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November 16, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Trudeau's "Peace Initiative"

As the result of Ken Dam's November 15 visit to Ottawa and further elaboration by Trudeau himself, we now have a clearer idea of content of the initiative about which he wrote the President. It consists of proposals for:

1. A five-power nuclear arms control negotiation "without prejudice to the INF or START talks" and recognizing the "rights of the US and the USSR as strategic equals."
2. Efforts to restore the vitality of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a consequence of agreement on reductions by the five nuclear powers.
3. Emphasis on high-level East-West dialogue, including through a Ministerial-level opening of the Stockholm CDE and a Ministerial-level MBFR meeting; in MBFR we would also renew efforts to reach agreement.
4. Agreements to ban testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems, restrict "excessive mobility" of ICBMs, and require that future strategic weapon systems be fully verifiable by national technical means.

Trudeau returned on Friday from a visit to the five INF basing countries and France, where he discussed his ideas with heads of state/government and the Pope. Although he claims publicly that his interlocutors were very supportive, we understand that his reception was in fact decidedly mixed. For example, the Italians (Craxi and Andreotti) reportedly found his initiative "dangerous and untimely." Margaret Thatcher apparently rejected the idea of a five-power nuclear arms control negotiation. We are awaiting reports from other capitals. Meanwhile, Trudeau plans to discuss his ideas with Nakasone this Saturday, and he may make a presentation on the subject at the subsequent Commonwealth meeting in New Delhi. He also has written Moscow and Beijing, but neither has yet replied.

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We can support Trudeau's efforts to mobilize support for a more effective NPT and, depending on the substance of his proposals, we may be able to agree with some of his other initiatives, such as his interest in ensuring the verifiability of mobile ICBMs. We do, however, have significant problems with some other elements of the initiative, which Ken Dam flagged today in general terms. In particular:

-- While we do not oppose a five-nuclear power negotiation in principle, its proposal now is untimely. This initiative is certain to be neuralgic with the UK, France and China, will only serve to focus attention on third country systems even as we attempt to keep it on the US-Soviet balance, and could undermine the prospects for START and INF.

-- The MBFR talks continue to be blocked by Soviet refusal to move on either data or verification. Trudeau appears to be proposing nothing less than that we accept the Soviet position on one or both of these issues.

-- We see nothing to be gained by a Ministerial-level CDE meeting. The Secretary has made it clear to key Allies that he would find it difficult, if not impossible, to attend a Ministerial CDE opening in January and that we therefore do not want to be boxed in on this.

-- Trudeau's suggestions concerning a high-altitude ASAT ban could cut directly across the direction of our own policies.

While we have serious problems with Trudeau's proposals, we can also expect some of them to fall of their own weight, and indeed the whole initiative, designed primarily for domestic purposes, may not prove sustainable for long. We believe therefore that we should maintain our current posture of avoiding public criticism while privately expressing our reservations. We will also inform other key Allies, particularly the UK and France, of our attitude, and seek their views before giving the Canadians any definitive reaction.

Foreign Minister MacEachen, during today's meeting with Ken Dam in Ottawa, again raised the idea of an early Trudeau meeting with the President to discuss his initiative, in addition to the planned state visit. (The President's reply to Trudeau expressed a willingness to meet without mentioning any time frame; we have been non-committal with the Canadians about specifics while exploring internally the possibility of a

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January Trudeau visit.) MacEachen has now indicated that December is much better for them than January. We will be providing you with our views on a Trudeau visit soon.

for *Charles Hill*
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Brief Trudeau Meeting With The President

When Prime Minister Trudeau called the President on November 17, he discussed the results of his "peace initiative" to date and again raised, as he did in his October 24 letter, the possibility of meeting with the President on this matter. The President indicated, as did his reply to the Trudeau letter, that he looks forward to such a meeting "for a detailed discussion" without mentioning a date.

We recommend that the President receive Trudeau for approximately 60 minutes sometime before Christmas. A brief visit held in the near future offers several advantages. It would enable us to hold the meeting which Trudeau has been eagerly seeking well before the start of Canada's upcoming election campaign, which may begin as early as next spring. Likewise, this timing would allow us to schedule a subsequent brief meeting with Canada's new Conservative Leader, Brian Mulroney, also before the election campaign begins. A meeting with Trudeau early on would also relieve pressure on us to grant the Prime Minister a full-fledged official visit, which he has been seeking since last summer and which he feels he is owed. An official visit would be much more demanding of the President's time and also risk the appearance of our involvement in the Canadian election. Lastly, a pre-Christmas visit offers two other advantages regarding Trudeau's "peace initiative", which we have avoided criticizing publicly despite our scepticism. First, it would give the President an early opportunity to steer Trudeau away from ideas which could be especially difficult for us (such as a CDE Summit in Stockholm in January). Second, since Trudeau's initiative is poorly timed and unlikely to win strong support from the Allies, an earlier rather than a later meeting would help us avoid being blamed should his effort fail to achieve substantial results.

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

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