SECRET

NEA/ARN: WASTANTON: CG
02/04/84 EXT. 21019
P: LEAGLEBURGER

NEA/ARN: AE JONES
PM: AKANTER
S/P: PRODMAN
S/S-0:

NEA: RH PELLETREAU
DOD/ISA: MGTIXIER
NSC: HTEICHER
S/S: CHILL

IMMEDIATE BEIRUT

NODIS
FOR AMBASSADORS RUMSFELD AND MURPHY

E.O. 12356:  DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, LE, US
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH MNF PARTNERS

1. IS - ENTIRE TEXT

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE TALKING POINTS TO BE USED WITH MNF PARTNERS IN CONJUNCTION WITH DELIVERY OF THE LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MNF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT:

3. --PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. I WOULD, HOWEVER, LIKE TO EMPHASIZE A FEW ESSENTIAL ASPECTS OF THE PLAN WE ENVISAGE AND FOR WHICH WE HOPE WE WILL HAVE YOUR SUPPORT.

--OUR REVISED PLAN IS PREMISED ON SEVERAL KEY ASSESSMENTS WHICH I BELIEVE YOU SHARE.

--ANY LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO LEBANON'S PROBLEMS MUST BE BASED ON A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND NOT ON FORCE.

--PART OF THE PURPOSE OF THE MNF IS TO ENABLE THIS

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NEGOTIATING PROCESS TO MOVE FORWARD. THE MNF PROVIDES A CERTAIN BACKDROP OF SECURITY AND GIVES THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT THE SUPPORT AND THE CONFIDENCE IT NEEDS TO ENGAGE IN A GENUINE DIALOGUE FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WITH RESPONSIBLE OPPOSITION LEADERS.

--SYRIA, HOWEVER, IS BLOCKING THIS NEGOTIATING PROCESS. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED TO THE SYRIAN LEADERSHIP THAT COMPROMISE IS NECESSARY AND THAT NO ONE PARTY CAN HAVE ALL IT WANTS IN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, THE SYRIAN POSITION ON LEBANON REMAINS RIGID. THERE HAS BEEN ABSOLUTELY NO GIVE.

--MEANWHILE, THE SECURITY SITUATION IN LEBANON CONTINUES TO DETERiorATE. SYRIAN-SUPPORTED TERRORISTS CONTINUE TO INFILTRATE INTO BEIRUT AND TO THREATEN BOTH THE MNF AND OUR CIVILIANS.

--SYRIAN ARTILLERY IN THE METN CONTINUES TO INTimidATE THE LEBANESE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT AND THREATENS OUR FORCES AS WELL.


--As you are well aware, the continuing plight of the MNF has given rise to increasing domestic opposition to our policy in Lebanon. The MNF has, in fact, become the chief issue, rather than the unwillingness of Syria and its surrogates to negotiate a political settlement.

--As MNF domestic support weakens, Syria's position hardens and the negotiating process remains frozen.

--We have devised measures intended to break this stalemate in a practical and realistic way. Our plan has four chief goals:

--To maintain vital Western support for the Lebanese government in its efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in the face of Syrian intransigence and intimidation.

--To strengthen domestic support for the MNF role while maintaining the visible commitment the MNF provides to
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THE LEbanese GOVERNMENT.

--TO ENHANCE THE LEbanese GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO ASSUME AUTHORITY OVER ITS OWN TERRITORY AND TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST THE DUAL THREATS OF TERRORISM AND ARTILLERY FIRE FROM SYRIAN-CONTROLLED TERRITORY.

--TO CONVINCE SYRIA AND HER FRIENDS THAT THE WEST WILL NOT BACK DOWN IN THE FACE OF TERRORISM, INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE.

--THERE ARE THREE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO OUR PLAN.

--STRENGTHENING THE LAF'S ABILITY TO MEET THE SECURITY CHALLENGES IT FACES.

--REDepLOYING U.S. GROUND FORCES.

--PROVIDING ADDITIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT TO THE LEbanese GOVERNMENT.

--WE BELIEVE THE MEASURES WE HAVE DEVISED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE GOL WILL REDUCE MNF RISKS WHILE MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE MNF MISSION. OUR MILITARY COMMANDERS WILL, OF COURSE, SOON BE CONSULTING ON THIS MATTER, BUT THE BASIC STEPS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

--THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE MARINES NOW AT BEIRUT AIRPORT TO SHIPS OFFSHORE WOULD TAKE PLACE IN PHASES BASED ON AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION. THE FIRST PHASE MIGHT REDEPLOY SOMETHING LIKE 500 MEN FROM BEIRUT AIRPORT BACK TO THE AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS, LEAVING ABOUT 1000 STILL AT BEIRUT AIRPORT.

--THE TIMETABLE FOR THIS AND SUBSEQUENT PHASES HAS NOT YET BEEN DEVELOPED AND APPROVED, BUT IT WILL TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS.

