

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90275

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

DATE: Friday, March 11, 1983
LOCATION: The Situation Room
TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

PR

I. PURPOSE

To review our Lebanon policy.

II. BACKGROUND

This weekend Foreign Minister Shamir and a party of senior Israelis will be visiting Washington for consultations with Secretary Shultz, primarily on Lebanon. The Israelis have informed us of Shamir's hope to see you. I think you should see him, but George will probably not want to offer a meeting until the consultations at State are already underway. We should discuss this with George. It is expected that the Lebanese Foreign Minister Salem will also be visiting early next week. As of now no tri-lateral meetings are planned but clearly major decisions will have to be taken in the next week concerning the next steps in Lebanon. As you know, Phil Habib is now back in Washington and will also be in a position to report on his understanding of the latest positions of the parties.

Attached at Tab B is a memorandum from George, outlining the issues that have to be resolved in the coming weeks. State's thinking at the moment is that Habib should return to the Middle East after the Shamir and Salem visits to try to persuade the Lebanese to table a draft agreement and to state publicly that all foreign forces must be out of Lebanon by a certain date.

Tomorrow's meeting will be a review and information session. We will probably have to hold another meeting after the the two foreign ministers leave to give Phil further instructions before returning to the area.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Will be provided.

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IV. PRESS PLAN

None.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

See Agenda (Tab C).

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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SYSTEM II
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March 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz
Subject: Lebanon Negotiations: Visits by Israeli and
Lebanese Foreign Ministers

The next two or three weeks could prove crucial in terms of the Lebanon negotiations. Lack of early movement could also impact on the larger peace process. The visits to Washington of Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir and emissaries from Lebanon provide us with an opportunity and a challenge. There are a number of substantive and tactical considerations that confront us as we prepare for these visits. The talks inevitably will receive wide attention. We must take as much advantage from them as we can while recognizing that there will be limits to what we can accomplish. We hope, however, to use them as a means of bringing Lebanon to a decisive phase.

Shamir is visiting at his Government's suggestion, apparently propelled by Defense Minister Arens who called me last weekend to suggest the trip. At least initially, the Israelis seemed to wish to focus on SA-5 missiles in Syria, a concern we share, perhaps as a demonstration that despite other differences the U.S. and Israel stand together against the Soviet Union as strategic allies. While welcoming Shamir's visit, I made it clear that we also wished to have in-depth discussions on Lebanon. The Israelis readily agreed, and we informed Jerusalem we were also inviting a Lebanese ministerial delegation in order that the current position of both sides could be discussed with us. Phil Habib will arrive this afternoon to help prepare for the talks.

Shamir and his delegation will arrive on Friday and will rest on Saturday. We foresee the return of Ambassador Draper and General Cooley for the talks, which will begin Sunday morning and may conclude as early as Monday afternoon. The Lebanese will probably arrive on the weekend. If we sense an opportunity to move the negotiations significantly while both delegations are here, we might consider recommending tripartite meetings. This seems unlikely at this point since Shamir and his Lebanese counterpart will probably be on very short leashes with authority only to "consult." More likely is that the

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Lebanese will press for a meeting with you as the Israelis already are doing. I will make a recommendation once we have had our initial talks with the Israelis.

We have reached a difficult point in the negotiations, with Israel having informed Phil Habib last week that proposals he had worked out after pushing the Lebanese as far as he could were not sufficient to meet Israel's requirements regarding either security or normalization. The proposals on security were found wanting because Israel claims the Lebanese Armed Forces alone lack the capability to prevent a return of the PLO to South Lebanon, necessitating some form of continued Israeli involvement on the ground there. However, Shamir will hopefully bring with him alternative proposals designed to meet Israeli security needs without the early warning stations demanded thus far. He will also apparently bring several ideas on mutual relations between Israel and Lebanon, an area in which the Israelis appear convinced there will be no incentives for Lebanese movement following withdrawal of Israeli forces.

For their part, the Lebanese are convinced they have gone as far as they can without totally jeopardizing any chances for Lebanese cohesion and Arab aid, or risking a Syrian refusal to join in the withdrawal process. Phil Habib is certain that the traffic in Lebanon will bear little more, and President Gemayel reminded him a week ago of your commitment to him last fall that the U.S. would not press Lebanon to the point that its relations with the Arab world would be jeopardized.

Our tentative thinking shared by Phil Habib is that following the meetings here he will return to the Middle East with the goal of eventually encouraging the Lebanese to table a draft agreement and to state publicly that all foreign forces must be out of Lebanon by a date certain. Such a scenario would require delicate handling and coordination. To have a real chance for success, we would have to support publicly the Lebanese position. We will review the bidding and have recommendations for you before Phil leaves again for the Middle East.

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