



SYSTEM 11  
8408365 90307 add-on  
United States Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

March 19, 1984

84 MAR 20 A 7: 28

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WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Consular Review Talks with the USSR

In response to your March 12 request, we are attaching a report with recommendations for next steps on the Consular Review Talks with the Soviet Union. The Department would like to proceed with the Consular Review Talks using the agenda to which the FBI agreed prior to the April, 1983 meeting with the Soviets. The FBI subsequently withdrew its concurrence to one item of the package -- an increase of entry/exit points -- an item which we feel is central to a balanced package. The entry/exit issue was placed on the agenda to counterbalance the Soviet request for diplomatic visas for high-level Soviet officials and to address Embassy Moscow's request for improved travel [REDACTED] a long-standing goal of the U.S. Government.

*BmeKmliz*  
for Charles Hall  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:  
As stated.

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR MDR-DID#3  
BY RW NARA DATE 7/13/10


E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3 (b)(1)

SECRET/WNINTEL

RE: SOVIET SECTION INTD'S POSITION ON BALTIMORE  
AS THE ENTRY/EXIT POINT FOR SOVIET OFFICIALS

The agreed upon proposals approved by the SIG-I addressing limiting the presence and travel of hostile foreign officials and nonofficials in the U.S., proposed in part "... limiting Soviet officials and tourists to specific entry/exit points; ..." had as its thrust the reduction of entry/exit points available for utilization by Soviet officials.

Therefore, the FBI opposes the Port of Baltimore being designated as an entry/exit point for the convenience of Soviet travelers. The presence of Soviet passenger ships for extended periods of time in this port facility would afford the Soviets a prolonged period of time to accomplish disembarkment and boarding of passengers and large cargo items. In addition, members of the crew would also be afforded the opportunity to disembark.



While opposing opening the Port of Baltimore, the FBI would not oppose the resumption of weekly Aeroflot flights into JFK Airport, New York, if such an offer would afford adequate negotiating leverage to gain the additional entry/exit points desired by State in the USSR. Such resumption of flights would be permitted and contingent upon simultaneous access to the desired entry/exit points in the USSR and their continued availability to U.S. officials and tourists.

-SECRET/WNINTEL

Classified by: 4193  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR M82-D10 #5  
BY RW NARA DATE 7/15/10

E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
3.3(b)(1)

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 28, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: DIANE DORNAN *DD*

SUBJECT: FBI Comments on Proposed Terms of Reference  
for Negotiations with the USSR

At your request I contacted FBI and asked that they revise their initial comments on opening the port of Baltimore to the Soviets, in order to make them more relevant to the issues being discussed.

The initial problem arose because the Bureau was not fully informed on the terms of reference and was not asked for a formal opinion even on the port issue. They were informally approached by a State official and asked to put on paper the gist of the objections they had raised last spring to terms of reference then being considered, which involved access through the port of Baltimore. They were astounded to discover that the real issue apparently related to visas, that San Francisco was also being considered as an additional entry/exit point and that the brief, informal paper they had quickly prepared was to be attached to a decision package as their formal and complete comment.

I suggested that FBI call the Soviet desk at the State Department to ensure that they had an accurate and complete account of the issues upon which they were to comment. Lynn Pascoe insisted that FBI was not to be concerned with other issues in the negotiating package, including visa issues, but was to confine their comments merely to the entry/exit points issue. They have framed their comments accordingly, although trying to tailor them to address indirectly visa issues which may be under consideration.

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DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR *MD2-D10#10*  
BY *RW* NARA DATE *7/15/10*



SYSTEM 11  
8408365 90307 add-or  
United States Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

March 19, 1984

84 MAR 20 A 7:28

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

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*BmeKmlay*  
for Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:  
As stated.

