

38495

1

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE337
STU5907
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHBL #5018/01 1241700
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK RUEHC
O 241652Z APR 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUQUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NNACT IMMEDIATE 0015
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0006
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0002
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0003
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0001
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 5018

EO 12356 DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P) LE

SUBJ: VISIT OF SECRETARY SHULTZ TO BEIRUT

REF STATE 110467

1. C U - CENTIRE TEXT

2. EMBASSY HAS INFORMED GOL OF SEC'S PROPOSED VISIT. GOL IS, OF COURSE, VERY PLEASED AND WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE VISIT.

3. WE UNDERSTAND BY TELEPHONE THAT PARTY WILL ARRIVE LATE MORNING APRIL 28. WE ARE PROCEEDING TO PLAN UNDER FOLLOWING BASIC ASSUMPTIONS:

- THIS WILL BE A WORKING VISIT, WITH MINIMAL PROTOCOL.

- VISIT TO BEIRUT WILL TAKE THE BETTER PART OF A WORKING DAY

- VISIT WILL HAVE A DOUBLE FOCUS: ACCELERATING THE NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING ISRAELI WITHDR-2-), AND SHOWING CONCERN AND EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR HELP FOLLOWING THE EMBASSY BOMBING.

- BECAUSE OF SEVERELY REDUCED SUPPORT CAPABILITIES, LIMITED TRANSPORTATION, SECURITY CONCERNS AND CONGESTION AT THE EMBASSY SITE AND TEMPORARY CHANCERY, THE SIZE OF THE SEC'S PARTY VISITING BEIRUT MUST BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED.

4. CONTROL OFFICER IS POL/MIL OFFICER DONALD ELLSON (OFFICE 364-099, 361-800, 364-117; NO HOME PHONE). S/S ADVANCE TEAM IS AT THE SAME OFFICE NUMBERS; CADMOS HOTEL PHONES 363-196, 362-811).

5. FOLLOWING IS ROUGH PROPOSED SCHEDULE OF EVENTS WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SEC'S ITINERARY, ASSUMING ARRIVAL AT 1100 LOCAL:

1100- ARRIVAL

1100-1115 - MEET SENIOR OFFICERS OF 22 MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT (MAU) AND PHIBRON TWO AT AIRPORT.

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/11

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SITUATION: LEB
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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

1115-1135 - ENROUTE TO EMBASSY SITE
1135-1155 - PRESS STATEMENT IN FRONT OF EMBASSY; INSPECT SITE/
1155-1200 - WALK TO DURAFFOURD BLDG
1200-1215 - BRIEF REMARKS TO EMB EMPLOYEES
1215-1220 - EN ROUTE TO BRITISH EMB
1220-1240 - UNADVERTISED CALL ON BRIT AMB; TOUR US OFFICE SPACE
1240-1310 - EN ROUTE TO EMB'S RESIDENCE IN YARZE
1310-1330 - DISCUSSION WITH AMBS DILLON, HABIB AND DARAPER
BEFORE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
MEMBERS OF THE PARTY OTHER THAN THE SEC AND ASST SEC VELIOTES
WILL REMAIN AT RESIDENCE.
1330-1340 - EN ROUTE TO PRESIDENTIAL PALACE
1340-1600 LUNCH AND MEETING AT PALACE (WE WILL NOT SEEK LUNCHEONK
UNTIL SCHEDULE IS APPROVED)
1600-1610 - RETURN TO AMB DILLON'S RESIDENCE, YARZE
1610-1640 - MEET WITH MNF AMBS AND COMMANDERS
1640-1710 - DRIVE TO AIRPORT
1710-1725 - PRESS STATEMENT
1730 - WHEELS UP

5. BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN BEIRUT, WE HOPE THAT THIS STOP CAN BE GIVEN PARTICULAR CONSIDERATION IN A NUMBER OF AREAS, WE ARE DELIGHTED THAT THE SEC AND PARTY WILL BE VISITING. WE APPRECIATE THE OBVIOUS CONCERN THAT EVERYONE HAS EXPRESSED, AND WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE VISIT. HOWEVER, EMBASSY SUPPORT FACILITIES ARE NECESSARILY MINIMAL.
6. PRESS CONSIDERATIONS: ALL MAJOR US MEDIA ARE ALREADY WELL REPRESENTED HERE, AND WE WOULD PREFER NOT TO DEAL WITH VISITORS AS WELL. FROM THE EMBASSY'S POINT OF VIEW, ADDITIONAL MEDIA REPS WOULD COMPLICATE THE WORK OF OUR USIS STAFF, WHICH LOST THREE FSNS KILLED AND HAS BOTH US STAFFERS INJURED BUT STILL UNFUNCTIONING. WE PROPOSE TO ASK 22 MAU TO PROVIDE PHOTO AND VIDEO COVERAGE OF THE ARRIVAL AT THE AIRPORT AND THE MEETING WITH MNF REPS AT THE AMB'S RESIDENCE, AND TO POOL THE COVERAGE. WE PROPOSE A POOL PHOTO OPPORTUNITY FOR THE VISIT TO Q22 MAU. (MEMBERS OF THE POOL COVERING THE 22 MAU VISIT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO COVER THE VISIT TO THE EMBASSY SITE. ALL DEAD WILL PROBABLY NOT YET HAVE BEEN RECOVERED, AND WE HAVE BEEN EXCLUDING ALL PRESS FROM THE EMB GROUNDS. THUS WE DO NOT PROPOSE TO ALLOW ANY PRESS ACCESS TO THE EMB SITE. THE LOCALLY BASED PRESS WILL BE KEPT BEHIND LINES MAINTAINED BY US MARINES DURING THE SKEC'S VISIT TO THE SITE. IF TRAVELING PRESUS MUST COME, 22 MAU WILL PROVIDE A TRUCK TO ALLOW THE VISITORS TO BE MOVED CLOSER TO THE SITE FOR A BETTER VIEW AND CAMERA ANGLE, BUT THEY WILL REMAIN ON THE TRUCK. WE WILL NOT PERMIT MEDIA ACCESS TO THE DURAFFOURD BUILDING OR THE BRIT EMB. WE WOULD PROPOSE A PRE-DEPARTURE AIRPORT PRESS STATEMENT AFTER THE MEETING WITH PRES GEMAYEL

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

(NOTE: A LATE AFTERNOON PRESS STATEMENT MAY MISS THE FILING DEADLINE FOR EVENING NEWS IN THE US). WE WOULD PROPOSE TO ASK THE GOL FOR A PHOTO OPPORTUNITY AT THE PALACE FOR BOTH LOCAL AND TRAVELING PRESS, IF ANY; NO STATEMENT AT THAT TIME.

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DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE338
STU5910
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHBL #5018/02 1141720
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZK RUEHC
O 241652Z APR 83
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0016
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0007
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0003
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0004
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0002
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 5018

7. WE PROPOSE TO LIMIT THE US PARTICIPATION IN MEETINGS WITH GOL TO THE SEC, ASSISTSEC VELIOTES, AMB DILLON, HABIB, DRAPER AND CHRIS ROSS

8. BRITISH AMB'S OFFER TO HOUSE PART OF OUR EMBASSY ON HIS PREMISES IS EXTREMELY GENEROUS. WE BELIEVE IT APPROPRIATE FOR THE SECRETARY TO CALL BRIEFLY ON THE AMB AND THANK HIM. ENTRANCE TO THE BUILDING FOR THIS PURPOSE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE SEC, AMB DILLON AND NO MORE THAN THREE SECURITY OFFICERS. IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR USMARINES TO SURROUND THE BRITISH CHANCERY TO PROVIDE SECURITY, BUT THEY CAN BE USED IN THE MOTOR CASE AND AT A DISCREET DISTANCE DOWN THE STREET FROM THE EMBASSY. ANY VISIT THERE MUST BE SCHEDULED BEFORE THEIR CLOSING TIME AT 1430 HOURS LOCAL.

9. EMBASSY HAS VERY LIMITED SECURITY RESOURCES. HOWEVER, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT 22 MAU CAN PROVIDE ALL THE MARINES NECESSARY TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE VISIT.

