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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting: Soviet Shoot-Down of KAL Airliner

INTRODUCTION

The shooting down of a Korean airliner demands a serious international response. The scale of the tragedy is dramatic--surely one of the worst in civil aviation history.

The Soviets have a long history, beginning in 1946, of shooting down unarmed aircraft near their borders. Moreover, they have had a policy of electronic deception of radio air navigation aids which have lured many aircraft across their borders, only to be shot down. This is the second time they have shot down a Korean airliner.

Some will want to view this incident in a narrow context. However, it is worth considering whether the Soviets were deliberately seeking an opportunity to increase tensions in Asia in order-after events Lebanon, Chad, Central America-to test us in multiple theaters simultaneously. It is entirely likely that the decision to attack the airliner was made at a very high level.

It is therefore important that you focus the discussion at today's meeting on the broader ramifications of this incident. What does it say about how far the Soviets may now be prepared to go in trying to intimidate our Asian allies - who, like the Japanese, have shown some greater willingness to take new steps for effective defense - or our European allies on the verge of INF deployments? What does it say about the growing cynicism and boldness of the current Soviet leadership? And, based on the answer to this question, what does it say about the character and possibilities for our bilateral relationship in the immediate future?

The chief dilemma over the near term is how to translate the concern of the world into meaningful actions without making it appear that we are improperly capitalizing on the tragedy itself. How to devise measures that can be sustained? How to focus the existing rage in ways that enable us to influence domestic and

international reaction of others on important issues before us; e.g., Soviet supported terrorism, use of chemical biological weapons, etc.

In past cases where the Soviets have committed egregious crimes they and their apologists have attempted through disinformation and lies to turn the focus away from their actions and somehow blame the U.S. or its allies. Unless we take the offensive they will try to put us on the defensive.

We need to think hard about an appropriate response, and we have to consider what message the Soviets may have tried to send as George Shultz prepares to meet next week with Gromyko in Madrid. If we decide that meeting should proceed, as George has announced, we need to consider very carefully the message we want to send.

OBJECTIVES

Your personal statement and early return have already set the tone of our concern. We must now ensure that follow on actions are directed and structured to achieve recognizable and coherent objectives. These objectives must be shared by the American people, the Congress, our major allies and reflect our status as leader of the free world. We believe that our actions in the coming days and weeks must be designed to achieve the following objectives:

- o Reverse Soviet "Peacemaker" Image and Register an Appropriate Political Protest. The incident presents us with the opportunity to reverse the false moral and political "peacemaker" perception that the Soviets have been cultivating. Their active propaganda in this regard has cast the Soviet Union as flexible, legitimate and searching for peace. This has, in turn, created severe problems in our efforts to convince the free world of their true objectives. Actions to achieve this objective should be aimed at securing domestic and international support for your programs to strengthen western security.
- o Justice. We must be seen as a leader (but not alone) in the international community in calling for justice. Civilized societies demand punishment and restitution. In order to deter and raise perceived costs of future egregious acts.

Despite numerous incidents of this kind, the Soviets have never acceptably investigated, reported or identified their victims. We must demand that they do so now. In order to be effective, the action we take to achieve this objective must be tailored to appear proportional to the crime. We cannot be perceived as too harsh, too weak or ineffective in the sanctions we call for or endorse.

- o Bolster the confidence of Intimidated States. What we do or fail to do in supporting the Koreans and Japanese in the days and weeks ahead will be a telling signal to friends and allies alike. We must be responsive and cooperative, without appearing excessive, particularly in the case of military support.

ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES

- o Actions to Reverse Soviet "Peacemaker" Image and Register Political Protest.

- A major Presidential speech addressing the objectives and methods of Soviet grand strategy.
- Review the degree to which our presence at negotiating tables with the Soviets reinforces the idea that the Soviets are good-faith negotiators. Consider withdrawal from various or all negotiations.
- Diplomatic effort to secure public statements and resolutions condemning the Soviet Union in relevant international fora.
- Major information campaign by USIA.
- Consider cancelling the forthcoming Shultz-Gromyko meeting. Such a meeting could be boycotted until the Soviets provide an explanation for the incident, an apology and reparations.
- Consider closing the Soviet consulate in San Francisco; it is a center for their spy network against the U.S. electronics industry.

o Actions to secure justice.

- Soviets grant unimpeded Western access to crash site.
- Soviets publicly document to world-wide aviation bodies their procedures in the case of airliners crossing into Soviet airspace.
- Soviets provide specific assurances against destructive force being used again against straying airliners.
- Consider seizure or attachment of Soviet owned commercial assets in the U.S. in connection with filing an international claim against the USSR on behalf of American citizen victims.
- Soviets document that no future incidents of electronic deception of radio air navigation signals will occur.
- Soviets must provide full reparations to Korea and to the families of the dead on accepted international scales.
- Options should be prepared concerning internationally implementable procedures to impede Aeroflot activities, world-wide, and discourage flights to the Soviet Union for a specified period of time.
- Review all outstanding U.S., allied and third country equipment sales to the Soviet aviation industry and seek immediate agreement from as many countries as possible to terminate or suspend indefinitely these deliveries.

o Actions to Bolster Confidence of Intimidated States

- Lease or sell AWACS to Japan to help defend regional air routes.
- Possible acceleration of F-16 deployment in Japan.
- Carrier battle group deployment to the region.
- Discussions with allies in the area to bolster regional security arrangements.

