

38470 1

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE757  
VSK428 510 UTS2080 //NO MCN ASSIGNED//  
OO RUEHC RUEHSD  
DE RUEHBI #3070 1121515 TAO AD364632 510  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 221312Z APR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEIRUT 3070

DEPT PLS PASS TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM  
JIDDA, USELO RIYADH TEL AVIV AND DIA WASHDC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAHS: PINS MOPS, LE

SUBJECT: WALID JUMBLATT: PESSIMISM ON INTERNAL POLLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. POLOOFF MET APRIL 21 WITH DRUZE/PSP LEADER WALID JUMBLATT WHO IS BACK IN BEIRUT AFTER AN EXTENDED TRIP TO MOSCOW, SPAIN, AND PORTUGAL (FOR THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE). JUMBLATT WAS NEGATIVE OVER PROSPECTS BOTH FOR THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS AND INTERNAL LEBANESE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, A MOOD HE SAID WAS DEEPEENED BY THE ATTACK ON THE EMBASSY (SEPTEL). ON THE SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, JUMBLATT AVOIDED HIS CUSTOMARY CRITICISM OF THE U.S. ROLE AS A SUPPORTER OF ISRAEL, PERHAPS IN DEFERENCE TO U.S. FEELINGS FOLLOWING THE BOMBING. INSTEAD, HE EXPRESSED THE CONVICTION THAT NO MATTER WHAT PRESSURE THE U.S. APPLIED, THE ISRAELIS WOULD FIND A WAY TO BLOCK A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME.

3. JUMBLATT'S DEEPEST WORRIES WERE OVER THE DOMESTIC SITUATION, HOWEVER, HE SAID HE WAS HAD NO CONTACT WITH AMIN GEMAYEL SINCE THEIR MEETING LAST MONTH AND INTERPRETS THIS LACK OF REGULAR COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRESIDENT OR HIS KEY ADVISORS AS EVIDENCE IN ITSELF THAT GEMAYEIS NOT SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN FORMING A TRUE POLITICAL COSENSUS IN LEBANON. INSTEAD, JUMBLATT SAID HE FELT INCREASINGLY CERTAIN THAT GEMAYEL WAS SEEKING PHALANGE DOMINATION OF THE COUNTRY. THERE WERE, HE SAID, TOO MANY INDICATIONS OF THIS TO IGNORE:

-- MOST KEY APPOINTMENTS IN THE GOVERNMENT ARE GOING TO PHALANGISTS.

-- THE PHALANCE PARTY IS ENERGETICALLY PURSUING EFFORTS TO

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD9265/3#38470

BY PW NARA DATE 1/10/01

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE OUTSIDE OF TRADITIONAL AREA OF MARONITE CONTROL, BOTH MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY. -- INSPITE OF THE CONTINUING TRUCE IN THE MOUNTAINS THE LEBANESE FORCES ARE CONTINUING TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES AND HAVE REINSTITUED CONSCRIPTION IN THE SHUF AND ALAYH. THESE DEVELOPMENTS, JUMBLATT SIAD, CALL INTO QUESTION THE ACCEPTABILITY OF A LEBANESE ARMY DEPLOYMENT IF THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS WITHDRAW: HE CONTINUES TO HOLD A FAVORABLE OPINION OF LAF COMMANDER TANNUS, BUT CANNOT TRUST THE ARMY AS AN INSTITUTION IN VIEW OF WHAT HE SUSPECTS ARE THE POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS OF THE PPRESSIDENT.

4. JUMBAATT TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN SAYING (AGAIN) THAT HE AND OTHER DRUZE LEADERS OF IMPORTANCE (HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED MAJID ARSALAN AND DRUZE SPIRITUAL LEADER MUHAMMAD ABU SHAQRA) WERE ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO AN INDEPENDENT DRUZE STATE. SUCH SENTIMENTS ARE PRESENT IN THE DRUZE COMMUNITY AND TEND TO INCREASE WHENEVER SF/PHALANGE EXPAND ACTIVITY IN DRUZE AREAS. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NO CHANCE THAT DRUZE SEPARATISM WOULD EVER GAIN A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF SUPPORT.

5. THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION, WE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF DIALOGUE AND CONTACT BETWEEN LEBANON'S POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE GOVERNMENT. JUMBLATT REPLIED THAT HE HAS MADE IT CLEAR TO GEMAYEL THAT HE IS READY TO TALK AT ANY TIME BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, REJECT OVEROBSERVATION THAT AT LEAST A PHONE CALL TO THE PALACE COULD BE USEFUL BEFORE HE LEAVES AGAIN FOR AMMAN.

6. COMMENT: AS WE WILL BE REPORTING SEPARATELY, THERE ARE GROWING FEARS AMONG MUSLIMS AND SOME CHRISTIANS THAT GEMAYEL IS ATTEMPTING TO USE THE PRESIDENCY AS A MEANS TO ENSURE PHALANGE CONTROL OVER LEBANON. MUCH OF THIS CONCERN RESULTS FROM THE FACT THAT GEMAYEL IS DISINCLINED TO CONSULT WITH POLITICAL LEADERS, AND GIVEN JUMBLATT'S TENDENCY TO BROOD WHEN LEFT ALONE, WE SUSPECT THAT THIS LACK OF CONTACT IS AN ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT FACTOR IN HIS CASE. HE IS NOT, HOWEVER, DOING MUCH TO ENCOURAGE GEMAYEL TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE: IN LISBON, FOR EXAMPLE, HE ISSUED ANOTHER STATEMENT ACCUSING THE PHALANGE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE AND DEMANDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT PROVE ITS IMPARTIALITY BY BRINGING THE PERPETRATORS TO JUSTICE. DILLON

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
#3070  
NNNN

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38471

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

HCE774  
STU2864  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUQMBE #3069 1121330  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 221315Z APR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3049  
BT  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEIRUT 3069

EXDIS

DEPT PLS PASS TO CAIRO JIDDA RIYADH DAMASCUS TEL AVIV AND  
JERUSALEM INFO IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12356: DCL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PINS, LE, US

SUBJ: AMAL ELECTIONS: NEW MANDATE FOR NABIH BARRI

1. (C- ENTIRE TEXT).