10. 22 MAU AND PHIBRON Q TWO HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY HELPFUL TO THE EMBASSY DURING THIS EMERGENCY PERIOD. THEY HAVE PROVIDED SECURITY AND OTHER ASSISTANCE AT THE EMBASSY SITE AND THE RELOCATED CHANCERY. THEY HAVE PROVIDED COMMUNICATIONS, MED ASSISTANCE AND A VARIETY OF OTHER ASSISTANCE. WE BELIEVE SPECIAL PRAISE IS DUE THE COMMANDERS AND TROOPS FOR THE SUPERB JOB THEY HAVE DONE.

11. EACH MEMBER OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE (MNF) HAS BEEN VERY COOPERATIVE ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE SACRIFICED IN DIFFERENT WAYS. BRITISH HAVE OFFERED OFFICE SPACE IN THEIR EMBASSY. FRENCH PROVIDED IMMEDIATE PROTECTION AFTER THE BLAST AND EVEN PUT THEIR TROOPS UNDER US COMMAND. ITALIANS WERE UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE, BUT NOT FOR LACK OF DESIRE, AND THEY ARE THE ONLY OTHER MNF FORCE TO HAVE SUFFERED KIAS. WE BELIEVE THE SEC-

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SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RETARY SHOULD MEET BRIEFLY WITH THE MNF AMBS AND COMMANDERS TO OFFER SPECIAL THANKS TO EACH.

12. THERE WILL BE NO VISA PROBLEMS IF THE SECRETARY'S PARTY COMES AND GOES BY MILAIRCRAFT. WE ARE PROVIDING THE MANIFEST LIST TO THE GOL.

13. ALL PERSONNEL SHOULD CARRY THEIR OWN PPT WHILE IN LEBANON. THEY MAY BE REQUIRED AT ANY TIME FOR ID AT CHECKPOINTS.

14. SUBJECT TO SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS, US HELICOPTERS COULD BE USED FOR A LIMITED NUMBER OF VIPS, USING THE AIRPORT, AUBB FOOTBALL FIELD, AND THE MINISTRY OF DEF HELO PAD.

15. PARTY SHOULD BE AWARE THAT GEN VESSEY, CHAIRMAN OF JCS, WILL BE IN BEIRUT ON A PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED VISIT THE SAME DAY ASQ THE SECRETARY.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE349
STU5939
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHBL #5019/D1 1141830
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 241825Z APR 83 AFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0008
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0017
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 5019

EXDIS

FOR HAUBIE FROM DRAPER

EO 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL IS, LE, MOPS, XF, SY

SUBJ: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: 24 APRIL MEETING WITH GEMAYEL

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: HABIB AND DRAPER MET TODAY, APRIL 24, FOR SOME 90 MINUTES WITH PRES GEMAYEL, WHO WAS ALONE. IN PART QTHE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE THRUST OF THE COMMENTS MADE BY DAVID KIMCHE DURING OUR MEETING WITH HIM IN TEL AVIV ON APR 23, DURRNG WHICH KIMCHE EXPRESSED HIS GOVT'S SHOCK OVER GEMAHEL'S PRESS STATMENT OF APR 22. GEMAYEL WAS UNAPOLEGETIC ABOUT HIS PRESS STATMENT ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED MANY COMMENTS WERE BASICALLY EXTEMPORANEOUS AND SPONTANEOUS. HE SAID HE FELT THAT ISRAEL AND LEBANON WERE NATURAL ALLIES AND SHOULD ESTABLISH A COMMON STRATEGY, BUT LEBANON COULD NOT ACCEPT THE DEGREE OF NORMALIZAU-TION SOUGHT BY ISRAEL NOR COULD IT HURT ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE BY ACCEDING TO A SOLUTION ON HADDAD IMPOSED BY ISRAEL. IN ADDITION, HE EXPLAINED HIS DEEP REESERVATIONS ABOUT THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS, CONSIDERING THEM A DE FACTO RESIDUAL PRESENCE.
3. HABIB STRESSED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE CONCERNED DEEPLY THAT LEBANON WAS RETREATING FROM POSITIONS ALREADY AGREED TO. HABIB EXPLORED - ON THE BASIS OF KIMCHE'S HINTS - WHETHER HADDAD COULD BE GIVEN SOME SIGNIFICANT GOPERATIONAL RESPONSIBIL-ITIES UNDER AN "ADJUSTED "MODEL FORMULA". GEMAYEL DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT AND FELT HE HAD A BETTER SOLUTION FOR ISRAEL'S CONCERNS THROUGH THE APPOINTMENT OF LAF OFFICERS OF SUPERIOR MILITARY ABILITY IN SOUTH LEBANON. AS FOR THE JOINT TEAMS, HABIB AND DRAPER STRESSED THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE SHOULD BE GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR MANAGEMENT, WHERE AND WHEN, AND TO WHICH AIMS THEY WOULD BE USED. HABIB STRRSSED THE NEED FOR FURTHER SECRET DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE

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MLRRMD9-2165/3#38496
BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/11

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SITUATION LISTING

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SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ISRAELI AND LEBANESE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES. WE SECURED GEMAYEL'S AGREEMENT THAT, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE SUNDAY CABINET MEETING IN ISRAEL, LEBANON WOULD DO NOTHING TO SUSPEND OR BREAK OFF NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY

4. DURING GEMAYEL'S MEETING WITH US ON APRIL 24, HE ASKED ABOUT PLANS FOR THE SEC'S VISITS TO BEIRUT. HABIB SAID THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO COME TO BEIRUT ON THURSDAY MORNING FOR WORKING MEETINGS. WHILE EXACT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPLETED WITH AMB DILLON, HABIB SAID HE SUSPECTED THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD NOT REMAIN OVERNIGHT BUT MIGHT WELL RETURN ON SATURDAY, FOLLOWING FRIDAY'S SESSIONS IN ISRAEL, AND CONCEIVABLY CONTINUE A SHUTTLE THEREAFTER. THE FOCUS OF HIS ME TRIP, HABIB STRESSED, WAS THE SITUATION IN LEBANON.

5. HABIB SAID THAT HE, DRAPER, AND AMB LEWIS HAD MET WITH KIMCHE ON FRIDAY, AND THAT KIMCHE HAD EXPRESSED HIS GOVT'S SHOCK OVER THE THRUST OF GEMAYEL'S APRIL 22 STATEMENT TO EDITORS. GEMAYEL WAS UNAPOLEGETIC. WHILE HE HAD MADE EXTEMPORANEOUS STATEMENTS THAT REFLECTED HIS VIEWS ACCURATELY, HE HAD GENUINELY SERIOUS PROBLEMS. NEVERTHELESS, HE CONSIDERED ISRAEL AND LEBANON AS NATURAL ALLIES. THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD ESTABLISH A COMMON STRATEGY. ISRAEL HAD TO UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT LEBANON COULD NOT ACCEPT THE DEGREE OF NORMALIZATION SOUGHT BY ISRAEL, SINCE THE ARAB WORLD WOULD THEN BOYCOTT LEBANON. OVER THE LONG RUN, HE ADDED, LEBANON WOULD, OF COURSE, BE ABLE TO ARRANGE TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ALONG LINES MORE ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL.

6. CONTINUING, GEMAYEL SAID THAT ISRAEL'S ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE ITS OWN SOLUTION AS REGARDS HADDAD WAS AN ATTACK ON LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE, AND ALSO WOULD WORK AGAINST THE MORALE AND EFFICIENCY OF THE LAF. ISRAEL'S CONCEPT OF THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS WAS IN THE SAME CATEGORY, HE SAID. LEBANON COULD NOT TOLERATE A RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE. SUMMING UP, HE SAID THAT THESE ISSUES WERE LEBANESE PROBLEMS; THEY DID NOT REFLECT AN ARAB WORLD POSITION AS SUCH. HE WANTED TO AVOID A SITUATION WHICH WOULD PROVOKE POPULAR LEBANESE OPPOSITION AGAINST THE ISRAELIS.

