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NLRR 107-051 #31895

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BY AW NARA DATE 5/29/08 Received by THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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ACTION

October 26, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: MBFR -- Decision and Letter to Prime Minister
Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl

The NSC meeting of October 18, to consider options for a new US and NATO position for the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations, revealed strong splits among agencies concerning the military, intelligence, and Alliance implications of the four options presented for NSC consideration. All agreed that the three new US/NATO MBFR proposals of the past six years had demonstrated positive approaches and flexibility, and that the last Soviet response of this spring was very unsatisfactory. However, NSC principals were divided on which of the four options provided the most promise with the least risk.

The following memorandum and its supporting documents summarize and update the NSC discussion and provide alternative decisions in the direction of the UK/FRG proposal, as well as providing a proposed letter from you to Prime Minister Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl.

NSC Meeting Discussion of Options

At the NSC meeting, Secretary Shultz supported the new UK/FRG proposal for initial 13,000/30,000 US/Soviet troop reductions, without prior data agreement, to be followed by a 2-3 year freeze on all NATO Warsaw Pact forces, to be followed by further reductions to parity if data was substantiated by a highly intrusive verification package. Ambassador Blackwill, the Chief US MBFR Negotiator, proposed a smaller initial US/Soviet cut of 6,500/15,000, with a freeze on US/Soviet forces only, to be followed by further reductions if data was validated by enhanced verification package. ACDA Director Adelman proposed to draw the Soviets out on verification issues, somewhat along the lines of your proposal of September last year on nuclear testing issues, by proposing mutual inspections to determine the efficacy of associated measures including verification provisions. Secretary Weinberger urged a shift in the Western position setting US/Soviet agreement on NATO's enhanced verification package as a priority. Additionally, at the meeting Weinberger, Adelman, and Director Casey expressed concern about the negotiability and efficacy of the intrusive UK/FRG verification package, and Admiral Crowe,

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cc: Vice President

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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pointed out the very serious military hazards involved in the UK/FRG reductions and freeze proposal at a time when US forces are already handicapped by congressionally mandated ceilings on US troops in Europe.

Memoranda from Secretary Weinberger, Admiral Crowe, and Secretary Shultz

Following the NSC meeting, Secretary Weinberger and Admiral Crowe, Chairman, JCS, sent memoranda expressing their views that the UK/FRG proposal has serious verification flaws and would create "unacceptable military risk." At the same time, Secretary Shultz has sent a memorandum reaffirming his earlier endorsement of the UK/FRG proposal. The memoranda are summarized below.

Admiral Crowe's memorandum (Tab A) was created in a meeting the Chiefs held just after the NSC meeting. Admiral Crowe stresses the military harm that the UK/FRG proposal would cause, noting that it would compel us to change the mission of our forces in Europe from "defense to delay." It would make the US withdraw "the combat equivalent of one division," and "would restrict and complicate significant and current modernization plans to meet the growing threat in Europe." Similarly, the ceiling, or freeze, proposed by the US/FRG would "prevent reinforcement by United States troops in a crisis unless the US were prepared to break the treaty" and would, among our Allies, "inhibit mobilization of theater forces." Admiral Crowe concludes that it is the view of the Chiefs that the proposed reduction "could have hazardous consequences for NATO's ability to defend Europe" and that, furthermore, "given the serious impact of the 13,000-man cut, making a concession on data agreement before we know the proposed verification regime is acceptable to the Soviets, or actually workable, would in the JCS view run an unacceptable military risk."

Cap Weinberger's memorandum (Tab B) endorses the Chiefs' military points and notes that "the Thatcher and Kohl letter does stress the importance of tough verification and their resolve to insist on it, but they do so as a means of pressing us to abandon a verification principle of high importance: Agreement on what is to be limited is an indispensable precondition to limitations." He predicts that "once we drop the prior data principle, a freeze/reductions agreement is a virtual certainty, for which verification is impossible (regardless of the intrusiveness of the agreed measures) and the Soviets will therefore see to it that any other obstacles are overcome so that they can secure the freeze/reduction which is very much in their interest." He recommends that "if the UK and FRG really have the commitment to tough verification that they profess, then they should accept a

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modification of their option: Obtain data agreement through verification measures, as they propose, but do so before any freezes or reductions are imposed." Weinberger reports that "the Chiefs concur in this memo in its entirety."

