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February 4, 1983


MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: National Security Council Planning
Group Decisions ~~(S)~~

At the meeting of the NSPG on Lebanon on Friday, February 4, 1983, the following decisions were made:

- o Ambassador Habib is authorized to return to the Middle East to pursue negotiations with the Governments of Israel and Lebanon on the American plan already submitted. He should also confirm the Syrian and PLO commitment to withdraw from Lebanon and seek to conclude a final schedule and other related arrangements for the withdrawal.
- o In the event that the proposals in the current plan for the security zone in southern Lebanon are unacceptable to Israel, Habib is authorized to say that the United States is prepared to deploy additional units of its contingent of the MNF into the southern zone temporarily until Lebanese and/or other non-Israeli forces are capable of securing the area. The Department of State is requested to forward proposals for discreet consultations with Congress no later than noon, February 5.
- o The President requested that studies begin immediately on "worst case" scenarios and policies in the event that current negotiations fail. These should include both positive and negative incentives we can use with the Arabs and Israelis to bring a speedy withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and progress on the September 1 peace initiative. ~~(S)~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT:


William P. Clark

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BY any DATE 11/15/05
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- If Begin is unreceptive, Phil would seek agreement with Gemayel on a draft which Lebanon would then table with our public support. Phil would press Gemayel to make his best offer on both normalization and security.
- In either case, Phil would go to Syria and Saudi Arabia to assure firm support for whatever Gemayel intends to accept.

Key Issues

The key issues are: a timetable for withdrawal of all foreign forces, security arrangements, and normalization arrangements.

The key on withdrawal is for Lebanon to receive, and publicly announce that it has received, firm assurances of Syrian and PLO willingness to withdraw.

On security, we still prefer a role for UNIFIL in the South. If Israel objects, however, we should be ready to offer as a fallback the MNF with U.S. participation in the security zone. (Previously we have only discussed an expanded MNF along the highway east of Beirut.) Although such an offer entails high risks with Congress and the public, it will demonstrate the extent of our commitment to Israeli security, may yield trade-offs on normalization, and may attract Begin while isolating Sharon.

On normalization, the Israelis must understand that the Lebanese might provide some de facto normalization, but not de jure -- and still maintain internal consensus and wide Arab support. But with our urging and Saudi support, the Lebanese may be able to go farther than they have offered thus far.

During Phil's Mission

We hope that Israel will now agree to work with us toward common goals. However, while Phil is in the area, we should consider what steps we might take if agreement is not reached. In particular, if our diplomatic efforts fail, we may want to consider shifting the focus to the Peace Process (specifically, West Bank settlements), where our hand may be stronger, and the rewards greater, than in Lebanon.

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