

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

P W 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 4240 DTG: 310359Z OCT 85 PSN: 065285
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TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE
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MODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 107-054 *32012
BY CU NARA DATE 9/11/02

1. ~~SECRET~~, ENTIRE TEXT

2. EMBASSIES SHOULD DELIVER MESSAGE IN PARA 3 BELOW FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO HEAD OF STATE/GOVERNMENT ASAP. USNATO SHOULD PROVIDE COPY TO SECRETARY GENERAL COM. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR.....

AS I INDICATED IN MY ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS LAST WEEK, I LOOK FORWARD TO A FRESH START IN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHEN I MEET WITH MR. GORBACHEV IN GENEVA NEXT MONTH. IN PREPARATION FOR THAT MEETING, I HAVE DECIDED THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ADVANCE ADDITIONAL ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS PRIOR TO THE END OF THE CURRENT ROUND OF THE TALKS IN GENEVA. OUR POSITIONS IN GENEVA HAVE ENJOYED WIDE SUPPORT FROM OUR ALLIES, WHICH HAS HELPED BRING THE SOVIETS TO MAKE COUNTERPROPOSALS OF THEIR OWN. IT NOW APPEARS POSSIBLE TO BUILD ON ELEMENTS OF THOSE COUNTERPROPOSALS, AS I SAID IN THE UNITED NATIONS, "TO ESTABLISH A GENUINE PROCESS OF GIVE-AND-TAKE". GIVEN THAT THERE IS LITTLE TIME BEFORE THE END OF THE CURRENT ROUND, WE WILL BE MOVING RAPIDLY TO PRESENT NEW PROPOSALS. I WANTED, THEREFORE, TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THINKING AS WE MOVE AHEAD.

THE NEW US PROPOSALS WILL DEAL WITH ALL THREE AREAS UNDER DISCUSSION IN GENEVA: STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS, INTERMEDIATE RANGE FORCE REDUCTIONS, AND DEFENSE AND SPACE.

IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC ARMS, THE UNITED STATES AGREES WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF A FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES. WE CANNOT AGREE TO AN APPROACH WHICH WOULD HAVE US ABANDON OUR ALLIES AND OUR LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO SDI RESEARCH OR WHICH PROVIDES FOR REDUCTIONS IN WAYS THAT ARE DESTABILIZING. HOWEVER, WE ARE PREPARED TO PROPOSE AN APPROACH WHICH APPROPRIATELY BUILDS UPON THE FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTION PRINCIPLE CONTAINED IN THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL.

THE ELEMENTS OF THIS APPROACH INCLUDE: A REDUCTION TO 4500 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS (A 50 PER CENT CUT), OF WHICH 3000 COULD BE ON ICBMS. A 50 PER CENT CUT IN MAXIMUM BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW WEIGHT. CONTINGENT ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEAD AND THROW WEIGHT REDUCTIONS, A LIMIT OF 1500 ALCMS. THE 4500 WARHEAD LIMIT AND 1500 ALCM LIMIT WOULD RESULT IN A TOTAL OF 6000 SUCH WEAPONS, ALTHOUGH THE US WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN AGGREGATE LIMIT INCLUDING BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS AND ALCMS UNDER A SINGLE LIMIT. A RANGE OF 1250 TO 1450 ICBMS AND SLBMS, REPRESENTING AN APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT CUT. A LIMIT OF 350 BOMBERS, MAKING A MAXIMUM TOTAL OF 1800 SNDVS, BUT ONCE AGAIN WITHOUT AGREEING TO A SINGLE LIMIT ON BOTH BALLISTIC MISSILES AND BOMBERS. A BAN ON NEW HEAVY ICBMS AND MOBILE ICBMS. THE REITERATION OF THE U.S. BUILD-DOWN PROPOSAL, TO ENSURE THAT THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED ABOVE PROMPTLY TAKE EFFECT.

IN THE AREA OF INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES, WE WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE PREVIOUS U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION REMAINS ON THE TABLE. WE WOULD RESTATE OUR PREFERENCE FOR A U.S./SOVIET ZERO-ZERO OUTCOME AND OUR CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO ULTIMATELY ACHIEVING THE ELIMINATION OF THE ENTIRE CLASS OF LAND-BASED LRINF MISSILES.