2. THE SHI'A ORGANIZATION AMAL CONVENED ITS BIENNIAL  
CONGRESS LAST WEEK IN BEIRUT FOR ELECTIONS OF THE  
MOVEMENTS LEADERSHIP. AS WE HAD ANTICIPATED (AND IN  
SPITE OF DARK PREDICTIONS FROM G-2 CHIEF QASSIS), NABIH  
BARRI FACED NO SERIOUS CHALLENGES AND WAS REELECTED AS  
PRESIDENT. THE CONGRESS ALSO RESULTED IN A  
RESTRUCTURING OF THE ORGANIZATION: THE COMMAND COUNCIL  
HAS BEEN DISSOLVED AND REPLACED BY AN EXPANDED POLITICAL  
BUREAU WHICH WILL HAVE AS MANY AS 60 MEMBERS APPOINTED  
BY BARRI. IT IS HEADED BY AQIF HAYDAR, A RETIRED  
LAF COLONEL CONSIDERED VERY CLOSE POLITICALLY AND  
PERSONALLY TO BARRI. A 12-MEMBER EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, HEADED BY  
FORMER COMMAND COUNCIL VICE PRESIDENT HASHIM AL-HASSAN  
(ALSO A BARRI INTIMATE) WILL HAVE RESPONSIBILITY  
FOR IMPLEMENTING POLITICAL BUREAU DECISIONS BUT  
APPARENTLY NO POLICY MAKING AUTHORITY. BARRI TOLD US  
APRIL 21 THAT THERE WILL ALSO BE AN OFFICE OF THE  
PRESIDENCY, INCLUDING BARRI HIMSELF, HAYDAR, AL-HASSAN  
AND ONE OR TWO OTHERS WHO WILL DIRECT THE MOVEMENT'S  
ACTIVITIES ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS.

3. BARRI SAID THAT THE RESTRUCTURING WAS INTENDED TO  
DE-EMPHASIZE THE MILITARY NATURE OF AMAL THAT HAD BEEN  
REPRESENTED BY THE COMMAND COUNCIL. THE MOVEMENT WOULD  
NOW FOCUS ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN SHI'A  
AREAS, AND BARRI SAID THE POLITICAL BUREAU AND ESPECIALLY  
THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL WOULD CONTAIN A HIGH PERCENTAGE  
OF INDIVIDUALS WITH PROFESSIONAL AND PRACTICAL

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NLRRM04-265/3#38471  
BY RWJ NARA DATE 1/1/04



SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

QUALIFICATIONS IN THESE FIELDS. BARRI ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT IN VIEW OF THE CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY OVER LEBANON'S FUTURE, HE WAS HEDGING HIS BETS: AMAL MILITIA COMMANDER ABU YAHYA WILL OCCUPY A SEAT ON BOTH THE COUNCIL AND IN THE POLITICAL BUREAU. BARRI ALSO CONFIRMED WHAT WE HAD ALREADY SUSPECTED -- AMAL HAS KEPT ITS MILITIA MORE OR LESS ORGANIZATIONALLY INTACT AND MEMBERS RETAIN INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS.

4. BARRI SAID THAT THE CONGRESS DID NOT BRING ABOUT A RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN HIM AND SHI'A SPIRITUAL LEADER MOHAMMAD MAHDI SHAMS-AL-DIN. HE MAINTAINED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SPLIT IS NO LONGER SIGNIFICANT. THE CONGRESS CONFIRMED THAT WHILE SHAMS-AL-DIN MAY BE RESPECTED AS A RELIGIOUS LEADER, HE HAS NO SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL FOLLOWING.

5. BARRI COMMENTED THAT WHILE IT WAS NOW CLEAR THAT HE HAD THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE SHI'A COMMUNITY, HE REMAINED CONCERNED AND DISTURBED OVER WHAT HE PERCEIVES AS A HOSTILE GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE OFFICIAL MEDIA MADE NO REFERENCE TO HIS REELECTION AND SAID THAT HE BELIEVES THE GOL IS CONTINUING TO SEEK WAYS OF UNDERMINING HIS AUTHORITY IN THE COMMUNITY. FOR EXAMPLE, HE SUSPECTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL ATTEMPT TO USE IT'S RECENTLY LAUNCHED CAMPAIGN TO EXPAND SOCIAL SERVICES AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IN BEIRUT'S PREDOMINANTLY SHI'A SUBURBS IN AN EFFORT TO DRAW SUPPORT AWAY FROM HIM. BARRI'S EXPLANATION FOR HIS THEORY OF A GOL DESIRE TO WEAKEN HIM IS SIMPLE: AMIN GEMAYEL IS SEEKING WAYS TO ESTABLISH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT KAMAL AL-ASSAD AS THE PREEMINENT FIGURE IN THE SHI'A COMMUNITY.

6. BARRI WARNED THAT IF GEMAYEL DOES SUCCEED IN UNDERMINING HIS FOLLOWING AMONG THE SHI'A, THE BENEFICIARY WOULD NOT BE AL-ASSAD, WHO HAS VERY LITTLE POPULAR SUPPORT. INSTEAD, THE WINNERS WOULD BE RELIGIOUS EXTREMISTS SUCH AS HUSSEIN MUSSAWI (AMAL OF ISLAM LEADER IN BA'LABAKK) AND LIKE-MINDED INDIVIDUALS IN BEIRUT. THESE PEOPLE, HE SAID, WERE ACTIVE AND AMBITIOUS IF ANY VACUUM DEVELOPS IN SHI'A POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, THEY WILL BE EAGER TO FILL IT.

7. COMMENT: BARRI HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT HE IS FIRMLY IN CONTROL OF AMAL, BUT HE WILL BE FACING DIFFICULT CHALLENGES IN THE COMING MONTHS. IT WILL NOT BE AN EASY TASK TO REDIRECT THE MOVEMENT, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT A NEW STRUCTURE WAS NECESSARY: AMAL COULD NOT HOPE TO MAINTAIN A STRONG FOLLOWING WITHOUT SHIFTING EMPHASIS FROM A MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DEFEND SHI'A FROM NOW

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

VANISHED FOES (THE PLO AND ITS LEBANESE ALLIES) TO A  
FOCUS ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, WHICH SHI'A  
BADLY NEED. WE ARE ALSO INCLINED TO AGREE THAT IF  
THERE ARE THREATS TO BARRI'S LEADERSHIP, IT WILL BE  
FROM THE EXTREMISTS RATHER THAN A TRADITIONAL LEADER  
LIKE AL-ASSAD. IN ADDITION TO PRO-KHOMEINI ELEMENTS,  
WE ARE HEARING THAT COMMUNISTS (BOTH GEORGE HAWI'S  
LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE COMMUNIST ACTION  
ORGANIZATION OF MUHSIN IBRAHIM -- A SHI'A) ARE STEPPING  
UP EFFORTS TO RECRUIT FOLLOWERS FROM THE SHI'A POPULATION.  
THE PITCH IS THE ONE BARRI IS TRYING TO PREEMPT: THE  
SHI'A CAN EXPECT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE ONLY THROUGH  
COMMUNISM. DILLON

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38472 7  
SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

HCE777  
UTS2093  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHDM #3053 1121447  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 221446Z APR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1432  
INFO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1818  
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 5033  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 7664

BT

~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 03053

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINS, PREL, MOPS, LE, US, IS, SY

SUBJECT: UNIFIL AND THE PROTECTION OF PALESTINIANS -  
THE SYRIAN FACTOR

REF: BEIRUT 3068

1. S-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE AGREE WITH AMEMBASSY BEIRUT (REFTEL) THAT AS PART OF ANY LEBANESE-US-ISRAELI AGREEMENT UNIFIL HAS A NECESSARY ROLE TO PLAY IN PROTECTING PALESTINIAN CAMPS. BEYOND ARGUMENTS LAID OUT BY BEIRUT TO SUPPORT THIS RECOMMENDATION, WE BELIEVE THAT SYRIAN CONCERN ABOUT THE POST-WITHDRAWAL SITUATION IN LEBANON WOULD BE NEGATIVELY INFLUENCED IF UNIFIL IS NOT RETURNED TO PROTECT THE PALESTINIANS.