George Shultz's memorandum (Tab C) does not directly refute the military and intelligence concerns raised by other NSC principals, but notes that the 13,000/30,000 US/Soviet cut has been proposed earlier (though under different circumstances), notes the impact of improved US intelligence estimates on the data question, and stresses his belief that the proposal "from two of our closest and most important Allies" has "considerable merit."

Proposed Letter to Thatcher and Kohl

The proposed letter from you to PM Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl agrees to their proposal in principle, and establishes terms of reference for work to produce a fully developed proposal for presentation to the East. Your letter is aimed at ensuring that the key security concerns expressed in your earlier letter to them and also expressed by your senior military advisors will be resolved satisfactorily during consultations with our two key Allies. Those consultations are required to work out the important details of an agreed trilateral US/UK/FRG approach to be presented to our other NATO Allies and to the Soviet Union.

Your letter reiterates the priorities you expressed in the NSC meeting about full agreement on effective verification procedures and it protects, as well as possible, the security, intelligence, and diplomatic concerns expressed during the NSC discussion by Cap Weinberger, Admiral Crowe, Ken Adelman, and Bill Casey. The letter points out that deferring a data agreement prior to undertaking reductions involves a very major concession in MBFR, with additional implications for other arms reductions negotiations such as those in Geneva on nuclear arms reductions, in which we have insisted on an agreed data base before any force reductions can occur. Your letter notes that in light of such a major concession, the Allies must agree on a complete verification package before a new NATO proposal can be launched and that the East must agree to that package before any troop reduction or freeze can take effect. Finally, the letter cites your senior military advisors to the effect that a reduction of 13,000 US troops from Europe as proposed by the UK/FRG would not be a "token" cut, but a very substantial cut that would significantly hamper priority NATO force modernization programs (including INF) already adversely affected by congressionally-imposed ceilings on

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US forces in Europe (the Stevens Amendment in the last two years). Your letter states that you are asking your military advisors to assess alternative reductions as well as the impact of any ceiling or freeze such as those proposed by the UK and FRG, to ensure that NATO is not disadvantaged.

In view of the importance of informing PM Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl of your decision and to foreclose divisive debate within the US Government, I recommend that you approve the proposed letter to Thatcher and Kohl for early transmission. Assessments by your military and defense advisors and early US consultations with UK and FRG experts would follow, with the goal of producing a complete Alliance package for presentation to the East before the MBFR round ends on December 5.

Recommendations

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NO

— That you review the memoranda from Admiral Crowe at Tab A, Secretary Weinberger at Tab B, and Secretary Shultz at Tab C.

— That you endorse in principle the UK/FRG proposal as recommended by Secretary Shultz, and approve the attached letter (Tab D) to PM Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl for electronic transmission via White House channels. (The proposal seeks a 2-3 year initial 13,000/30,000 US/USSR troop reduction and freeze on NATO/Pact forces if the East will agree to strict verification measures. If implementation of such measures yields East-West agreement on force levels, more reductions can be negotiated. If not, reductions are nullified and freeze terminated. The letter states that you have asked your military and defense advisors to assess alternative numbers for reductions and ceilings.)

— Alternatively, that you endorse in principle the UK/FRG option with the modification recommended in the memoranda from Secretary Weinberger and the Chiefs (i.e., obtain data agreement through verification measures, as UK/FRG propose, but do so before any freezes or reductions are imposed).

— Alternatively, that you endorse Ambassador Blackwill's option (i.e., same as UK/FRG option but smaller, 6,500/13,000 US/USSR initial reductions, with no freeze on NATO/Pact forces, and limits only on US/USSR combat and combat support forces).