7. HABIB SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS, AS OF FRIDAY, DID NOT HAVE THE EXACT TEXT OF GEMAYEL'S REMARKS TO THE PRESS. HAVING READ THEM JUST BEFORE THIS MEETING, HE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT GEMAYEL'S VIEWS WERE NOT AS NEGATIVE TOWARDS THE ISRAELI POSITIONS AS HE HAD BEEN TOLD. HE THEN REVIEWED THE MEETING WITH KIMCHE IN SOME DETAIL DURING WHICH HE HAD URGED KIMCHE NOT TO CONSIDER BREAKING OFF THE NEGOTIATIONS THIS WEEK. HE HAD EXPLAINED TO KIMCHE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN "OPERATIONAL PATROLS" AND "SUPERVISORY TEAMS", STRESSING THE NEED TO RETAIN THE COSMETICS OF THE UNDERSTANDINGS. THEN AND LATER, GEMAYEL MADE CLEAR

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT BREAK OFF NEGOTIATIONS.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE351
UTS3582
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHBL #5019/02 1241845
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 241825Z APR 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0009
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0018
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 5019
EXDIS

FOR HABIB FROM DRAPER

8. AT BOTTOM, HABBIB SAID THE ISRAELIS DEEPLY FEARED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE REVERSING THE PATH ON WHICH THEY HAD UNDERTAKEN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ISRAELIS FEARED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE BACKING AWAY FROM POSITIONS THEY HAD ALREADY AGREED TO. THAT WAS WHY IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT LEBANON CONTINUE TO ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE SUCH CONCEPTS AS JOINT SUPERVISORY CONTROLS WHILE WORKING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO LIMIT THEIR SCOPE, WHEN NECESSARY, AND THEIR VISIBILITY.

9. IN A DEFENSIVE WAY, GEMAYEL SAID THAT BEGIN AND ARENS HAD MADE ALL KINDS OF CAUSTIC STATEMENTS ABOUT LEBANON AND LEBANON'S CAPACITY. THERE WAS NO REASON WHY LEBANON'S LEADERS, LIKE HIMSELF, SHOULD NOT CLARIFY THEIR OWN POSITIONS. HADDAD WAS A GOOD CASE IN POINT. HADDAD BASICALLY WAS A PROBLEM FOR LEBANON ALONE, HE STRESSED, ALTHOUGH HE WAS READY FOR A REASONABLE SOLUTION WITHIN A BROAD PACKAGE PLAN. RETURNING TO THE JOINT TEAMS, HE STRESSED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD AGAIN STRESSED THE CONCEPT OF "HOT PURSUIT" AND "JOINT OPERATIONS". HE COULD NOT LIVE WITH SUCH CONCEPTS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD JUSTIFIED SOME OF THE EXISTING LEBANESE POSITIONS IN HIS PRESS COMMENTARY BY LYKENING THE PROPOSED MILITARY COMMITTEE TO THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION. HABBIB REMARKED THAT MENTION OF A MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION WAS A RED FLAG TO THE ISRAELIS. GEMAYEL SAID HE WOULD NOT WILLINGLY AGREE TO FURTHER CONCESSIONS TO THE ISRAELIS, EXCEPT WITHIN A PACKAGE PLAN. THIS INCLUDED THE USE OF APC'S BY THE TEAMS.

10. CITING SOME OF WHAT HAS ALREADY COME OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, HABBIB AND DRAPER STRESSED THE SAFETY FEATURES OF ALLOWING THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO MAKE THE DECISIONS ON THE USE OF THE TEAMS, THEIR NUMBER, SCOPE OF ACTIVITY, ETC.

11. HABBIB PROPOSED GEMAYEL HARD ABOUT A NEW KIND OF SOLUTION FOR THE HADDAD PROBLEM, BASED ON HIS COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ON HINTS GIVEN THE DAY PREVIOUSLY BY KIMCHE TO THE EFFECT THAT A NEW "MODEL FORMULA" MIGHT BE CONSIDERED IN AN OPEN-MINDED WAY. HABIB SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE ENTRANCED IF HADDAD HAD SOME OPERATIONAL AS OPPOSED TO THE STAFF RESPONSIBILITY. COULD HADDAD'S PROPOSED ROLE AS A BIGADE DEPCOMMANDER IN CHARGE OF G-2 BE MANIPULATED SO AS TO GIVE HIM CONTROL OVER SOME LIMITED STRIKE FORCE, FOR EXAMPLE?

12. GEMAYEL DID NOT WANT TO TALK FURTHER ABOUT HADDAD. HE SAID THAT THE AND GEN TANNOUS HAD SOME OFFICERS IN MIND FOR LEADERSHIP ROLES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, BUT HE WAS AFRAID THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD CAUSE EMBARRASSMENTS IF THESE NAMES WERE GIVEN TO THE ISRAELIS NOW. THESE MEN, HOWEVER, GEMAYEL SAID, WERE MORE EFFICIENT MILITARILY THAN HADDAD. THIS WAS THE SOLUTION. GEMAYEL WENT ON TO VOICE SUSPICIONS OF ISRAEL'S MOTIVATIONS ABOUT HADDAD, WHO HE CLAIMED WAS IN EFFECT A PRISONER OF THE ISRAELIS. RATHER THAN GIVE IN TO THE ISRAELIS ON THIS MATTER, HE SAID HE WOULD PREFER TO LET THEM STAY IN SOUTH LEBANON.

13. HABIB SAID THAT HE COULD NOT LET GEMAYEL STOP WORKING FOR A SOLUTION TO HADDAD AND OTHER PROBLEMS. GEMAYEL SAID THE PROBLEM FOR HIM AND LEBANON WAS "TO BE OR NOT TO BE." THE KEY WAS SOUTH LEBANON. IF LEBANON COULD NOT SECURE A GOOD SOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, AND MAINTAIN ITS CREDIBILITY, THEN THERE WOULD BE IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, WHILE THE IRANIANS, SYRIANS, COMMUNISTS AND THE PLO TRIED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE.

14. AFTER FURTHER EXCHANGE OF VIEWS TO IMPROVE WAYS TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO A MORE ACCOMMODATING POSITION VIS-A-VIS LEBANON, HABIB URGED THAT LEBANON AND ISRAEL STEP UP THEIR CONSULTATIONS ON INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION. AFTER HE ASKED ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THE LAST SUCH MEETINGS BY THE RESPECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES, GEMAYEL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY HAD "NOT BEEN TOO POSITIVE."

15. THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULD REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH, PARTICULARLY THROUGHOUT THE FORTHCOMING VISITS OF THE SECRETARY TO ISRAEL AND LEBANON. GEMAYEL RETURNED TO THE THEME THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE INSISTENT ON MAINTAINING A MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON "ON THE GROUND." THIS ISRAELI DESIRE, IF SATISFIED, WOULD INEVITABLY CREATE STRONG ANTI-ISRAELI SENTIMENT AND ATTITUDES, WHILE ALSO PROVOKING THE SYRIANS TO RETREAT FROM THEIR PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS. THE REAL SOLUTION FOR ISRAEL WAS TO LOWER ITS PRESENCE AND CUT BACK ON ITS DEMANDS SO THAT ISRAEL AND LEBANON COULD WORK COOPERATIVELY IN A QUIET ATMOSPHERE FOR THE OBJECTIVES THEY BOTH SOUGHT. DILLON

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE377

OO RUEHC RUEHAM RUEHEG

DE RUEHC #2859 1142148

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 242005Z APR 83 ZFF5

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3502

INFO RUEHEG/USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0808

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 112859 TOSEC 040001

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL; OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, JO

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO KING HUSSEIN

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO KING HUSSEIN, RECEIVED FROM THE WHITE HOUSE APRIL 24, SHOULD BE DELIVERED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE SECRETARY'S TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

YOUR MAJESTY:

THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 16. WE, TOO, WERE SURPRISED AT THE KAREN HOUSE ARTICLES AND CAN SEE WHY IT CAME AS SUCH A SHOCK TO YOU TO SEE SO MUCH DETAIL IN PRINT. MISS HOUSE IS A VERY DILIGENT REPORTER WHO OBVIOUSLY SPENT MONTHS PIECING TOGETHER THIS STORY FROM MANY, MANY DIFFERENT SOURCES -- CLEARLY NOT ALL FROM JORDAN. FOR EXAMPLE, STORIES ABOUT MY LETTERS TO YOU HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING FOR MONTHS IN BOTH THE ISRAELI AND THE ARAB PRESS.

I HAVE THIS WEEK ASKED SECRETARY SHULTZ TO TRAVEL TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO PERSONALLY PARTICIPATE IN THE EFFORT TO CONCLUDE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT AND SLOWER THAN I HAD HOPED, BUT AMBASSADOR HABIB AND HIS TEAM HAVE NOW BROUGHT THEM TO THE POINT WHERE WE BELIEVE EARLY AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. I APPRE-

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BY rw NARA DATE 1/11/01

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

CIATE YOUR SUPPORT FOR OUR GOALS IN LEBANON AND YOUR -
READINESS TO ASSIST PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IN HIS EFFORTS TO
RESTORE HIS COUNTRY'S SOVEREIGNTY.