3. FOR REASONS LIKE THOSE ADDUCED IN REFTEL, THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT WISH TO RISK CONCURRING IN AN AGREEMENT THAT LEFT PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON UNPROTECTED. WE RECALL AN INTERVIEW THAT APPEARED IN THE APRIL 2 EDITION OF THE ARABIC WEEKLY MAGAZINE AL-MUSTAQBAL IN WHICH PRESIDENT ASSAD SAID THAT SYRIA WOULD BASE ITS CONSIDERATION OF ANY WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON ON HOW IT WOULD AFFECT FIRST, SYRIA'S SECURITY AND SECOND, THE SAFETY OF SYRIA'S "FRIENDS" IN LEBANON. ALTHOUGH MOST OF SYRIA'S "FRIENDS" ARE CONCENTRATED IN THE TRIPOLI AREA AND THE BIGA', WE DO NOT DOUBT THAT IN THIS CONTEXT PRESIDENT ASSAD MIGHT WELL INCLUDE THE PALESTINIANS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON ON HIS LIST OF FRIENDS.

4. ASSAD ALSO PROBABLY VALUES THE PRESENCE OF UNIFIL IN SOUTH LEBANON AS A USEFUL, IF LIMITED, RESTRAINING FACTOR ON ISRAELI INFLUENCE THERE.

5. THEREFORE WE BELIEVE THAT IF UNIFIL IS EXCLUDED FROM

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NLRRM09-265/3#38472

BY rw NARA DATE 1/1/01

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

A ROLE IN SOUTH LEBANON, WE WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE  
THE TASK OF OBTAINING SYRIAN AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW ITS  
FORCES.

6. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT. RUGH

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38473 9  
SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE804  
VSK438 510 STU2028  
OO RUEHC RUEHSD  
DE RUQMBE #3068 1120800 CCY TEXT 510  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 220845Z APR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000  
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 001  
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 001  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 001  
BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 3068

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y TEXT (PARA 7)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINS, PREL, MOPS, LE, US, IS

SUBJ: LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS: UNIFIL AND  
PROTECTION OF PALESTINIANS.

REF: TEL AVIV 5092

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: A RECENT INDICATION FROM AMIN GEMAYEL THAT UNIFIL IS EXPENDABLE-- PARTICULARLY IF THE ROLE ENVISIONED FOR IT IS PROTECTION OF PALESTINIAN CAMPS-- PLUS ISRAEL'S CONSISTENT ANTI-UNIFIL POSITION INCREASES THE POSSIBILITY THAT LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS WILL AGREE ON NO UN TROOPS IN SOUTH LEBANON. CONTINUING VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION DIRECTED AGAINST PALESTINIANS IN THE SIDON AREA IS A CLEAR INDICATOR OF THE HOSTILITY WITH WHICH SOME LEBANESE VIEW THEM, HOWEVER, AND IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SOME PROVISIONS FOR PROTECTION MUST BE MADE FOLLOWING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WHILE THE LAF HAS THE CAPABILITY OF PROVIDING SECURITY, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE GOL WILL ATTACH A HIGH PRIORITY TO SUCH A MISSION. FROM THE .S. PERSPECTIVE, AN AGREEMENT THAT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ADEQUATE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF PALESTINIANS IN SOUTH LEBANON CARRIES TWO RISKS: FIRST, THE PLO MAY REFUSE TO WITHDRAW. SECOND, IF THE PALESTINIANS ARE VICTIMS OF LARGE SCALE VIOLENCE FOLLOWING AN IDF PULL OUT, THE U.S., AS PARTY TO AN AGREEMENT THAT DID NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS, WILL BE SEEN AS RESPONSIBLE. ALTHOUGHT IT MAY NOT BE AN IDEAL SOLUTION, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT UNIFIL BE RETAINED IN SOUTH LEBANON TO PROTECT

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NLRRM09-265/3#38473

BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/11

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

PALESTINIAN CAMPS AS PART OF ANY LEBANESE-U.S.- ISRAELI AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY

3. IN THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, CONSIDERATION OF THE FUTURE ROLE OF UNIFIL AND THE ISSUE OF PROTECTION FOR PALESTINIANS IN SOUTH LEBANON HAVE OFTEN BEEN CONNECTED: UNIFIL COULD BE DEPLOYED AROUND REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE SIDON AND TYRE AREAS. THE ISRAELIS HAVE CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED THE PRESENCE OF UNIFIL TROOPS FOR ANY PURPOSE IN THE SECURITY ZONE, AND IN HIS APRIL 14 MEETING WITH HABIB, AMIN GEMAYEL MADE IT CLEAR THAT AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, A CONTINUED ROLE FOR UNIFIL IN THE SOUTH IS NOT AN IMPORTANT ISSUE -- PARTICULARLY IF THE MISSION IS PROTECTION OF PALESTINIANS.

4. GEMAYEL'S COMMENTS ON UNIFIL, COUPLED WITH ISRAEL'S WELL-KNOWN POSITION, STRENGTHENS THE POSSIBILITY THAT LEFT TO THEMSELVES, THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE WILL SIMPLY DEAL UNIFIL OUT OF THE SOUTH. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT WE AGAIN REVIEW THE STATUS OF AND PROSPECTS FOR PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON IN LIGHT OF U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES. OUR REPORTING SINCE LAST JULY HAS MADE IT REPEATEDLY CLEAR THAT PALESTINIANS HERE FACE A HOSTILE AND THREATENING ENVIRONMENT. THE EVENTS OF THE LAST EIGHT YEARS HAVE FOSTERED AN INTENSE HATRED OF PALESTINIANS ON THE PART OF MANY LEBANESE, AND A DEFEATED ADVERSARY IN THIS SOCIETY IS NOT DEALT WITH MAGNANIMOUSLY. INDEED, ACTIONS AGAINST PALESTINIANS, ESPECIALLY THE STRING OF THREATS AND MURDERS AROUND SIDON, ARE CONTINUING PROOF THAT SOME LEBANESE ARE FULLY PREPARED TO RESORT TO EXTREME ACTS TO GET PALESTINIANS OUT OF LEBANON.

