

38419 4
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 802

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE677
STU7912
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHBL #4162 1060912
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 160912Z APR 83
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3046
INFO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 2651
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 2895
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2120
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1950
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2513
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1972
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH 1168
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CAS 8/5/10 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BEIRUT 04162

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PINS, MOPS, LE, IS

SUBJECT: ARENS-HADDAD MEETING

1. AFTER SHARON ON APRIL 11, HADDAD RECEIVED MOSHE ARENS IN MARJ'UYUN APRIL 14. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS HERE, ARENS TOLD JOURNALISTS AFTER THE MEETING THAT "I AM CERTAIN THAT MAJOR HADDAD MUST CONTINUE TO PLAY HIS ROLE." HE ADDED THAT HE EXPECTED THE GOL TO CHANGE ITS POSITION ON HADDAD BECAUSE KEEPING HADDAD "RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SOUTH IS IN THE INTERESTS OF LEBANON."

2. IN HIS OWN COMMENTS TO REPORTERS, HADDAD REPEATED HIS HOPE THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD SEND AN EMISSARY TO HIM. HE APPEARED TO HAVE ALREADY MADE UP HIS MIND ABOUT THE FUTURE, HOWEVER: "MAJOR HADDAD WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY WITH ALL THE SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY OF FREE LEBANON, REGULARS AND IRREGULARS. THE REGULAR TROOPS HAVE BEEN SELECTED, AND THE NATIONAL GUARD (ISRAELI ORGANIZED VILLAGE MILITIAS) WILL BE A RESERVE FOR THE ARMY. THEY WILL ALSO BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF MAJOR HADDAD." DILLON

SENSITIVE

5
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 203

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BT
#4162
NNNN

SENSITIVE

38420 6
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 796

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA543

OO RUEADWW

DE RUEHBL #4166/01 1061154

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 161148Z APR 83

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3049

INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2122

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1951

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2515

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 2653

RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 1974

RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0540

RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0988

RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH PRIORITY 1170

RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0949

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 2897

RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0409

RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0616

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY

RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 04166

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

CAIRO/JERUSALEM PASS AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER FROM
ROSS

E.O. 12356: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH GEMAYEL AND
TEAM, APRIL 14

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY. HABIB MET WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, HIS KEY
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISORS, AND THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING
TEAM FOR THREE HOURS APRIL 14 TO ASCERTAIN LEBANESE
POSITIONS ON THE KEY "POLITICAL" ISSUES AND THE NUMEROUS
SECONDARY ISSUES REMAINING UNRESOLVED IN THE FORMAL
NEGOTIATING SESSIONS IN KHALDAH AND KIRYAT SHEMONA/
NETANYA.

IN A SMALL MEETING WITH GEMAYEL, SALEM, AND WADI' HADDAD,
HABIB RAISED THE FUTURE STATUS OF MAJOR HADDAD, THE
FUTURE OF UNIFIL, FORMAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, AND THE

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NRMR 1009-265/3#38420

BY RW NARA DATE 1/1/11

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ASSIGNMENT OF ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICERS TO LEBANESE UNITS IN THE SECURITY REGION. THE LEBANESE STUCK ADAMANTLY TO THEIR PREVIOUS POSITIONS ON ALL BUT UNIFIL, ASSERTING THAT TO GO ANY FURTHER WOULD DESTROY LEBANON'S DOMESTIC CONSENSUS, GREATLY WEAKEN ARMY MORALE, AND CREATE NEW OBSTACLES TO SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. ON UNIFIL, GEMAYEL STATED THAT ITS RETENTION WAS NOT A LEBANESE DEMAND. (SALEM AND GHASSAN TUENI LATER TRIED TO WATER THIS POSITION DOWN.)

IN A LARGER MEETING WITH SALEM, HADDAD, TUENI, AND THEN THE WHOLE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING TEAM, HABIB WENT OVER THE SOME 30 POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT REMAINING IN THE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS. THE LEBANESE GAVE PRECIOUS LITTLE, WITH HADDAD AND TUENI IN PARTICULAR ACTING AS IF THEY WERE IN A COLLEGE DEBATE RATHER THAN IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. HABIB WILL TAKE THE RESULTS OF HIS TALKS IN LEBANON TO ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.

3. AMB. HABIB, JOINED BY AMB. DILLON AND ROSS AND LATER BY GEN. COOLEY AND KOZAC, MET IN VARIOUS GROUPINGS WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, HIS ADVISORS AND THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING TEAM FOR THREE HOURS APRIL 14 TO ASCERTAIN LEBANESE POSITIONS ON THE KEY "POLITICAL" ISSUES AND THE NUMEROUS SECONDARY ISSUES REMAINING UNRESOLVED IN THE FORMAL NEGOTIATING SESSIONS IN KHALDAH AND KIRYAT SHEMONA/NETANYA.

4. IN A FIRST, SMALL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM, AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR WADI' HADDAD, HABIB REVIEWED THE MAJOR ISSUES: THE FUTURE STATUS OF MAJOR HADDAD, THE FUTURE OF UNIFIL, FORMAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICERS TO LEBANESE UNITS IN THE SECURITY REGION.

5. IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, HABIB MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- THE FORMAL SESSIONS HAVE DONE GOOD WORK, BUT THEY ARE TAKING TOO LONG. THEIR WORK HAS, HOWEVER, NARROWED THE DIFFERENCES AND MADE IT POSSIBLE TO FORESEE A CONCLUSION.
- IT IS NOW POSSIBLE TO CREATE A PACKAGE AGREEMENT TO PRESENT TO BOTH PARTIES FOR APPROVAL. IN ORDER TO PRESENT SUCH A PACKAGE IT IS NECESSARY TO GO OVER THE MAJOR ISSUES WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO ASCERTAIN ITS "FINAL" POSITION.
- IF THE ISRAELIS REJECT THIS PACKAGE, PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FORMAL FORMAT WILL CONTINUE. ISRAEL OR LEBANON MAY EVENTUALLY BACK DOWN FROM THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS, BUT IN THE MEANWHILE SECURITY PROBLEMS WILL

BT

8
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 798

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:
#4166
NNNN

SENSITIVE

9
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 793

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA545
OO RUEADWW
DE RUEHEL #4166/02 1061156
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 161148Z APR 83
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3050
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2123
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1952
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2516
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 2654
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 1975
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0541
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0989
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH PRIORITY 1171
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0950
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 2898
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0410
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0617
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BEIRUT 04166

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
CAIRO/JERUSALEM PASS AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER FROM
ROSS

INTENSIFY IN LEBANON, THE SYRIANS WILL BECOME MORE AND
MORE DISPOSED TO REJECT THE EVENTUAL AGREEMENT, AND A
FEELING OF BITTERNESS WILL EMERGE IN LEBANON VIS A VIS
ISRAEL, NEGATING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR TRUE COOPERATION
THAT HAVE EXISTED UP TO NOW.