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Attachments

Tab A Memorandum from Admiral Crowe, Chairman, JCS
Tab B Memorandum from Secretary Weinberger
Tab C Memorandum from Secretary Shultz
Tab D Proposed Letter to Prime Minister Thatcher and
 Chancellor Kohl

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SYSTEM II
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

NLRR MD7-051 #31849

SUBJECT: MBFR

BY CU NARA DATE 1/31/07

The conclusion of our meeting on Friday on MBFR was a little hurried. So I set out the following points for your consideration, as you decide whether to join in any way the proposals made to us by our British and German allies:

1. The point was made by Admiral Crowe that any reductions made should be "asymmetrical." The ones proposed certainly are: 13,000 U.S. vs. 30,000 Soviet.

2. Some of the argumentation carried the implication that this pattern of an initial, small reduction is a new Soviet idea. In fact, it has been part of the U.S. position for a year and a half, so it will seem a little strange to our allies for us to back off from it when they propose it.

3. The perennial data issue has been mitigated somewhat by reestimates from the Agency, moving their estimate of Eastern forces closer to the number asserted by the Soviet Union. The difference is now roughly 12%, not a large difference in the light of the inevitably loose and inexact basis for the Agency's estimates.

4. The verification regime proposed is very intrusive so, if adopted, it would serve three important purposes:

-- general verification of any undertakings made in connection with any MBFR agreement;

-- sharp increase in our knowledge of what is going on in presently more or less forbidden areas;

-- the good precedent of on-site inspection for practically every other area of arms control.

5. This is a proposal that has come to us very forcefully from two of our closest and most important allies, proposals for what should happen in Europe, where they live. Particularly since I believe there is considerable merit to their proposal, and even though it is unlikely that the Soviets would accept it, I believe that good Alliance management means that we should take their idea with great seriousness.

6. I would urge that you inform Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl personally this week of your agreement with their proposal, including the verification regime, so that experts can begin working out the details.

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1/3/85 632-0821 WANG 3912M
S: CHILL

NSC: RMC FARLANE
S/PN: PNITZE
S/S: BRCKINLEY

EUR: RBURT/MPALMER
PH: JCHAIN

S, S/S, D, P, S/PN, EUR, PH ONLY

IMMEDIATE ANATO, TOKYO IMMEDIATE, CANBERRA IMMEDIATE, WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, UR, US

SUBJECT: LETTER TO ALLIED LEADERS ON GENEVA

CH
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RM RBAB
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BMCK

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. EMBASSIES SHOULD DELIVER LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO ALLIED LEADERS (BELOW) AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE JANUARY 4. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR-----:

- AS WE APPROACH THE COMPLETION OF OUR PREPARATIONS FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ'S GENEVA MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, I WANT TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR THE WISE COUNSEL AND WARM SUPPORT WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. I KNOW YOU SHARE MY HOPE THAT THIS MEETING WILL

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NLRR 107-048 #31793

BY CU NARA DATE 1/17/08

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OPEN THE WAY TO RENEWED ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AND ESTABLISH A PRODUCTIVE BASIS FOR PROGRESS IN THOSE TALKS. WE HAVE, AS YOU KNOW, BEEN GIVING CLOSE CONSIDERATION IN RECENT WEEKS TO THE APPROACH WE SHOULD ADOPT IN GENEVA, AND I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU THE TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS WE HAVE NOW REACHED.

- WE FEEL THAT OUR FOREMOST OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE THE EARLY RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS. SOVIET SPOKESMEN, FOR THEIR PART, HAVE IDENTIFIED ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS, THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE AND THE GENERAL AREA OF SPACE AS MATTERS OF HIGH CONCERN TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND WE ARE ACCORDINGLY PREPARED TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES AS WELL.