5. WE HAVE READ TEL AVIV'S REPORT OF BG DAGAN'S OBSERVATIONS ON PROSPECTS FOR PALESTINIANS IN SOUTH LEBANON (REFTEL). HIS COMMENT THAT ONCE THE IDF WITHDRAWS, FURTHER MASSACRES OF PALESTINIANS ARE LIKELY STRIKES US AS PLAUSIBLE. WHILE WE BELIEVE THE LAF'S CAPABILITIES ARE INCREASING STEADILY, WE CANNOT BE SURE THAT THE GOL AND LAF WILL BE MOTIVATED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION TO PALESTINIANS. THEREFORE, BUT LIKELY FOR DIFFERENT REASONS, WE FIND BG DAGAN'S ASSERTION OF LAF INADEQUACY IN PROTECTING PALESTINIANS QUITE PLAUSIBLE. WHILE THE IDF MAY NOT BE DOING EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO PREVENT INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION OF PALESTINIANS, ISRAELI PRESENCE HAS PROBABLY BEEN THE MAJOR FACTOR IN THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE ON A MAJOR SCALE. FOLLOWING AN IDF WITHDRAWAL,

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SOUTH LEBANON WITHOUT UNIFIL COULD VERY EASILY BECOME THE ARENA FOR INCREASED VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS.

6. IF UNIFIL IS DROPPED EVEN AS A PRESENCE AROUND PALESTINIAN CAMPS, WE FORESEE TWO MAJOR DANGERS FROM THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE. FIRST, THE PLO MAY REFUSE TO WITHDRAW ON THE GROUNDS THAT THERE ARE NO ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE PROTECTION OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS. SECOND, AS A FULL PARTY TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE WILL BE HELD RESPONSIBLE IN WORLD OPINION FOR CONSEQUENCES RESULTING FROM THE TERMS OF ANY AGREEMENT. IN OUR VIEW, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT A WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES WILL INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF NEW VIOLENCE AGAINST PALESTINIANS. IF WE HAVE ACQUIESCED IN AN AGREEMENT THAT LEAVES PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS WITHOUT SOME FORM OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, THE UNITED STATES WILL BE BLAMED FOR WHAT HAPPENS. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO FORESEE THE ASSASSINATION OF BASHIR GEMAYEL, THE ISRAELI INVASION OF WEST BEIRUT AND THE SUBSEQUENT MURDER OF PALESTINIANS IN SABRA/SHATILA. IF THERE WERE TO BE A MASSACRE IN SOUTH LEBANON, WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ARGUE THAT THERE WERE NO PRIOR WARNINGS.

7. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM OF PROTECTION FOR PALESTINIANS IN SOUTH LEBANON AT LENGTH WITH ICRC AND OTHERS. WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT IT WILL BE EASY TO ENSURE SECURITY FOLLOWING AN IDF WITHDRAWAL, AND IN SOME AREAS FULL SECURITY MAY NOT BE ATTAINABLE. SIDON WILL POSE PARTICULAR PROBLEMS: IN ADDITION TO THE THREATS POSED BY THE PATTERN OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION THAT HAS ALREADY DEVELOPED, UNRWA ESTIMATES THAT OVER HALF OF THE ESTIMATED 5,000 PALESTINIANS IN THE SIDON AREA ARE OUTSIDE REFUGEE CAMPS. ALTHOUGH IT IS CLEARLY NOT POSSIBLE TO POST UN TROOPS WHEREVER THERE ARE PALESTINIANS, IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO CONSIDER A SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT IN SIDON FOR INTENSIVE PATROLS IN AREAS OUTSIDE THE CAMPS THAT ARE HEAVILY POPULATED BY PALESTINIANS. THIS ALONE WOULD BE SOMETHING THAT WOULD REQUIRE MORE THAN A TOKEN FORCE OF A COMPANY OR SO.

8. THERE ARE NUMEROUS PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNIFIL AROUND REFUGEE CAMPS AND OTHER PALESTINIAN AREAS: IT IS AN ISSUE THAT WILL COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATIONS, CAUSE FRICTION WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, FOSTER A GHETTO-LIKE ATMOSPHERE AMONG THE PALESTINIANS, AND MAY BRING OBJECTIONS FROM SOME TROOP CONTRIBUTORS. IT IS OUR VIEW, HOWEVER, THAT NONE

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OF THESE OUTWEIGHT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE HUMAN AND  
POLITICAL DISASTER THAT COULD RESULT FROM AN AGREEMENT  
THAT PROVIDES NO INTEROSTIONAL PROTECTION FOR PALESTINIANS.  
DILLON

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#3068  
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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE847  
VSK444 510 STU3462  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHTV #5492/02 1121706  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 221659Z APR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3149  
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2438  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5821  
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 8981  
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9907  
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7352.  
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3768  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 05492  
EXDIS

7. A DRAFTING GROUP WAS ESTABLISHED TO ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS; THE TWO PARTIES SUBSEQUENTLY AGREED TO THE FOLLOWING TEXT WHICH MET FATTAL'S CONCERNS:  
BEGIN TEXT

ALL OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO THESE LIAISON OFFICES, THEIR PERSONNEL, AND THE PERSONNEL OF EACH PARTY PRESENT IN THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY IN CONNECTION WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A PROTOCOL TO BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE. PENDING THE CONCLUSION OF THIS PROTOCOL, THE LIAISON OFFICES AND THE ABOVE-MENTIONED PERSONNEL WILL BE TREATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION ON SPECIAL MISSIONS OF DECEMBER 8, 1969, INCLUDING THOSE PROVISIONS CONCERNING PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. THE FOREGOING IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNING THAT CONVENTION.  
END TEXT.

--  
8. THE DISCUSSION MOVED TO ARTICLE 10 AND THE ISRAELI DESIRE THAT THE WORDING SHOULD INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THAT THE PRESENT AGREEMENT SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL A ("COMPLETE," "FULL," OR "FORMAL") TREATY OF PEACE IS ACHIEVED. THE PARTIES FINALLY AGREED TO CONSIDER AD REFERENDUM DRAPER'S FORMULATION, WHICH READS: "THE PRESENT AGREEMENT SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS FORMALLY

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD4-265/3 #38474  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/84

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

CONCLUDED." AT ISRAELI INITIATIVE, IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE 10, CONCERNING REVISIONS TO THE AGREEMENT, WOULD BE SIMPLIFIED. THE NEW VERSION OF PARAGRAPH 2 READS: "THE PRESENT AGREEMENT MAY BE REVIEWED, AND AMENDED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES, UPON REQUEST OF EITHER PARTY."