-- OBTAINING ISRAELI AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE EASY, AND
SUCCESS MAY NOT COME ABOUT. THE ISRAELIS MAY PREFER TO
HOLD TO THEIR ARGUMENTS AND LOOK AGAIN AT THE POSSIBILITY
OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, WHICH WOULD BE GOOD FOR NO ONE.
-- BEFORE CONSIDERING FURTHER STEPS WE MUST AWAIT THE
RESULTS OF OUR LATEST APPROACH.

6. HABIB THEN BROACHED THE KEY ISSUES THAT REQUIRED
"POLITICAL" CONSIDERATION. THE FIRST ISSUE HE RAISED WAS
THE FUTURE STATUS OF SA'D HADDAD. HE DESCRIBED THE VARIOUS
OPTIONS THAT GEN. TAMIR HAD "INFORMALLY" PROPOSED OVER THE

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

LAST WEEKS. THESE FORESAW AT LEAST TEMPORARY COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES OVER TROOPS. HOW MUCH FLEXIBILITY DID THE LEBANESE HAVE, HABIB ASKED. GEMAYEL IMMEDIATELY REPLIED THAT THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL (CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE SECURITY REGION) HAD ALREADY GONE BEYOND THE LEBANESE "BOTTOM LINE." IT HAD BEEN OFFERED "IN THE LAST STRETCH" AND AS PART OF A PACKAGE DEAL. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT MOVE BEYOND THIS. SALEM BEGAN TO ENLARGE ON GEMAYEL'S REMARKS, SAYING THAT THE LEBANESE PEOPLE COULD NOT ACCEPT HADDAD. GEMAYEL, WHOSE FACE BEGAN TO REDDEN AND WHOSE VOICE BEGAN TO RISE AT THIS POINT, INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT ARMY MORALE WAS THE KEY FACTOR. HOW COULD MAJOR HADDAD, A "PATENTED" AGENT FOR THE ISRAELIS, BE GIVEN COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE LEBANESE ARMY WITHOUT DESTROYING MORALE? ALMOST SHOUTING, GEMAYEL SAID "YOU ASK ME TO ACCEPT THIS? I WOULD PREFER TO RESIGN." HE POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD JUST GOTTEN RID OF A NUMBER OF UNSATISFACTORY OFFICERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS. HOW, HE ASKED, COULD HE ACCEPT SA'D HADDAD AFTER THE BATTLE HE HAD HAD TO FIGHT ON THESE DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS? SALEM INTERJECTED THAT HE HAD LOOKED INTO HADDAD'S STATUS AND FOUND THAT HE HAD BEEN DISCIPLINED AND REMOVED FROM THE ARMY BY ORDER OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. GEMAYEL, RETURNING ANGRILY TO THE ATTACK, SAID HE REFUSED TO TALK ABOUT SA'D HADDAD ANY MORE. HIS STATUS WAS A LEBANESE PROBLEM, AND HE DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS IT FURTHER WITH ANYONE, EVEN WITH HABIB. SALEM DID CONFIRM AFTER THIS OUTBURST THAT, AS PART OF A PACKAGE DEAL, AND SUBJECT TO THE STATED LEBANESE CONDITIONS ON EXCLUSION OF A COMMAND POST AND LIMITATION ON DURATION, THE LEBANESE OFFER ON HADDAD STILL STOOD. 7. AT THIS POINT, GEMAYEL INTERRUPTED WITH YET ANOTHER EMOTIONAL POSITION. HE REMINDED HABIB THAT, WHEN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS HAD BEGUN, THE STATED OBJECTIVE OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN THE REMOVAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. THE U.S. POSITION, AS STATED REPEATEDLY, HAD INCLUDED THREE ELEMENTS: WITHDRAWALS, PRESERVATION OF THE LEBANESE DOMESTIC CONSENSUS, AND MAINTENANCE OF LEBANON'S ARAB CREDENTIALS. UP TO THIS VERY MOMENT, GEMAYEL SAID, HE HAD BEEN ASKING FOR EVIDENCE OF U.S. BACKING FOR THESE GOALS WITHOUT GETTING ANY RESPONSE. LEBANON WAS ALREADY BEYOND ITS RED LINES AND HAD ACCEPTED MANY THINGS IN SPITE OF ITSELF AND AGAINST ITS WILL BECAUSE THERE HAD BEEN NO REAL U.S. PRESSURE TO THE CONTRARY. HE SAID HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT WANTED TO WORK AS A TEAM WITH THE U.S. IN

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 795

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IF THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE, "SOME-
THING ELSE" SHOULD BE LOOKED AT. INTERRUPTING HABIB'S
ATTEMPTS TO RETURN TO THE SUBJECT, HE REJECTED ISRAEL'S
ATTEMPT TO CREATE A SECURITY STRATEGY AROUND "ONE
VULNERABLE MAN" WHO "MIGHT DIE," AS WELL AS ISRAEL'S

BT

#4166

NNNN

SENSITIVE

12
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 790

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA546
OO RUEADWW
DE RUEHBL #4166/03 1061158
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 161148Z APR 83
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3051
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2124
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1953
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2517
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 2655
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 1976
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0542
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0990
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH PRIORITY 1172
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0951
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 2899
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0411
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0618
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BEIRUT 04166

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
CAIRO/JERUSALEM PASS AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER FROM
ROSS
INSISTENCE ON "PATROLS" EQUIPPED WITH APCs IN LEBANESE
TERRITORY. HABIB RESPONDED THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD
LEBANON'S POSITION ON MAJOR HADDAD AND WOULD RAISE IT
NO FURTHER. THE "SUPERVISORY TEAMS" WERE ANOTHER
MATTER, AND THE MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE IN THE NEGOTIAT-
IONS HAD DONE GOOD WORK ON THEM. SALEM INTERJECTED THAT
THE USE OF APCs WAS STILL BEING DRAFTED WITHIN THE
LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. GEMAYEL SAID DARKLY THAT ISRAELI
TACTICS WERE "BLACKMAIL," AND HE WOULD NOT SUBMIT.
8. RETURNING TO THE MAJOR ISSUES, HABIB THEN TURNED TO
UNIFIL. GEMAYEL, IN A SURPRISING CHANGE OF THE LEBA-
NESE POSITION, VOICED THE VIEW THAT LEBANON HAD NO
POSITION ON ITS RETENTION. THIS, HE SAID, WAS A MATTER
FOR THE U.S., THE U.N., AND FOR "YOUR ARAB FRIENDS.
WE ARE NOT CONCERNED BY UNIFIL. WHY DIFFERENTIATE