- ONE QUESTION WHICH WILL NEED TO BE DEALT WITH IN GENEVA IS THAT OF THE NEGOTIATING FORA TO BE ESTABLISHED. THE UNITED STATES, SUPPORTED BY ITS ALLIES, HAS REITERATED THROUGHOUT THE PAST YEAR OUR READINESS AND DESIRE TO RESUME THE START AND INF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WERE INTERRUPTED BY THE SOVIET UNION IN 1983. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THESE TWO FORA REPRESENT A SIMPLE AND EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ORGANIZING OUR NEGOTIATING EFFORTS ON OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS. WE ARE ALSO READY, HOWEVER, TO EXAMINE OTHER POSSIBILITIES WHICH WOULD PERMIT BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS TO BE ADDRESSED, INCLUDING THOSE RAISED BY THE SOVIET UNION. I INTEND TO INSTRUCT SECRETARY SHULTZ TO SEEK TO WORK OUT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO MUTUALLY AGREEABLE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL PERMIT THE CONVENING OF EARLY FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS.

- THE FORTHCOMING MEETING IN GENEVA IS NOT LIKELY TO PROVIDE TIME FOR DETAILED EXCHANGES REGARDING THE TWO SIDES' APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL. I DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT SOME GENERAL EXCHANGE ON SUBSTANCE CAN BE HELPFUL.

- FOR OUR PART, I PLAN TO AUTHORIZE SECRETARY SHULTZ TO INDICATE THAT IN NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS THE UNITED STATES WILL BE PREPARED TO EXPLORE TRADE-OFFS THAT WOULD RECOGNIZE AND ACCOMMODATE ASYMMETRIES IN THE TWO SIDES' FORCE STRUCTURES, PROVIDED THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO APPROACH THE PROBLEM IN AN EQUALLY CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER. HE WOULD NOTE THAT U.S. NEGOTIATORS WILL HAVE EXTENSIVE FLEXIBILITY AS TO THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THE TRADE-OFFS.

- SECRETARY SHULTZ WILL STRESS THE HIGH PRIORITY WE ATTACH TO ACHIEVING EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE LIMITATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. HE WILL REMIND GROMYKO OF THE POSITION WHICH THE UNITED STATES, BASED UPON ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS, PUT FORWARD TO THE SOVIET SIDE IN SEPTEMBER 1983, AND INDICATE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL BE PREPARED, IN NEGOTIATIONS, TO EXPLORE HOW THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THIS POSITION COULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR OVERCOMING EXISTING DIFFERENCES IN THE TWO SIDES' APPROACHES. (FOR NATO COUNTRIES: WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU AS OUR EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS ON THIS POINT PROGRESS.) AT THE SAME TIME, WE WILL, OF COURSE, REJECT ANY PROPOSALS FOR A MORATORIUM ON INF DEPLOYMENTS AS A PRECONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS, REJECT THE INCLUSION OF THIRD-COUNTRY SYSTEMS, AND REAFFIRM THAT THE NATO DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM DECIDED UPON IN 1979 CAN BE ALTERED ONLY AS A RESULT OF A CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT.

- SECRETARY SHULTZ WILL ALSO BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS IN A CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER THE OTHER AREAS OF APPARENT SOVIET CONCERN. HE WOULD THUS BE AUTHORIZED TO AGREE TO NEGOTIATIONS THAT ADDRESS SPACE-RELATED ISSUES AS ELEMENTS OF THE BROAD RANGE OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ARMS. WITH RESPECT TO ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS, HE WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT, IN FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, THE UNITED STATES WILL BE READY TO CONSIDER AREAS OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT. SECRETARY SHULTZ WILL ALSO INDICATE OUR WILLINGNESS -- INDEED, OUR DESIRE -- TO DISCUSS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRESENT AND FUTURE DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF BOTH SIDES.