SECRETARY SHULTZ WILL CONCENTRATE HIS EFFORTS ON THE
LEBANON ISSUE DURING THIS TRIP BUT HE ALSO HOPES TO BE
ABLE TO SEE YOU. I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT HE
CANNOT NOW PREDICT THE COURSE OF THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS
AND, THEREFORE, CANNOT PREDICT WHETHER HE WILL BE ABLE TO
VISIT JORDAN. HE, OF COURSE, WILL KEEP IN TOUCH WITH YOU
THROUGH AMBASSADOR VIETS, WHO WILL MEET WITH THE SECRETARY
IN CAIRO EARLY IN THE WEEK.

YOUR MAJESTY, I HAD HOPED THAT THERE NEED NOT BE LINKAGE
BETWEEN LEBANON AND THE PEACE PROCESS. NEVERTHELESS,
OTHERS HAVE MADE IT SO AND I NOW INTEND TO MOVE THE
LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS TO AN EARLY CONCLUSION AND THEN TURN
OUR ATTENTION FULLY TO REINVIGORATING THE PEACE PROCESS.
MEANWHILE, I HOPE OUR MUTUAL FRIENDS IN THE ARAB WORLD
CONTINUE TO SUPPORT YOUR VISION OF WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE,
AS I DO.

I LOOK TO YOU AS MY PARTNER IN THE GREAT ENTERPRISE OF
PEACE BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS AND I ASSURE YOU THAT
I REMAIN DETERMINED TO OVERCOME ANY AND ALL OBSTACLES
TO THE REALIZATION OF THAT GOAL. TOGETHER, WE CAN WIN.

SINCERELY, YOUR FRIEND,
RONALD REAGAN END TEXT. SHULTZ
BT
#2859
NNNN

SENSITIVE

38499
14
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 571

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE392

VSK616 620 STU6030

00 RUEHC RUEHSD

DE RUEHAI #0003 115012Z

ZNY CCCCC (TAO ADO35140 STU6030 620 MCN NAR)

O 240122Z APR 83

FM USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT

TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTO 04003

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY
TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: UNDER SECRETARY
EAGLEBURGER HAS RETURNED FROM HIS SORROWFUL MISSION TO
BEIRUT AND REPORTED TO ME ON THE COURAGE AND DETER-
MINATION THAT HE FOUND THERE, AMONG AMERICANS AND LEBANESE
ALIKE. I WANT TO EXPRESS TO YOU MY
SYMPATHY FOR THE SACRIFICE OF THE LOYAL LEBANESE CITIZENS
WHO LOST THEIR LIVES WHILE SERVING BESIDE THEIR AMERICAN
COLLEAGUES AT OUR EMBASSY IN BEIRUT. I ALSO SEND YOU MY THANKS
FOR ALL THAT YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT ARE DOING FOR OUR PEOPLE AT
THIS TRYING TIME. I WAS TOUCHED BY THE EXPRESSION OF SYMPATHY AND
SUPPORT CONVEYED ON YOUR BEHALF AT THE CEREMONY MARKING
THE RETURN OF THE DECEASED AMERICANS TO ANDREWS AIR
FORCE BASE ON SATURDAY.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN THE NEXT FEW
DAYS TO TAKE UP WITH YOU PERSONALLY THE URGENT TASK
OF RESTORING PEACE AND TRANQUILITY TO YOUR COUNTRY.
SINCERELY YOURS, GEORGE P. SHULTZ. END TEXT.

4. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ.

BT

#0003

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SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD9-2105/3#38499

BY RW NARA DATE 1/4/11

38560
15
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 570

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE425
STU6585
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHBL #5021 1150740
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
O 250735Z APR 83 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE 011
INFO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 005
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 005
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0020
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEIRUT 5021

EXDIS

FOR HABIB FROM DRAPER: PASS ALSO TO SPAR CREW

1. (C- ENTIRE TEXT)
2. ISRAELIS HAVE DECIDED NOT RPT NOT TO CONTINUE KHALDAH SESSIONS INTO TUESDAY, APRIL 26, REPORTEDLY IN ORDER TO HAVE DELEGATION PREPAARE FOR SECRETARY'S TRIP.
3. ACCORDINGLY, SPAR AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE SENT TO BEIRUT TODAY, MONDAY, APRIL 25, TO TRANSPORT ME (AND ROBERTA) AT ABOUT 1700 LOCAL (1500 ZULU) TO CAIRO. THIS WOULD ALLOW ME TO JOIN SCHEDULED BREKFEST BRIEFING AND OTHER BRIEFINGS OF SECRETARY ON TUESDAY.
4. OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY WILL GO TO ISRAEL BY HELO ON LATE AFTERNOON, TUESDAY, APRIL 26, FOLLOWING TALKS WITH TANNOUS. (TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM -- DETAILS BY SEPTTEL).

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#5021

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SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

MLRR M09-265/3 #38500

BY RW NARA DATE 1/1/1

38504 51
SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB

SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE599

STU7631

OO RUEHC

DE RUEHBL #5035 1151335

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 251330Z APR 83

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0030

INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 002

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 006

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 007

BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 5035

EXDIS/NOFORN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PINS, LE

SUBJ: LAF CONTACTS WITH AHMAD AL-KHATIB

1. (S. ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS WE HAVE REPORTED, LAF COMMANDER IBRAHIM TANNUS IS IN CONTACT WITH SA'D HADDAD'S CHIEF LIEUTENANTS AND HAS A LONG-STANDING PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH HADDAD THAT GOES BACK TO THE DAYS WHEN THE TWO MEN SERVED TOGETHER.

3. HADDAD'S MIRROR IMAGE IS LT. AHMAD AL-KHATIBU, A SUNNI OFFICER WHO LEFT THE LAF DURING THE CIVIL WAR TO FORM THE LEBANESE ARAB ARMY, CLOSELY ALLIED WITH THE PLO, LEBANESE LEFTIST GROUPS AND, DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS, THE SYRIANS. THE COMPARABILITY OF THE TWO REBEL OFFICERS HAS LED MANY LEBANESE TO FEAR THAT THE SYRIANS WILL COUNTER THE ISRAELI FOCUS ON HADDAD BY BUILDING UP AL-KHATIB IN NORTH LEBANON OR THE EIAQA'.

4. IT NOW APPEARS, HOWEVER, THAT THE LAF HAS CONTACT WITH AL-KHATIB WITH WHOM HE HAS SERVED PREVIOUSLY. TANNUS SAID HE WAS TOLD BY AL-KHATIB, WHO IS CURRENTLY IN TRIPOLI, THAT HE WANTS TO RETURN TO THE LAF AND HAS EVEN STATED HE IS PREPARED TO FACE A COURT MARTIAL. ACCORDING TO TANNUS, AL-KHATIB HAD COMMENTED THAT HE WAS UNDER PRESSURE TO EXPAND HIS FORCE AS A CHALLENGE TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, BUT HE MAINTAINS THAT HE IS NOT COOPERATING (SOURCES IN TRIPOLI HAVE TOLD US THAT AL-KHATIB IS INDEED THERE BUT THAT HE IS NOT PLAYING A PARTICULARLY VISIBLE ROLE).

5. COMMENT: TANNUS HAS ALREADY SHOWN HIMSELF TO BE

SENSITIVE

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NRMD9-265/3#38504

BY RW NARA DATE 1/1/11

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB

SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

A SKILLFUL NEGOTIATOR THROUGH HIS ROLE IN WORKING OUT THE LAF DEPLOYMENT IN EAST BEIRUT AND BRINGING ABOUT DRUZE ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF AN ARMY MOVE TO THE SHUF AND ALAYH IF FOREIGN FORCES WITHDRAW. HIS ABILITY TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH BOTH HADDAD AND AL-KHATIB IS ANOTHER ILLUSTRATION OF HIS ABILITY IN THIS REGARD.