SENSITIVE

13
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 791

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LES
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BETWEEN THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS AND OTHER AREAS OF LEBANON? IT IS NOT A LEBANESE DEMAND TO HAVE UNIFIL AROUND THE CAMPS." SALEM, TRYING TO WATER THIS DOWN, DESCRIBED UNIFIL AS "NOT A MAJOR CONCERN" AND ONE ON WHICH GEMAYEL HAD NOT BEEN BRIEFED. (COMMENT: GEMAYEL IS OBVIOUSLY REFLECTING THE LACK OF CONCERN, TO PUT IT MILDLY, OF MARONITE CIRCLES ON THE FATE OF THE PALESTINIANS. SALEM AND TUENI, AS GREEK ORTHODOX WITH GREATER SENSITIVITY TO THE ARAB WORLD, FEEL DIFFERENTLY. IN THE FOLLOWUP MEETING WITH THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING TEAM, TO WHICH HE CAME STRAIGHT FROM THE AIRPORT FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM CAIRO, TUENI CLAIMED THAT WHAT GEMAYEL HAD MEANT WAS THAT IT WAS UP TO THE U.S. AND "OTHER PARTIES" I.E., THE PALESTINIANS), NOT LEBANON, TO DEMAND UNIFIL, SINCE THIS RESPONDED TO THEIR INTERESTS, NOT LEBANON'S, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. SALEM FINALLY LEFT IT WITH HABIB THAT HE, HABIB, HAD CARTE BLANCHE ON THIS SUBJECT. IF UNIFIL PROVED IMPOSSIBLE TO SELL TO THE ISRAELIS, THEN -- AS HABIB REMINDED THE LEBANESE -- IT SHOULD BE ABANDONED IN RETURN FOR THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE PRICE.

9. TURNING TO RECOGNITION, GEMAYEL STATED FLATLY THAT LEBANON COULD NOT RECOGNIZE ISRAEL FORMALLY AT THIS TIME. THE PREAMBLE OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS THE FACT OF SIGNATURE, CONSTITUTED DE FACTO RECOGNITION AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED. TO GO FURTHER AT THIS TIME, HE SAID, WOULD DESTROY LEBANON'S ARAB CREDENTIALS. SALEM, LAUGHING DERISIVELY, ASKED HOW LEBANON COULD APPROACH SYRIA TO OBTAIN WITHDRAWAL IF IT HAD RECOGNIZED ISRAEL FORMALLY IN THE AGREEMENT.

10. TURNING BRIEFLY TO THE ISSUE OF ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICERS WITH LEBANESE UNITS IN THE SECURITY ZONE, GEMAYEL SAID THIS WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION. THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WOULD UNDERTAKE THE NECESSARY FUNCTIONS.

11. FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH GEMAYEL, HABIB AND HIS TEAM MET INITIALLY WITH SALEM. HADDAD, AND TUENI AND THEN WITH THE WHOLE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING TEAM, TO GO OVER THE SOME 30 POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT REMAINING IN THE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS. SALEM, HADDAD, AND TUENI GAVE PRECIOUS LITTLE, WITH HADDAD AND TUENI IN PARTICULAR ACTING AS IF THEY WERE IN A COLLEGE DEBATE RATHER THAN IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. WE WILL BE DESIGNING A PACKAGE TO PRESENT TO THE ISRAELIS APRIL 15 REFLECTING SOME BUT NOT ALL OF THE LEBANESE POSITIONS. THEY WILL BUY OUR CHANGES AS PART OF A PACKAGE DEAL -- IF WE CAN SELL IT TO THE ISRAELIS. DILLON

SENSITIVE

14
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 792

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BT
#4166
NNNN

SENSITIVE

38421
16
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 787

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:
MESSAGE:

HCE864
STU8676
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHDM #2905/01 1070752
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 170746Z APR 83
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1367
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 9693
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1812
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 7886
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 5012
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 5895
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH 1806
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 7643
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 02905

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PINS, MOPS, LE, IS, SY

SUBJECT: SYRIAN VIEWS ON WITHDRAWAL AND ON POSSIBLE
- WAR IN THE BIGA'

REF: (A) BEIRUT 3903, (B) DAMASCUS 2542,

- (C) DAMASCUS 2601

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: REF A REPORTS STRONG SKEPTICISM IN LEBANON OVER SYRIA'S EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM LEBANON, AND DISCUSSES POSSIBILITY OF WAR IN THE BIGA'. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS OUR BEST ASSESSMENT ON THOSE QUESTIONS. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD'S PREFERRED COURSE OF ACTION IS TO WITHDRAW HIS TROOPS FROM LEBANON RATHER THAN TO LEAVE THEM THERE INDEFINITELY OR TO PROMOTE LEBANESE PARTITION. HOWEVER, ASSAD'S EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW IS STILL CONDITIONAL, AND DEPENDS PRIMARILY ON HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE EMERGING ISRAELI-LEBANESE RELATIONSHIP. SYRIANS ARE EXPRESSING PESSIMISM ABOUT THAT RELATIONSHIP AND THEY STILL RETAIN THE OPTION OF REFUSING TO WITHDRAW IF THEY BELIEVE THEY CAN BETTER PRESERVE SYRIAN INTERESTS BY STAYING. ASSAD PROBABLY WANTS TO AVOID MILITARY CLASHES IN THE BIGA', BUT EXPECTS THAT ISRAEL MAY AT SOME POINT INITIATE HOSTILITIES THERE. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM09-265/3#38421
BY RW NARA DATE 11/11/17