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR M02-010#12  
BY *RW* NARA DATE 7/15/10


E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
800.3.3(b)(1)

SECRET/WNINTEL

RE: SOVIET SECTION INTD'S POSITION ON BALTIMORE  
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SECRET/WNINTEL

Classified by: 4193  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR MD2-DID #14  
BY RW NARA DATE 7/15/10

E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3(b)(4)

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
April 3, 1984

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: DIANE DORNAN *DD*  
KENNETH E. deGRAFFENREID *DD for KLG*

SUBJECT: Nonconcurrence on Authorization for Consular  
Review Talks with the USSR

Basis of Nonconcurrence

We are unable to concur on this package because, despite requests by us and the FBI, the full negotiating terms of reference are not revealed, and because FBI has pointed out counterintelligence concerns which merit further study. Lack of information on the negotiating package reflects the deeper problem of failure to consider carefully whether the proposed terms would in fact secure net benefits for the US or at least avoid overall harm. We recommend that the package be remanded without prejudice for more careful study and that the precedent be established for orderly review of intelligence collection and counterintelligence issues in preparing negotiating packages. The process should include full participation of the FBI and OFM. OFM has been excluded from these discussions although it is authorized and required by the Foreign Missions Act to ensure reciprocity of benefits with the USSR. For your convenience we have summarized below the pros and cons expressed regarding the known negotiating terms of reference.

Summary of Issues Under Contention:

Those who advocate the wisdom of negotiating such terms contend that an agreement will demonstrate that we can negotiate successfully with the Soviets and that the addition of two entry/exit points will make the entire package more favorable to the US than to the Soviets; without these additional entry/exit points, the terms of reference would favor the USSR. You are asked to authorize State to negotiate "on the basis it recommends." This basis, and the arguments pro and con, are presented as follows:

- Diplomatic visas would be given to high-level US and Soviet government officials not normally eligible for them. This is said to be the primary Soviet incentive to accept the package, although it is said that these persons still will have to go through the normal visa authorization process and their primary gain will be one of prestige

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR M02-D10 #20

BY *RD* NARA DATE 7/15/10

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and, to a minor extent, of convenience. FBI was not informed of this proposal or asked to comment on it.

- "A package of rather minor visa concessions" to the Soviets which have not been specified would be negotiated. FBI was told these were irrelevant to the Bureau's concerns and its comments were not desired.

- Entry/Exit points would be expanded from three to five. Arguments that this would be more advantageous to the US than to the USSR include the following:

- The Soviets do not need or want additional such sites.
- Opening of Brest on the Polish border would be a major convenience for diplomats and their families traveling to and from Europe, since it is a shorter and less expensive trip than through Finland and since it would facilitate access to the proposed consulate in Kiev.
- Overland access through Brest and Nahodka (on the Pacific coast near Vladivostok) would provide an "opportunity to penetrate Soviet society" and to "spread our ideas."

E.O. 12958

As Amended

Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

- FBI claims regarding CI problems and burdens are exaggerated and center primarily on the issue of Soviet ship visitation rights, which will be unaffected.
  - FBI arguments in other areas misunderstand actual practices and exaggerate the meaning of entry/exist points authorization.
  - By removing the need to obtain special permission to enter and exit from these two additional cities and making it a normal right, we will restrict Soviet ability, against which we have no strictly reciprocal retaliation options, to deny travel requests by US personnel, especially military attaches who have wished to use Brest.
- The FBI, however, argues that additional entry/exit points may benefit the Soviets more than us in that:
- This would run counter to recent policy initiatives ameliorating the CI problem, including the drastic reduction in allowable Soviet exit points which recently was imposed.

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- Already strained CI resources would be spread thinner. Prolonged boarding procedures would make surveillance difficult in the ports of Baltimore and San Francisco; these port problems would be exacerbated if visa holders came on Soviet-owned ships, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Although we have denied Soviet ship visits to Baltimore in 1983 and 1984 to retaliate for problems in the USSR, this is the preferred Soviet method for rotating Washington embassy staff; the Soviets may accuse the US or reneging on the spirit, if not the letter, of the agreement if we deny such ship visitations and require that they book vessels from other countries, and may deny US travel rights through Brest or Nahodka in retaliation. We can anticipate internal and external pressure to allow Soviet ship visitation and in practice we are likely to lose the ability to deny these rights, thus sacrificing current retaliatory leverage over the USSR and incurring additional CI problems. In addition, access to San Francisco by air would provide easy contact with the large Soviet intelligence organization at their embassy in Mexico City, which conducts intelligence operations against the US.

- [REDACTED] benefits accruing to the US from adding two more entry/exit points may be overstated since:

- o The extent to which we have been able to [REDACTED] influence opinions by digressing into the countryside from access routes is questionable.
- o Travel from Nahodka would be by train only, which eases Soviet surveillance tasks and does not facilitate digression from the approved route.
- o Allies [REDACTED] already have access to these cities.