--  
9. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE CONTENTIOUS FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 11, WHICH REFERS TO THE ABROGATION OF TREATIES, LAWS, AND REGULATIONS IN CONFLICT WITH THE AGREEMENT, WOULD BE DEFERRED. (THE ISRAELIS OBVIOUSLY WANT TO TIGHTEN UP THE LANGUAGE IN THIS PARAGRAPH AS IT APPLIES TO THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT.)

--  
10. ISRAEL AGREED TO ARTICLE 12, CONCERNING RATIFICATION PROCEDURES, AS IT STOOD IN THE LEBANESE DRAFT. THE ISRAELI SIDE ALSO AGREED TO THE LEBANESE DRAFT ON ARTICLE 13 (RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES), THOUGH THEY WANTED ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE TO BE INSERTED WHICH WOULD REFER TO THE PARTIES RESOLVING ISSUES BETWEEN THEM IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. BOTH PARTIES AGREED TO CONSIDER A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL, INVOLVING A ONE WORD CHANGE, SUGGESTED BY KOZAK. FINALLY, THE LAST ARTICLE, ARTICLE 14 (UN NOTIFICATION AND LANGUAGE OF TEXTS) WAS ACCEPTED IN ITS PRESENT FORM BY ISRAEL.

--  
11. THE AGREED MINUTES TO THE AGREEMENT WERE ALSO REVIEWED. THERE IS BASIC AGREEMENT IN THIS AREA, THOUGH THE LEBANESE SIDE STILL HAS TO CHECK OUT SEVERAL POINTS.

--  
12. WHILE THE FULL CIVILIAN SUBCOMMITTEE WAS MEETING, KHARMA (LEBANON) AND SEMADAR (ISRAEL) DISCUSSED THE NEW LEBANESE DRAFT FORMULA CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD (JERUSALEM 1357). KHARMA AND SEMADAR REACHED AGREEMENT ON REVISED LANGUAGE RELATING TO TWO POINTS IN THE LEBANESE TEXT. THEY CENTERED ON ISRAELI PREFERENCE THAT THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS BE BASED ON THE DRAWING UP OF NEGATIVE LISTS (I.E., ISRAELI GOODS WHICH COULD NOT BE EXPORTED TO LEBANON) RATHER THAN THE REVERSE, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE LEBANESE DRAFT. ALSO, KHARMA AGREED WITH SEMADAR THAT THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS, WHO WOULD MONITOR TRADE, COULD NOT ADJUST THE VOLUME OF TRADE, GIVEN THE FREE-MARKET ECONOMIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. WHEN KHARMA SUBSEQUENTLY SOUGHT APPROVAL ON THESE TWO POINTS FROM HIS SUPERIORS IN BEIRUT, HE RECEIVED A NEGATIVE

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SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 634

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RESPONSE AND SO INFORMED SEMADAR. HOWEVER, KHARMA  
PROMISED TO PURSUE THE TWO REVISIONS FURTHER WITH  
HIS AUTHORITIES. KHARMA AND SEMADAR DID NOT REACH  
AGREEMENT ON A THIRD ISSUE, NAMELY, THE SENTENCE IN  
THE LEBANESE DRAFT WHICH READS: "IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT  
LEBANON WILL NOT IMPORT FROM ISRAEL PRODUCTS AND  
GOODS THAT LEBANON PRODUCES FOR EXPORT ." THIS SENTENCE  
IS, OF COURSE, POLITICALLY IMPORTANT TO LEBANON

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SENSITIVE

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PAGE 1 - 629

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

HCE869  
VSK456 510 STU3585  
00 RUEHC RUEHSD  
DE RUEHTV #5492/01 1121704 CCY AD371411 510 MCN NAR  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 221659Z APR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3148  
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2437  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5820  
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 8980  
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9906  
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7351  
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3767  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 05492  
EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y TEXT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING OF THE CIVILIAN  
- SUBCOMMITTEE, KHALDE, APRIL 21

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: THE CIVILIAN SUBCOMMITTEE COMPLETED ITS REVIEW OF THE COVERING AGREEMENT AND AGREED MINUTES. HOWEVER, WHILE A NUMBER OF REVISIONS WERE AGREED TO, INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON AN ABBREVIATED TEXT ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES, THE QUESTION OF THE ABROGATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENT (ECONOMIC BOYCOTT) WAS DEFERRED. THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AND RECOGNITION ISSUES ARE THE TWO PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCES WHICH STILL NEED TO BE RESOLVED IN THE COVERING AGREEMENT. IN SIDE MEETINGS, AGREEMENT WAS NOT REACHED ON THE LEBANESE DRAFT ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS. ALSO, THE ISRAELI SIDE PRESSED FOR EXPLANATIONS ON HOW AND WHEN ON-THE-GROUND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD WOULD BE HANDLED. AMBASSADOR KHARMA'S VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS RESPONSES ONLY SERVED TO HEIGHTEN ISRAELI SUSPICIONS THAT THE LEBANESE ARE BACKSLIDING ON THEIR EARLIER COMMITMENTS IN THIS SPHERE. END SUMMARY.

3. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING OF THE CIVILIAN

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 104-216/3#38475  
BY RW NARA DATE 11/11/11

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SUBCOMMITTEE, KIMCHE SAID HE WISHED TO RAISE A PROBLEM CONCERNING A LEBANESE NEWSPAPER AGENT FOR THE JERUSALEM POST WHO HAD BEEN INFORMED BY THE LEBANESE SURETE THAT HE COULD NO LONGER BRING COPIES OF THE JERUSALEM POST INTO BEIRUT, AND HAD COPIES OF THE NEWSPAPER ON HAND SEIZED. COMING ON THE HEELS OF THE EARLIER PROBLEM RELATING TO THE CONFISCATION OF ISRAELI GOODS BY THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES, KIMCHE SAID THESE ACTIONS SOURED THE ATMOSPHERE IN ISRAEL AND CREATED AN AIR OF SUSPICION AT THE POLITICAL, AS WELL AS NEGOTIATING, LEVEL.

4. FATTAL REPLIED THAT, WHILE THE INCIDENT CONCERNING THE JERUSALEM POST WAS REGRETTABLE, IT WAS VIRTUALLY INEVITABLE IN A SITUATION WHEN NO GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL HAD BEEN REACHED. HE SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER, BUT ALSO DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS INTO LEBANON AND LITERARY/INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS WHICH HAVE A POLITICAL DIMENSION. KIMCHE SAID HE WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHETHER THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES HAD ACTED UNDER INSTRUCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE JERUSALEM POST, OR WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLY A MATTER OF AN OVERZEALOUS OFFICIAL OPERATING UNDER PAST GUIDELINES.