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

3. SYRIAN OFFICIALS, IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES FROM LEBANON SINCE LAST SUMMER, IN A WAY THAT SEEMS TO BE PREPARING THE GROUNDWORK AMONG SYRIANS AND ARABS FOR THAT WITHDRAWAL TO TAKE PLACE. SYRIA ENDORSED, AND ADHERES TO, THE FEZ AGREEMENTS, AND HAS ACQUIESCED IN THE LAPSE OF THE ARAB LEAGUE MANDATE AND THE TERMINATION OF THE ADF STRUCTURE. ASSAD CLAIMS THE ADF STOPPED THE CIVIL WAR, BUT HE HAS ADMITTED PUBLICLY THAT THE SYRIAN INTERVENTION IN LEBANON FAILED TO SOLVE LEBANON'S FUNDAMENTAL INTERNAL PROBLEMS, WHICH IMPLIES THAT SYRIAN FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW.
4. FOR MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, THEREFORE, THE SYRIANS HAVE PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY GIVEN REPEATED ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM LEBANON, BUT THEY HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO MAKE THIS CONDITIONAL ON THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL NEITHER IMPAIRED LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY NOR THREATENED SYRIAN SECURITY. THE SYRIANS HAVE NOT OFFERED TO US MUCH IN THE WAY OF PRACTICAL CLARIFICATION OF THESE DELPHIC CONDITIONS; THEY MAY WELL HAVE REVEALED THEIR POSITION IN GREATER DETAIL TO THE LEBANESE, BUT THEY ARE PLAYING THEIR CARDS CLOSE TO THEIR VEST, WAITING FOR THE LEBANESE TO INFORM THEM OF THE OUTCOME OF THE CURRENT TALKS WITH ISRAEL. OUR OWN ANALYSIS CONTINUES TO BE THAT THE MAJOR SELLING POINT FOR AN ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT IS TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AND, AS WE HAVE NOTED (REF B), THE TERMS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW UNDERWAY HAVE AT TIMES COME DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO SYRIAN RED LINES.
5. WE SEE TWO MAJOR SCENARIOS THAT COULD LEAD TO SYRIA REFUSING TO WITHDRAW: (A) THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS FAIL TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT, AND ISRAEL STAYS IN LEBANON; OR (B) THEY DO REACH AN AGREEMENT BUT ASSAD SEES ITS TERMS AS THREATENING SYRIAN SECURITY OR IMPAIRING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAS THE PRIMARY BURDEN OF PREVENTING THE SECOND SCENARIO FROM OCCURRING, BY PERSUADING ASSAD TO ACCEPT THE AGREEMENT, BUT IF THE SAUDIS SUPPORT THE AGREEMENT AND THROW THEIR WEIGHT BEHIND IT, THAT WILL MAKE A DIFFERENCE. (WE NOTE THAT THE PHALANGE VIEW OF SYRIA AS DESCRIBED IN REF A, PARA 3, IS THE MIRROR IMAGE OF THE SYRIAN VIEW: FACED WITH AN ISRAELI REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW, THE SYRIANS MAY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO CONTINUE THEIR OCCUPATION.)
6. THE PERCEPTION ELSEWHERE THAT THE SYRIANS ARE UNWILLING TO LEAVE LEBANON SEEMS TO BE FED PARTLY BY THE FACT THAT

11
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 789

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SYRIAN MILITARY ACTIVITY IN LEBANON (LIKE ISRAELI ACTIVITY
THER) SEEMS TO BE PREDICATED ON THE ANALYSIS THAT NEGO-
TIATIONS MAY NOT BE SUCCESSFUL AND THAT THEIR MILITARY
MISSION MAY CONTINUE INDEFINITELY. WE BELIEVE THAT

BT

#2905

NNNN

SENSITIVE

18
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 785

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE866
STU8678
00 RUEHC
DE RUEHDM #2905/02 1070754
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 170746Z APR 83
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1368
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 9694
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1813
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 7887
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 5013
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 5896
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH 1807
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 7644
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DAMASCUS 02905

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PINS, MOPS, LE, IS, SY

SUBJECT: SYRIAN VIEWS ON WITHDRAWAL AND ON POSSIBLE
- WAR IN THE BIQA'

ASSAD DOES NOT WANT LARGE-SCALE HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL, BUT HIS MILITARY GENUINELY EXPECTS SOME SORT OF ISRAELI ATTACK IN THE BIQA', EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF ISRAELI PREPARATORY MEASURES. WHATEVER THE RATIONALITY OF THE SYRIAN FEARS, THEY ARE REAL. IN OPERATIONAL TERMS THIS FEAR TRANSLATES INTO A HIGH LEVEL OF READINESS OF SYRIAN FORCES IN THE BIQA', AND THIS READINESS IN TURN FUELS SKEPTICISM ABOUT SYRIAN INTENTIONS.

7. THE SOVIET ROLE IN THIS SITUATION IS NOT NECESSARILY ONE OF BLOCKING WITHDRAWAL. CLEARLY MOSCOW AND DAMASCUS HAVE DRAWN CLOSER TOGETHER IN THE WAKE OF THE 1982 ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON. ALSO, GRADUALLY OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS CRITICISM HAS APPEARED IN THE SYRIAN MEDIA OF THE PRESENCE OF U.S. MARINES IN LEBANON, AND THIS MAY BE A SOVIET-INSPIRED THEME. IN ADDITION, THE SYRIANS AND SOVIETS HAVE BOTH EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO THE REAGAN PLAN, AND TO THE EXTENT STALLED NEGOTIATIONS IN LEBANON WOULD DERAIL POSSIBILITIES FOR EXTENDING THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, POSSIBLY THE SOVIETS WOULD SUPPORT A SYRIAN DECISION TO FRUSTRATE A LEBANESE SETTLEMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, HOWEVER, IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT THE

SENSITIVE

19
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 786

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SOVIETS WANT ANOTHR ROUND OF FIGHTING BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES IN LEBANON, WHICH COULD AGAIN SHOW THE INFERIORITY OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT, AND EVEN RISK DIRECT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. WHATEVER THE SOVIET ROLE IS, HOWEVER, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE SYRIANS WILL MAKE THEIR OWN DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO WITHDRAW. 8. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, THE ONLY WAY TO TEST SYRIAN INTENTIONS IS FOR THE LEBANESE TO PRESENT THE SARG WITH A DEMAND TO WITHDRAW BASED ON AN AGREEMENT THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL LIKEWISE WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON. THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN SECURING SYRIAN AGREEMENT WILL BE THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT, AND WHETHER THEY VIOLATE THE SYRIAN RED LINES. RUGH

BT

#2905

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

38422

20

PAGE 1 - 782

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE933
STU9013
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHTV #5196/01 1071703
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O 171701Z APR 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3009
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 2760
INFO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 9825
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 05196

NODIS

BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB
DEPARTMENT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM AND VELIOTES
FROM LEWIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, MOPS, IS, US, LE, PEPR

SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ TO
- DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS AND DISCUSSION WITH
- ARENS CONCERNING LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS

REF: STATE 105415

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

--

2. TO UNDERSCORE IMPLICITLY THE LINKAGE, PHIL HABIB
AND I MET WITH DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS AT 1330 ON
SUNDAY, APRIL 17, TO DELIVER THE SECRETARY'S LETTER
REGARDING THE RELEASE OF LAVI TECHNOLOGY, AND TO
PROBE FURTHER INTO ARENS' POSITION ON HADDAD'S FUTURE.
TWO OF ARENS' AIDES, INCLUDING GENERAL MERON, WERE
ALSO PRESENT.