- AS YOU KNOW, THE SOVIET UNION HAS SOUGHT WITH INCREASING INTENSITY OVER RECENT WEEKS TO IDENTIFY THE U.S. PROGRAM OF RESEARCH ON STRATEGIC DEFENSES AS AN OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL. IN GENEVA SECRETARY SHULTZ WILL RESPOND TO ANY SUCH APPROACH BY NOTING THAT IT IS THE SOVIET UNION THAT HAS UNDERMINED THE ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH THE ABM TREATY WAS BASED. HE WILL REAFFIRM THAT THE U.S. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE IS A RESEARCH PROGRAM THAT IS PERMITTED AND BEING CARRIED OUT IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THE ABM TREATY, AND NOTE THAT ANY DECISIONS AS TO TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEMS NOT PERMITTED BY THE TREATY WOULD BE A MATTER FOR NEGOTIATION. HE WILL ALSO POINT OUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION THAT WE BELIEVE ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE TREATY.

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- NOTING THAT THE SOVIET PROGRAM OF RESEARCH ON NEW FORMS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES PARALLELS AND, IN SOME AREAS, SURPASSES OUR OWN, SECRETARY SHULTZ WILL NOTE THE IMPRACTICALITY OF SEEKING TO LIMIT RESEARCH ACTIVITY, BUT HE WILL ALSO STRESS THE DESIRABILITY OF INITIATING A DIALOGUE REGARDING THE LONGER-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF NEW DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DETERRENCE.

- IN MY VIEW, NEW FORMS OF DEFENSE AGAINST THE THREAT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACK MAY, IN THE LONG RUN, OFFER A MEANS OF ENHANCING DETERRENCE AND REDUCING THE IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE OVERALL STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, IF IT PROVES TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE, SHOULD BE MANAGED COOPERATIVELY. THUS, EVEN WHILE U.S. AND SOVIET SCIENTISTS LOOK INTO THE TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES FOR THE FUTURE, I AM PREPARED TO BEGIN DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIET UNION NOW ON THE STRATEGIC AND ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF THESE NEW TECHNOLOGIES. I WOULD NOTE THAT THE LONG-TERM GOAL OF THE EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS BEEN EMBRACED BY BOTH SIDES.

- IF THE SOVIET UNION COMES TO GENEVA GENUINELY DESIROUS OF OPENING A NEW AND MORE PRODUCTIVE PHASE IN US-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL, I BELIEVE THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD BE ABLE TO REACH EARLY AGREEMENT ON THE SUBJECT AND OBJECTIVES FOR NEW TALKS, AND ON THE APPROPRIATE NEGOTIATING FORA. WE MUST ANTICIPATE, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS MAY CONTINUE TO PURSUE THEIR MULTI-TIERED STRATEGY OF DIPLOMACY, PROPAGANDA AND INTIMIDATION DESIGNED TO SECURE WESTERN RESTRAINT WITHOUT COMPARABLE LIMITATIONS ON THEIR OWN FORCES. WE HAVE SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED THESE SOVIET EFFORTS IN THE PAST, AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN DO SO IN THE FUTURE.

- AT THIS STAGE, I BELIEVE WE MUST AVOID ESTABLISHING ARTIFICIAL DEADLINES FOR PROGRESS, AND RESIST EXCESSIVE EXPECTATIONS. FOR OUR PART, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AND EFFORT AS IS NECESSARY TO LAUNCH THIS NEXT STAGE OF US-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. WITH GOODWILL, PATIENCE, AND YOUR CONTINUING SUPPORT, I AM OPTIMISTIC THAT WE CAN SUCCEED.

- IN ORDER TO ASSURE THE BEST PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS IN SECRETARY SHULTZ'S FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS, I ASK THAT YOU HOLD ALL THE ABOVE IN UTMOST CONFIDENCE. WE WILL, OF COURSE, BRIEF YOU AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE ON THE RESULTS OF THE GENEVA TALKS (ADD FOR NATO ALLIES: (SENIOR MEMBERS OF SECRETARY SHULTZ'S PARTY TO GENEVA WILL BRIEF THE NORTH

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ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN BRUSSELS ON JANUARY 433. I LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING YOUR CONTINUED COUNSEL ON THESE ISSUES.

- SINCERELY
- RONALD REAGAN

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