5. KHARMA ALSO EXPLAINED FOR THE RECORD THE HISTORY OF THE EARLIER CONFISCATION OF ISRAELI GOODS. HE SAID THAT LEBANESE CUSTOMS PATROLS HAD, IN FACT, SEIZED A CONVOY OF ISRAELI GOODS IN THE COURSE OF THEIR WORK, AS INDEED THEY HAD ALSO SEIZED OTHER GOODS ENTERING THE BEIRUT AREA ILLEGALLY FROM OTHER PARTS OF LEBANON. UNFORTUNATELY, KHARMA CONTINUED, IT WAS TOO LATE TO TAKE ANY ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE GOODS WHICH HAD BEEN CONFISCATED, BUT HE HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN ISSUED TO PREVENT A REPETITION OF SUCH INCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE.

6. AFTER THIS INITIAL EXCHANGE, THE SUBCOMMITTEE CONTINUED THE REVIEW OF THE TEXT OF THE COVERING AGREEMENT AND THE AGREED MINUTES WHICH HAD BEGUN AT PREVIOUS NEGOTIATING SESSIONS. MOST OF THE MORNING'S DISCUSSION CENTERED ON AN ABBREVIATED TEXT ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. IT SOON BECAME CLEAR THAT FATTAL WAS CONCERNED THE TEXT (EVEN THOUGH IT WAS A LEBANESE DRAFT) WOULD ONLY NARROWLY APPLY TO THOSE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES DESCRIBED IN THE CONVENTION FOR SPECIAL MISSIONS, AND

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SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 631

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WOULD NOT COVER OTHER IMPORTANT "OBLIGATIONS" INCLUDED  
IN THE CONVENTION. HE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO SUCH  
ISSUES AS THE NOTIFICATION AND NOMINATION PROCESS,  
THE QUESTION OF DECLARING PERSONA NON GRATA, AND THE  
SIZE OF THE MISSION. FATTAL OBLIQUELY REFERRED TO  
HIS PRINCIPAL CONCERN WHEN HE MENTIONED AN EARLIER  
LEBANESE MESSAGE TO CHINA, IN WHICH LEBANON HAD FOREWARNED  
CHINA THAT THEIR EMBASSY SHOULD NOT BE TOO LARGE.

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#5492  
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SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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PAGE 1 - 627

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

HCE887

OO RUEHC RUSBLK RHDLCNE RUSNNOA RUEHKO RUDKGPQ RUEHTH  
RUEHTV RUESTE RUFHLGA RUQMMT RUEHIN RUEHCR RUDKKR  
RUEHOT RUDKSNQ RUFHOC RUMJNG RUDKHLQ RUEBBRA RUFHOLC  
RUFHNA RUFHOK RUQMQG RUEHNM RUEHNE RUADBEE RUMJPG  
RUEHNR RUFRRSH RUEHCR RUEHMT RUEHMN RUTAMA RUQMDI  
RUEHMO RUEHROC RUESXM RUMJDN RUFHME RUEHME RUEHRB  
RUEHML RUESMG RUEHCR RUEHMD RUEHMR RUEHRU RUFHMU  
RUEHLD RUFHPC RUEHCR RUESLM RUFHLC RUDKFDQ RUEHLP  
RUEHOS RUTAH I RUEHLS RUFHBG RUEHRO RUESUA RUEHBR  
RUEHKJ RUMJRV RUEHRA RUFHLG RUEHIL RUESON RUEHROB  
RUFHGV RUEHCR RUEHGT RUESGY RUFLAEA RUEHCR RUQMPL  
RUEHCR RUEHSP RUEHRH RUEHCR RUESPR RUEHSA RUDKRP  
RUEHZP RUEHROD RUFHFR RUEHCR RUTAOU RUTAAK RUMJGM  
RUDKPNQ RUFHLNJ RUMJIA RUEHBY RUSBTA RUEHCV RUEHEG  
RUEHTN RUFHBA RUEHCR RUMJFS RUEHVI RUFHLA RUFHVI  
RUEHLDE RUQMDH RUEHDM RUEHDR RUEHDO RUTADS RUEHJA  
RUEHCR RUFHDB RUFHOLB RUFHOL RUSBAY RUESBG RUEHCR  
RUEHWN RUEHBR RUEHBS RUDKRB RUEHLDB RUDKEBQ RUFHEB  
RUEHCR RUEHNB RUMTBK RUTABO RUQMAM RUEHAD RUFHJA  
RUFHPBI RUDKAR RUEHBU RUDKDA RUTAOK RUDKFMQ RUMJSA  
RUFHOLD RUDKSA RUEHGP RUEHUL RUEHCR RUESUP RUESSD  
RUESNA RUEHSN RUEHSJ RUQMNS RUEHSB RUMJHE RUEHCR  
RUTADE RUEHROA RUTAFN RUFHFT RUEHTH RUCBNAJ RUEHAK  
RUEHAM RUFHRS RUQMBI RUEHAL RUTAGN RUTABA RUFLEPA  
RUEHAB RUESAS RUMJDK RUEHWL RUDKRW RUEHCR RUEHJI  
RUEHJM RUEHDT RUESGI RUQMKA RUEHKK RUEHKG RUEHKI  
RUEHLGB RUMJHT RUEHKP RUTAKA RUEHUB RUEHKL RUQMKW  
RUFHMC RUFLSHA RUEHLG RUQMDJ

DE RUEHC #1044 1121828

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 221406Z APR 83

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE

INFO RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 8666

RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR IMMEDIATE

RUSNNOA/CINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 111044

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, LE, US

SUBJECT: EBANON SITREP NO. 9, 0800 EST, APRIL 22, 1983

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD9-265/3 #38476  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/1/04

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SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 628

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

2. THE SPECIAL DELEGATION LED BY UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER ARRIVED IN BEIRUT AT 0202 EST. EAGLEBURGER, VELIOTES AND DILLON MET MID-MORNING TODAY WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AFTER MEETING WITH EMBASSY STAFF.