6. ALL ADDRESSEES PLEASE NOTE: THIS INFORMATION IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND MUST BE CLOSELY HELD. PUGH

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#5035

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SENSITIVE

38505 23
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 560

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE715
STU8531
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHBL #5047 1152255
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK RUEHEG
O 252035Z APR 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE 0012
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0032
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0009
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0008
RUEHIA/USIA WAQSHDC IMMEDIATE 0003
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEIRUT 5047

CAIRO FOR USDEL SECRETARY

EO 12356 DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHILTZ, GEORGE P) LE

SUBJ: SECRETARY'S VISIT TO BEIRUT

REF A. BEIRUT 5018 B. SKECTO 4005 C. TEL AVIV 5520

1. C - KENTIRE TEXT

2. BASED ON THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SECRETARY (O-4TY AS EXPRESSED IN REF B AND THE 1000 ETD FROM JERUSALEM PROPOSED REF C, THE FOLLOWING IS A REVISED PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO BEIRUT:

1045 ARRIVE AT 22 MAU LANDING AREA

1045 - 1105 MEET WITH SENIOR OFFICERS OF 22 MAU AND PHIBRON TWO NEAR AIRSTRIP

1105 - 1120 HELO TO MOD LANDING ZONE

1120 - 1130 MOTORCADE TO PALACE

1130 - 1500 MEETINGS AND LUNCH AT PALACE

1500 - 1510 MOTORCADE TO AMB'S RESIDENCE

1510 - 1540 MEET WITH MNF AMBASSADORS AND COMMANDERS

1540 - 1550 MOTORCADE TO MOD

1550 - 1620 HELO TO AUB ATHLETIC FIELD, MOTORCADE TO URAFFOURD BUILDING

1620 - 1650 MEET WITH EMBASSY STAFF (US AND FSLN) URETURN TO ATHLETIC FIELD

12650 - 17710 HELO TO 22 MAU LANDING AREA

1710 - 1725 PRESS STATEMENT AT AIRSTRIP

1730 DEPARTURE FOR JERUSALEM

3. BELIEVE IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO POST MORALE THAT SECRETARY VISIT THE TEMPORARY EMBASSY CHANCERY IN THE DUFFAFFOURD BUILDING AND MEET EMBASSY EMPLOYEES THERE RATHER THAN AT THE AMB'S RESIDENCE. RSO SEES NO SECURITY REASONS TO PRECLUDE

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

MLRR MD9-265/3 #38505

BY RW NARA DATE 11/11/11

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

VISIT TO THIS AREA. THE SURROUNDING ROADS ARE CLOSED; US MARINES AND LOCAL FORCES ARE ON THE SCENE IN FORCE; AND SECURITY IS RELATIVE GOOD IN THIS AREA. FURTHERMORE, WE DO NOT WISH TO EXPOSE THE EMBASSY STAFF WHICH HAS BEEN UNDERMINE STRIN, TO - 09 8703 8-,83497 627 6 5480 5#49718# 5#3 :856 59 5#3 -.2'S RESIDENCE TO MEET THE SECRETARY. MOREOVER WE WILL BE IN THE MIDDLE OF MOVING A MAJOR PART OF OUR EMBASSY TO THE BRITISH CONSUL. WE HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT THE SECRETARY WILL DECIDE TO MEET THE EMBASSY EMPLOYEES ON LOCATION.

4. EMBASSY CONTROL OFFICER AND S/S ADVANCE TEAM DISCUSSED DRAFT SCHEDULE WITH LEBANESE FORMIN, ELIE SALEM AND PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT WADIA HADDAD. HE APPROVED THE LENGTH OF TIME ALLOTTED FOR DISCUSSION OF THE TRILATERAL TALKS AT THE PRESIDENT'S PALACE. FORMIN TOLD US HE HAD DISCUSSED THE VISIT BRIEFLY WITH PRES GEMAYEL. AS ARTICULATED BY THE FORMIN, PRESIDENT TENTATIVELY PLANS TO HAVE A ONE-ONE-ONE MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY FOR UP TO ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS, POSSIBLY FOLLOWED BY A MORE FORMAL MEETING WITH AIDES. THIS WOULD BE FOLLOWED, HE SAID, BY "A LARGER MEETING WITH AIDES. THIS WOULD BE FOLLOWED, HE SAID BY "A LARGER MEETING WITH LEBANESE LEADERS WHOSE OPINIONS ARE IMPORTANT." THE SETTING FOR THIS LARGER MEETING WOULD APPARENTLY BE A STANDUP SOCIAL OCCASION AND LUNCHEON. THIS MIGHT THEN BE FOLLOWED BY 26 - 3:00, 9, 3-ON-ONE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY. DR HADDAD CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS PROGRAM IS HIGHLY TENTATIVE AT THE MOMENT.

5. FORMIN SAID HE WOULD MEET THE SECRETARY AT THE AIRPORT ON ARRIVAL BUT WOULD NOT ACCOMPANY HIM IN THE HELICOPTER. HE SAID HE DID NOT PLAN TO BE AT THE AIRPORT ON THE SECRETARY'S DEPARTURE. THE MINISTER ASKED THE EMBASSY: 1) WHETHER THE SECRETARY'S ETA AND ETD SHOULD BE PUBLICIZED BY THE GOL, AND IF SO WHEN; 2) WHETHER THE SECRETARY WOULD LIKE PRESS COVERAGE OF HIS ARRIVAL AT THE AIRPORT (SEE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH); 3) WHETHER THE SECRETARY WISHES TO MEET ANY PARTICULAR INDIVIDUALS AT THE PALACE OR WILL LEAVE THE SCHEDULE ENTIRELY TO THE GOL. WE PROMISED TO SEEK ADVICE FROM THE SECRETARY'S PARTY.

6. DR HADDAD SAID THE MIN OF INFORMATION WILL ESCORT THE TRAVELING PRESS THROUGHOUT THE DAY. THEY WILL RECEIVE A SUBSTANTIVE BRIEFING (PROBABLY BY FORMER AMB GHAZZAN TUENI), LUNCH, AND A TOUR OF THE CITY, AND THEY WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE AIRPORT IN TIME FOR THE SECRETARY'S DEPARTURE STATEMENT. THE EMBASSY CONCURS IN THIS APPROACH AND IS ARRANGING BUS TRANSPORTATION FOR THE GROUP. (NOTE: THE EMBASSY WILL INSIST ON CONTROLLING PRESS ACCESS TO THE EMBASSY SITE ALONG LINES DISCUSSED IN REF A.) GOL PLANS PHOTO OPPORTUNITIES AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE VISIT TO THE PALACE. 22 MAU HAS OFFERED TO PROVIDE PHOTO
COVERAGE, FOR POOL DISTRIBUTION, OF THE SECRETARY'S MEETINGS
WITH USMC/USN OFFICERS AND UNF AMBASSADORS AND COMMANDERS.
7. WE ARE PUZZLED BY REF B'S REQUEST THAT WE DEVELOP RECOMMEN-
DATIONS ON "BILATERALS", AND WOULD APPRECIATE FURTHER GUIDANCE.
THE FORMIN TOLD US THE GOL HAD NO PLANS TO URGE ANY BILATERAL
ISSUE AND WILL CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY ON THE TRILATERAL
NEGOTIATIONS.

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SENSITIVE

38506

26

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB

SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE717

STU8522

OO RUEHC

DE RUEHTV #5616/01 1152119

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 252106Z APR 83 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3215

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE 5873

INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2466

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9008

RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7376

RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3793

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 05616

ZFF SECSTATE AND CAIRO ONLY

EXDIS

CAIRO FOR THE SECRETARY'S PARTY AND FOR AMBASSADORS LEWIS, HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12065: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, MOPS, US, IS, SYCELLE, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING IN KHNGTAH, APRIL 25

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

--XQK2. SUMMARY: KIMCHE SAID HXMWOULD NOT MAKE EXTENDED COMMENT PW ONPRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S DECLARATIONS OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS. HOWEVER, HE STATED FLATLY, WHILE ISRAEL WANTED TO REACH AN EARLY AGREEMENT, IT WOULD NOT AGREE TO RENEGOTIATE PREVIOUSLY-1984/33 09 8589, .