AT THE SAME TIME, AS ONE POTENTIAL INTERIM STEP TOWARD THIS GOAL, WE WOULD PROPOSE AN APPROACH CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS: A CAP ON US LRINF MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE AT 140, THEIR LEVELS ON DECEMBER 31, 1985, IN RETURN FOR SOVIET AGREEMENT TO REDUCE SS-20S WITHIN RANGE OF EUROPE TO 140 LAUNCHERS; FREEDOM TO MIX WITHIN THE 140 LAUNCHER LIMIT (I.E., FOR THE U.S., BETWEEN P-11 AND GLCM LAUNCHERS), BUT WITH THE MIX A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIET UNION; PROPORTIONAL REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET SS-20S IN ASIA; A RESULTING EQUAL GLOBAL LRINF MISSILE WARHEAD NUMBER; CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE MISSILES; AND DISCUSSION OF CONSTRAINTS ON COMPARABLE AIRCRAFT ON BOTH SIDES.

I WOULD NOTE THAT SINCE THE P-11 IS A SINGLE MISSILE LAUNCHER, WHILE THE GLCM CARRIES FOUR MISSILES PER LAUNCHER, THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS WHICH THE US MIGHT HAVE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE UNDER THIS PROPOSAL WOULD DEPEND ON THE FINAL MIX. THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE 420 WARHEADS ON 140 SS-20S IN RANGE OF EUROPE; THE US WOULD BE PERMITTED AT LEAST THAT NUMBER OF WARHEADS AND A MIX COULD BE SELECTED THAT WOULD RESULT IN A SIMILAR WARHEAD LEVEL.

IN THE AREA OF DEFENSE AND SPACE, WE WOULD RESTATE THAT THE SDI PROGRAM IS AND WILL REMAIN IN FULL ACCORD WITH THE ABM TREATY AND WOULD REQUIRE SOVIET COMPLIANCE THEREWITH AS WELL. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WOULD SEEK SOVIET COMMITMENT TO EXPLORE NOW A COOPERATIVE TRANSITION TO GREATER RELIANCE ON DEFENSES COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. WE WOULD ALSO PROPOSE AN "OPEN LABORATORIES" INITIATIVE. UNDER THIS PROPOSAL, BOTH SIDES WOULD COMMIT TO PROVIDE, ON A REGULAR AND RECIPROCAL BASIS, BRIEFINGS ON EACH OTHER'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND OPPORTUNITIES TO VISIT ASSOCIATED RESEARCH FACILITIES AND LABORATORIES.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE PROPOSALS, WE WOULD STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RELATED ISSUES OF VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING AGREEMENTS TO PROGRESS IN REACHING ANY FUTURE AGREEMENTS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT THE SOVIET UNION TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO CORRECT ITS CURRENT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING AGREEMENTS. WE WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIET UNION ALTER CERTAIN OF ITS CURRENT PRACTICES WHICH HAMPER VERIFICATION OF

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COMPLIANCE. ONE SUCH STEP WOULD BE TO ALTER ITS CURRENT TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION AND REVERT TO PRACTICES WITH REGARD TO TELEMETRY IN USE AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING OF SALT II.

I BELIEVE THAT THIS COMPREHENSIVE INITIATIVE OFFERS A SERIOUS PROSPECT FOR OPENING A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE IN THE GENEVA TALKS. AS I MENTIONED EARLIER, I INTEND TO

AUTHORIZE OUR NEGOTIATORS TO PRESENT IT TO THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS IN GENEVA BEFORE THE END OF THE CURRENT ROUND, AND HAVE ASKED THEM TO SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT TO EXTEND THE CURRENT ROUND SUFFICIENTLY TO PERMIT A FULL PRESENTATION. THIS WILL ALSO ENABLE THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO SEEK ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NEEDED TO ENSURE THAT THEY FULLY UNDERSTAND THE INITIATIVE PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE FROM GENEVA. (FOR NATO: I APPRECIATE THE GREAT INTEREST WHICH ALL MEMBERS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE HAVE FOR THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE ADVICE AND COUNSEL WHICH MANY MEMBERS HAVE OFFERED. I LOOK FORWARD TO THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU AND OUR OTHER ALLIANCE COLLEAGUES IN BRUSSELS AFTER MY MEETING WITH MR. GORBACHEV.) SHULTZ
BT

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