3. EMBASSY BEIRUT REPORTED THAT THE BODY OF THE LAST MISSING AMERICAN WAS RECOVERED TODAY. THE FINAL COUNT OF RECOVERED AMERICAN BODIES NOW STANDS AT 17 WITH NONE MISSING. SHULTZ

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SENSITIVE



38478 21  
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 624

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE907

VSK456 510 STU3585

OO RUEHC RUEHSD

DE RUEHTV #5492/01 1121704 CCY AD371411 510 MCN NAR

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 221659Z APR 83

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3148

INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2437

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5820

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 8980

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9906

RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7351

RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3767

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 05492

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y TEXT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING OF THE CIVILIAN

- SUBCOMMITTEE, KHALDE, APRIL 21

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

--

2. SUMMARY: THE CIVILIAN SUBCOMMITTEE COMPLETED ITS REVIEW OF THE COVERING AGREEMENT AND AGREED MINUTES. HOWEVER, WHILE A NUMBER OF REVISIONS WERE AGREED TO, INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON AN ABBREVIATED TEXT ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES, THE QUESTION OF THE ABROGATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENT (ECONOMIC BOYCOTT) WAS DEFERRED. THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AND RECOGNITION ISSUES ARE THE TWO PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCES WHICH STILL NEED TO BE RESOLVED IN THE COVERING AGREEMENT. IN SIDE MEETINGS, AGREEMENT WAS NOT REACHED ON THE LEBANESE DRAFT ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS. ALSO, THE ISRAELI SIDE PRESSED FOR EXPLANATIONS ON HOW AND WHEN ON-THE-GROUND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD WOULD BE HANDLED. AMBASSADOR KHARMA'S VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS RESPONSES ONLY SERVED TO HEIGHTEN ISRAELI SUSPICIONS THAT THE LEBANESE ARE BACKSLIDING ON THEIR EARLIER COMMITMENTS IN THIS SPHERE. END SUMMARY.

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3. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING OF THE CIVILIAN

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRMD4-265/3#38478

BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/01

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SUBCOMMITTEE, KIMCHE SAID HE WISHED TO RAISE A PROBLEM CONCERNING A LEBANESE NEWSPAPER AGENT FOR THE JERUSALEM POST WHO HAD BEEN INFORMED BY THE LEBANESE SURETE THAT HE COULD NO LONGER BRING COPIES OF THE JERUSALEM POST INTO BEIRUT, AND HAD COPIES OF THE NEWSPAPER ON HAND SEIZED. COMING ON THE HEELS OF THE EARLIER PROBLEM RELATING TO THE CONFISCATION OF ISRAELI GOODS BY THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES, KIMCHE SAID THESE ACTIONS SOURED THE ATMOSPHERE IN ISRAEL AND CREATED AN AIR OF SUSPICION AT THE POLITICAL, AS WELL AS NEGOTIATING, LEVEL.

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4. FATTAL REPLIED THAT, WHILE THE INCIDENT CONCERNING THE JERUSALEM POST WAS REGRETTABLE, IT WAS VIRTUALLY INEVITABLE IN A SITUATION WHEN NO GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL HAD BEEN REACHED. HE SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER, BUT ALSO DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS INTO LEBANON AND LITERARY/INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS WHICH HAVE A POLITICAL DIMENSION. KIMCHE SAID HE WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHETHER THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES HAD ACTED UNDER INSTRUCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE JERUSALEM POST, OR WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLY A MATTER OF AN OVERZEALOUS OFFICIAL OPERATING UNDER PAST GUIDELINES.

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5. KHARMA ALSO EXPLAINED FOR THE RECORD THE HISTORY OF THE EARLIER CONFISCATION OF ISRAELI GOODS. HE SAID THAT LEBANESE CUSTOMS PATROLS HAD, IN FACT, SEIZED A CONVOY OF ISRAELI GOODS IN THE COURSE OF THEIR WORK, AS INDEED THEY HAD ALSO SEIZED OTHER GOODS ENTERING THE BEIRUT AREA ILLEGALLY FROM OTHER PARTS OF LEBANON. UNFORTUNATELY, KHARMA CONTINUED, IT WAS TOO LATE TO TAKE ANY ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE GOODS WHICH HAD BEEN CONFISCATED, BUT HE HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN ISSUED TO PREVENT A REPETITION OF SUCH INCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE.

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6. AFTER THIS INITIAL EXCHANGE, THE SUBCOMMITTEE CONTINUED THE REVIEW OF THE TEXT OF THE COVERING AGREEMENT AND THE AGREED MINUTES WHICH HAD BEGUN AT PREVIOUS NEGOTIATING SESSIONS. MOST OF THE MORNING'S DISCUSSION CENTERED ON AN ABBREVIATED TEXT ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. IT SOON BECAME CLEAR THAT FATTAL WAS CONCERNED THE TEXT (EVEN THOUGH IT WAS A LEBANESE DRAFT) WOULD ONLY NARROWLY APPLY TO THOSE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES DESCRIBED IN THE CONVENTION FOR SPECIAL MISSIONS, AND

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SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 626

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WOULD NOT COVER OTHER IMPORTANT "OBLIGATIONS" INCLUDED  
IN THE CONVENTION. HE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO SUCH  
ISSUES AS THE NOTIFICATION AND NOMINATION PROCESS,  
THE QUESTION OF DECLARING PERSONA NON GRATA, AND THE  
SIZE OF THE MISSION. FATTAL OBLIQUELY REFERRED TO  
HIS PRINCIPAL CONCERN WHEN HE MENTIONED AN EARLIER  
LEBANESE MESSAGE TO CHINA, IN WHICH LEBANON HAD FOREWARNED  
CHINA THAT THEIR EMBASSY SHOULD NOT BE TOO LARGE.

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SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 621

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE908

VSK444 510 STU3462

00 RUEHC

DE RUEHTV #5492/02 1121706

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 221659Z APR 83

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3149

INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2438

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5821

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 8981

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9907

RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7352

RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3768

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 05492  
EXDIS

7. A DRAFTING GROUP WAS ESTABLISHED TO ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS; THE TWO PARTIES SUBSEQUENTLY AGREED TO THE FOLLOWING TEXT WHICH MET FATTAL'S CONCERNS:  
BEGIN TEXT

ALL OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO THESE LIAISON OFFICES, THEIR PERSONNEL, AND THE PERSONNEL OF EACH PARTY PRESENT IN THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY IN CONNECTION WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A PROTOCOL TO BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE. PENDING THE CONCLUSION OF THIS PROTOCOL, THE LIAISON OFFICES AND THE ABOVE-MENTIONED PERSONNEL WILL BE TREATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION ON SPECIAL MISSIONS OF DECEMBER 8, 1969, INCLUDING THOSE PROVISIONS CONCERNING PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. THE FOREGOING IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNING THAT CONVENTION.  
END TEXT.

8. THE DISCUSSION MOVED TO ARTICLE 10 AND THE ISRAELI DESIRE THAT THE WORDING SHOULD INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THAT THE PRESENT AGREEMENT SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL A ("COMPLETE," "FULL," OR "FORMAL") TREATY OF PEACE IS ACHIEVED. THE PARTIES FINALLY AGREED TO CONSIDER AD REFERENDUM DRAPER'S FORMULATION, WHICH READS: "THE PRESENT AGREEMENT SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS FORMALLY

SENSITIVE

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SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 622

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

CONCLUDED." AT ISRAELI INITIATIVE, IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE 10, CONCERNING REVISIONS TO THE AGREEMENT, WOULD BE SIMPLIFIED. THE NEW VERSION OF PARAGRAPH 2 READS: "THE PRESENT AGREEMENT MAY BE REVIEWED, AND AMENDED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES, UPON REQUEST OF EITHER PARTY."