HE ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT LEBANESE ACTIONS OF APRIL 24 WITH RESPECT TO PUNITIVE MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST LEBANESE MERCHANTS ENGAGED IN TRADE WITH ISRAEL. FATTAL REITERATED HIS GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT AND SAID HIS PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS SHOULD BE READ IN THIS LIGHT. AFTER THIS OPENING, AND RELATIVELY SOFT, EXCHANGE, THE PLENARY PROCEEDED TO REVIEW ONCE AGAIN THE COVERING AGREEMENT AND THE ACCOMPANYING AGREED MINUTES. A CERTAIN NUMBER OF POINTS WERE CLEARED UP. RECOGNITION AND ECONOMIC BOYCOTT REMAIN THE PRINCIPAL SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES. IN ADDITION, THE LEVEL OF SIGNATURE, NAME OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE LIAISON OFFICES TO THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE AND TWO OTHER DIFFERENCES WITH RESPECT

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 009-21653 #38506

BY RW NARA DATE 11/1/11

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TO THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES STILL

R

ICVLBE

RESOLVED. IN A SI

D MEETING, THE ISRAELIS PUT ONX

THE TABLE A DRAFT PA

PER CONCERNING INTERIM ARRANGE-

MENTS ANDX CTICAL MEASURES REQUIRED TO INXORE THAT

THESE WOULD BE IMPEMEUAEED UPON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

WHILE AGREEING TO THE NEED FOR PRACTICAL STEPS,

AMBASSADOR KHARM

BASICALLY FUDGED THESE ISSUES,

SAYING HE WAS WITHOUT FURTHER IRRSTRCTIONS FROM HIS
GOVERNMENT.

--

3. THE PLENARY REVX

WED THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

ANNEX. IN AN IMPORTANT BREAK-I

HRUGH, AN AGREED

AD REFERENDUM TEXT ON THE INTEGRATION OF LOCAL

UNITS INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE WAS REACHED.

THE DEMARCATION OF THE SECURITY REGION (JEBAL BARUK),

U.S. PARTICIPATION ON THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, AND

UNIFIL, REMAIN THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE ANNEX

PER SE. MOREOVER, NO UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED ON

THE QUESTION OF "HOT PURSUIT" INTO LEBANON'S

TERRITORIAL WATERS, THOUGH DRAPER INDICATED HE MAY

HAVE A COMPROMISE FORMULA TO OFFER LATER. (HE

TOLD KINCHE PRIVATELY THAT "HOT PURSUIT" ACROSS THE

BORDER WAS ABSOLUTELY OUT.) THE QUESTION OF THE

NUMBER OF SUPERVISORY TEAMS, WHICH NEARLY PREC

RTATED

AN ISRAELI WALKOUT AT XHE LAST MEETING IN KHALDAH,

WA LDISCUSSED AT LENGTH WITHOUT ANY XZLER-CUT

RESOLUTION. THE ZIBANESE ARGUED STRONGLY FOR A

WO YEAR TIME LIMIT TO THE SUPERVISORY TEAMS AND

ADDED THEY WERE XUREARED TO ACCEPT UP TO FIVE TEAMS

NORMALLY AND UP TO EIGHT UNDEXGEXCEPTIONAL CIRCUM-

STANCES. THE ISRAELIS RIPOSTED THEY WOULD NOT BUDGE

IN INSISTING THAT THE AGREED MINUTES REFLECT

THAT UP TO EIGHT TEAMS COULD OPERATE IN THE SECURITY

REGION, AS HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY AGREED. THEY ALXS

OFFERED SOME COMPROMISE FORMULAS ON THE DURATION

ISSUE. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF AN ISRAELI DRAFT

ON THE "SUPERVISION CENTERS," WHICH REQUIRES

FURTHER DISCUSSION THOUGH GENERAL HAMDAN PUT DOWN

SENSITIVE

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SEVERAL MARKERS. THE LEBANESE ARE CLEARLY WORRIED ABOUT THE VISIBILITY QUESTION. SEPTTEL WILL PROVIDE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF DISCUSSION ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. END SUMMARY.

--
4. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETINGS, KIMCHE SAID HE WOULD NOT REACT AT LENGTH TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S RECENT DECLARATIONS FOR REASONS HE HAD EXPLAINED PRIVATELY TO AMBASSADOR FATTAL. HOWEVER, HE REJECTED ANKHNLLEGATIONS THAT IT WAS ISRAEL'S INTENTION OR WISH TO LIMIT LTMNSNEE SOVEREIGNTY, WHICH, WYE OTED, HAD ONLY BEEN PUT IN QXBCTION BY THE CAIRO AGREEMENTS AND PLO AND SYRIAN ACTIONS.

HEJ8.0- 8"3\$ 8 4-3) 2-,53\$ 59 285#\$-.- -, \$ 59)3-;3
AN INDEPENDENT BANON IN ITS WAKE. KIMCHE ALNS

BT

#5616

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SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

38508

PAGE 1 - 553

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE754
STU8102
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHBL #5045 1151717
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 251715Z APR 83
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 31
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 3
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 7
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8
BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 5045

EXDIS

NOFORN

EO 12356 DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS

SUBJ: LAF CONTACTS WITH AHMAD AL-KHATIB

REF BEIRUT 5032

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING IS CORRECTION TO REFTEL. PARA 4 SENTENCES ONE AND TWO SHOULD READ AS FOLLOWS:

IT NOW APPEARS, HOWEVER, THAT THE LAF HAS CONTACT WITH AL-KHATIB AS WELL AS HADDAD AND THROUGH THE SAME MAN: TANNUS. TANNUS TOLD OMC CHIEF HE IS IN TOUCH WITH AL-KHATIB WITH WHOM HE HAS SERVED PREVIOUSLY.

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BT

#5045

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SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M09-265/3#38508

BY RW NARA DATE 1/1/11

38509 33
SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE747

VSK765 634 STU8677

OO RUEHSD RUEHC

DE RUEHTV #5616/01 1152121

ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK (CCY TEXT ADX064265 STU8522-634) MCN NAR

O 252106Z APR 83 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3215

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE 5873

INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2466

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9008

RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7376

RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3793

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 05616

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT: THROUGHOUT)

ZFF SECSTATE AND CAIRO ONLY

CAIRO FOR THE SECRETARY'S PARTY AND FOR AMBASSADORS LEWIS,
HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, MOPS, US, IS, SY, LE, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING IN KHALDAH,
APRIL 25

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

--
2. SUMMARY: KIMCHE SAID HE WOULD NOT MAKE EXTENDED
COMMENTS ON PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S DECLARATIONS OVER
THE LAST FEW DAYS. HOWEVER, HE STATED FLATLY,
WHILE ISRAEL WANTED TO REACH AN EARLY AGREEMENT, IT WOULD
NOT AGREE TO RENEGOTIATE PREVIOUSLY-AGREED POSITIONS.
HE ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT LEBANESE ACTIONS OF
APRIL 24 WITH RESPECT TO PUNITIVE MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST
LEBANESE MERCHANTS ENGAGED IN TRADE WITH ISRAEL.
FATTAL REITERATED HIS GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO
ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT AND SAID HIS PRESIDENT'S
STATEMENTS SHOULD BE READ IN THIS LIGHT. AFTER THIS
OPENING, AND RELATIVELY SOFT, EXCHANGE, THE
PLENARY PROCEEDED TO REVIEW ONCE AGAIN THE COVERING
AGREEMENT AND THE ACCOMPANYING AGREED MINUTES. A
CERTAIN NUMBER OF POINTS WERE CLEARED UP. RECOGNITION
AND ECONOMIC BOYCOTT REMAIN THE PRINCIPAL SUBSTANTIVE
DIFFERENCES. IN ADDITION, THE LEVEL OF SIGNATURE,
NAME OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, THE RELATIONSHIP

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 104-265/3#38509

BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/11

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OF THE LIAISON OFFICES TO THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE AND TWO RATHER MINOR DIFFERENCES WITH RESPECT TO THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES STILL NEED TO BE RESOLVED. IN A SIDE MEETING, THE ISRAELIS PUT ON THE TABLE A DRAFT PAPER CONCERNING INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AND PRACTICAL MEASURES REQUIRED TO INSURE THAT THESE WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED UPON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WHILE AGREEING TO THE NEED FOR PRACTICAL STEPS, AMBASSADOR KHARMA BASICALLY FUDGED THESE ISSUES, SAYING HE WAS WITHOUT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT.

--
3. THE PLENARY REVIEWED THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ANNEX. IN AN IMPORTANT BREAK-THROUGH, AN AGREED AD REFERENDUM TEXT ON THE INTEGRATION OF LOCAL UNITS INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE WAS REACHED. THE DEMARCATION OF THE SECURITY REGION (JEBAL BARUK), U.S. PARTICIPATION ON THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, AND UNIFIL, REMAIN THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE ANNEX PER SE. MOREOVER, NO UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED ON THE QUESTION OF "HOT PURSUIT" INTO LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL WATERS, THOUGH DRAPER INDICATED HE MAY HAVE A COMPROMISE FORMULA TO OFFER LATER. (HE TOLD KIMCHE PRIVATELY THAT "HOT PURSUIT" ACROSS THE BORDER WAS ABSOLUTELY OUT.) THE QUESTION OF THE NUMBER OF SUPERVISORY TEAMS, WHICH NEARLY PRECIPITATED AN ISRAELI WALKOUT AT THE LAST MEETING IN KHALDAH, WAS DISCUSSED AT LENGTH WITHOUT ANY CLEAR-CUT RESOLUTION. THE LEBANESE ARGUED STRONGLY FOR A TWO YEAR TIME LIMIT TO THE SUPERVISORY TEAMS AND ADDED THEY WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT UP TO FIVE TEAMS NORMALLY AND UP TO EIGHT UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. THE ISRAELIS RIPOSTED THEY WOULD NOT BUDGE IN INSISTING THAT THE AGREED MINUTES REFLECT THAT UP TO EIGHT TEAMS COULD OPERATE IN THE SECURITY REGION, AS HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY AGREED. THEY ALSO OFFERED SOME COMPROMISE FORMULAS ON THE DURATION ISSUE. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF AN ISRAELI DRAFT ON THE "SUPERVISION CENTERS," WHICH REQUIRES FURTHER DISCUSSION THOUGH GENERAL HAMDAN PUT DOWN SEVERAL MARKERS. THE LEBANESE ARE CLEARLY WORRIED ABOUT THE VISIBILITY QUESTION. SEPTTEL WILL PROVIDE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF DISCUSSION ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. END SUMMARY.

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4. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETINGS, KIMCHE

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SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SAID HE WOULD NOT REACT AT LENGTH TO PRESIDENT
GEMAYEL'S RECENT DECLARATIONS FOR REASONS HE HAD
EXPLAINED PRIVATELY TO AMBASSADOR FATTAL. HOWEVER,
HE REJECTED ANY ALLEGATIONS THAT IT WAS ISRAEL'S
INTENTION OR WISH TO LIMIT LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY,
WHICH, HE NOTED, HAD ONLY BEEN PUT IN QUESTION BY
THE CAIRO AGREEMENTS AND PLO AND SYRIAN ACTIONS.
HE EMPHASIZED ISRAEL WANTED TO WITHDRAW AND TO LEAVE
AN INDEPENDENT LEBANON IN ITS WAKE. KIMCHE ALSO

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE756
STU8528
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHTV #5616/02 1152123
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
O 252106Z APR 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3216
RUEHEN/AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE 5874
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2467
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9009
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7377
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3794
BT
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STRESSED THAT ISRAEL WANTED TO REACH A SPEEDY AGREEMENT, BUT ASSERTED VIGOROUSLY ISRAEL WAS NOT PREPARED TO RENEGOTIATE PREVIOUSLY-AGREED POSITIONS. TO DO SO, HE SAID, WOULD LEAD TO AN INDEFINITE PROLONGATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE OBSERVED THAT ISRAEL WOULD JUDGE LEBANON'S INTENTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT WHAT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN AGREED.

--
5. KIMCHE THEN REFERRED TO AN INCIDENT WHICH HE SAID HAD TAKEN PLACE YESTERDAY (APRIL 24) IN LEBANON AGAINST CERTAIN LEBANESE MERCHANTS ENGAGED IN TRADE WITH ISRAEL AND HE ASSERTED THAT SOME ISRAEL AGRICULTURAL GOODS HAD BEEN CONFISCATED AND LEBANESE MERCHANTS ARRESTED. THE MERCHANTS HAD ALSO BEEN TOLD THEY WOULD FACE EVEN MORE SEVERE PENALTIES IF THIS TRADE WAS NOT STOPPED BY MAY 7. COMING ON THE HEELS OF THE EARLIER LEBANESE ACTION AGAINST ISRAELI GOODS, KIMCHE REITERATED THAT THESE ACTIONS MADE A MOCKERY OF ALL THAT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE ASKED THAT THE MERCHANTS BE RELEASED, THE MAY 7 DEADLINE RESCINDED, AND NON-PERISHABLE GOODS RELEASED.

--
6. IN REPLY, FATTAL STATED THAT LEBANON WAS AS DEDICATED AS ISRAEL TO REACHING AN ACCORD. HE COMMENTED THAT IF ONE EXAMINED HIS PRESIDENT'S DECLARATION IN ITS WHOLE--AND NOT IN ITS DETAILS--IT COULD BE

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SEEN THAT THIS WAS ALSO THE MOOD WHICH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD EXPRESSED. HOWEVER, FATTAL EMPHASIZED, LEBANON DID NOT WANT TO ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ENDANGER ITS FUTURE OR COMPROMISE ITS INDEPENDENCE. FATTAL OBSERVED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS MUST BE READ WITH "SERENITY" AND THAT DISCUSSION MUST CONTINUE IN ORDER TO REACH COMPROMISE ON THE REMAINING POINTS AT ISSUE. FINALLY, FATTAL STATED HE WAS NOT INFORMED OF YESTERDAY'S ACTION AGAINST THE LEBANESE MERCHANTS AND COULD NOT REPLY AUTHORITATIVELY TO KIMCHE ON THIS POINT.

7. FOLLOWING THIS EXCHANGE, THE PLENARY REVIEWED AGAIN THE COVERING AGREEMENT AND THE ACCOMPANYING AGREED MINUTES IN ORDER TO HIGHLIGHT THOSE POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT BEFORE THE SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL.

PREAMBLE

8. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO THE PREAMBLE IN ITS PRESENT FORM, THOUGH BOTH SIDES RESERVED THEIR POSITION ON THE LEVEL AT WHICH THE SIGNING WOULD TAKE PLACE. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS ISSUE WOULD BE LEFT IN ABEYANCE.

ARTICLE 1

9. THE RECOGNITION ISSUE IS STILL NOT RESOLVED IN THIS PARAGRAPH. HOWEVER, A REVISED ORDERING OF THE PARAGRAPHS WITHIN THE ARTICLE WAS AGREED TO. BEGIN TEXT:

-- 1. THE PARTIES AGREE AND UNDERTAKE TO
-- (IS: RECOGNIZE AND) RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY,
-- POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
-- OF EACH OTHER. THEY CONSIDER THE EXISTING
-- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL
-- INVIOABLE.
-- 2. THE PARTIES CONFIRM THAT THE STATE
-- OF WAR BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL HAS BEEN
-- TERMINATED AND NO LONGER EXISTS.
-- 3. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PROVISIONS OF PAR-
-- GRAPHS 1 AND 2, ISRAEL UNDERTAKES TO WITHDRAW
-- ALL OF ITS ARMED FORCES FROM LEBANON IN
-- ACCORDANCE WITH THE ANNEX OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT.
END TEXT.

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ARTICLE 7

10. FATTAL PROPOSED, AND ISRAEL ACCEPTED, THE FOLLOW-

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE757

STU8530

OO RUEHC

DE RUEHTV #5616/03 1152124

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 252106Z APR 83 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3217

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE 5875

INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2468

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9010

RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7378

RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3795

BT

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ING REVISION TO THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 7: IT
NOW READS: QUOTE NEW CONTRIBUTORS TO SUCH FORCES
SHALL BE SELECTED FROM AMONG STATES WHICH HAVE
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES TO THE PRESENT
AGREEMENT. END QUOTE. KIMCHE THEN RAISED THE
QUESTION OF THOSE UNIFIL CONTINGENTS PRESENTLY IN
LEBANON WHICH DO NOT HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH
ISRAEL OR LEBANON. FIVN, SENEGAL AND NIGERIA
FALL INTO THIS CATEGORY. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS
ISSUE WOULD BE LEFT OPEN FOR THE MOMENT AND POSSIBLY
HANDLED LATER BY AN AGREED MINUTE. FATTAL OBSERVED
THAT ONE HAD TO BE CAREFUL TO AVOID A COLLISION WITH
THE U.N. SYSTEM ON THIS MATTER.

--
ARTICLE 8

11. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE NAME WHICH
WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE (PARAGRAPH
1(C) OF ARTICLE 8). IN ORDER TO SPEED THINGS
ALONG, KIMCHE SUGGESTED THAT THE GROUP BE NAMED THE
"SECURITY COMMITTEE." DRAPER THOUGHT THIS WAS AN
ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE, BUT THE LEBANESE PREFERRED
TO RESERVE THEIR POSITION. SOME OTHER MINOR DRAFTING
CHANGES WERE ALSO AGREED TO IN THIS ARTICLE. WITH
RESPECT TO THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL THAT CLAIMS
LANGUAGE BE ADDED (ARTICLE 8, PARAGRAPH 2), KIMCHE
SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS STILL CONSIDERING
THIS MATTER.

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ECONOMIC BOYCOTT LANGUAGE

12. KIMCHE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ADD THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH TO ARTICLE 8 IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE PROVISION WITH RESPECT TO THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT. (NOTE: THIS PARAGRAPH IS A REVISED FORMULATION OF THE LEBANESE LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 11 OF THEIR DRAFT.)
BEGIN TEXT:

-- EACH OF THE PARTIES WILL TAKE, UPON ENTRY
-- INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENTS PROVIDED FOR
-- IN SUB-PARAGRAPH "A" OF THIS PARAGRAPH, AND
-- NOT LATER THAN ONE YEAR FROM THE ENTRY INTO
-- FORCE OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, ALL NECESSARY
-- MEASURES, IN CONFORMITY WITH ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
-- PROCEDURES, FOR THE ABROGATION OF LAWS AND
-- REGULATIONS WHICH ARE NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE
-- PRESENT ARTICLE OR THE ABOVEMENTIONED AGREEMENTS,
-- OR WHICH IMPEDE THE NON-DISCRIMINATORY PASSAGE
-- OF GOODS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

END TEXT.

FOR THE SAME REASON, KIMCHE ALSO ASKED THAT A FURTHER PARAGRAPH BE INCLUDED UNDER ARTICLE 8 WHICH WOULD STATE THAT EACH PARTY WILL REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS WHICH WOULD HARM THE ECONOMY OF THE OTHER PARTY.

--
13. FATTAL STATED THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THESE PROPOSALS FOR REASONS WHICH HE HAD PREVIOUSLY EXPLAINED. HE INDICATED THAT THIS WAS A MOST DELICATE ISSUE AND HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT WANT THE BOYCOTT TO BE SUPPRESSED TOO CLEARLY IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE AGREEMENT. HE ALSO NOTED THAT WHEN ONE EMPLOYED PHRASEOLOGY THAT TRADE WOULD BE ON A "NON-DISCRIMINATORY" BASIS, THIS MADE ANY OTHER REFERENCE TO THE BOYCOTT SUPERFLUOUS. DRAPER SUGGESTED A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE IN THE FORM OF AN AGREED MINUTE TO THE AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD READ: QUOTE: IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS PROVISION SHOULD APPLY MUTATIS MUTANDIS TO AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY BOTH PARTIES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 8, PARAGRAPH 2. UNQUOTE. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT THIS LANGUAGE WOULD STILL BE CONTINGENT ON A FINAL AGREEMENT BEING REACHED; AND RUBENSTEIN UNDERScored MY POINT BY SAYING THAT ISRAEL WANTS THE BOYCOTT TO BE ABROGATED WHETHER OR NOT THE FINAL NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL RELATIONS ARE CONCLUDED. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS ISSUE WOULD BE HELD IN ABEYANCE.

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ARTICLE 10

14. FATTAL SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT STILL PREFERRED

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:
MESSAGE:

HCE758

VSK761 WTJ STU8535

OO RUEHC RUEHSD

DE RUEHTV #5616/04 1152126

ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY EXDIS ADDED ADD64440 STU8535 -WTJ-MCN NAR)
O 252106Z APR 83 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3218

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE 5876

INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2469

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9011

RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE NUEUO

RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3796.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 TEL AVIV 05616
EXDIS

TO MAINTAIN THE INITIAL LANGUAGE ON PARAGRAPH 1,
ARTICLE 10, AS OPPOSED TO THE AMERICAN FORMULA WHICH
STATES THAT QUOTE THE AGREEMENT WOULD REMAIN IN
FORCE UNTIL THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE PARTIES
IS FORMALLY CONCLUDED. END QUOTE. KIMCHE STATED
THAT ISRAEL ALSO PREFERRED ITS ORIGINAL FORMULATION,
BUT WAS STILL CONSULTING ABOUT THE AMERICAN
PROPOSITION. IT WAS ALSO AGREED AT FATTAL'S SUGGESTION
TO REVISE PARAGRAPH 2 TO READ: QUOTE: THE PRESENT AGREE-
MENT MAY BE MODIFIED OR AMENDED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT
OF THE TWO PARTIES."

--
ARTICLE 11

15. ASIDE FROM THE EARLIER DISCUSSION BY THE
ISRAELI SIDE WHICH WOULD MOVE THE FIRST PARAGRAPH
OF ARTICLE 11 (THE ABROGATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS)
TO ARTICLE 8, BOTH SIDES AGREED TO REVISE THE SECOND
PARAGRAPH TO READ: "THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO
APPLY EXISTING OBLIGATIONS, ENTER INTO ANY OBLIGATION,
OR ADOPT LAWS OR REGULATIONS IN CONFLICT WITH THE
PRESENT AGREEMENT." THE ISRAELI SIDE WANTED THIS
LANGUAGE TO BE INCLUDED IN ORDER TO MAKE IT CLEAR
THAT THIS AGREEMENT WOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER
LEBANON'S OBLIGATIONS TO THE ARAB DEFENSE PACT.

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ARTICLE 13

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

16. FATTAL PROPOSED NEW LANGUAGE FOR PARAGRAPH ONE
RELATING TO THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES. BEGIN

TEXT:

-- ANY DISPUTE ARISING BETWEEN THE PARTIES
-- CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION
-- OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, WHICH IS NOT
-- SETTLED BY NEGOTIATION IN THE JOINT LIAISON
-- COMMITTEE, SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO CONCILIATION,
-- AND IF NOT SO RESOLVED, TO AN AGREED PROCEDURE
-- FOR A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT.

END TEXT.

KIMCHE STATED THAT THIS LANGUAGE WAS ACCEPTABLE
PROVIDED THAT IT BEGAN WITH THE WORDING QUOTE:
ANY UNRESOLVED DISPUTE UNQUOTE. FATTAL STRONGLY
RESISTED SUCH AN ADDITION, ARGUING THAT THIS WOULD
ESTABLISH ANOTHER LEVEL OR PHASE IN NEGOTIATING DIS-
PUTES. DESPITE SOME COMPROMISE SUGGESTIONS
OFFERED BY DRAPER, FATTAL REFUSED TO BE BUDGED
AND IT WAS FINALLY AGREED TO SET THIS ISSUE ASIDE FOR
THE MOMENT. FATTAL ALSO DISAGREED WITH THE ISRAELI
SUGGESTION THAT THE PROVISIONS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF
DISPUTES FALLING UNDER THE SECURITY ANNEX (PARAGRAPH 2)
SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE ARTICLES 4 AND 6 OF THE COVERING
AGREEMENT. THE ISRAELIS ARGUED THAT THESE TWO ARTICLES
WERE OF A SECURITY NATURE AND SHOULD BE DEALT WITH
IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE
MILITARY COMMITTEE. THIS ISSUE WAS NOT RESOLVED.

AGREED MINUTES

17. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO THE AGREED MINUTES FOR THE
COVERING AGREEMENT.

INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS

18. IN A SIDE MEETING, AMBASSADOR KHARMA DISCUSSED
INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WITH RUBENSTEIN AND KOZAK. HE
SAID HE STILL DID NOT HAVE ANY FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS
CONCERNING INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MOVEMENT
OF GOODS, ESPECIALLY ON THE QUESTION OF "POSITIVE"
VERSUS "NEGATIVE" LISTS. THE ISRAELIS PRESSED FOR
CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE THAT THE INTERIM
ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED ON THE GROUND; AND
THEY PRESENTED A DRAFT TO COVER THESE POINTS.
KHARMA, AS HE HAD DONE DURING THE LAST MEETING IN
KHALDAH, FUDGED AND SAID HE WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS.
HE ALSO HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ISRAELI

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PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD SPECIFY THOSE AREAS TO BE COVERED
DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FINAL AGREEMENT(S)
ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, INCLUDING SUCH AREAS AS CULTURAL
RELATIONS. KOZAK TOLD KHARMA THAT IT WAS VERY
IMPORTANT FOR LEBANON TO BE AT LEAST IN THE POSITION

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