-- Since we do not know whether we can negotiate acceptable terms for opening a Kiev consulate, it is premature to arrange easier access to such a site.

-- The merits of convenience should be weighed against expected CI problems.



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RECOMMENDATION

That you return the package to agencies for further and fuller consideration of its net benefits, without prejudice to judgments regarding its overall desirability.

Approve *J*

*see my note*  
Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That FBI and OFM be included in such deliberations and that counterintelligence and intelligence collection issues be more carefully weighed.

Approve *J*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*Need to also involve DIA to get  
better assessment on intelligence gains.  
Again we need to proceed with dispatch  
and prepare an options memo.*

~~SECRET~~

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U.S.-Soviet Consular Review Talks

The Consular Review Talks (CRT) are part of our effort to find areas in the bilateral relationship in which we can make progress in solving specific problems. We are having particular problems now on a series of consular and visa matters that the talks could help resolve. Successful talks could also provide a demonstration that realistic negotiations can produce agreements that serve the interests of both countries. A round of talks in Washington last spring came close to producing an agreement that we thought was attractive, but the FBI withdrew its consent on one important element. As a result, we had to stall and the Soviets eventually went home. The shutdown of the KAL aircraft delayed a resumption of the talks.

We believe now is the time to resume the talks. The USG must decide, however, whether or not we can agree to a reciprocal increase in the number of entry/exit points in each country from three to five. This is the issue that caused us the problem last spring, when the FBI withdrew its concurrence. Increasing the number of Soviet exit/entry points has long been a U.S. goal. It would greatly increase our ability to enter and depart the country, particularly by the overland routes

We would obtain entry/exit at Brest, on the Polish border, and Nakhodka, on the Soviet Pacific coast near Vladivostok. The Soviets would obtain entry/exit at San Francisco, where they have a consulate, and at Baltimore (by sea only, to parallel our entry/exit possibilities at Nakhodka).

The FBI opposes this expansion of entry/exit points. The attached statement of its position (Tab A) lists the following objections: "The agreed upon proposals approved by the SIG-I addressing limiting the presence and travel of hostile foreign officials and nonofficials in the U.S., proposed in part '...limiting Soviet officials and tourists to specific entry/exit points; ...' had as its thrust the reduction of entry/exit points available for utilization by Soviet officials"; and, "The presence of Soviet passenger ships for extended periods of time in this port facility (of Baltimore) would afford the Soviets a prolonged period of time to accomplish disembarkment...."

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M02-010 #44

BY RW NARA DATE 1/27/10

E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 1.4 (D)

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- 2 -

The Department does not share the FBI's view that the SIG-I agreed to reduce the number of entry/exit points; rather, it merely agreed to add exit controls to the previously existing entry controls. Earlier, the Soviets had been restricted to specific entry points, but could exit from any open city. The SIG/I decision restricted the Soviets to the same exit points as entry points. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Soviets cannot bring any more ships into Baltimore than we authorize. Making Baltimore an exit/entry point will not change that. In some past years, they already have been permitted to have one ship visit. In 1983 and again this year the Department turned down their yearly ship-visit request because the Soviets were not sufficiently forthcoming on our needs in Moscow. [REDACTED]

Given the convenience of Brest as an entry point (particularly if we open a consulate in Kiev) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the United States will get considerably more out of this expansion of exit/entry points than the Soviets and our interests are served by going ahead with it on its own merits. In addition, this was a key element in the draft "package" that we worked on with the Soviets last spring. To withdraw it would unbalance the package in the Soviets' favor, leaving us several unpalatable alternatives: 1) reach an agreement in which we will give more than we get; 2) withdraw a bargaining item of major interest to the Soviets, i.e. diplomatic visas for high-level U.S. and Soviet officials, leaving a package of rather minor visa concessions which they would probably reject; or, 3) decline to resume the talks, thus giving up the opportunity for progress that they represent and possibly stimulating a worsened tit-for-tat situation on these irritating visa and consular issues.

The State Department recommends that the entry/exit points be included in the next round of talks and we will then inform the Soviets that the U.S. proposes to reconvene the talks in May.

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