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9. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE CONTENTIOUS FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 11, WHICH REFERS TO THE ABROGATION OF TREATIES, LAWS, AND REGULATIONS IN CONFLICT WITH THE AGREEMENT, WOULD BE DEFERRED. (THE ISRAELIS OBVIOUSLY WANT TO TIGHTEN UP THE LANGUAGE IN THIS PARAGRAPH AS IT APPLIES TO THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT.)

--  
10. ISRAEL AGREED TO ARTICLE 12, CONCERNING RATIFICATION PROCEDURES, AS IT STOOD IN THE LEBANESE DRAFT. THE ISRAELI SIDE ALSO AGREED TO THE LEBANESE DRAFT ON ARTICLE 13 (RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES), THOUGH THEY WANTED ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE TO BE INSERTED WHICH WOULD REFER TO THE PARTIES RESOLVING ISSUES BETWEEN THEM IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. BOTH PARTIES AGREED TO CONSIDER A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL, INVOLVING A ONE WORD CHANGE, SUGGESTED BY KOZAK. FINALLY, THE LAST ARTICLE, ARTICLE 14 (UN NOTIFICATION AND LANGUAGE OF TEXTS) WAS ACCEPTED IN ITS PRESENT FORM BY ISRAEL.

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11. THE AGREED MINUTES TO THE AGREEMENT WERE ALSO REVIEWED. THERE IS BASIC AGREEMENT IN THIS AREA, THOUGH THE LEBANESE SIDE STILL HAS TO CHECK OUT SEVERAL POINTS.

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12. WHILE THE FULL CIVILIAN SUBCOMMITTEE WAS MEETING, KHARMA (LEBANON) AND SEMADAR (ISRAEL) DISCUSSED THE NEW LEBANESE DRAFT FORMULA CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD (JERUSALEM 1357). KHARMA AND SEMADAR REACHED AGREEMENT ON REVISED LANGUAGE RELATING TO TWO POINTS IN THE LEBANESE TEXT. THEY CENTERED ON ISRAELI PREFERENCE THAT THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS BE BASED ON THE DRAWING UP OF NEGATIVE LISTS (I.E., ISRAELI GOODS WHICH COULD NOT BE EXPORTED TO LEBANON) RATHER THAN THE REVERSE, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE LEBANESE DRAFT. ALSO, KHARMA AGREED WITH SEMADAR THAT THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS, WHO WOULD MONITOR TRADE, COULD NOT ADJUST THE VOLUME OF TRADE, GIVEN THE FREE-MARKET ECONOMIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. WHEN KHARMA SUBSEQUENTLY SOUGHT APPROVAL ON THESE TWO POINTS FROM HIS SUPERIORS IN BEIRUT, HE RECEIVED A NEGATIVE

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RESPONSE AND SO INFORMED SEMADAR. HOWEVER, KHARMA  
PROMISED TO PURSUE THE TWO REVISIONS FURTHER WITH  
HIS AUTHORITIES. KHARMA AND SEMADAR DID NOT REACH  
AGREEMENT ON A THIRD ISSUE, NAMELY, THE SENTENCE IN  
THE LEBANESE DRAFT WHICH READS: "IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT  
LEBANON WILL NOT IMPORT FROM ISRAEL PRODUCTS AND  
GOODS THAT LEBANON PRODUCES FOR EXPORT ." THIS SENTENCE  
IS, OF COURSE, POLITICALLY IMPORTANT TO LEBANON

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MESSAGE:

HCE909  
VSL445 510 UTS2571  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHTV #5492/03 1121708  
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O 221659Z APR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3150  
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2439  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5822  
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 8982  
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9908  
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7353  
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3769  
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BECAUSE OF ITS FEAR OF ARAB BOYCOTT, AND SEMADAR UNDER-  
STANDS THIS FULLY.

13. FOLLOWING IS THE REVISED TEXT BASED ON THE KHARMA/  
SEMADAR UNDERSTANDING.

BEGIN TEXT

THERE WILL BE A MOVEMENT OF PRODUCTS AND GOODS BETWEEN  
LEBANON AND ISRAEL WHICH WILL TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION  
THE PROTECTION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE AGRICULTURE AND  
INDUSTRY AS WELL AS THEIR PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION  
NEEDS. (IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT LEBANON WILL NOT  
IMPORT FROM ISRAEL PRODUCTS AND GOODS THAT LEBANON  
PRODUCES FOR EXPORT.) THE MOVEMENT OF PRODUCTS AND  
GOODS WHICH ARE NOT SPECIFIED IN THIS ANNEX WILL BE  
ON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS.

EXPERTS DESIGNATED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL MEET  
ON A REGULAR BASIS AND NO LESS THAN ONCE A MONTH,  
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE,  
TO ENSURE THE PROPER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE-  
MENTIONED ARRANGEMENT AND TO DEAL WITH PROBLEMS WHICH  
ARISE.

END TEXT.

14. AT THE END OF THE AFTERNOON SESSION, RUBENSTEIN  
QUESTIONED KHARMA ON HOW THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS,  
PERTAINING PRINCIPALLY TO THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND

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PEOPLE, TRANSPORT, AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, WOULD, IN FACT, BE IMPLEMENTED. KHARMA, WHOSE PROPENSITY FOR AMBIGUITY HAS ALREADY BEEN WELL ESTABLISHED, REACHED NEW HEIGHTS IN DESCRIBING WHAT MAY OR MAY NOT TAKE PLACE ON THE GROUND FOLLOWING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. KHARMA SAID THAT ANNEXES (OR OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS) CONCERNING THE VARIOUS INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE SUBSEQUENTLY DEVELOPED BY EXPERTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE. RUBENSTEIN PRESSED FOR MORE PRECISE DEADLINES IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE AGREED TO EVEN BEFORE RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT TOOK PLACE. KHARMA KEPT RESISTING THE EFFORT TO BE PINNED DOWN TO ANY TIMETABLE, SAYING THAT THESE WERE COMPLICATED ISSUES THOUGH HE ADDED THEY WOULD BE PURSUED AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE. AT THE END OF THE DISCUSSION, KHARMA DID, HOWEVER, STATE AT AMERICAN URGING THAT HE WOULD REQUEST HIS GOVERNMENT TO HAVE EARLY MEETINGS IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS FIELD. DESPITE THIS ELABORATION, THE ISRAELIS WERE LEFT WITH THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT LEBANON WAS BACKSLIDING ON HOW AND WHEN PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED ON THE GROUND DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. THERE WAS ALSO NO AGREEMENT ON HOW THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE RECORDED.

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