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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE, TIME Wednesday, April 21, 1982
AND PLACE: The Cabinet Room -- 10:30-11:40 A.M.

SUBJECT: Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President

State
Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Mr. Richard Burt, Director, Politico/
Military Affairs

OSD
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
Under Secretary Fred C. Ikle

OMB
Associate Director William Schneider

CIA
Director William J. Casey

USUN
Ambassador Kenneth Adelman

JCS
General David C. Jones

ACDA
Director Eugene V. Rostow
Ambassador Edward L. Rowny

White House
Mr. Edwin Meese, III
Mr. James A. Baker, III
Mr. Michael K. Deaver
Judge William P. Clark
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Admiral John M. Poindexter
Mr. Richard G. Darman

The Vice President's Office
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

NSC
Colonel Michael O. Wheeler
Mr. Sven Kraemer
Lt Col Robert Linhard

Minutes

Judge Clark: Mr. President, today we will beginning final preparations in the NSC process to develop the U.S. negotiating position for START. There are divergent views on many of the complex issues involved. That is healthy. We will begin today with a presentation by Richard Burt (Department of State) on the START interagency process thus far.

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Review April 21, 2002
Classified and Extended by William P. Clark
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

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Mr. Burt: Mr. President, the START IG has been at work for over a year. I am here as Chairman of the IG, not representing the special interest of State. With the help of these charts, I will be reviewing the framework for the U.S. negotiating approach.

Our central purpose today is to begin discussion on the framework of an opening START position. Our central question is what element of strategic nuclear forces we want to reduce. A corollary question is to what levels we want to reduce. The basic objectives of a U.S. position, we believe, should be those of: (1) military sufficiency (NSDD-13); (2) strategic stability; (3) significant reductions (military useful and politically necessary); (4) politically plausible; and (5) verifiable.

The question of what should be reduced is the question of "units account." Different options and combinations of options have been examined in the START IG. The units include: (1) ballistic missile warheads; (2) launchers; (3) missile throw-weight; (4) warhead weight; (5) bombers; and (6) bomber armament.

Criteria for selecting units of account include: (1) easily understood (to gain wide support); (2) deal with important asymmetries (especially heavy missiles); (3) tough but plausible; (4) protect Allied interest; (5) generally consistent with INF; and (6) flexible and durable framework for negotiations.

The strategic balance in 1982, as the chart shows, is roughly as follows. In deployed missile warheads, the USSR is slightly ahead (7500 to 7100). In SALT-accountable missile warheads (including Poseidon), the U.S. is slightly ahead (9500 to 8800). In strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the Soviets have a substantial lead (2763 to 1944). In missile throw-weight, the Soviets have a very substantial lead (5.1 to 1.9 kilogram). In bombers, including Backfire, the Soviets lead 415 to 347; however, the U.S. leads in numbers of bomber weapons.

In terms of agency approaches to the units of account issue, all agencies favor radical cuts in the number of warheads to levels of 4,000 or 5,000. On launchers, State favors a limit of 1,500; other agencies do not favor launcher limits. On throw weight, State favors reductions in heavy missiles and ICBM warheads; ACDA favors a warhead weight limit; and OSD favors reductions to U.S. level. On bombers, all favor levels of about 250. The Chief Negotiator, Ambassador Rowny, has his own proposal and will make some comments later. We understand that JCS will also be expressing their own views.

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In terms of our analysis, we have sought to evaluate the different units of account and their possible combination in terms of the criteria we identified above. As a focus for our discussion, we have proposed seven questions as follows: (1) How does our choice of units of account help us to achieve significant reductions and also protect our military requirements? (2) How does our choice of units of account build or undercut support for the President's strategic modernization program and for the defense program as a whole? What is the political environment surrounding START? (3) How does the choice of units of account build or undercut support of the U.S. position: with the the public, in Congress, and with our Allies? (4) Is continuity with SALT I and SALT II good or bad? (5) How does verification bear on the choice of the U.S. negotiating proposal? (6) Are some proposals more resilient than others? What is the relationship between our negotiating position and the likely course of the negotiations? (7) Do we require equality in every important measure of strategic capability? What are the requirements of Public Law 92-448 (the "Jackson Amendment" to SALT I).

Judge Clark: General Jones, would you care to say a few words on the JCS views?

General Jones: We have a problem with our ability, should we achieve "significant" reductions, to certify military sufficiency of our remaining assets in terms of the policy guidance we have received, as in NSDD-13. Our guidance has given us very severe requirements on destroying the Soviet target structure. We would require 13,000-15,000 strategic weapons vice the 9,000 we have today to carry out this guidance, and these weapons would need to be of much better quality. We actually need increased and better weapons.

Mr. Meese. What policy guidance do you mean?

General Jones: NSDD-13 and the SIOP, etc. Such guidance might be adjusted; for example, with a launch-on-warning strategy. But our guidance requires more than the 9,000 weapons we have today against the [REDACTED] we have indentified. I have brought three charts with me which demonstrate what I mean:

-- The first chart, on the U.S. weapons Five-Year Defense Plan, shows that we will be going from our current 9,000 weapons to [REDACTED]

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-- The second chart, based on the latest NIE, shows that the number of Soviet warheads will increase from present levels, close to ours, to some [REDACTED] 1991, and that these will be heavily missile-oriented (i.e., first-strike weapons), whereas ours will contain a large bomber weapon (second strike) element.

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- The third chart shows that if the different agencies' START proposals are fully implemented, the U.S. warhead numbers and requirements do not drop, but actually rise, as will be the case when we deploy B-1 and Trident.

This leaves us with two dilemmas. In terms of the guidance we have, the agencies' proposals focus on missile warhead reductions, while we will actually need to grow in number of bomber- and submarine-force weapons. But in that case, we may be perceived as not seeking significant reductions. We in the JCS do not have the answer to these dilemmas, but we certainly feel that the issues are considerably more complex than the chart presented by the State briefer.

Secretary Weinberger: General Jones' statement is very important.

Mr. President, we need a proposal to be complete and ready before the European Summit. We need something like a Memorial Day T.V. address, which will drive the process, will dominate the Summit, and will demonstrate to all the Administration's seriousness about arms control. As for the criteria of being politically plausible, we should not hesitate to ask the Soviets to reduce more than we do, since to do otherwise, would be to freeze their superiority. You made the same point prior to your November 18 speech, when some told us that the public here and in Europe would not buy it. But the Soviets have not refused to negotiate, and your proposal still enjoys high public support in Europe and here.

General Jones pointed out some problems with reductions. Let me make some points. Our approach should not build on SALT; launchers will not be the basic units of account. The SALT launcher emphasis permitted an enormous Soviet buildup. Warheads are not the proper measure, since they do not account for the effectiveness of deterrence or include categories like accuracy, yield, or hard-target capability. We believe throw weight is the overall measure of effectiveness, and that we need to reduce it to achieve real reductions. As for NSDD-13, I believe it does not really apply if we realize Soviet restraints under a new agreement. I believe it applies if there are no Soviet restraints. One other point is that your proposal will probably demand on-site verification, and this will put the Soviets on the defensive, since the public generally supports the idea.

Dr. Rostow: I want to back up Cap (Weinberger) about the issue of being fair to the Soviets. We should not negotiate for them; they do a good job for themselves. The ACDA approach is best for

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the U.S.; it is serious and plausible. I am helping prepare Soviet and U.S. public opinion for the June speeches, and I am getting a good response. Our approach is plausible and is based on INF experience. Then we asked for asymmetrical reductions, explained our rationale, and had our positions accepted by U.S. and European opinion. Our rationale is that we must have deterrence, and that we must limit, or eliminate, the first-strike systems. Our mistake in the 70's was to think that the Soviets, like we, did not want first-strike capability. Now we must insist on equal deterrence to the bulk of their threat. At present, the Soviets can knock out our ICBMs with one-fifth of their forces. Our proposal would take away two-thirds of their first-strike capability. A first-strike would no longer be plausible, and we would greatly reduce the nightmare paralyzing our people.

The anti-nuclear movement is important. But, perhaps, more troubling is what I sense to be a return to isolationism. There are more people now, who in the face of the Soviets' buildup, want to pull U.S. troops out of Europe and to fold the U.S. inward. Note Congressman Rhodes' recent speech and the McNamara/Bundy article. Also, Henry Kissinger said in Brussels that great powers don't commit suicide for other nations. We have real problems; I think we really need to restore our credibility.

The ACDA proposal involves a simple formula. It involves a limit on the number of warheads that can kill, and it limits the measure of destructive power for the most rapid and most accurate weapons. Our proposal meets all of the criteria. ACDA right now is focusing on limiting the weight of the warheads, but we are not hard on this way of limiting warheads.

There is a mistake in Rick Burt's chart. ACDA does favor an explicit limit on the number of ICBM warheads, even though this would be asymmetrical reductions. We reject State's position of limiting the number of deployed launchers. State's position has overtones of SALT, which would be damaging, and which could also interfere with future U.S. force developments. On the 4,000 warhead limit, we will work the warhead number in terms of the important military considerations stated by General Jones. It could be 4, 5, or 6 thousand or whatever.

General Jones: Let me correct something stated earlier (by Secretary Weinberger). The number I used, of some [REDACTED] required, does take Soviet reductions in a START environment into account.

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Dr. Ikle: But the reduced Soviet numbers in a START environment would in the longer term not include the large Soviet first-strike forces. Therefore, U.S. requirements would be different. Wouldn't they?

Dr. Rostow: Let me get back to the deployed launcher issue. Such a limit would in time block potential U.S. multiple aim-point systems, which could become much more feasible with a smaller missile force. It could also require a change of definition from SALT II in terms of U.S. M-X deployments. Also, we may want to move to more smaller weapons to provide for deterrence, especially if we eliminate MIRVs and eliminate first-strike systems. In sum, we feel the U.S. approach should include limitations on the number of warheads, especially ICBM warheads, and limitations on the measure of destructive power, such as throw weight.

Mr. Casey: I will limit my comments to the U.S. ability to monitor the specific units of account. Details are provided in the paper we have submitted. I believe the units of account should be decided on the basis of security requirements. The specific units of accounts have not been worked out yet. Once we have decided what they are, we will need to see how these affect Soviet capabilities and how these need to be limited. One needs to look at problems of refires, telemetry, concealment, etc.

Dr. Schneider: I am concerned about the emphasis in these options on warhead count. I know the concern on the Hill, from Senators who criticized SALT II, will not be met with a focus on warheads. I favor an emphasis on throw-weight limitations.

The President: I agree that we should not have a negotiation position taking an approach linked to SALT. It's obvious that if we do, some will push us to ratify SALT II, which we think is lousy.

Isn't one of the problems with limiting warheads that we cannot easily verify their numbers? That is really an important issue.

Secretary Haig: The thing most difficult to verify would be throw weight, also accuracy.

Dr. Rostow: Ambassador Dobrynin and Premier Brezhnev (in his Spiegel interview) agreed to go beyond national technical means of verification to other measures, in an appropriate START atmosphere.

The President: The land-based missiles are certainly the most important of all. Are they difficult to verify?

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We have to reduce the first-strike sudden threat of the missiles. The bombers take 12 hours to arrive and are easier to spot. The submarines are not so accurate; and both the submarines and bombers can be attacked before they shoot their missiles. The ICBM is different. The greatest psychological factor has to be an emphasis on the land-based missiles and their special threat.

Ambassador Rowny: You are absolutely right. Those missiles are the most destabilizing weapons. SALT II allowed them to build and deploy more.

Dr. Rostow: That's right. They are the most destabilizing weapons.

Judge Clark: Secretary Haig, I believe you wanted to address some of the political aspects.

Secretary Haig: Your decision on the framework of our START position will probably be the most important of your Presidency.

In the past, we let the Soviets build up. McNamara constrained and froze our systems. Then the U.S. let the Soviets go beyond our numbers and never challenged them. Now the Soviets have caught up with us in technology, and they are ahead of us in throw weight.

It is important to remember that the START arms control does not occur in a vacuum. It is related to our overall defense policy, including especially, our strategic modernization program, especially the M-X. The Administration must move quickly, vis-a-vis the Hill, with an agreed deployment mode. This issue is intimately inter-related with START.

All agencies' proposals mark a clear departure from SALT II. All require substantial and asymmetrical Soviet reductions. The real question is whether we are going to have a real, credible, and plausible position. The JCS charts are most revealing. One of them shows that the span of differences among the proposals are not so wide. What really matters is how plain and simple our proposal is. The greatest strength of the November 18 proposal was its simplicity.

I am not impressed by specific numbers, unless these are geared to our own defense requirements. That means we have to preserve the M-X at all cost.

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On limiting throw weight, I am worried about verification. The SS-18's have [REDACTED] kilograms alone. We need a dramatic proposal to reverse the momentum over the peace movement and put you on the side of the Angels. We need to take a look higher than

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that of the IG at the issues. The IG's work so far has been superb. We have heard the IG Chairman, Rick Burt's, presentation. The remaining questions center on the units of measure and on ceilings. You can be proud of your IG.

Finally, I agree with Cap (Weinberger); you need to make your announcement on START before you go to Europe.

The President: It's too bad we cannot do in START what we did in INF, or what Ike (Eisenhower) proposed on all nuclear weapons. First, we need to restore the balance.

Judge Clark: By the May 3 NSC meeting, we will need to work on these issues.

Secretary Weinberger: On the M-X, we had to make a decision involving interim basing. We wanted to get the M-X into existing silos, which was better than to leave them in warehouses. Congress rejected that. Now Congress wants us to decide on a defense basing mode and a permanent one by December 1. That's like asking NIH to come up with a cancer cure by December 1. Dense Pack looks promising for M-X, but we need to do further studies.

The President: How many Titan missile silos do we have (for M-X)?

Secretary Weinberger: There are 52 Titan silos. The Titans are an older generation system. Generally, the Soviets have deployed fifth generation missiles, with the sixth generation follow-on coming down the road, while we are in the fourth generation.

The President: What about those SS-16's? Are they in Kamchatka? I am concerned about our West Coast and Alaska.

Secretary Weinberger: They are very hideable.

Judge Clark: We will be meeting again the week of May 3.

The meeting adjourned at 11:40 a.m.

Attachments

1. START IG Charts (Prepared by Dept of State) -- Presented at Meeting
2. JCS Charts -- Presented at Meeting

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REVIEW OF START POLICY ISSUES

This package consists of the following elements:

A. Agency positions on units of account, with the comments of the Chairman of the START delegation and the intelligence community.

B. Options on interim restraints.

C. Discussion of other START issues.

On the first issue, units of account, a decision is necessary to permit formulation of the US proposal and to enable the President to address the START issue publicly and in a timely manner. A decision on interim restraints must be commensurate with our unit of account position and can be made only following such a decision. Of the other START issues before us, some fall into place in connection with a units of account decision, while others will need further review. The final section, therefore, is intended for discussion only.

A. Units of Account

Option 1: Position of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

The Office of the Secretary of Defense believes that a Reagan Administration START proposal should depart clearly, in form and substance, from the SALT I and II agreements in order to achieve real arms control.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense proposes sharp reductions in the two principal units of account -- ballistic missile warheads, which we would reduce by about 50% to 4000 on each side, and ballistic missile throw-weight, which we would fix equally at a level slightly below the current US level (and 40% of the current Soviet level). We believe that this proposal, which deliberately departs from the flawed approach of the past, offers our best chance to negotiate a stable equilibrium with sharp reductions.

SALT I and II gave the appearance, but not the reality, of significant limits on Soviet strategic power. A START proposal that parallels the structure of SALT II, as recommended by agencies that would limit warheads and launchers alone, would drive the Administration into a repetition of past mistakes and produce a START treaty that would resemble the SALT II treaty against which it campaigned successfully. Such a SALT II style proposal would increase pressures to proceed with ratification of SALT II while we negotiate START, thus undercutting efforts to negotiate substantial reductions. Indeed, a SALT II style proposal would leave the Administration with no credible argument for resisting ratification of the existing SALT II treaty.

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The principal failure of the SALT II treaty was its perpetuation of a 2.5-to-1 Soviet advantage in ballistic missile throw-weight. So fundamental was this inequity that the Senate Armed Services Committee, in opposing the treaty as "not in the national security interests of the United States," listed first among the changes it proposed "remedying such inequalities as the Soviet advantage in ICBM throw-weight..."

Now we find the Department of State opposed to the US START proposal calling for equal throw-weight at sharply reduced levels. Indeed, the Department of State wishes to remain silent on the subject of throw-weight, even though it is here that the Soviets enjoy their most dramatic margin of superiority. We believe that a failure even to ask for equal sharply reduced levels of ballistic missile throw-weight would be inconsistent with PL 92-448, a Public Law passed following SALT I that called on the President to achieve strict equality in any future treaty.

The Department of State argues that we can obtain equal throw-weight as an indirect consequence of other features of a new START proposal. But without articulating the principle of equality in throw-weight and incorporating that principle prominently in our START proposal, we believe that equal throw-weight will inevitably be sacrificed in the give-and-take of bargaining as we head down the familiar path of a SALT II treaty -- limiting only the number of warheads and launchers.

The OSD position's emphasis on sharp reductions to a low and equal level of warheads and throw-weight would distinguish the approach of the Reagan Administration from its predecessors, meet the requirements of PL 92-448, throw the spotlight on the area where the Soviets have (and have insisted on retaining) an immense advantage, and provide a principled position that we could sustain effectively in the face of Soviet and other hostile opposition.

Among the arguments advanced for not proposing equal throw-weight the least convincing is that equal throw-weight will prove difficult to negotiate. In SALT I and II, the US effort suffered from the tendency to compromise our goals even before the negotiations got underway -- with the inevitable result that we found ourselves concluding agreements that reflected Soviet objectives, permitted the Soviet build-up to continue and protected and legitimized the Soviet margin of superiority. We must have the courage to make proposals that are defensible, fair and balanced, even if they will be somewhat more difficult to negotiate. Enshrining the principle of equality throughout is the most effective way to do so.

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Option 2: ACDA Position

Our START approach should significantly reduce missile destructive capability, and therefore should reduce the number and destructive power of ballistic missile warheads. The essential elements of this approach can be described clearly and succinctly: A cut of roughly half the total number of missile warheads, and a substantial reduction in their destructive power as well. Reductions should be phased over five years.

Warhead number. One key measure of destructive capability is the number of warheads. As missile accuracy improves, most targets can be destroyed by a single reliable warhead of nominal size. The US should press for substantial reduction in the total number of missile warheads, to an equal level of perhaps 4000 on each side, which would be roughly one-half the present numbers. A sublimit would permit no more than 2500 warheads on ICBMs. Such an approach would force the Soviets to dismantle more than half of their present ICBM force. Substantial Soviet ICBM reductions are essential if we are to achieve our objectives of enhanced deterrence and stability.

Destructive power. Limits on warheads alone would not be sufficient for an equitable agreement, since some warheads are substantially larger and more destructive than others. Soviet warheads are on average larger than US warheads, and if only warhead numbers were limited, there would be an incentive to increase missile and warhead size. To constrain such increases, and the corresponding breakout capability, there should be limits on warhead size.

A straightforward way to accomplish this would be to place limits on the weight of RVs. Any RV with a weight above the ceiling would be counted more than one, in proportion to its weight. In the long run, the weight threshold should be low, e.g., 200 kilograms (roughly the size of the MM-III RV); in the near term transitional period, the threshold could be higher, e.g., 450 kg. The low warhead ceiling could be phased in over a number of years to give the sides time to adjust their forces, and transitional arrangements could be made for existing systems. In order to limit breakout potential, the throw-weight of missiles could be limited to no more than twice the weight of their RVs. The essential point is that the unit of account for START should measure destructive capability of strategic forces and should therefore constrain the number and size of warheads. Such an RV weight limit would force the Soviets to reduce their ICBM throw-weight by half in the near term, with further reductions when current systems are replaced.

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Constraints on RV weight and the ratio between RV weight and throw-weight can be verified with less uncertainty than constraints on throw-weight. In addition, constraints on throw-weight alone could be circumvented by the Soviets, since the Soviets could reduce throw-weight without reducing the number and size of warheads, e.g., by replacing MIRV missiles with single RV missiles.

Negotiations should focus attention on reductions in missile forces, rather than on bombers and cruise missiles, which do not pose the same first-strike threat and face unconstrained defenses. In the context of Soviet agreement to substantial reductions in missile forces along the lines of the U.S. proposal, the U.S. could accept a separate limit of 250 heavy bomber aircraft.

OPTION 3: State Department Position

SALT II provides an unacceptable framework for our approach to START. The prominent focus of our policy must be to achieve substantial reductions in destabilizing systems, which SALT II clearly failed to do. A START approach which seeks equal deterrence in a direct and understandable way will achieve broad support in the US and with our allies.

This option provides the best means of focusing on destabilizing weapons and current Soviet advantages:

- It would require both sides to reduce to an equal ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads, no more than half of which would be ICBM warheads. (SALT II placed no direct limits on warheads.)

- In addition to requiring major reductions in the Soviet ICBM force as a whole through warhead limits, this approach could require specific reductions in the most destabilizing Soviet system, the SS-18, the elimination of which could be linked to an offer to forego deployment of the MX. (SALT II allowed the Soviets a unilateral right to 308 SS-18s.)

- Also, to enhance verification and eliminate the current Soviet superiority in launchers, this approach would require reductions to a common ceiling of 1500 missile launchers and bombers. (The SALT II ceiling was 50% higher.)

This approach would place the President center stage as a man of peace and vision, committed to negotiating seriously to reduce nuclear weapons, thus allowing us to seize the political high ground on an issue of intense public concern.

A major strength of this approach is that it would achieve military equality without the serious military and political problems of direct limits on missile throw-weight.

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- Throw-weight is not a good indicator of overall strategic capability. Despite their current advantage, no one suggests that the Soviets are two-and-a-half times stronger than the US. With improvements in technology (particularly accuracy), throw-weight has become (and will continue to be) a factor of declining importance in measuring strategic capability.

- Throw-weight is not an easily understood indicator of strategic capability. Most Americans do not know what throw-weight is.

- Seeking direct throw-weight limits is likely to lead to an agreement with ceilings considerably above actual or projected US levels, which would perpetuate the Soviet advantage, while permitting the US only cosmetic equality.

- Direct throw-weight limits would lead the Soviets to introduce bomber payload into the negotiations, which could lead to restraints on bombers that the US could not accept.

- Direct throw-weight limits present serious verification problems. The intelligence community indicates that there is a range of uncertainty of twenty percent above and below our best estimate of Soviet missile throw-weight (i.e., one million kilograms, equal to the throw-weight of 130 SS-18s).

- A throw-weight limit set at or near current US levels -- such as the OSD proposal -- would play directly into the hands of the Soviets. The Soviets would take maximum advantage of this propaganda opportunity by arguing that the US position would require only the USSR to make reductions. While any approach which protects US interests must require the Soviets to reduce more than the US, we must avoid presenting our proposal in a way which is so blatantly one-sided.

Option 3, on the other hand, would require the Soviets to make significant reductions in destructive potential without these obvious obstacles. It would focus on important and easily understood indicators of strategic power and would therefore achieve broad public support in the US and with our allies. It would enhance the credibility of US arms control policy and strengthen the President's position during his trip to Europe and to the UN in June.

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Views of the Chairman of the START Delegation

The Chairman of the START Delegation believes that a combination of significant reductions in ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight provides the most effective overall constraint on the destructive capability of Soviet forces. In order to enhance our primary objective -- deterrence -- the United States should seek reductions in ballistic missile warheads over the first five years of an agreement to a level of perhaps 6000, with ICBM warheads limited to one-half of that total.

How the reductions are phased over time is important to our security and to the negotiability of an agreement. In other words, the goals we seek in terms of lower numbers of warheads, throw-weight and bombers can be announced at the commencement of START without specifying when we expect to achieve these goals. If the Soviets argue that these goals are not plausible, we can stretch out the time in which these goals are to be achieved. Deeper reductions, down to a level of perhaps 5000 ballistic missile warheads, should be sought over a longer, ten-year period. The final warhead level should ensure US ability to carry out its military objectives against reduced Soviet forces and preserve a viable triad.

The US START position should also include an initial limit on aggregate ballistic missile throw-weight set at approximately one-half of current Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight. Throw-weight is the only significant measure which completely identifies the capability of missiles and which prevents the Soviets from exploiting the destructive potential of their heavier missiles. Limits on launchers or on reentry vehicle size, without limits on throw-weight, would allow the Soviets to deploy considerably more warheads on their existing missiles if there were a breakout or termination of the treaty. A throw-weight/warhead weight ratio would require the parties to agree, in effect, to a throw-weight aggregate, but adds another element of complexity to negotiating an agreement.

Reducing Soviet warheads and throw-weight to these levels would put significant bounds on the ICBM survivability problem we now face, would make it easier to deploy MX in a survivable mode, and would be readily understandable. Although the USSR would initially retain a throw-weight advantage, the US should make clear its objective of bringing Soviet throw-weight down to the US level in ten years.

Bombers should be limited separately from ballistic missiles because they are not effective first-strike weapons and because US bombers face unconstrained Soviet air defenses. We should seek equal ceilings on the number of heavy bombers. The initial level should be set at about 350 with phased, ten-year reductions

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to a level of perhaps 250. The final level should be sufficient to ensure continued penetrability and to allow for the conventional mission of heavy bombers. Bomber weapons should not be limited.

Any agreement must be effectively verified. This includes at a minimum access to unencrypted telemetry and going beyond national technical means.

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COMMENTS ON UNITS OF ACCOUNT

Verification

In general, the Intelligence Community believes that high confidence levels in monitoring units of account, where achievable, will require access to flight test data, prohibitions on concealment, type and counting rules and agreed definitions. In many cases, cooperative measures would be needed to enhance and supplement national technical means. Our capabilities to monitor the units of account under consideration are summarized below. It should be noted that the relative verifiability of these units of account depends on factors such as specific treaty provisions and collateral constraints, which are beyond the scope of this paper. In addition, there are factors, such as refire missiles, which could have a significant impact on verification but would affect equally all the units of account.

1. Ballistic Missile Launchers

High confidence in counting SLBM and fixed ICBM launchers can be achieved with national technical means and appropriate counting rules. For land-mobile ICBM launchers, intrusive measures would be required for high confidence.

2. Deployed Ballistic Missile Warheads

With flight test data and counting rules, we would have high confidence in the number of warheads to be attributed to each missile system and high confidence in the aggregate deployed warhead count for SLBMs and fixed ICBM launchers.

3. Deployed Ballistic Missile Throw-Weight

With flight test data, we can determine maximum demonstrated throw-weight for each system within 10-25%, but without usable telemetry, uncertainty would more than double for new systems. At present, with virtually no uncertainty

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in launcher count for ICBMs and SLBMs, current throw-weight uncertainty for the Soviet forces is 20%, i.e., 5 million + 1 million kilograms. Changes to throw-weight on an existing

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4. Monitoring Warhead Weight

At present, our capability to monitor warhead weight is analogous to throw-weight (10-25% per warhead). This capability will improve somewhat to 10-15% this fall with a new collector.

5. Throw-Weight/Warhead Weight Relationship

[REDACTED]

The Intelligence Community also points out that the absence of restrictions on new ICBM launcher construction could introduce difficult monitoring problems.

Soviet Reactions

Deep Reductions. The Soviets have said they will consider deep reductions if US FBS, third country systems, and long-range cruise missiles are taken into account. However, it is doubtful that they would agree to SNDV ceilings below 2000 at least in the near term, and they will resist including Backfire in this ceiling.

New Units of Limitations. The Soviets probably would be receptive to a combination of launcher and warhead limits but not in isolation from bomber loadings and cruise missiles. They would be unwilling to reduce their heavy missile forces unless they received major U.S. concessions. They would also be unwilling to accept throw-weight limitations which they would see as amounting to unilateral reductions.

Verification. The Soviets are unlikely to go much beyond NTM and cooperative measures similar to those agreed to in SALT II, despite Soviet hints to the contrary. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets would agree to on-site inspection or other intrusive measures. They probably will resist attempts to tighten SALT II limits on telemetry denial.

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Allied Reactions

The Allies will back any U.S. proposal that is seen to be credible, simple and straightforward, calls for reductions in existing and future deployments, does not hinge unduly on verification, and includes Backfire (if it is not included in INF talks). They will want START and INF to be linked. They will want to be consulted on the U.S. approach to START and may seek the establishment of a formal mechanism for this purpose in NATO. They will be deeply concerned about the impact of the U.S. approach on domestic public opinion.

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C. Other START Issues

A number of issues require resolution before finalization of the US START package. However, it is not necessary for the NSC to make decisions on these issues at this time. The IG will provide recommendations to the NSC after resolution of the primary issues of unit of account and level of reductions.

Issues on which there is interagency agreement:

1. Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs)

The US should not seek special limits on ALCMs themselves. ALCM carriers should not be subject to restrictions beyond those applying to other heavy bombers. (Some believe that eventually the US should be willing to accept limits on maximum ALCM loadings per bomber consistent with our force requirements. Others are strongly opposed to including any ALCM limits in the initial US proposal.)

2. Inter-Continental Cruise Missiles (ICCMs)

The US should not seek a ban on ICCMs at this time.

3. Telemetry Encryption

Flight test telemetry would provide an essential input to the verification of certain START limitations. The US should seek a ban on all telemetry encryption in flight tests of START-limited systems.

4. Missile Flight Tests

The US should not seek a limitation which would set an annual quota of missile flight tests.

5. Bomber Pre-Launch Survivability

The only potentially useful limitation appears to be a ban on "depressed trajectory" SLBM flight tests. However, because of the possible implications for certain US systems (e.g., flight tests of Trident II), we should not propose a ban on such testing in our initial START package. Study on the potential utility of such a ban will continue.

6. Exclusion of FB-111

A total of 63 FB-111s are assigned to the Strategic Air Command, but their inherent capabilities are less than for other US and Soviet bombers (including BACKFIRE). The US should therefore exclude FB-111s from our initial START proposal.

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7. Limits on Air Defenses

We do not envisage air defense limitations in a START agreement. We should, however, use the lack of constraints on Soviet air defenses to achieve preferential treatment of US bombers and their weapons in START.

8. Limits on Civil Defense

Although the Soviet Union has a considerably more active civil defense program than the US, we should not seek civil defense limitations in START. Such limitations would be very difficult to negotiate or verify and could inhibit US civil defense programs.

9. Limits on Anti-Submarine Warfare Capabilities

As there appears to be no compelling US security requirement for ASW limitations, they should not be included in our START proposal.

Issues on which there is no interagency consensus:

Agreement has not yet been reached within the interagency community on the following issues. Recommendations or options will be submitted to the NSC after resolution of the START framework issue.

1. Treaty Duration

The issue of whether the US should propose an agreement of limited (e.g., ten years) or indefinite duration (with periodic reviews) is largely dependent upon the type of limitations we will seek. Therefore, the US should not decide on the duration of a START agreement until after a decision is reached on the unit of account.

2. ICBM Refires

All agencies agree that we should limit Soviet ICBM reconstitution capabilities in some fashion. Some agencies believe that it would be sufficient to prohibit the development, testing or deployment of rapid reload systems for ICBM launchers, together with a ban on excess missile and warhead storage within a certain radius of ICBM complexes. Other agencies believe that it would be necessary to seek more stringent restrictions, such as a ban on all refire ICBMs or direct limits on missiles or warheads for missiles.

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3. Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs)

Most agencies believe that the US should oppose SLCM limits in START at this time. Others believe that the US should prepare a position on SLCM limits, as the Soviets are sure to raise this issue. Options include an equal limit on nuclear SLCM platforms or a ban on all nuclear SLCMs with a range above some figure less than the 600-km limit in SALT II.

4. Mobile ICBMs

Some believe that it would be inappropriate for the US to propose a ban on mobiles until our missile development plans are more clear. Others believe that such a ban would be in the US interest, as the USSR has at least one, and perhaps two mobile ICBMs under development. Furthermore, there may be an asymmetry in the political ability of the US and USSR to deploy mobile ICBMs. Other agencies believe that mobile ICBMs could be permitted, provided they meet criteria specified in a START agreement designed to ensure verifiability.

5. New-Type ICBMs

This issue is related to the question of the unit of account and should be deferred until after resolution of the latter question.

6. Information Access (other than telemetry encryption)

Some additional constraints on telemetry denial (other than encryption) will be necessary to the verification of a START agreement. However, the reciprocal application of some desirable measures could have a serious impact on US testing practices. Until we know what characteristics of Soviet forces we will need to verify (i.e., until the unit of account issue is resolved), it is not possible to weigh the costs and benefits of additional measures to ensure telemetry access.

7. Ban on Heavy ICBMs

This issue is addressed in different ways in the alternative options on unit of account and should be addressed after resolution of that issue.

8. Ban on Operational Launchers and Associated Equipment at Test Facilities

In order to eliminate the uncertainties we face regarding SS-16s at Plesetsk, the US START position could seek to prohibit operational missiles and launchers

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at test facilities. The US START position could include the following provisions:

- o Prohibit operational launchers at test facilities.
- o Limit the number of launchers allowed for testing purposes at test facilities.
- o Prohibit equipment associated with banned systems at test facilities, i.e., ban equipment associated with mobile missiles if mobiles are banned in START.
- o Prohibit warheads and warhead storage facilities at test facilities.
- o Dismantle according to agreed procedures all operational launchers and missiles now at test facilities.
- o Possible on-site inspection of test facilities.

This proposal has not been thoroughly discussed by the IG, and the impact on US test facilities requires close evaluation.

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