear Mr. President." You may, therefore, wish to revert to "Dear Mr. General Secretary."

Although the draft reply is longer than I would like it to be, it is only slightly longer than Gorbachev's letter (a translation of which is at Tab B for your reference). Nevertheless, I consider it important to provide answers to Gorbachev's allegations in some detail, and this cannot be done much more briefly. Providing him with a detailed reply does indicate that you take his arguments seriously and have given them careful thought.

If you decide to write out a letter along the lines of the draft, I would recommend that we do a courtesy translation (on very close hold) and send it through Hartman in a sealed envelope, as we did with your previous handwritten letter.

Regarding the letter of January 12, we will be consulting the Allies over the next few days and should have a formal reply ready for you to consider at the end of next week.

Recommendation:

 $\frac{OK}{OK}$

<u>No</u>

That you write a reply to Gorbachev along the lines of the draft at Tab A.

Attachments:

Tab A Draft Reply to Handwritten Letter from Gorbachev

Tab B Translation of Gorbachev's Handwritten Letter of December 24, 1985

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock