

SENSITIVE

38454

PAGE 1 - 696

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

HCE294  
UTS9803  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUQMBE #3063 1111010  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK  
O 211000Z APR 83 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEIRUT 3063

EXDIS

PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: APER, OTRA, LE, US

SUBJ: VIP PLANE TO BEIRUT: CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL  
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I DISCUSSED PRESIDENTIAL AIRCRAFT COMING FOR REMAINS WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL LAST NIGHT, 4/20. HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE UNDER-SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES AND WE AGREED ON A BRIEF CALL SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVAL. FONMIN SALIM WILL BE PRESENT AND THIS WILL TAKE CARE OF ANY "FORMALITIES" IN CONNECTION WITH VISIT. PRESIDENT LOOKS FORWARD TO AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A MORE SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATION WITH VELIOTES AFTER DEPARTURE OF AIRCRAFT.

3. GEMAYEL WANTS TO SEND LEBANESE DELEGATION TO ACCOMPANY REMAINS. HE PROPOSES TO SEND AMBASSADOR FUAD TURK, SEC GEN OF FOREIGN MINISTRY (ROUGHLY EAGLEBURGER/DAM EQUIVALENT), ACCOMPANIED BY SIX OTHERS. SIZE OF DELEGATION STEMS FROM FACT HE WOULD LIKE ALL COMMUNITIES TO BE REPRESENTED. THE ONLY NAME HE COULD GIVE ME WAS THAT OF BRIGADIER HBIB FARIS. I TOLD GEMAYEL THAT WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED THE GESTURE BUT THAT I WOULD WISH TO CONFIRM THAT THERE WAS IN FACT ROOM ON THE PLANE. HE UNDERSTOOD AND SAID IF NECESSARY SIZE OF DELEGATION COULD BE CUT DOWN. (RECOMMENDATION: IF DELEGATION CAN BE ACCOMMODATED ON PLANE, I RECOMMEND WE DO SO. LEBANESE FEEL VERY DEEPLY ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED AND THIS IS WHAT SEEMS TO THEM AN APPROPRIATE GESTURE ON THEIR PART. WE SHOULD ACCEPT IT GRACIOUSLY IF WE CAN.)

4. I TOOK ADVANTAGE OF CONVERSATION TO TELL PRESIDENT GEMAYEL ABOUT MY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION A FEW HOURS EARLIER WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. HE WAS VERY PLEASED TO HEAR THE PRESIDENT'S REAFFIRMATION OF HIS DETERMINATION TO GO AHEAD IN LEBANON. THIS MORNING THE PRESS CARRIES THE PRESIDENT'S WORDS IN FULL, BASED ON RELEASES FROM WASHINGTON. WE WILL BE REPORTING FURTHER ON LEBANESE REACTIONS IN SEPTELS. DILLON

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M09-265/3#38454

BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/11

SENSITIVE

N

PAGE 1 - 697

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BT

#3063

NNNN

SENSITIVE

38457 7  
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 689

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE357  
STU0019  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUDKGPQ #2931/01 1111508  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 211505Z APR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9243  
INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2563  
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0257  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0887  
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0152  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0541  
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 1253  
RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 2485  
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 1632  
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 5752  
RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 0736  
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 0015  
RUTADS/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 0094  
RUTAGN/AMEMBASSY ACCRA IMMEDIATE 0074  
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SUVA IMMEDIATE 0025  
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 1729  
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2802  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 02931  
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL  
COLLECTIVE, IMMEDIATE  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: UNSC, PREL, MARR, LE, NL  
SUBJECT: UNIFIL EUROPEAN TROOP CONTRIBUTORS MEETING  
IN THE HAGUE, APRIL 20  
REFS: (A) THE HAGUE 2854, (B) USUN 954  
1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE DISCUSSED MEETING WITH MFA IO POLITICAL AND  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS DIRECTOR ETTEMA. HE  
EXPLAINED THAT THE MFA'S REASONS FOR SPONSORING THE MEETING  
WERE: (1) TO PROVIDE FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE  
EUROPEAN TROOP CONTRIBUTORS; (2) TO SHOW THE MOD -- WHICH  
HAS RECOMMENDED DUTCH WITHDRAWAL FROM UNIFIL (SEE PARA. 7)  
-- THE SUPPORT OF OTHER EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTORS FOR CONTINUED  
PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE; AND (3) TO ESTABLISH FOR THE  
CABINET AND PARLIAMENT A RECORD OF CONSULTATIONS ON UNIFIL  
AND ALSO TO DEMONSTRATE THE BROAD EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLR M09-2105/3#38457

BY RW NARA DATE 1/1/11

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

## PARTICIPATION.

3. PRESENT AT THE MEETING, WHICH WAS CALLED ON APRIL 15, WERE THE NETHERLANDS (HOST), NORWAY, IRELAND, FINLAND, SWEDEN, AND ITALY. ALL BUT ITALY SENT MFA AND MOD/MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES. ITALY WAS REPRESENTED BY ITS EMBASSY IN THE HAGUE. FRANCE WAS INVITED TO ATTEND BUT DECLINED "ON PRINCIPLE." THE FRENCH ASSERTED THAT UNIFIL CONSULTATIONS SHOULD INCLUDE ALL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS AND THIS COULD BEST BE DONE IN NEW YORK. ETTEMA SPECULATED THAT THE FRENCH ALSO DID NOT WANT TO PARTICIPATE IN WHAT THEY CONSIDERED A MEETING OF "SMALL POWERS."

4. ETTEMA DECLINED TO DESCRIBE THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY PARTICIPANTS (ASIDE FROM THE DUTCH) BUT HIS IMPRESSION WAS OF A GENERAL CONSENSUS OO AS FOLLOWS:

-- THERE IS DISSATISFACTION REGARDING THE PRESENT SITUATION IN LEBANON AND THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH UNIFIL IS OPERATING.

-- THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS COULD NOT MAKE ANY DEFINITIVE DECISIONS AT THIS POINT BECAUSE THERE WERE TOO MANY UNCERTAINTIES.

-- ANY NEW ROLE FOR UNIFIL SHOULD MAINTAIN THE "INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CHARACTER" OF THE FORCE. NONE OF THOSE PRESENT WISHED TO SEE UNIFIL TAKE ON AN INTERNAL POLICE FUNCTION. WHILE NO ONE SAID SO EXPLICITLY, THERE WAS STRONG AVERSION TO ASSUMING A ROLE OF PROTECTING PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS.

-- THERE WAS SOME UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE USG POSITION ON UNIFIL. WHAT ROLE DID THE U.S. SEE FOR THE FORCE? TWO PARTICIPANTS NOTED THE UNSYG'S COMMENTS ON A NEW UNIFIL ROLE THROUGHOUT LEBANON AND SPECULATED THAT THIS WAS INSPIRED BY THE U.S. PERHAPS THE U.S. WANTED TO SEE UNIFIL DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT LEBANON IN ORDER TO PHASE OUT THE MNF.

-- NO STATE EXPRESSED AN INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM UNIFIL, NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES. THE DUTCH MOD REP, HOWEVER, DID VOICE STRONG DOUBTS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF CONTINUED DUTCH PARTICIPATION GIVEN UNIFIL'S CURRENT NON-ROLE. THE DUTCH MFA REP, ON THE OTHER HAND, FAVORED REMAINING IN THE FORCE. ETTEMA NOTED THAT THE MFA WAS PLEASED BY THE BROAD SUPPORT EXPRESSED AT THE MEETING FOR REMAINING IN UNIFIL.

5. ETTEMA ADDED THAT THE MEETING -- WHICH WAS A ONE-TIME AFFAIR -- ENDED WITH NO FORMAL CONCLUSIONS.

6. THE ITALIAN EMBASSY PARTICIPANT AT THE MEETING

BT

#2931



9  
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 691

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
NNNN

SENSITIVE

10  
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 687

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB

SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE359

UTS0356

OO RUEHC

DE RUDKGPQ #2931/02 1111509

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 211505Z APR 83

FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9244

INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2564

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0258

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0888

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0153

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0542

RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 1254

RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 2486

RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 1633

RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 5753

RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 0737

RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 0016

RUTADS/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 0095

RUTAGN/AMEMBASSY ACCRA IMMEDIATE 0075

RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SUVA IMMEDIATE 0026

RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 1730

RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2803

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 THE HAGUE 02931

(PROTECT) AND ONE OF THE MOD REPS ALSO PROVIDED READOUTS ALONG THE LINES OF ABOVE.

7. IN ADDITION, ETTEMA TOLD US THAT DEFENSE MINISTER DE RUITER HAS SENT A LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DEN BROEK RECOMMENDING THAT THEY JOINTLY PROPOSE TO THE CABINET DUTCH WITHDRAWAL FROM UNIFIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER JULY 19 IF A NEW AND MORE EFFECTIVE MANDATE IS NOT FORTHCOMING. ETTEMA IS PREPARING A DRAFT REPLY FOR VAN DEN BROEK WHICH WOULD RECOMMEND AGAINST DUTCH WITHDRAWAL. HE EXPECTS THE TWO MINISTERS TO WORK OUT THEIR DIFFERENCES BEFORE THE CABINET CONSIDERS THE UNIFIL ISSUE. ETTEMA IS FAIRLY CONFIDENT THAT THE MFA POSITION -- TO CONTINUE IN UNIFIL -- WILL PREVAIL.

8. COMMENT: THE CABINET IS LIKELY TO DECIDE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS ON CONTINUED DUTCH PARTICIPATION IN UNIFIL. WE RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT CONSIDER DEMARCHE TO THE DUTCH ON THE IMPORTANCE OF STAYING IN UNIFIL. DYESS  
BT

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 688

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
#2931  
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

38458

PAGE 1 - 685

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

HCE384  
STU0098  
OO RUEHC RUEHSD  
DE RUQMBE #3066 1111525  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK  
O 211450Z APR 83 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3066  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEIRUT 5008  
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO FOLLOWING ALL IMMEDIATE  
CAIRO JIDDA RIYADH DAMASCUS TEL AVIV JERUSALEM ANKARA USUN  
LONDON PARIS ROME

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PINS, LE, US

SUBJ: EMBASSY BOMBING: LEBANESE PERCEPTIONS OF  
RESPONSIBILITY

1. (C- ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS IS CUSTOMARY AFTER MAJOR ACTS OF TERRORISM,  
LEBANESE PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION BEGAN MANUFACTURING  
THEORIES AND ALLEGATIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY IMMEDIATELY  
AFTER THE APRIL 18 BOMBING OF THE EMBASSY. TO A LARGE  
EXTENT, THIS FOLLOWED PREDICTABLE PATTERNS:  
MUSLIMS/LEFTISTS ARE INCLINED TO BLAME THE ISRAELIS  
WHILE CHRISTIANS/RIGHTISTS HOLD THE SYRIANS, PALESTINIANS  
AND/OR IRANIANS RESPONSIBLE, EITHER ALONE OR IN  
COORDINATION WITH LEBANESE ALLIES.

3. THE IMMEDIATE CLAIM OF RESPONSIBILITY BY THE  
ISLAMIC HOLY WAR ORGANIZATION (AL-JIHAD AL-ISLAMI),  
THE SAME "GROUP" THAT HAS ANNOUNCED ITSELF AS BEING  
BEHIND THE RECENT ATTACKS ON MNF TROOPS, HAS FUELED  
MUCH OF THE CONVICTION THAT PRO-KHOMEINI SHIA FANATICS  
WERE BEHIND THE BLAST. REPORTS THAT THE BOMBING  
WAS A SUICIDE MISSION PERFORMED BY A DRIVER WITH A  
CAR (OR TRUCK) LOADED WITH EXPLOSIVES ARE BEING  
INTERPRETED AS FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE EXPLOSION  
WAS THE WORK OF A RELIGIOUS FANATIC. SIMILARLY,  
A LATER CLAIM OF CREDIT BY THE HITHERTO UNKNOWN  
"ORGANIZATION FOR VENGEANCE FOR THE MARTYRS OF SABRA  
AND SHATILA" HAS BROUGHT ABOUT AN UPSURGE IN SPECULATION  
THAT PALESTINIANS EXTREMISTS WERE INVOLVED.

4. IN AN APRIL 21 CONVERSATION, AMAL LEADER NABIH  
BARRI WAS CATEGORIC THAT AL-JIHAD AL-ISLAMI WAS A  
FICTION (AND COMPARED IT TO THE EQUALLY EPHEMERAL FRONT

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M09-265/3#38458

BY RW NARA DATE 1/1/11

13  
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 686

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

FOR THE LIBERATION OF LEBANON FROM FOREIGNERS WHOSE ALLEGED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ANNOUNCED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANTI-SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN ATTACKS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS). HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT WHILE THE ORGANIZATION ITSELF DID NOT EXIST, THERE WERE PRO-KHOMEINI LEBANESE SHIA IN BEIRUT WHO MIGHT BE CAPABLE, AT LEAST PSYCHOLOGICALLY, OF CARRYING OUT SUCH AN ACTION. HE COMMENTED THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE WELL-KNOWN TO THE LEBANESE ARMY'S G-2 AND NOTED SARCASTICALLY THAT IF THEY WERE DETAINED INDEFINITELY AS WAS THE CASE WHEN THE ARMY ARRESTED MEMBERS OF AMAL INSTEAD OF ONLY A FEW HOURS, SUCH INCIDENTS MIGHT BE AVOIDED. (COMMENT: WE BELIEVE BARRI WAS REFERRING TO JAFAR SHA'IB, HEAD OF THE ISLAMIC UNION OF STUDENTS, WHO WAS DETAINED BRIEFLY BY THE LAF BEFORE SHIA SPIRITUAL LEADER SHAMS-AL-DIN PRESSED FOR HIS RELEASE. EARLIER EMBASSY REPORTING REFERS TO SHA'IB AND OTHER PRO-IRANIAN SHIA IN THE BEIRUT AREA. END COMMENT.)

5. BARRI WAS CAREFUL TO STRESS THAT WHILE SHIA EXTREMISTS WERE THEORETICAL CANDIDATES FOR RESPONSIBILITY, THERE WERE MANY OTHERS. HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE LOGICAL PLACE TO SEARCH FOR CULPRITS WAS ON THE POLITICAL FRINGES: PALESTINIAN RADICALS, SUNNI FUNDAMENTALISTS AND KHOMEINI FOLLOWERS -- AS WELL AS LEBANESE FORCES AND ISRAELIS. DILLON

BT

#3066

NNNN

SENSITIVE

38459 14  
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 683

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE418

00 RUEHC RUEHKO RUDKGPQ RUEHTH RUEHTV RUESTE RUFHLGA  
RUQMMT RUEHIN RUEHCR RUDKKR RUEHOT RUDKSNQ RUFHOC  
RUMJNG RUDKHLQ RUEBBRA RUFHOLC RUFHNA RUFHOK RUQMGG  
RUEHNM RUEHNE RUADBEE RUMJPG RUEHNR RUFRSHH RUEHCR  
RUEHMT RUEHMN RUTAMA RUQMDI RUEHMO RUEHROC RUESXM  
RUMJDN RUFHMB RUEHME RUEHRB RUEHML RUESMG RUEHCR  
RUEHMD RUEHMR RUEHRU RUFHMU RUEHLD RUFHPC RUEHCR  
RUESLM RUFHLC RUDKFDQ RUEHLP RUEHOS RUTAH I RUEHLS  
RUFHBG RUEHRO RUESUA RUEHBC RUEHKJ RUMJRV RUEHRA  
RUFHLG RUEHIL RUESON RUEHROB RUFHGV RUEHCR RUEHGT  
RUESGY RUFLAEA RUEHCR RUQMPL RUEHCR RUEHSP RUEHRH  
RUEHCR RUESPR RUEHSA RUDKRP RUEHZA RUEHROD RUFHFR  
RUEHCR RUTAOU RUTAAK RUMJGM RUDKPNQ RUFHLNJ RUMJIA  
RUEHBY RUSBTA RUEHCV RUEHEG RUEHTN RUFHBA RUEHCR  
RUMJFS RUEHVI RUFHLA RUFHVI RUEHLDE RUQMDH RUEHDM  
RUEHDR RUEHDO RUTADS RUEHJA RUEHCR RUFHDB RUFHOLB  
RUFHOL RUSBAY RUESBG RUEHCR RUEHWN RUEHBR RUEHBS  
RUDKRB RUEHLDE RUDKEBQ RUFHEB RUEHCR RUEHNB RUMTBK  
RUTABO RUGMAM RUEHAD RUFHJA RUFHPBI RUDKAR RUEHBU  
RUDKDA RUTACK RUDKFMQ RUMJSA RUFHOLD RUDKSA RUEHGP  
RUEHUL RUEHCR RUESUP RUESSD RUESNA RUEHSN RUEHSJ  
RUQMNS RUEHSB RUMJHE RUEHCR RUTADE RUEHROA RUTAFN  
RUFHFT RUEHTH RUCBNAJ RUEHAK RUEHAM RUFHRS RUQMBI  
RUEHAL RUTAGN RUTABA RUFLEPA RUEHAB RUESAS RUMJDK  
RUEHWL RUDKRW RUEHCR RUEHJI RUEHJM RUEHDT RUESQI  
RUQMKA RUEHKH RUEHKG RUEHKI RUEHLGB RUMJHT RUEHCP  
RUTAKA RUEHUB RUEHKL RUQMKW RUFHMC RUFLSHA RUEHLG  
RUQMDJ

DE RUEHC #9506 1111506

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 211452Z APR 83 ZEX

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 109506

EXDIS - INFORM CONSULS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PTER, LE, US

SUBJECT: LEBANON SITUATION REPORT NO. 7

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING THE NIGHT'S WORK AN ADDITIONAL FIVE BODIES

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 109-265/3#38459

BY RW NARA DATE 11/11/11

15  
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 684

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WERE LOCATED AND IDENTIFIED. EXCAVATION WORK CONTINUES.  
WE NOW LIST 15 AMERICANS DEAD WITH TWO MISSING AND  
PRESUMED DEAD.

3. THE SPECIAL DELEGATION TRAVELING TO BEIRUT IS  
SCHEDULED TO DEPART TODAY.

4. LATE PRESS REPORTS (FBIS), CITES IDF RADIO IN TEL  
AVIV AS HAVING REPORTED THAT AT ABOUT 0900 GMT (0500  
EST), SEVERAL SHOTS HAD BEEN FIRED AT THE EMBASSY WHILE  
RESCUE OPERATIONS WERE UNDERWAY. THE EMBASSY REPORTED AT  
0545 EST THAT THE SHOTS MAY HAVE ORIGINATED WHEN A CAR  
DROVE THROUGH AN INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE (POLICE)  
CHECK-POINT WITHOUT STOPPING. THIS INCIDENT IS BEING  
CHECKED FURTHER BY THE EMBASSY. SHULTZ

BT

#9506

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

38461

17

PAGE 1 - 679

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE464  
UTSD595  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHAM #3761/01 1111649  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 211648Z APR 83 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3342  
INFO RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 9042  
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 2835  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 03761  
NODIS

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, PLO, JO, MO, US, AG, XF  
SUBJECT: APRIL 21 CONVERSATION WITH KING HUSSEIN:  
- ALGERIAN "FEELER"  
REF: (A) STATE 109072, (B) STATE 108845 (NOTAL)  
1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.  
2. AS INSTRUCTED I BRIEFED KING HUSSEIN THIS  
AFTERNOON ON THE VELIOTES-BANDAR CONVERSATION  
RELATING TO THE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FOR THE  
RECORD I LEFT A COPY OF THE TEXT OF PARA (5) OF REFTEL  
(A) CONTAINING THE ALGERIAN QUESTION AND OUR RESPONSE.  
ALSO, I UNDERLINED THE CONTINUING NEED TO GUARD  
THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THIS EXCHANGE. I NOTED IT  
WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT [REDACTED]

3. HUSSEIN SAID THE REASONS FOR THE ALGERIAN FOREIGN  
MINISTER'S VISIT HERE WERE A MYSTERY TO HIM. HE  
IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE TOMORROW AND THE KING SAID  
HE WILL MEET WITH HIM ON SATURDAY. THE SAUDI  
REPORT THAT THE PRINCIPAL REASON BEHIND THE ALGERIAN  
MISSION RELATES TO IMPROVEMENT OF JORDANIAN-SYRIAN  
RELATIONS SEEMED MILDLY TO INTEREST HUSSEIN. HE  
SPECULATED ON WHETHER THIS WAS CONNECTED TO AN  
INDIRECT EFFORT TO BRING PRESSURE ON ARAFAT, OR  
WHETHER IT WAS EXCLUSIVELY RELATED TO AN ATTEMPT  
TO UNFREEZE THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. EITHER  
WAY, HE PLAINLY WAS SKEPTICAL ABOUT WHAT THE  
ALGERIANS COULD ACCOMPLISH.

4. IN BRIEFING HUSSEIN ON KING HASSAN'S ABORTIVE

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3 (b) (6)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR 109-265/3#38461

BY 140 NARA DATE 11/11/14



18  
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 680

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

REQUEST THAT WE SEND AN EMISSARY TO RABAT TO RECEIVE A SPECIAL MESSAGE, I ASKED IF HE HAD HEARD ANYTHING FURTHER FROM KING HASSAN SINCE BOUCETTA'S VISIT. HE HAD NOT, [REDACTED]

5. HUSSEIN SAID HE HAD FORGOTTEN TO RELATE TO ME HASSAN'S REQUEST THAT HE (HUSSEIN) AGREE IN A SEPARATE SECRET DOCUMENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE ONCE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL HAD TAKEN PLACE. HE HAD TOLD BOUCETTA TO INFORM HIS MONARCH [REDACTED]

HE WAS PREPARED TO SIGN A DOCUMENT THAT MADE REFERENCE TO SELF-DETERMINATION BECAUSE HE BELIEVED THIS WAS THE SACRED RIGHT OF ANY PEOPLES. [REDACTED]

6. THE KING ALSO SAID THAT WITHIN THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS HE EXPECTED THE GOJ WOULD BE ANNOUNCING NEW RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL BETWEEN THE WEST BANK AND JORDAN ("I AM GOING TO BEGIN TO PUT THE PRESSURE ON"). THE BRIDGES WOULD REMAIN OPEN, BUT MUCH GREATER CARE WOULD BE GIVEN TO SCREENING TRAFFIC AND CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE WOULD REQUIRE PRIOR APPROVAL BEFORE BEING PERMITTED TO ENTER JORDAN. HE ALSO FORECAST TIGHTER CONTROLS ON INTERNAL TRAVEL OF PLO OFFICIALS NOW RESIDENT IN JORDAN.

7. FINALLY, AS I WAS WALKING OUT OF THE OFFICE HUSSEIN MADE A CURIOUS REMARK THAT BEARS RECORDING. IN RESPONDING TO MY OBSERVATION THAT WE HAD HEARD THERE MIGHT BE A MEETING OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE IN TUNIS TONIGHT, HE SCATHINGLY REMARKED THAT HE DOUBTED IF ANYTHING WOULD COME OUT OF IT. [REDACTED]

--  
--  
8. COMMENT: THE KING APPEARED RESTED AND RELAXED. HE ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY FURTHER NEWS ON A VISIT TO THE AREA BY THE SECRETARY. I

SENSITIVE

19  
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 681

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT A DECISION ON A TRIP  
PROBABLY WOULD BE MADE SHORTLY. HUSSEIN SAID  
BT  
#3761  
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

38462 -D

PAGE 1 - 676

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

HCE499  
STU0307  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHAM #3760/01 1111643  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 211642Z APR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3340  
INFO RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4917  
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 1128  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1602  
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 9700  
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 5750  
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 9040  
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5522  
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH 2833  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 6699  
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 2112  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 03760  
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PLO, JO

SUBJECT: EXILED MAYOR QAWASMEH'S VIEWS ON PLO-US  
RELATIONS

1. CC - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY. IN A MEETING WITH EXILED MAYOR FAHD QAWASMEH, DCM DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A RESUMPTION OF THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT DIALOGUE. QAWASMEH'S BOTTOM LINE ASSESSMENT WAS THAT ARAFAT, BECAUSE OF HIS WEAKENED LEADERSHIP ROLE WITHIN THE PLO, WILL NEED U.S. ASSURANCES TO MOVE FORWARD WITH HUSSEIN. QAWASMEH SAID THESE U.S. ASSURANCES SHOULD INCLUDE U.S. "RECOGNITION" OF THE PLO (NOT JUST OPENING OF A DIALOGUE) AND RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIAN RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN RETURN FOR AN EXPLICIT PLO DECLARATION OF ACCEPTANCE OF 242, 338 AND ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. IF ARAFAT CAN OBTAIN THIS FROM THE U.S., HE WILL RISK JOINING HUSSEIN AND FACING THE INEVITABLE DIVISION BETWEEN THE PLO MODERATES AND EXTREMISTS. QAWASMEH PLANS TO GO TO TUNIS AND ALGIERS NEXT WEEK TO MEET ARAFAT AND SAID HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CARRY ANY MESSAGE THE USG MAY WANT TO CONVEY TO ARAFAT. END SUMMARY.
3. QAWASMEH OPENED THE CONVERSATION WITH DCM AND ACTING

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD9-265/3 #38462

BY RW NARA DATE 1/1/11

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 677

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

POLCHIEF APRIL 21 BY EXPRESSING HIS SORROW OVER THE BEIRUT EMBASSY BOMBING. HE STATED HE WAS CONVINCED THIS TERRORIST ACT WAS NOT COMMITTED BY THE PLO AND HE KNEW DIRECTLY FROM ARAFAT AND ABU JIHAD THAT MILITARY ACTION BY THE PLO WAS PROHIBITED AT THIS STAGE.

4. DCM ASKED QAWASMEH OF HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF MOVING THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD AFTER THE BREAKDOWN IN THE HUSSEIN/ARAFAT TALKS. QAWASMEH SAID THE OUTLOOK WAS NOT BRIGHT. HE WAS CRITICAL OF ARAFAT'S LEADERSHIP AT THE PNC AND ALGIERS AND SAID ARAFAT COULD HAVE ORCHESTRATED THE ALGIERS CONFERENCE TO ADDRESS THE REAL ISSUES IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND TO OBTAIN A STRONG MANDATE TO MOVE FORWARD. INSTEAD, HE TURNED IT INTO A DEBATING SOCIETY AND LET EVERYONE HAVE HIS SAY. THE RESULT WAS THAT THE VARIOUS FACTIONS OF THE PLO ALL THOUGHT THEY HAD GIVEN ARAFAT A DIFFERENT MANDATE. THIS AMBIGUOUS SITUATION LED TO ARAFAT'S INABILITY TO LEAD THE PLO TO A DECISION TO MOVE FORWARD WITH KING HUSSEIN ON THE BASIS OF THE PLO/JORDANIAN TALKS. ARAFAT, IN SHORT, REAPED IN KUWAIT THE RESULTS OF HIS LACK OF LEADERSHIP IN ALGIERS.

5. NEVERTHELESS, EFFORTS TO GET THE JORDANIAN/PLO TALKS REVIVED MUST CONTINUE, QAWASMEH SAID. HE IS CONVINCED THAT THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AND FEZ SUMMIT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR FORWARD MOVEMENT. HOWEVER, SOMETHING HAS TO BE DONE TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK WITH THE PLO. QAWASMEH ASKED IF THE U.S. WAS WILLING AND PREPARED TO OFFER THE PLO "ASSURANCES" WHICH WOULD SERVE TO GIVE THE PLO MORE OF A STAKE IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

6. DCM ASKED WHETHER ARAFAT WAS IN A POSITION TO ACCEPT EXPLICITLY AND PUBLICLY UNSC 242, 338, AND ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT IN RETURN THE USG WOULD ENTER INTO IMMEDIATE CONTACT WITH THE PLO. THE ADVANTAGES TO THE PLO OF SUCH DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE U.S. WERE SIGNIFICANT. QAWASMEH STATED THAT ARAFAT CANNOT ACCEPT THE U.S.'S CONDITIONS, ALTHOUGH THE CHAIRMAN RECOGNIZES THE NECESSITY OF A DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. HE MIGHT BE WILLING TO ANNOUNCE HIS SUPPORT OF "ALL UN RESOLUTIONS INCLUDING UN RESOLUTION 242." DCM SAID THIS WAS TOO AMBIGUOUS. QAWASMEH REMARKED THAT WHAT ARAFAT REALLY NEEDS IS ASSURANCE THAT, IF HE ACCEPTS 242, HE WILL RECEIVE IN RETURN U.S. "RECOGNITION" OF THE PLO (NOT SIMPLY THE INITIATION OF A DIALOGUE) AND OF THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. WITH THIS ASSURANCE IN HAND, ARAFAT WOULD HAVE THE STRENGTH OF POSITION TO SPLIT THE PLO AND TURN HIS BACK ON SYRIA'S

SENSITIVE

20  
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 678

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THREATS AND THOSE OF THE RADICALS. THIS WOULD STRENGTHEN  
ARAFAT'S HAND WITH THE OTHER PLO FACTIONS TO ALLOW HIM  
TO PROCEED WITH HUSSEIN TO SUPPORT THE U.S. INITIATIVE.

BT

#3760

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

38463

23

PAGE 1 - 675

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE500  
STU0309  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHAM #3760/02 1111645  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 211642Z APR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3341  
INFO RUOMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4918  
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 1129  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1603  
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 9701  
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 5751  
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 9041  
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5523  
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH 2834  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 6700  
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 2113  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 AMMAN 03760  
EXDIS

IF SOMETHING OF THIS NATURE WAS NOT INJECTED INTO THE  
PROCESS, QAWASMEH PREDICTED PROLONGED DRIFT AND AN IN-  
CREASING INABILITY OF THE ARAB SIDE TO MOVE TOWARD  
NEGOTIATIONS.

S. QAWASMEH, IN PARTING, SAID HE WAS TRAVELING TO  
ALGIERS ON APRIL 26 TO ATTEND THE ARAB MUNICIPALITIES  
CONFERENCE, THEN WOULD GO TO TUNIS BEFORE RETURNING TO  
AMMAN. HE HAD SENT A CABLE TO ARAFAT TO ARRANGE A  
MEETING AND RECEIVED AN AFFIRMATIVE REPLY. QAWASMEH  
VOLUNTEERED TO PASS ANY MESSAGE OR QUESTIONS TO ARAFAT  
THE U.S. DESIRED.

VIETS

BT

#3760

NNNN

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD9-215/3 #38463

BY RW NARA DATE 11/1/11

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 662

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE695

STU2240

PP RUEHC RUEHSD

DE RUTAOU #0979 1111355 (CCY TEXT AD313756 UTS0294 410 MCN NAR)

ZNR UUUUU ZZH

P 211307Z APR 83

FM AMEMBASSY COTONOU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6018

BT

UNCLAS COTONOU 0979

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OPDC, DM

SUBJECT: BEIRUT BOMBING: MESSAGE TO SECRETARY SHULTZ

1. FOREIGN MINISTER ADJIBADE HAS ASKED THE EMBASSY TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO SECRETARY SHULTZ "ON THE OCCASION OF THE DISGRACEFUL OFFENSE COMMITTED APRIL 18, 1983, AGAINST THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN BEIRUT."

2. INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION IS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE YOUR EXCELLENCY, IT IS WITH GRIEF THAT I HAVE JUST LEARNED OF THE TRAGIC EVENT WHICH OCCURRED APRIL 18, 1983 AT THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN BEIRUT. ON THIS SAD OCCASION, PERMIT ME TO PRESENT TO YOU IN THE NAME OF THE BENINESE PEOPLE AND STATE AS WELL AS IN MY OWN NAME, MY HEARTFELT AND MOST SINCERE CONDOLENCES. PLEASE TRANSMIT TO THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS MY DEEPEST SYMPATHY. SINCERELY, TIAMIU ADJIBADE. UNQUOTE.

3. EMBASSY WILL RETAIN ORIGINAL OF THE NOTE UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED. TRANSMIT SEPARATELY TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY AN APPROPRIATE EXPRESSION OF SYMPATHY AND TO REPRESENT THE GOVERNMENT AT ANY CEREMONY.

TWINING

BT

#0979

NNNN

SENSITIVE

38466  
29  
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 658

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83/1180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE694  
STU2028  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUGMBE #3068 1120800  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 220845Z APR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3068  
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 001  
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 001  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 001  
BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 3068

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINS, PREL, MOPS, LE, US, IS

SUBJ: LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS: UNIFIL AND  
PROTECTION OF PALESTINIANS.

REF: TEL AVIV 5092

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: A RECENT INDICATION FROM AMIN GEMAYEL THAT UNIFIL IS EXPENDABLE-- PARTICULARLY IF THE ROLE ENVISIONED FOR IT IS PROTECTION OF PALESTINIAN CAMPS-- PLUS ISRAEL'S CONSISTENT ANTI-UNIFIL POSITION INCREASES THE POSSIBILITY THAT LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS WILL AGREE ON NO UN TROOPS IN SOUTH LEBANON. CONTINUING VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION DIRECTED AGAINST PALESTINIANS IN THE SIDON AREA IS A CLEAR INDICATOR OF THE HOSTILITY WITH WHICH SOME LEBANESE VIEW THEM, HOWEVER, AND IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SOME PROVISIONS FOR PROTECTION MUST BE MADE FOLLOWING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WHILE THE LAF HAS THE CAPABILITY OF PROVIDING SECURITY, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE GOL WILL ATTACH A HIGH PRIORITY TO SUCH A MISSION. FROM THE .S. PERSPECTIVE, AN AGREEMENT THAT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ADEQUATE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF PALESTINIANS IN SOUTH LEBANON CARRIES TWO RISKS: FIRST, THE PLO MAY REFUSE TO WITHDRAW. SECOND, IF THE PALESTINIANS ARE VICTIMS OF LARGE SCALE VIOLENCE FOLLOWING AN IDF PULL OUT, THE .S., AS PARTY TO AN AGREEMENT THAT DID NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS, WILL BE SEEN AS RESPONSIBLE. ALTHOUGH IT MAY NOT BE AN IDEAL SOLUTION, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT UNIFIL BE RETAINED IN SOUTH LEBANON TO PROTECT PALESTINIAN CAMPS AS PART OF ANY LEBANESE-U.S.- ISRAELI

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD9-265/3 #38466

BY RW NARA DATE 11/11/11



SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY

3. IN THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, CONSIDERATION OF THE FUTURE ROLE OF UNIFIL AND THE ISSUE OF PROTECTION FOR PALESTINIANS IN SOUTH LEBANON HAVE OFTEN BEEN CONNECTED: UNIFIL COULD BE DEPLOYED AROUND REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE SIDON AND TYRE AREAS. THE ISRAELIS HAVE CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED THE PRESENCE OF UNIFIL TROOPS FOR ANY PURPOSE IN THE SECURITY ZONE, AND IN HIS APRIL 14 MEETING WITH HABIB, AMIN GEMAYEL MADE IT CLEAR THAT AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, A CONTINUED ROLE FOR UNIFIL IN THE SOUTH IS NOT AN IMPORTANT ISSUE --

PARTICULARLY IF THE MISSION IS PROTECTION OF PALESTINIANS. 4. GEMAYEL'S COMMENTS ON UNIFIL, COUPLED WITH ISRAEL'S WELL-KNOWN POSITION, STRENGTHENS THE POSSIBILITY THAT LEFT TO THEMSELVES, THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE WILL SIMPLY DEAL UNIFIL OUT OF THE SOUTH. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT WE AGAIN REVIEW THE STATUS OF AND PROSPECTS FOR PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON IN LIGHT OF U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES. OUR REPORTING SINCE LAST JULY HAS MADE IT REPEATEDLY CLEAR THAT PALESTINIANS HERE FACE A HOSTILE AND THREATENING ENVIRONMENT. THE EVENTS OF THE LAST EIGHT YEARS HAVE FOSTERED AN INTENSE HATRED OF PALESTINIANS ON THE PART OF MANY LEBANESE, AND A DEFEATED ADVERSARY IN THIS SOCIETY IS NOT DEALT WITH MAGNANIMOUSLY. INDEED, ACTIONS AGAINST PALESTINIANS, ESPECIALLY THE STRING OF THREATS AND MURDERS AROUND SIDON, ARE CONTINUING PROOF THAT SOME LEBANESE ARE FULLY PREPARED TO RESORT TO EXTREME ACTS TO GET PALESTINIANS OUT OF LEBANON.

5. WE HAVE READ TEL AVIV'S REPORT OF BG DAGAN'S OBSERVATIONS ON PROSPECTS FOR PALESTINIANS IN SOUTH LEBANON (REFTEL). HIS COMMENT THAT ONCE THE IDF WITHDRAWS, FURTHER MASSACRES OF PALESTINIANS ARE LIKELY STRIKES US AS PLAUSIBLE. WHILE WE BELIEVE THE LAF'S CAPABILITIES ARE INCREASING STEADILY, WE CANNOT BE SURE THAT THE GOL AND LAF WILL BE MOTIVATED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION TO PALESTINIANS. THEREFORE, BUT LIKELY FOR DIFFERENT REASONS, WE FIND BG DAGAN'S ASSERTION OF LAF INADEQUACY IN PROTECTING PALESTINIANS QUITE PLAUSIBLE. WHILE THE IDF MAY NOT BE DOING EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO PREVENT INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION OF PALESTINIANS, ISRAELI PRESENCE HAS PROBABLY BEEN THE MAJOR FACTOR IN THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE ON A MAJOR SCALE. FOLLOWING AN IDF WITHDRAWAL, SOUTH LEBANON WITHOUT UNIFIL COULD VERY EASILY BECOME THE ARENA FOR INCREASED VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS.

6. IF UNIFIL IS DROPPED EVEN AS A PRESENCE AROUND PALESTINIAN CAMPS, WE FORESEE TWO MAJOR DANGERS FROM THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE. FIRST, THE PLO MAY REFUSE TO WITHDRAW ON THE GROUNDS THAT THERE ARE NO ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE PROTECTION OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS. SECOND, AS A FULL PARTY TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE WILL BE HELD RESPONSIBLE IN WORLD OPINION FOR CONSEQUENCES RESULTING FROM THE TERMS OF ANY AGREEMENT. IN OUR VIEW, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT A WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES WILL INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF NEW VIOLENCE AGAINST PALESTINIANS. IF WE HAVE ACQUIESCED IN AN AGREEMENT THAT LEAVES PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS WITHOUT SOME FORM OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, THE UNITED STATES WILL BE BLAMED FOR WHAT HAPPENS. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO FORESEE THE ASSASSINATION OF BASHIR GEMAYEL, THE ISRAELI INVASION OF WEST BEIRUT AND THE SUBSEQUENT MURDER OF PALESTINIANS IN SABRA/SHATILA. IF THERE WERE TO BE A MASSACRE IN SOUTH LEBANON, WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ARGUE THAT THERE WERE NO PRIOR WARNINGS.

7. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM OF PROTECTION FOR PALESTINIANS IN SOUTH LEBANON AT LENGTH WITH ICRC AND OTHERS. WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT IT WILL BE EASY TO ENSURE SECURITY FOLLOWING AN IDF WITHDRAWAL, AND IN SOME AREAS FULL SECURITY MAY NOT BE ATTAINABLE. SIDON WILL POSE PARTICULAR PROBLEMS: IN ADDITION TO THE THREATS POSED BY THE PATTERN OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION THAT HAS ALREADY DEVELOPED, UNRWA ESTIMATES THERE ARE OVER HALF OF THE ESTIMATED 5000 PALESTINIANS IN THE SIDON AREA ARE OUTSIDE REFUGEE CAMPS. ALTHOUGH IT IS CLEARLY NOT POSSIBLE TO POST UN TROOPS WHEREVER THERE ARE PALESTINIANS, IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO CONSIDER A SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT IN SIDON FOR INTENSIVE PATROLS IN AREAS OUTSIDE THE CAMPS THAT ARE HEAVILY POPULATED BY PALESTINIANS. THIS ALONE WOULD BE SOMETHING THAT WOULD REQUIRE MORE THAN A TOKEN FORCE OF A COMPANY OR SO.

8. THERE ARE NUMEROUS PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNIFIL AROUND REFUGEE CAMPS AND OTHER PALESTINIAN AREAS: IT IS AN ISSUE THAT WILL COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATIONS, CAUSE FRICTION WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, FOSTER A GHETTO-LIKE ATMOSPHERE AMONG THE PALESTINIANS, AND MAY BRING OBJECTIONS FROM SOME TROOP CONTRIBUTORS. IT IS OUR VIEW, HOWEVER, THAT NONE OF THESE OUTWEIGHT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE HUMAN AND POLITICAL DISASTER THAT COULD RESULT FROM AN AGREEMENT

40  
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 661

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THAT PROVIDES NO INTEROSTIONAL PROTECTION FOR PALESTINIANS.  
DILLON

BT

#3068

NNNN

SENSITIVE

38467

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 655

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA347

OO RUEADWW

DE RUEHJM #1398/01 1121318

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 221258Z APR 83

FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5142

INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0407

RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 9149

RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH PRIORITY 1557

RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 3232

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 5919

RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 3461

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 01398

EXDIS

FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR

TAGS: PREL, IS, SY, LE, PLC, MOPS, XF

SUBJ: HABIB-DRAPER MISSION: NEAR CRISIS AT 21 APRIL

NETANYA SESSION

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: THE 21 APR TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATING SESSION AT NETANYA REFLECTED SOME OF THE CROSS CURRENTS NOW EMERGING, INCLUDING GROWING LEBANESE RESISTANCE TO SOME ISRAELI CONCEPTS. THE HEADS OF DELEGATION AGREED PRIOR TO THE SESSION THAT WE SHOULD HAVE FOUR NEGOTIATING SESSIONS NEXT WEEK, MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO CONCLUDE AN UNDERSTANDING ON ALL ISSUES EXCEPT THOSE WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE SETTLED AT THE HIGHER POLITICAL LEVEL, E.G., HADDAD, UNIFIL, AND THE FEASIBILITY OF SOME JOINT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. WE CLEARED UP TO 95 PERCENT OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE COVERING AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS THE AGREED MINUTES INTERPRETING THE COVERING AGREEMENT, WITH THE ISRAELI SIDE DEMONSTRATING AN ACCOMMODATING ATTITUDE ON MOST SUBJECTS. IN CONTRAST TO MOST PAST BEHAVIOR, THE LEBANESE SIDE INDULGED IN SOME NITPICKING.

3. A NEAR CRISIS AROSE AS WE WERE ABOUT TO BREAK FOR LUNCH. GENERAL EINAN, THE CHIEF ISRAELI NEGOTIATOR IN THE MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE, CAME DOWN FROM THE MEETING ROOM WITH STORM CLOUDS ON HIS FACE AND INSISTED TO KIMCHE THAT THE ISRAELI DELEGATION PACK UP AND LEAVE

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M09-265/3 #38467

BY RW NARA DATE 1/1/84

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

INSTANTLY. HE CLAIMED THAT THE LEBANESE MILITARY DELEGATION HAD REVOKED SIGNIFICANTLY SOME PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS AND WAS TRYING TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK. THE ISRAELI REACTION WAS TRIGGERED BY HAMDAM'S RESPONSE TO A POORLY DRAFTED ISRAELI CONCEPT PAPER ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS WHICH WAS PROVIDED TO THE LEBANESE FOR COMMENT AFTER THE CLOSE OF THE LAST MEETING. THE LEBANESE REJECTED THE ISRAELI PAPER AND RETRENCHED TO A POSITION OF 3-5 TEAMS, WHICH THE ISRAELIS REJECTED. KIMCHE PROFESSED TO AGREE WITH EINAN THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD LEAVE RIGHT AWAY BUT DRAPER PREVAILED UPON HIM TO STAY FOR AN AFTERNOON SESSION ON SECURITY MATTERS WHICH WOULD BE ATTENDED ONLY BY THE CHIEF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES. AT THAT AFTERNOON SESSION, A FEW MISUNDERSTANDINGS STARTED TO BE CLEARED UP AND A CONSENSUS WAS REACHED ON RESOLVING ONE MAJOR ISSUE. MEVERTHELESS, THIS SESSION REVEALED IN DETAIL A MAJOR DIFFERENCE IN APPROACH TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. THE SESSION ALSO MADE CLEARER THAN EVER THAT THE LEBANESE HAVE BEEN HAVING SECOND AND EVEN THIRD THOUGHTS ABOUT WHAT THEY HAVE GIVEN UP ON NEGOTIATIONS ON JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS. AMONG OTHER MATTERS, AND APPEAR DETERMINED TO RESIST CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF OPERATION WHICH THE ISRAELIS UP TILL NOW THOUGHT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED. AT THE SAME TIME, IN THE CIVILIAN SUBCOMMITTEE (REPORTED SEPTEL) THE LEBANESE APPEARED TO BE BACKING AWAY FROM INSTITUTING AT LEAST SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SIX MONTH INTERIM PERIOD, ALTHOUGH WE CLEARED THIS UP TO A CERTAIN EXTENT BY THE END OF THE SESSION. THIS UNDOUBTEDLY HEIGHTENED ISRAELI CONCERNS.

END SUMMARY.

4. SINCE THE SUBJECTS COVERED IN THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SUBCOMMITTEES HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN SEPTELS, THE REMAINDER OF THIS REPORT WILL DEAL ONLY WITH THE AFTERNOON SESSION ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ATTENDED BY DRAPER AND COOLEY FOR THE UNITED STATES, BY KIMCHE AND EINAN FOR ISRAEL, AND BY FATTAL AND HAMDAM ON THE LEBANESE SIDE.

5. INVITED TO SPEAK FIRST, EINAN SAID HE HAD BEEN SHOCKED BY THE APPARENT TURN-AROUND OF THE LEBANESE SIDE ON SOME KEY SECURITY ISSUES. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE LEBANESE ATTITUDE PUT IN JEOPARDY THE PACKAGE OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WAS BEING DEVELOPED. HE SAID HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH FOUR ISSUES:

(1) THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL TO CHANGE THE NAME OF THE "MILITARY COMMITTEE" TO SOMETHING LIKE THE "SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE";

43  
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 657

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BT  
#1398  
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 653

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA348  
OO RUEADWW  
DE RUEHJM #1398/02 1121320  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 221258Z APR 83  
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5143  
INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0408  
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 9150  
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH PRIORITY 1558  
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 3233  
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 5920  
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 3462

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 01398

EXDIS

FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR

TAGS: PREL, IS, SY, LE, PLO, MOPS, XF

SUBJ: HABIB-DRAPER MISSION: NEAR CRISIS AT 21 APRIL

(2) THE LEBANESE CONCEPT FOR THE INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S FORCES INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE;

(3) LEBANESE RESISTANCE TO THE CONCEPT OF "HOT PURSUIT" IN LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL WATERS; AND

(4) THE LEBANESE VIEW THAT WE SHOULD RETURN TO THE CONCEPT OF ONLY THREE TO FIVE SUPERVISORY TEAMS (ORIGINALLY A UNITED STATES IDEA) IN LIEU OF THE AGREED FORMULA OF "UP TO EIGHT TEAMS."

6. DRAPER PROPOSED THAT NEGOTIATORS NOT FALL ON A SWORD OVER THE NAME OF A COMMITTEE BUT LEAVE THIS MINOR ISSUE UNTIL LATER. KIMCHE WENT INTO A LONG EXPOSITION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TO CHOOSE BETWEEN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE ONE HAND OR WITH SYRIA ON THE OTHER AND THAT LEBANON SHOULD RESIST ALLEGED ARAB PRESSURES, INCLUDING ON NAMES OF COMMITTEES.

7. DRAPER COUNTERED THAT LEBANON HAD ALREADY MADE ITS CHOICE OF FRIENDS AND ASSOCIATIONS AND IT WAS EXAGGERATION TO SUGGEST THAT SELECTION OF A NAME FOR A COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE SUCH MONUMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE. FATTAL ALSO HEATEDLY INSISTED THAT LEBANON HAD CHOSEN ITS PATH WITH THE WEST. EINAN REVEALED IN EFFECT THAT HE WAS FEARFUL OF GOING BACK TO HIS SUPERIORS WITH A LEBANESE-PROPOSED CHANGE OF NAME AFTER THE LEBANESE HAD GONE THROUGH 26 SESSIONS WITHOUT

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 654

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

POSING OBJECTIONS. HE SAID THAT TTTTYYYYY IS THE ---M  
KNEW THAT THE -EAL REASON WAS THE ATTITUDE -F THE LEBANESE  
PRIME MINISTER. WHILE NO -NE DISAGREED WITH THIS LAST  
ASSERTION, WE MAY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN COOLING TENSIONS TEMPO-  
RARILY ON THIS MINOR ISSUE.

8. THE QUESTION OF THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION OF THEO  
HADDAD FORCES WAS ANOTHER MATTER. HOWEVER. KIMCHE AND EINAN  
MADE CLEARER THAN EVER THE ISRAELI VIEW THAT THE PRESENT  
HADDAD FORCES, ADMITTEDLY FORMED BY ISRAEL, SHOULD BE  
LEGITIMIZED AS THE ONLY REAL BRIGADE IN THE SOUTHERN SE-  
CURITY ZONE. ONCE THAT OCCURRED, THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES  
MIGHT THEN RECRUIT INHABITANTS OF THE SECURITY REGION TO  
FILL IN THE GAPS IN THIS BRIGADE, WHILE ALSO BRINGING  
CERTAIN REGULAR LAF OFFICERS TO FLESH OUT THE BRIGADE  
LEADERSHIP FROM EXISTING LAF UNITS, ASSUMING ONCE AGAIN  
THAT ALL SUCH OFFICERS HAVE BEEN INHABITANTS OF THE SE-  
CURITY REGION. THE LEBANESE CONCEPT OF COURSE HAS BEEN  
THAT THEY HAVE FORMED A TERRITORIAL BRIGADE ON PAPER  
EARLIER THIS MONTH, WITH DESIGNATED OFFICERS FROM VARIOUS  
LAF UNITS. THEY

WOULD PLAN TO INTEGRATE MEMBERS OF THE HADDAD FORCES INTO  
THIS BRIGADE WHENEVER POSSIBLE ON A UNIT-BY-UNIT BASIS  
(E.G., PLATOONS, COMPANIES, AND EVEN BATTALIONS). DRAPER  
INSISTED THAT WHILE ISRAELI INTENTIONS HAD ALWAYS BEEN  
CLEAR ON THIS ISSUE, THERE NEVER HAD BEEN ANY AGREEMENT  
FROM THE LEBANESE SIDE TO THE ISRAELI CONCEPT. MOREOVER,  
CITING THE UNITED STATES NON-PAPER GIVEN TO THE ISRAELIS  
IN WASHINGTON AS WELL AS THE UNITED STATES COMMENTS TO  
THE ISRAELI REACTION TO THAT NON-PAPER, DRAPER SAID IT WAS  
CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD ALWAYS ACCEPTED THE  
LEBANESE APPROACH. IN OTHER WORDS, HADDAD'S MEN WOULD BE  
INTEGRATED INTO A LEGALLY FORMED LEBANESE BRIGADE. DRAPER  
NOTED THAT SUCH A BRIGADE HAD IN FACT BEEN FORMED ON PAPER  
BY LEGAL ACTION TAKEN IN THE FIRST WEEK OF APRIL. DRAPER  
ALSO ADDED THAT IT WAS NOT ONLY POLITICALLY ESSENTIAL FOR  
THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO BE SEEN AS ESTABLISHING THEIR  
OWN BRIGADE, IT WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL FOR LEGAL REASONS.  
HAMDAM NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES COULD THEO-  
RETICALLY BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYING ALL THE BACK  
SALARIES OF MEMBERS OF HADDAD'S FORCES IF IT ACCEPTED THE  
ISRAELI CONCEPT AND LEGITIMIZED HADDAD'S SO-CALLED BRIGADE.

BT

#1398

NNNN

SENSITIVE



SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 651

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

EHA349  
OO RUEADWW  
DE RUEHJM #1398/03 1121322  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 221252Z APR 83  
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5144  
INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0409  
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO VRIORITY 9151  
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH PRIORITY 1559  
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 3234  
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 5921  
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 3463  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 01398

EXDIS

FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR

TAGS: PREL, IS, SY, LE, PLO. MOPS, XF

SUBJ: HABIB-DRAPER MISSION: NEAR CRISIS AT 21 APRIL

9. AFTER A LONG WRANGLE IN WHICH EVERYONE AT THE TABLE JOINED, A FRAGILE CONSENSUS EMERGED TO THE EFFECT THAT THE OUTCOME OF EITHER THE LEBANESE OR ISRAELI CONCEPT WOULD BE A TERRITORIAL BRIGADE IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE SECURITY REGION WHICH WOULD HAVE AS ITS NUCLEUS MANY OR MOST OF THE MEN OF HADDAD'S FORCES. IT WAS AGREED THAT ALL OF US WOULD TAKE A NEW STAB AT DRAFTING AN ISRAELI-LEBANESE UNDERSTANDING OF THIS ISSUE. HOWEVER, KIMCHE IN A SIDE TALK WPTH DRAPER REJECTED THE USE OF THE VERB "TO INTEGRATE" WHEN DESCRIBING WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN TO HADDAD'S FORCES.

10. A SIMILARLY LONG WRANGLE TOOK PLACE OVER THE QUESTION OF "HOT PURSUIT" INTO LEBANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS. THIS INCLUDED A STERILE EXCHANGE ON DEFINITIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW OF "HOT PURSUIT" IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. TO COMPRESS A LONG EXCHANGE, A CONSENSUS EMERGED TO THE EFFECT THAT LEBANON WOULD TACITLY ACCEPT ISRAELI "HOT PURSUIT" IN LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL WATERS IN RESPONSE TO TERRORIST ATTACK BY SEA AGAINST ISRAEL, AS LONG AS ISRAEL DID NOT ABUSE SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING. SINCE IT WS CLEAR THAT LEBANON UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES COULD AGREE OR ACQUIESCE IN WRITING, IT WAS DECIDED THAT THIS SENSITIVE ISSUE MIGHT BE HANDLED IN THE SAME WAY AS WE MIGHT HANDLE THE EQUALLY SENSITIVE ISSUE OF ISRAELI AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF THE

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 652

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SECURITY REGION.

11. FINALLY, WE TURNED TO THE JOINT SUPERVISORY PATGMLS, THEIR NUMBER, SCOPE, AND DURATION. HAMDAM AND FAOTAL STRONGLY URGED THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE BE DONE TO REDUCE THEIR VISIBILITY. HAMDAM URGED THAT A PROPORTIONATELY GREATER CUMBER OF SUCH TEAMS CARRY ON THEIR ACTIVITIES BY AIR RATHER THAN ON THE GROUND. HZ AND FATTAL ALSO URGED THAT A SCHEDULE BE AGREED UPON UNDER WHICH THE TEAMS WOULD GRADUALLY BE PHASED OUT OVER TWO YEARS. KIMCHE AND EINAM ARGUED EXTENSIVELY THAT THESE TEAMS WERE AT THE HEART OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND PLAYED DOWN HAMDAM'S ARGUMENT THAT BETTER SECURITY SURVEILLANCE COULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD WHICH LEBANON HAD ALREADY ACCEPTED.

12. TO COMPRESS AN EQUALLY LENGTHY DEBATE, THE OUTCOME WAS THAT ISRAEL REJECTED ANY MOVE AWAY FROM THE POSITION OF "UP TO EIGHT" TEAMS, BUT THE ISRAELIS ALSO AGREED THAT THE INFORMAL PAPER GIVEN TO THE LEBANESE AND UNITED STATES SIDES BY THE ISRAELIS IN THE LAST SESSION - DESCRIBING THE ISRAELI CONCEPT OF THE MISSION AND ACTIVITIES OF THESE TEAMS - HAD BEEN UNFELICITOUSLY DRAFTED IN SEVERAL PARAGRAPHS AND COULD BE CHANGED FOL928,8 !745#34 \$3?-53.

13. KIMCHE ALSO FINALLY AGREED TO DRAPER'S PROPOSAL THAT WE CONSIDER THE CONCEPT OF TARGETTING DATES FOR PHASING OUT THE SUPERVISORY TEAMS, IF SECURITY CONDITIONS SO PERMIT, AND PROVIDED THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ALSO AGREES. DRAPER POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD STILL HAVE A

M

VETO ON THE CONTINUATION OF THE TEAMS UNDER THIS APPROACH, BUT THAT TALKING ABOUT TARGET DATES WOULD EASE SEVERALL OF LEBANON'S POLITICAL CONCERNS. GROVE

BT

#1398

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 649

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA350

00 RUEADWW

DE RUEHJM #1398/02 1121325

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 221258Z APR 83

FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5143

INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0408

RUEADWWXWHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 9150

RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH PRIORITY 1558

RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 3233

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSX DAMASCUS PRIORITY 5920

RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 3462

BT

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 01398

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 7 - TEXT)

EXDIS

FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR

TAGS: PREL, IS, SY, LE, PLO, MOPS, XF

SUBJ: HABIB-DRAPER MISSION: NEAR CRISIS AT 21 APRIL

(2) THE LEBANESE CONCEPT FOR THE INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S FORCES INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE;

(3) LEBANESE RESISTANCE TO THE CONCEPT OF "HOT PURSUIT" IN LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL WATERS; AND

(4) THE LEBANESE VIEW THAT WE SHOULD RETURN TO THE CONCEPT OF ONLY THREE TO FIVE SUPERVISORY TEAMS (ORIGINALLY A UNITED STATES IDEA) IN LIEU OF THE AGREED FORMULA OF "UP TO EIGHT TEAMS."

6. DRAPER PROPOSED THAT NEGOTIATORS NOT FALL ON A SWORD OVER THE NAME OF A COMMITTEE BUT LEAVE THIS MINOR ISSUE UNTIL LATER. KIMCHE WENT INTO A LONG EXPOSITION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TO CHOOSE BETWEEN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES ON ONE HAND OR WITH SYRIA ON THE OTHER AND THAT LEBANON SHOULD RESIST ALLEGED ARAB PRESSURES, INCLUDING ON NAMES OF COMMITTEES.

7. DRAPER COUNTERED THAT LEBANON HAD ALREADY MADE ITS CHOICE OF FRIENDS AND ASSOCIATIONS AND IT WAS EXAGGERATION TO SUGGEST THAT SELECTION OF A NAME FOR A COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE SUCH MONUMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE. FATTAL ALSO HEATEDLY INSISTED THAT LEBANON HAD CHOSEN ITS PATH WITH THE WEST. EINAN REVEALED IN EFFECT THAT HE WAS FEARFUL OF GOING BACK TO HIS SUPERIORS WITH A LEBANESE-PROPOSED CHANGE OF NAME

SENSITIVE

91  
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 650

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AFTER THE LEBANESE HAD GONE THROUGH 26 SESSIONS WITHOUT POSING OBJECTIONS. HE SAID THAT EVERYONE IN THE ROOM KNEW THAT THE REAL REASON WAS THE ATTITUDE OF THE LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER. WHILE NO ONE DISAGREED WITH THIS LAST ASSERTION, WE MAY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN COMING TENSIONS TEMPORARILY ON THIS MINOR ISSUE.

8. THE QUESTION OF THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION OF THE HADDAD FORCES WAS ANOTHER MATTER, HOWEVER. KIMCHE AND EINAN MADE CLEARER THAN EVER THE ISRAELI VIEW THAT THE PRESENT HADDAD FORCES, ADMITTEDLY FORMED BY ISRAEL, SHOULD BE LEGITIMIZED AS THE ONLY REAL BRIGADE IN THE SOUTHERN SECURITY ZONE. ONCE THAT OCCURRED, THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES MIGHT THEN RECRUIT INHABITANTS OF THE SECURITY REGION TO FILL IN THE GAPS IN THIS BRIGADE, WHILE ALSO BRINGING CERTAIN REGULAR LAF OFFICERS TO FLESH OUT THE BRIGADE LEADERSHIP FROM EXISTING LAF UNITS, ASSUMING ONCE AGAIN THAT ALL SUCH OFFICERS HAVE BEEN INHABITANTS OF THE SECURITY REGION. THE LEBANESE CONCEPT OF COURSE HAS BEEN THAT THEY HAD FORMED A TERRITORIAL BRIGADE ON PAPER EARLIER THIS MONTH, WITH DESIGNATED OFFICERS FROM VARIOUS LAF UNITS. THEY

WOULD PLAN TO INTEGRATE MEMBERS OF THE HADDAD FORCES INTO THIS BRIGADE WHENEVER POSSIBLE ON A UNIT-BY-UNIT BASIS (E.G., PLATOONS, COMPANIES, AND EVEN BATTALIONS). DRAPER INSISTED THAT WHILE ISRAELI INTENTIONS HAD ALWAYS BEEN CLEAR ON THIS ISSUE, THERE NEVER HAD BEEN ANY AGREEMENT FROM THE LEBANESE SIDE TO THE ISRAELI CONCEPT. MOREOVER, CITING THE UNITED STATES NON-PAPER GIVEN TO THE ISRAELIS IN WASHINGTON AS WELL AS THE UNITED STATES COMMENTS TO THE ISRAELI REACTION TO THAT NON-PAPER, DRAPER SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD ALWAYS ACCEPTED THE LEBANESE APPROACH. IN OTHER WORDS, HADDAD'S MEN WOULD BE INTEGRATED INTO A LEGALLY FORMED LEBANESE BRIGADE. DRAPER NOTED THAT SUCH A BRIGADE HAD IN FACT BEEN FORMED ON PAPER BY LEGAL ACTION TAKEN IN THE FIRST 33( 9! -048). DRAPER ALSO ADDED THAT IT WAS NOT ONLY POLITICALLY ESSENTIAL FOR THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO BE SEEN AS ESTABLISHING THEIR OWN BRIGADE, IT WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL FOR LEGAL REASONS. HAMDAM NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES COULD THEORETICALLY BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYING ALL THE BACK SALARIES OF MEMBERS OF HADDAD'S FORCES IF IT ACCEPTED THE ISRAELI CONCEPT AND LEGITIMIZED HADDAD'S SO-CALLED BRIGADE.

BT

#1398

NNNN

SENSITIVE