--

3. I OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY HANDING ARENS A COPY
OF THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TOGETHER WITH A COVERING
LETTER FROM ME, IN WHICH I QUOTED THE ADDITIONAL
POINTS VERBATIM FROM PARA 4 OF REFTEL. MY COVER LETTER
MAKES CLEAR THAT THESE ADDITIONAL POINTS ARE OFFICIAL
AND ARE CONVEYED ON INSTRUCTION FROM WASHINGTON.

--

4. ARENS READ MY LETTER AND THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE
WITH CARE, THEN EXPRESSED HIS GREAT PLEASURE AT THE
GOOD NEWS (WHICH HAD, OF COURSE, ALREADY BEEN SIGNALLED
IN A NEWS BROADCAST FROM WASHINGTON EARLY THIS MORNING).
I UNDERSCORED TO ARENS THE DIFFICULTY WHICH THE SECRETARY

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR/M09-265/3#38422

BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/11

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 783

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HAD CONFRONTED IN OBTAINING THIS DECISION AND HOW MUCH EFFORT HAD GONE INTO IT. GENERAL MERON SAID HE COULD WELL UNDERSTAND, FROM HIS OWN RECENT MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON, HOW DIFFICULT INDEED HAD BEEN THE SECRETARY'S TASK. ARENS EXPRESSED HIS GREAT, PERSONAL APPRECIATION TO SECRETARY SHULTZ FOR THE DECISION AND FOR HIS WARM MESSAGE. (FORTUITOUSLY, ARENS WILL APPEAR LATER TODAY ON THE DAVID BRINKLEY INTERVIEW PROGRAM BY SATELLITE. HE HAD BEEN PREPARING, I LEARNED FROM HIS PRESS SPOKESMAN, TO RESPOND "VIGOROUSLY" TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE F-16 SUSPENSION AND THE LAVI AIRCRAFT ISSUE. THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE SHOULD RPT SHOULD PRODUCE MORE POSITIVE AND HELPFUL RESPONSES.)

--
5. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION OF ISRAEL-EGYPT RELATIONS, TRIGGERED BY ARENS' QUERY ABOUT HABIB'S TRIP TO CAIRO THE PREVIOUS DAY (SEPTEL), HABIB TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO MAJOR HADDAD'S FUTURE. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT HADDAD MUST REMAIN A COMMANDER; HE ALSO WAS TOTALLY CONVINCED THAT THE LEBANESE COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT GO BEYOND THEIR OFFER TO KEEP HIM AS A DEPUTY COMMANDER WITH CERTAIN SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INTELLIGENCE/ SECURITY MATTERS. HABIB WANTED TO TRY TO USE HIS TRIP TODAY TO BEIRUT TO TRY TO SEE IF THERE IS ANY POSSIBLE WAY TO BRIDGE THESE POSITIONS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE THOUGHT THE LEBANESE HAD PRESENTED THEIR POSITION BADLY; HADDAD'S FUTURE ROLE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED AS PART OF A TOTAL, COORDINATED COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR THE SOUTH. IT MUST BE CLEARER HOW HADDAD WOULD FIT IN THAT STRUCTURE. "IT IS NOT TRUE, AS SOME ISRAELIS THINK, THAT THE LEBANESE JUST WANT TO PUT HADDAD IN THE ASHCAN." (ARENS RESPONDED THAT THE FEAR IS THAT SOME MAY WANT TO SEE HIM IN THE CEMETERY.)

--
6. HABIB THEN REPEATED MANY OF THE ARGUMENTS HE HAD MADE ON FRIDAY, APRIL 15, TO BEGIN, ARENS, AND SHAMIR REGARDING THE WIDE RANGE OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS NOW AGREED UPON AND THE FAVORABLE CLIMATE IN BEIRUT FOR AGREEMENT AND COOPERATION WHICH NOW EXISTS BUT WHICH MAY SOON ERODE IF THE DEADLOCK CONTINUES. HE STRESSED THE ABSOLUTE LEBANESE COMMITMENT THAT THERE WILL BE NO PLO FORCES ANYWHERE IN THE SECURITY ZONE, OR ANYWHERE ELSE IN LEBANON FOR THAT MATTER. HE THEN ASKED ARENS WHAT DEFINITION OF

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 784

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RESPONSIBILITIES OR DUTIES FOR HADDAD AS DEPUTY
COMMANDER MIGHT SATISFY ISRAELI CONCERNS.

7. ARENS REPLIED BY FIRST DESCRIBING HIS RECENT VISIT
TO SOUTH LEBANON AND WITH HADDAD, A VISIT HE SAID HE

BT

#5196

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

38426 28

PAGE 1 - 775

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE213

STUD939

OO RUEHC

DE RUEHRA #3158 1081612

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 181611Z APR 83

FM AMEMBASSY RABAT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7922

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RABAT 03158

NODIS

FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY
VELIOTES FROM JOSEPH VERNER REED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, XF, MO, JO

SUBJECT: AMMAN'S CONCERNS WITH HASSAN

REFS: A) STATE 105419, B) STATE 105310, C) RABAT 3136,
- D) RABAT 3137

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. I APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S REPEAT OF AMMAN 3532 (REF A) AND BELIEVE IT WORTHWHILE TO CLARIFY SOME OBVIOUS MISUNDERSTANDINGS. AMBASSADOR VIETS' ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT U.S. EMBASSY-PALACE RELATIONS REPORTED IN REF A ARE CORRECT: THERE HAVE BEEN NO RPT NO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN KING HASSAN AND THE PRESIDENT SINCE THEIR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION APRIL 10. MY SUBSEQUENT CONTACT WITH THE KING WAS REPORTED IN REFS C AND D, WHICH DREW UPON DEPARTMENTAL GUIDANCE (REF B).
3. COMMENT: FROM RABAT'S PERSPECTIVE, AT LEAST PART OF THE CHALLENGE FOR THE U.S., BESIDES THE SHORT-TERM ESSENTIALNESS OF INSISTING THAT OUR MODERATE ARAB FRIENDS STAY THE COURSE WITH US AND GIVE KING HUSSEIN EXCLUSIVE BACKING IN THE PRESENT PEACE INITIATIVE, IS DEMONSTRATING TO MODERATES SUCH AS HASSAN THAT WE ARE ALSO KEEPING THEIR LONGER TERM POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PROBLEMS IN MIND.
4. WE SHOULD ALSO REMEMBER THAT, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE ARAB LEAGUE, HASSAN HAS THE COROLLARY RESPONSIBILITY OF REPRESENTING ALL THE MEMBER STATES UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THAT ORGANIZATION AND IS AND WILL BE REQUIRED TO TRANSMIT PAPERS ON ALL MEMBERS' BEHALF (INCLUDING THE PLO), AS REQUESTED, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATERIAL IS PALATABLE TO THE USG.
5. AS DEPARTMENT ALSO AWARE, MOROCCO IS IN THE MIDST