The NSPG meeting tonight will be too brief to discuss all of these matters. This paper, however, provides you with some thoughts to guide the discussion. Most importantly, in whatever we decide to do or not to do, we should keep these objectives in mind.

The Agenda for the NSPG meeting is attached. All principals have been advised.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the points above in discussing our options at tonight's NSPG meeting.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE

Attachment
NSPG Agenda

TABLE #16 CHRONOLOGY OF SOVIET ATTACKS ON US PLANES

CREW DISPOSITION

DETAILS

Date	Details	Crew Disposition
11 1946	Russian fighters fire on C-47 flying in the Linz-Vienna international air corridor.	No casualties
11 23, 1946	Two Soviet piloted P-39s fire on a US Army C-47 landing in Vienna.	No casualties
11 8, 1950	Privateer Navy patrol bomber shot down over the Baltic Sea.	Crew of ten ¹⁰ died
January 6, 1951	Noptune Navy patrol bomber on weather reconnaissance flight disappeared over international waters off Siberia after Soviet planes had fired on it	Crew of ten ¹⁰ lost
January 20, 1951	C-47 carrying supplies from Munich to US Embassy in Belgrade forced down by Hungarian based Soviet fighters.	US paid \$120,000 for release of crew and plane
13, 1952	B-29 Superfortress on reconnaissance mission disappeared in Far East. Possibly strayed over Soviet border.	Crew of thirteen ¹³ killed
March 7, 1952	Superfortress on routine flight disappeared after radar observation indicated interception at 15,000 feet while still over Japanese territory. Communist reports later said that the aircraft had been intercepted after firing on Soviet planes.	Crew of eight lost
July 27, 1953	Reconnaissance plane escorted by sixteen ^{My} Sabrejets on mission over Yellow Sea attacked by eight ^{My} MIGs. One MIG shot down.	No casualties

29, 1953

USAF RN-29 reconnaissance plane attacked by MIGs twenty-five miles off Soviet territory and 100 miles northeast of Petropavlovsk, Kamchatka. One of two MIGs fired on plane which returned fire. No damage to either plane.

No casualties

29, 1953

Sixteen men lost, one man recovered

1, 1954

USAF B-50 bomber shot down over the Sea of Japan. Navy P-2V ^{P-1} Neptuno patrol bomber shot down by two MIGs forty miles off Siberian coast.

One dead, nine survivors

DETAILS

CREW DISPOSITION

April 7, 1954 B-29 photo reconnaissance planes shot down over North Hokkaido, Japan.

One dead, ¹⁰ ten survivors

10, 1955 Eight F-86s on patrol mission over International waters off North Korean coast attacked by two ~~two~~ to ~~four~~ ^{two} MIGs. Two Soviet MIGs shot down.

No casualties

22, 1955 Navy P2V Neptune patrol bomber attacked near St. Lawrence Island in Bering Sea. Crash landed on the island.

^{two} injured, ^{eight} 8 unharmed

27, 1958 Unarmed C-118 diverted off course by bad weather on flight from Turkey to Iran shot down over Soviet Armenia by two MIGs.

Nine crew members returned by the USSR

September 2, 1950 C-130 transport on an internal flight in Turkey was "mooned" off course and shot down over Soviet Armenia.

Soviets returned bodies of six. Disclaimed knowledge of remaining 11 crew members

April 17, 1958 MIGs fired on two reconnaissance planes, one over the Baltic Sea and one over the Sea of Japan. Each was about 60 miles from Soviet territory.

No casualties

16, 1959 Navy P4M Mercator patrol plane attacked over Sea of Japan ~~eight~~ ^{two} miles east of Wonsan, North Korea. Plane returned to Niho Air Base, Japan.

Full gunner seriously wounded

1966 A USAF C-47 on a flight from Copenhagen to Hamburg, with passengers including female dependents, strayed over East Germany and was forced down by Soviet fighters.

Aircraft and passengers were recovered, uninjured, on May 25.

1969

SAC RD-47 Reconnaissance plane on an electronic magnetic survey mission shot down over the Barants Sea. Plane was at least 30 miles from Soviet territory.

held for trial on charges of spying. Released in January 1961.

May 1964

A USAFE T-39 from Wiesbaden Air Base, West Germany on a training instruction flight was "misconed" off course and shot down by Soviet fighters over East Germany.

Crew of three killed.

March 10 1964

A USAFE RD-66 on a training flight from Toul Air Base in France inadvertently overflowed over the "misconed" East Germany and was shot down.

One crew member badly injured. Crew of three eventually returned.

March 30, 1968

A Seaboard World Airline DC-8 enroute from McChord AFB to Yokota, Japan with 214 US military personnel aboard strayed off course and was forced to land on the Soviet island of Kurup in the Kurile Islands. Pilot alleged MIGs fired on plane.

Pilot and passengers released.