

STAFF SUMMARY SHEET

	TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE (Surname), GRADE AND DATE		TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE (Surname) GRADE AND DATE
1	XOO	Info		6			
2	XOX	Info		7			
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SURNAME OF ACTION OFFICER AND GRADE	SYMBOL	PHONE	TYPIST'S INIT	SUSPENSE DATE
Maj Jackson	XOXFM	57050	sab	
SUBJECT Draft Paper for Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Chemical Weapons Modernization (UI)				DATE 19 Jan 82

SUMMARY

1. (U) An IWG under the leadership of DATSD(AE) was formed on 7 January to provide rationale to Congress for the development of an offensive chemical retaliatory capability. The Air Force was tasked to develop this rationale and brief to appropriate forums at the direction of Dr Gold, DATSD(CM).

2. (U) The draft at TAB 1 is the Air Staff position with some previous editorial comments from the IWG. ^{incorporated} The concept is unchanged from the first draft. OSD will receive this paper on 28 Feb and distribute it for final IWG comments.

Paul H. Mays

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FOIA(b) (2)

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 By , NARA, Date 2/22/16

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
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
MILITARY NEED FOR LONG RANGE
CHEMICAL RETALIATORY CAPABILITY

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Although there are gaps in our intelligence on Soviet chemical warfare capability, there are definitely several areas of agreement throughout the informed community. First, the Soviets have a significant capability in terms of material and manpower dedicated to chemical warfare. Second, use of chemical, biological, or toxin agents is part of their doctrine and strategy.



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By SP5, NARA, Date 4/21/07


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

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If

NATO/friendly troops achieve adequate defensive protection (minimum casualties due to agent), then what is the advantage the Soviets hope to achieve?

(S) The answer is degradation of our warfighting capability. Specifically, the reduction in aircraft sortie generation and efficiency of our ground and air forces.




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(U) Regular inspections consistently find additional stockpiled munitions unserviceable. At present we have less than one-half the JCS estimate for US only air-deliverable chemical munitions. Logistic support for these munitions is difficult because of the lethal agent contained in these unitary weapons. Also storage of these munitions in Europe is hazardous since the enemy would likely attack these storage areas. In general, the stockpile is obsolete, marginally effective, deteriorating, and potentially a danger to friendly forces. In this case, how do we resolve the problem?

(U) The immediate answer is Bigeye, a binary, persistent agent spray bomb which will provide a near term US long range retaliatory chemical capability. The binary characteristics make the weapon safe for movement and storage. Enemy conventional attacks on binary supplies would not result in release of deadly chemical agent at US storage locations as is the case in unitary weapons. Most importantly, Bigeye provides significant improvements in agent effectiveness, bomb delivery parameters, and area coverage.

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(U) The Bigeye binary weapon generates persistent VX-2 agent. This agent provides days to weeks of contamination (depending on environmental conditions). The pilot can release the weapon over a large variation in airspeed and altitude. In addition, the pilot does not necessarily overfly the target. The Bigeye does have some glide capability which enhances carrier survivability. Also, the Bigeye has good area coverage. Three Bigeye weapons would contaminate approximately one square mile area. In short, Bigeye provides coverage and persistence not afforded by the MC-1, MK94, and Weteye bombs; and Bigeye provides release parameters and survivability not afforded by the TMU-28B and other similar spray tank munitions.

(U) At present, the Soviets have a long range offensive chemical warfare capability and the US/Allies have no suitable response. In this area the Soviets have escalatory dominance. When they degrade our ground forces, air bases, logistics facilities, nuclear storage sites, C³I networks, et. al.; we can only respond with defensive gear and reduced conventional capability. Although some advocate a nuclear response (as proposed by NATO "flexible response" in MC 14/3), this action is not in accord with stated administration policy/objectives. NATO MC 14/3 states that NATO requires a limited CW retaliatory capability. Currently the US provides this capability, however, as previously addressed, it is void of a deep strike capability that is credible. NATO is now being pushed to address this deficiency by providing CW policy guidance from the Defense Planning Committee


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level. The emphasis remains on "flexible response," but the current feeling is that nuclear weapons are not a suitable response to a Soviet CW attack because of the nuclear escalation issue. To fill this void, NATO and the US need options other than acceptance of defeat or escalation to nuclear conflict.

(U) In conclusion, we know the Soviets have an offensive chemical capability. 

 We know chemical attacks on lucrative deep targets pose a significant problem for our conventional forces. We feel the Soviets are not deterred from chemical use by our obsolete, inadequate stockpile of bombs or the Army chemical rounds. We must rectify this imbalance with procurement of the Bigeye binary chemical spray bomb. In addition to the immediate BIGEYE procurement a strong chemical technology base program must be pursued to insure that the most effective chemical munitions are available in the future.