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 89-265/3 #38426

BY RW NARA DATE 11/11/17

SENSITIVE

29

PAGE 1 - 776

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OF AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN WHERE THE INFLUENTIAL ISTIQLAL ("NATIONALIST") PARTY -- RUN BY FOREIGN MINISTER BOUCETTA -- IS VERY PRO-PLO. ALSO, MOST MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES HAVE SIZEABLE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITIES AND WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT REGARDLESS OF THE U.S. POSITION ON THE PLO, ARAB LEADERS HAVE THEIR LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH THOSE SAME COMMUNITIES VERY MUCH IN VIEW.

6. IN ORDER TO BE HELPFUL AT ANY GIVEN TIME, HASSAN WILL NEED CONSTANT INFORMATION ON OUR PLANS AND VIEWS IN ORDER TO BETTER USE HIS INFLUENCE AND POSITION. I BELIEVE, THEREFORE, THAT THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD CONSIDER MORE REGULAR BRIEFINGS FOR HASSAN -- PERHAPS USING THE FRAMEWORK OF REFTEL B, WHICH WILL BE MORE HELPFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE THAN SCOLDINGS OR REFERENCES TO COERCION. END COMMENT.

7. DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO THE NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK AND TO OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED. REED

BT

#3158

NNNN

SENSITIVE

30
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 774

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA798

OO RUEADWW

DE RUEHAM #3632 1081823

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 181823Z APR 83

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3276

RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE AMMAN 03632

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, JO, US

SUBJECT: LETTER OF CONDOLENCE FROM KING HUSSEIN

- TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

1. POST HAS JUST RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING LETTER OF
CONDOLENCE FROM KING HUSSEIN:

2. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER:

THE ROYAL PALACE

AMMAN, JORDAN

APRIL 18, 1983

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED WITH A DEEPLY SADDENED HEART THE
NEWS OF THE DASTARDLY CRIMINAL ACT PERPETRATED AGAINST
THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN BEIRUT. JORDANIANS SHARE
WITH ME OUR SENSE OF OUTRAGE OVER THIS HEINOUS CRIME.
IT IS AN ALIEN ACT TO ISLAM, ARABISM, AND ANY FORM OF
HUMAN DECENCY AND MORALITY.

PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, MY DEEPEST CONDOLENCES AND
SYMPATHIES TO THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS AND TO THE
GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,

HUSSEIN I

END TEXT.

2. POST WILL POUCH ORIGINAL LETTER TO NEA/ARN.

VIETS

BT

#3632

NNNN

SENSITIVE

784 28

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 770

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:
MESSAGE:

HCE301
UTSS255
RR RUEHC
DE RUEHEG #1605/01 1081608
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 181605Z APR 83
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1904
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2875
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0379
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 5745
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1950
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0291
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH 2091
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 11605
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EG, LE, US
SUBJECT: HABIB MEETING [REDACTED] LEBANON
REF: CAIRO 11302 (NOTAL)
1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY. ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR AND POLOFF
KEENE, AMBASSADOR HABIB BRIEFED [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ON CURRENT STATUS OF LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS DURING
ONE HOUR AND TWENTY MINUTE MEETING APRIL 16. HE
HIGHLIGHTED THE PRINCIPAL REMAINING ISSUES AND OUT-
LINED HIS TACTICS FOR SEEKING TO RESOLVE THEM.

[REDACTED] AS USUAL, SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. EFFORTS.
END SUMMARY.

3. HABIB BEGAN BY NOTING THAT AMBASSADOR ATHERTON
HAD BRIEFED OSAMA EL BAZ JUST A FEW DAYS PREVIOUSLY
ON THE STATE OF PLAY IN THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS
(REFTEL); HE WOULD THEREFORE CONCENTRATE ON BRINGING
[REDACTED] UP TO DATE ON DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE
PAST 4-5 DAYS. HABIB SAID HE KNEW OF NO VALID REASON
WHY AN AGREEMENT CANNOT BE COMPLETED. THERE ARE
ONLY FOUR PRINCIPAL ISSUES REMAINING, HABIB SAID:

-- THE ROLE OF SAAD HADDAD. ISRAEL WANTS HIM AS
TERRITORIAL BRIGADE COMMANDER OR COMMANDER OF THE
ENTIRE SECURITY ZONE. ([REDACTED] INTERJECTED THAT
"NO ONE WILL ACCEPT THAT. THE AMERICANS SHOULD

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M09-265/3# 38428

BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/14

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 (b) (1) (c)

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 771

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SAY NO IN CAPITAL LETTERS.") LEBANON IS WILLING TO APPOINT HADDAD AS DEPUTY BRIGADE COMMANDER FOR INTELLIGENCE, BUT CAN GO NO FURTHER.

-- LIAISON OFFICERS. ISRAEL WANTS LIAISON OFFICERS WITH LEBANESE FORCES IN THE SECURITY ZONE ([REDACTED] TERMED THIS "CONTINUED OCCUPATION"; HABIB SAID NO, BUT IT WOULD REPRESENT A RESIDUAL PRESENCE, SOMETHING THE U.S. OPPOSES);

-- UNIFIL. LEBANON WANTS A UNIFIL PRESENCE AROUND THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS TO SUPPORT THE LAF, WHILE ISRAEL OPPOSES A UNIFIL ROLE, ARGUING THAT THE PLO HAS ORGANIZED ITS FORCES BEHIND A UNIFIL SCREEN IN THE PAST. THE QUESTION NOW IS DOWN TO WHETHER THERE CAN BE ONE UNIFIL BATTALION AT SIDON, AND THAT TO BE ONE OF THE BETTER BATTALIONS;

-- JOINT MILITARY COMMITTEE. JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS AND SUPERVISORY STATIONS ARE INCLUDED UNDER THIS RUBRIC. THE TEAMS WOULD NOT BE IN LEBANON PERMANENTLY; A MAXIMUM OF 36 HOURS IS PROVIDED TO CARRY OUT A MISSION. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE NO UNILATERAL RIGHTS GIVEN TO EITHER PARTY; THE TEAMS WOULD OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF UNANIMITY. ON THE STATIONS, ISRAEL WANTS THREE AND LEBANON ONE, MAKING A COMPROMISE ON TWO LIKELY. THEY WOULD BE CLOSE ENOUGH TO THE ISRAELI BORDER TO ALLOW ISRAELI PERSONNEL TO COME AND GO. THERE WOULD BE NO PERMANENT ISRAELI PRESENCE. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE TO BE SECRET ARRANGEMENTS FOR MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS AND FOR INTELLIGENCE SHARING.