--FOLLOWING A DECISION TO BEGIN THE TRANSITION, WE EXPECT THAT THE FIRST PHASE COULD BE COMPLETED IN LESS THAN A MONTH. THE SUBSEQUENT PHASES WOULD TAKE PLACE OVER AN INDEFINITE PERIOD AND WOULD BE RELATED TO THE TRAINING AND EQUIPPING OF THE LAF BUILDUP AND OTHER FACTORS.

--WE WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE A MILITARY UNIT FOR SECURITY OF THE CHANCERY IN BEIRUT AND BUILDINGS HOUSING U.S. DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL.

--THE MARINES ABOARD OUR SHIPS WILL CONSTITUTE A MOBILE
RESERVE WHICH CAN BE REINSERTED ASHORE IF AND WHEN IT IS
DEEMED NECESSARY.

-- EVEN BEFORE THE REDEPLOYMENT IS UNDERWAY, WE WILL BE
STEPPING UP OUR EFFORTS TO ENHANCE THE GOL'S ABILITY TO
DEFEND ITSELF. MUCH HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE, BUT MORE IS
NECESSARY.

-- THE GOL FACES THREE SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES.

-- THE NEED TO EXPAND ITS TERRITORIAL CONTROL.

-- THE NEED TO IMPROVE ITS ABILITY TO CONTROL TERRORISM.

-- THE THREAT OF HOSTILE ARTILLERY FROM SYRIAN-CONTROLLED
AREAS.

-- IN ORDER TO HELP THE GOL MEET THESE NEW CHALLENGES THE
U.S. WILL BE UNDERTAKING A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC ACTIONS:

-- WE ARE ACCELERATING U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES
TO THE LAF AND WILL ENHANCE OUR TRAINING PROGRAM ALREADY
IN EFFECT.

-- WE WILL PROVIDE COUNTER-TERRORISM/COUNTER-INSURGENCY
TRAINING TO THE LAF BY DEPLOYING SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FORCES TO ACT AS TRAINERS.

-- WE WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE
LAF BY DEPLOYING TO LEBANON A SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS
SUPPORT UNIT AND TRAINING THE LAF IN COMMUNICATIONS
INTERCEPT PROCEDURES AND BY INCREASING OTHER INTELLIGENCE
SUPPORT.

-- WE WILL IMPROVE LAF COUNTER-BATTERY CAPABILITY BY:

-- REPOSITIONING COUNTER-BATTERY RADAR TO PROVIDE ENHANCED
CAPABILITY.

-- IMPROVING THE FLOW OF TARGETTING INFORMATION TO THE LAF.

-- PROVIDING THE LAF WITH MORE MODERN ARTILLERY AMMUNITION.

-- PROVIDING MORE COUNTER-BATTERY TRAINING.

-- ACCELERATING THE DELIVERY OF MORE ARTILLERY.

-- THIS WILL GIVE THE LAF A STEADILY IMPROVING CAPABILITY
TO DEAL WITH THE LEBANESE OPPOSITION'S ARTILLERY.

-- EVEN WITH THIS ADDED CAPABILITY, HOWEVER, SYRIAN ARTILLERY WILL CONTINUE TO POSE A THREAT BOTH TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND TO THE SAFETY OF MNF PERSONNEL. WE ARE THEREFORE EXPANDING OUR CURRENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT:

-- WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE AS UNDER OUR PRESENT ROE TO FIRE AT ANY UNIT CONDUCTING A HOSTILE ATTACK DIRECTLY ON THE MNF OR U.S. PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES.

-- WE WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO USE U.S. GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR ASSETS IN SUPPORT OF THE LAF, WHEN IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE U.S. GROUND COMMANDER, LAF POSITIONS CONTROLLING STRATEGIC ARTERIES TO BEIRUT ARE IN DANGER OF BEING OVERRUN BY HOSTILE FORCES.

-- IF THERE IS A RISK OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE OR A LACK OF PRECISE INFORMATION ON THE SOURCE OF HOSTILE FIRE, DESTRUCTIVE FIRE WILL BE DIRECTED AGAINST DISCRETE MILITARY TARGETS IN UNPOPULATED AREAS WHICH ARE ORGANIZATIONALLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE FIRING UNITS.

-- IN ORDER, HOWEVER, TO ENHANCE THE SAFETY OF MNF PERSONNEL, WE ARE ALSO GRANTING AUTHORITY TO U.S. NAVAL FORCES OFFSHORE TO PROVIDE NAVAL GUNFIRE AND AIR SUPPORT AGAINST ANY UNITS IN SYRIAN CONTROLLED TERRITORY FIRING INTO THE GREATER BEIRUT AREA.