4. [REDACTED] ASKED HOW HABIB SAW THE SITUATION. HABIB SAID EVEN NOW THE AGREEMENT GOES A LONG WAY. WHEN HABIB HAD RECENTLY PROBED AMIN GEMAYEL'S LIMITS, GEMAYEL HAD SAID HE HAD ALREADY GONE BEYOND THEM. A LOT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. AS HABIB RECENTLY TOLD BEGIN, FROM ISRAEL'S POINT OF VIEW, THERE ARE A GREAT MANY POSITIVE ELEMENTS ALREADY AGREED:

- ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURITY ZONE;
- RESTRICTIONS ON ARMAMENTS AND FOREIGN PRESENCE WITHIN THE ZONE ARE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED;
- HADDAD'S FORCES ARE TO BE INTEGRATED INTO THE LAF;
- HADDAD CAN REMAIN IN A STAFF POSITION;
- SUPERVISORY STATIONS ARE TO BE ESTABLISHED;

BT
#1605
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 768

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:
MESSAGE:

HCE302
UTS5257
RR RUEHC
DE RUEHEG #1605/02 1081609
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 181605Z APR 83
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1905
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2876
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0380
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 5746
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1951
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0292
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH 2092
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 CAIRO 11605
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EG, LE, US

SUBJECT: HABIB MEETING [REDACTED]: LEBANON

- A MILITARY LIAISON SYSTEM IS TO BE CREATED;
- THERE IS TO BE INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION;
- JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS ARE TO BE CREATED;
- ISRAEL OVERFLIGHTS ARE TO GO UNCHALLENGED.

5. HABIB SAID, IN HIS OPINION, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR GEMAYEL TO ACCEPT HADDAD IN A COMMAND POSITION. TO DO SO WOULD:

- CAUSE HIM PROBLEMS WITH THE LAF;
- THREATEN HIS POLITICAL CONSENSUS, PARTICULARLY AMONG MUSLIMS, AND
- JEOPARDIZE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

WE ALL NEED TO BE CAREFUL, HABIB SAID, NOT TO GIVE SYRIA AN ARGUMENT AGAINST WITHDRAWAL ON SECURITY GROUNDS. NONE OF WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED SO FAR THREATENS SYRIAN SECURITY, BUT HADDAD'S CONTROL OF THE SOUTH COULD ARGUABLY DO SO. AT THE LEAST SYRIA COULD ARGUE THAT ITS SURROGATE, LED BY AHMED KHATIB, SHOULD BE IN CHARGE OF THE BEKAA.

6. HABIB SAID THAT AMIN GEMAYEL CONTINUES TO PERFORM WELL. GEMAYEL'S PRIORITIES INCLUDE:

- THE REMOVAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES;
- MAINTAINING THE INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSENSUS;
- BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE FORCE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY;

SENSITIVE

36
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 769

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AND

-- MAINTAINING RELATIONS WITH ARAB WORLD.
MUBARAK AGREED THE LAST POINT IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE,
POINTING TO THE FACT THAT LEBANON'S TRADE IS OVERWHELM-
INGLY WITH OTHER ARAB STATES AND THAT LEBANON IS ALSO
HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON REMITTANCES FROM LEBANESE WORKING
IN ARAB COUNTRIES.

7. HABIB THEN TURNED TO THE FEW REMAINING ISSUES
CONNECTED WITH MUTUAL RELATIONS.

-- THE FIRST IS ISRAELI INSISTENCE THAT LEBANON ABRO-
GATE DOMESTIC LEGISLATION ON THE BOYCOTT. OSAMA
OBSERVED THAT IF LEBANON DID THAT IT WOULD ITSELF BE
SUBJECT TO THE BOYCOTT. [REDACTED] AGREED, NOTING THAT
A LOT COULD BE DONE DE FACTO, BUT THAT LEBANON SHOULD
NOT PUBLICLY DECLARE AN END TO THE BOYCOTT.

-- THE SECOND ISSUE IS ISRAEL'S INSISTENCE ON A FORMAL
STATEMENT OF RECOGNITION. OSAMA SAID ISRAEL SHOULD
AT LEAST LEAVE LEBANON A FIG LEAF. HABIB ARGUED
THAT THE AGREEMENT ITSELF WILL CONSTITUTE A CLEAR
FORM OF RECOGNITION.

8. DECLARING THAT ALL THESE ISSUES NEED TO BE SETTLED
QUICKLY, HABIB SKETCHED OUT HIS TACTICS. TEN DAYS AGO
LEBANON SUBMITTED A DRAFT AGREEMENT. HABIB WILL NOW
RECOMMEND THAT LEBANON DRAFT A NEW AGREEMENT, INCLUD-
ING ALL THE SIDE ARRANGEMENTS, ASSURANCES AND UNDER-
STANDINGS. HE HOPES TO HAVE THIS DONE BY TUESDAY
AND TO SUBMIT IT ALL AS A PACKAGE DEAL WHICH THE U.S.
WOULD SUPPORT. IT IS TIME TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES.
THE IDEA IS TO FORCE THE HAND OF THE PARTIES.

9. [REDACTED] OFFERED TO DO WHATEVER HE COULD TO HELP.
HABIB TOLD [REDACTED] THAT GEMAYEL GREATLY APPRECIATES
EGYPTIAN SUPPORT. HABIB SAID LEBANON IS WORRIED THAT
THE SAUDIS MAY BE LESS THAN FULLY SUPPORTIVE. AT THE
RIGHT TIME, HABIB ASKED [REDACTED] TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO
THE SAUDIS THAT LEBANON MUST MAKE SOME CONCESSIONS TO
GET THE ISRAELIS OUT. [REDACTED] AGREED, BUT SAID GEMAYEL
BT

#1605

NNNN

SENSITIVE

31
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 767

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:
MESSAGE:

HCE303
STU0914
RR RUEHC
DE RUEHEG #1605/03 1081610
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 181605Z APR 83
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1906
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2877
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0381
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 5747
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1952
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0293
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH 2093
BT
S E C R / E T SECTION 03 OF 03 CAIRO 11605
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EG, LE, US
SUBJECT: HABIB MEETING [REDACTED]: LEBANON
SHOULD BEGIN BY EXPLAINING THIS TO THE KING AND THE
CROWN PRINCE HIMSELF. HABIB AGREED, POINTING OUT THAT
GEMAYEL WILL ALSO NEED TO GO TO DAMASCUS. [REDACTED]
TOOK THE POINT. HABIB SAID HE HIMSELF WILL ALSO GO
TO RIYADH AND DAMASCUS BUT HE NEEDS AN ISRAEL-LEBANON
AGREEMENT IN HAND BEFORE HE DOES SO. ATHERTON
BT
#1605
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

38430

41

PAGE 1 - 762

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE340

00 RUEHC RUEHME RUEHKO RUDKGPQ RUEHTH RUEHTV RUESTE
RUFHLGA RUQMMT RUEHIN RUEHCR RUDKKR RUEHOT RUDKSNQ
RUFHOC RUMJNG RUDKHLQ RUEBBRA RUFHOLC RUFHNA RUFHOK
RUQMGG RUEHNM RUEHNE RUADBEE RUMJPG RUEHNR RUFRSHH
RUEHCR RUEHMT RUEHMN RUTAMA RUQMDI RUEHMO RUEHROC
RUESXM RUMJDN RUFHMB RUEHME RUEHRB RUEHML RUESMG
RUEHCR RUEHMD RUEHMR RUEHRU RUFHML RUEHLD RUFHPC
RUEHCR RUESLM RUFHLC RUDKFDQ RUEHLP RUEHOS RUTAH
RUEHLS RUFHGG RUEHRO RUESUA RUEHBC RUEHKJ RUMJRV
RUEHRA RUFHLG RUEHIL RUESON RUEHROB RUFHGV RUEHCR
RUEHGT RUESGY RUFLAEA RUEHCR RUQMPL RUEHCR RUEHSP
RUEHRH RUEHCR RUESPR RUEHSA RUDKRP RUEHZA RUEHROD
RUFHFR RUEHCR RUTAOU RUTAAK RUMJGM RUDKPNQ RUFHLNJ
RUMJIA RUEHBY RUSSTA RUEHCV RUEHEG RUEHTN RUFHBA
RUEHCR RUMJFS RUEHVI RUFHLA RUFHML RUEHLDE RUQMDH
RUEHDM RUEHCR RUEHDO RUTADS RUEHJA RUEHCR RUFHDB
RUFHOLB RUFHOL RUSBAY RUESBG RUEHCR RUEHWN RUEHBR
RUEHBS RUDKRB RUEHLDB RUDKEBG RUFHEB RUEHCR RUEHNMB
RUMTBK RUTABO RUQMAM RUEHAD RUFHJA RUFHPBI RUDKAR
RUEHBU RUDKDA RUTAAK RUDKFMQ RUMJSA RUFHOLD RUDKSA
RUEHGP RUEHUL RUEHCR RUESUP RUESSD RUESNA RUEHSN
RUEHSJ RUQMNS RUEHSD RUMJHE RUEHCR RUTADE RUEHROA
RUTAFN RUFHFT RUEHTH RUCBNAJ RUEHAK RUEHAM RUFHRS
RUQMBI RUEHAL RUTAGN RUTABA RUFLEPA RUEHAB RUESAS
RUMJDK RUEHWL RUDKRW RUEHCR RUEHJI RUEHJM RUEHDT
RUESQI RUQMKA RUEHKB RUEHKG RUEHKL RUEHLGB RUMJHT
RUEHKB RUTAKA RUEHUB RUEHKL RUQMKW RUFHMC RUFLSHA
RUEHLG RUQMDJ

DE RUEHC #6005 1090019

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 190010Z APR 83 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE

RUEHME/USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0760

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 106005 TOSEC 030017

EXDIS, ZFF4 SECRETARY ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: GADR

TAGS: PINT, PEPR, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, US, XF

SUBJECT: LWG SITREP NO. 2 AS OF 1440 EST, APRIL 18,
1983

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM09-265/3#38430

BY RW NARA DATE 1/1/14

42
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 763

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/29/83//180

SITUATION: LEB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

2. THE LEBANESE CIVIL DEFENSE FORCE AND UNITS FROM THE FRENCH CONTINGENT TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF) HAVE RESPONDED RAPIDLY TO RENDER AID AT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BEIRUT. A COMPANY OF U.S. MARINES IS PROVIDING PERIMETER SECURITY FOR THE CHANCERY. HEAVY EQUIPMENT HAS ARRIVED ON THE SCENE AND RUBBLE-CLEARING OPERATIONS ARE UNDERWAY WITH THE HELP OF FLOODLIGHTS.

DCM PUGH INFORMED US AT 1435 EST THAT RESCUE OPERATIONS WOULD GO ON THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. PUGH SAID THAT THE LEFT CENTER SECTION OF THE CHANCERY, WHICH HOUSED A NUMBER OF EMBASSY OFFICES, COLLAPSED INTO RUBBLE FROM THE SEVENTH FLOOR ON DOWN. THE EMBASSY CAFETERIA WAS TOTALLY DESTROYED AND A LARGE SECTION OF THE CONSULAR SECTION WAS ALSO DESTROYED. THE EMBASSY COMMISSARY WAS BURNED OUT AND THE USIS LIBRARY, LOCATED IN THE CHANCERY, WAS BLOWN IN BY THE FORCE OF THE EXPLOSION. THERE ARE SEVERAL USIA FOREIGN SERVICE NATIONAL EMPLOYEES STILL MISSING AND THEIR BODIES ARE PRESUMED TO BE IN THE RUBBLE. AMB. DILLON NARROWLY ESCAPED SERIOUS INJURY WHEN A SLAB OF CONCRETE FELL ON HIS LEGS AND PINNED HIM DOWN UNTIL HE COULD BE RESCUED. SIX BODIES OF U.S. PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN RECOVERED AND IDENTIFIED; NOTIFICATION OF NEXT-OF-KIN IS UNDERWAY.

PUGH SAID THAT THE CHANCERY WAS NO LONGER USABLE AND IN HIS OPINION IT IS PROBABLY BEYOND REPAIR BECAUSE OF SEVERE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND LAF COMMANDER TANNOUS VISITED THE CHANCERY AFTER THE EXPLOSION AND TALKED WITH AMB. DILLON. PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN ALSO CAME TO THE CHANCERY. A TEMPORARY CHANCERY WILL BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE AT A BUILDING NEAR THE DESTROYED CHANCERY. DAM

BT
#6005
NNNN

SENSITIVE