-- WE NATURALLY HOPE THAT WE WILL NOT HAVE TO MAKE USE OF THESE EXPANDED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. THAT, HOWEVER, IS UP TO THE SYRIANS. IT IS TIME THEY UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE LIMITS TO OUR PATIENCE IN CONFRONTING THREATS AND INTIMIDATION.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THESE NEW MEASURES WILL STRENGTHEN DOMESTIC POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR OUR POLICY. THEY WILL ALSO HELP CONVINCE THE SYRIANS TO PURSUE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, RATHER THAN A VICTORY THROUGH VIOLENCE. ALL PARTIES INVOLVED WILL THEN BE ABLE TO FOCUS ON THE HARD WORK OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

-- WE HOPE OUR ALLIES WILL HELP IN ENHANCING THE STRENGTH OF THE LAF TO THE POINT WHERE IT CAN DEAL, UNAIDED, WITH THE THREAT TO LEBANESE NATIONAL UNITY. ACCORDINGLY, WE WOULD LIKE TO CONSULT LATER IN MORE DETAIL ON A PROPOSED SHARING OF TASKS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS GOAL.
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--THERE ARE APT TO BE DIFFICULT TIMES IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS DURING THE TRANSITION TO OUR NEW POSTURE. STEADFASTNESS AND COORDINATION ARE THE KEY TO SUCCESS.

--WE WOULD AGAIN LIKE TO PROPOSE A COORDINATED SELF-DEFENSE EFFORT AMONG THE MNF FORCES. AGAIN, WE WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT U.S. FORCES ARE PREPARED TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY TO ANY CALL FOR ASSISTANCE BY THE FORCES OF ANY OF OUR THREE PARTNERS.

--OUR PROPOSED PLANS ARE NOT INTENDED IN ANY WAY TO CHANGE THE BASIC OVERALL MNF ROLE IN LEBANON; RATHER, WE BELIEVE THESE PLANS WILL ENABLE US TO CARRY OUT THAT ROLE MORE EFFECTIVELY UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

4. FOR MURPHY: SHOULD THE MNF WISH TO DISCUSS IN SOME DETAIL IMMEDIATELY CHANGED ROLES THEY MIGHT PLAY, WE HAVE PROVIDED BELOW SOME OF OUR OWN PRELIMINARY THINKING. WE WILL, OF COURSE, NOT HAVE RAISED ANY OF THESE IDEAS WITH GEMAYEL, SO YOU SHOULD CAREFULLY CAVEAT ANY DISCUSSIONS YOU MAY HAVE.

5. THE BRITISH:

--DRAWING ON YOUR EXPERIENCES, YOU ARE PARTICULARLY WELL SUITED TO PROVIDE TRAINING AND SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT TO LEBANESE RANGER (COMMANDO) UNITS WHOSE PRINCIPAL MISSION IS DEFENSE AND RIPPOSTE AGAINST TERRORIST UNITS.

--WE VISUALIZE A TRANSFORMATION OF THE UK FORCES FROM ESSENTIALLY POLICE UNITS TO A LARGE-SCALE COMMANDO TRAINING TEAM. THIS WILL HAVE THE FURTHER ADVANTAGE OF REMOVING BRITISH TROOPS FROM A SINGLE, EXPOSED, AND TARGETTABLE LOCATION WHERE THEY ARE ALWAYS AT RISK AGAINST ATTACK.

--WE ALSO BELIEVE THE UK SHOULD USE ITS HISTORIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DRUZE TO ENCOURAGE THEIR RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE GOL.

6. THE FRENCH:

--THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES TO THE STABILIZATION OF THE LEBANESE STATE CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE SPECIAL ROLE VISUALIZED FOR THESE FORCES IN THE PROPOSED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS PLANS.
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--UNFORTUNATELY, WE DOUBT THE ISF IS PRESENTLY CAPABLE OF ASSUMING EVEN THE LIMITED ROLES PRESENTLY FORESEEN. FRANCE, WITH ITS LONG HISTORY OF CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH LEBANON AND ITS EQUALLY MAGNIFICENT GENDARMERIE IS REMARKABLY WELL-QUALIFIED TO TAKE THE UPGRADING, MODERNIZATION AND EXPANSION OF THE ISF UNDER ITS WING.

--WE WOULD SUGGEST YOU COULD BEST ASSIST BY PROVIDING A SUBSTANTIAL GENDARMERIE TRAINING ELEMENT TOGETHER WITH A REORIENTATION OF FRENCH ASSISTANCE TO THE ISF ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS.

--IF NEEDED-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE LAF AND GOL HAVE CONSISTENTLY FAILED TO RESPOND TO PREVIOUS FRENCH OFFERS TO UPGRADE THE ISF. WE ARE PREPARED TO WEIGH IN WITH THE GOL AND GENERAL TANNOUS TO OBTAIN THEIR COOPERATION AND AGREEMENT TO THIS PROPOSAL.

7. THE ITALIANS:

--ITALIAN MNF FORCES HAVE PERFORMED MAGNIFICENTLY AT PERHAPS THE MOST DIFFICULT AND THANKLESS JOB IN BEIRUT, THE PROTECTION OF THE REFUGEES AND OTHER INNOCENT CIVILIANS IN THE AREA OF THE SABRA AND SHATILA REFUGEE CAMPS. THERE IS NO DOING WITHOUT THIS VITAL MISSION IF WE ARE TO CONTINUE TO ENJOY OUR OWN NATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE ROLE OF THE MNF IN LEBANON. ANOTHER MASSACRE OF PALESTINIANS WOULD DESTROY THE INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY AND SUPPORT OF THE GOL.

8. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. YYY