MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: The Situation Room

SUBJECT: More Reactions to Israeli Raid

June 9, 1981

Our Baghdad interests section reports that Iraqis are reacting with calm, anger and little surprise to the attack. The government seems to be attempting to use the raid to attract sympathy and support in its fight against Iran, linking Israel and Iran and discrediting Arab states, particularly Syria, which are supporting Iran. Our strong statement of condemnation which the foreign ministry believes was made by the President, was extremely helpful, though our position in the Security Council will be closely watched. (C)

The Israeli paper Yediot notes that support for the "super-Entebbe" operation cuts across party lines, and other papers echo their acclaim. The media also note Washington's reaction, commenting U.S. officials fear the impact on Habib's mission, and are concerned about the effect on our efforts to get Iraq to move closer to the West. They do not expect congressional investigation to produce an embargo. Gideon Samet writes that Washington increasingly perceives Begin's policy as a liability. (U)

Jordanian media calls the attack "one of the most dangerous developments" and says the entire world condemns the Israeli aggression. Ad-Dustour emphasizes there can be no security or secure future for Arabs as long as Israel exists and that the Arabs will acquire nuclear weapons no matter how long it takes. Commentary also notes that Secretary Haig came to the area asking the Arab states to join the U.S. in a strategic consensus against the USSR, but the danger comes from Israel rather than from Moscow. (U)

Syrian commentary argues that the real danger to the region is from Israel not the Soviets. Our embassy comments that the attack should help to reinforce and justify Syria's stand in the Lebanese crisis as well as to the appeal for Arab unity. (C)

REVIEW ON JUNE 9, 1987
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9 June 1981

All the referenced cables at the end of this message, if they were all received by the White House during the Carter administration, are now with the Carter archives and not in our system. The duty officer is inquiring of State as to their availability.

Frank

PS Robert Durham
(632-2540) in Bremner's office will be in touch tomorrow, (10 Jun)
DATE 6/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Rusa, chairman, J.P., VP
E.O.: Kean, chairman, Huberman
WSH COMMENTS, RED TAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:
NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE: RUSE, #9138/R1 JUN 81
To: JUN 81 10/24
From: AMBASSADEY TEL AVIV

TO: SECSTATE WAHCOC, IMMEDIATE 7502
INFO: WHITEHOUSE WAHCOC

SUBJECT: SECTION 81 OF 83 TEL AVIV #8138
NSC (NSC)FORM
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR LEWIS
E.O.: #8861 RUS #1, 3, 4 0/9/81 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) DRM
TASS:

NUCLEAR, MILITARY, HIGH, 16, US, 12

SUBJECT: ISRAELI STRIKE ON IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY
BACKGROUND FOR THE DECISION

REF: TEL AVIV #8865

1. (S=ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS I REFLECTED ON THE EVENTS OF THE LAST 48 HOURS IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT WITH THE CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION IN WASHINGTON THERE MAY HAVE DEVELOPED INADVERTENTLY A GAP IN OUR INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY. THE TIMING OF THE ISRAELI STRIKE ENORMOUSLY COMPROMISES MANY ASPECTS OF AMERICAN POLICY IN THIS REGION AND I AM NOT FOR A MOMENT TRYING TO DEFEND IT. BUT AS YOU CONSIDER HOW TO DEAL WITH THE FALL OUT AND WITH BEGIN HIMSELF, IN THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD, YOU AND THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY BRIEFED ON THE HISTORY OF OUR VERY SENSITIVE DIALOGUE WITH BEGIN DURING THE FINAL SIX MONTHS OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. THIS WAS A VERY FRUSTRATING SERIES OF EXCHANGES FOR BEGIN, AND VERY DANGEROUS FOR US. IT LEFT ME WITH NO DOUBT THAT BEFORE THE

TEL AVIV 9138

076-91689 JUN 81 10H R8467
70% 160/190/1942

SECRET

DECL. LIMIT: 12/7/81

By: 8/3/85
3. I WILL SUMMARIZE HERE THE EVOLUTION OF THE DIALOGUE:

I began by reviewing the high-level meetings and the discussions that led to the decision to strike. I will summarize here the key points:

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I began by reviewing the high-level meetings and the discussions that led to the decision to strike. I will summarize here the key points:
IN THE SUBSEQUENT WEEKS, DURING LATE AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER BEGIN ASKED ME SEVERAL TIMES WHETHER WE HAD ANYTHING MORE TO TELL HIM, AND I COULD ONLY STALL.

2. ON SEPTEMBER 29, HE REPORTED THAT WE WERE PICKING UP A NUMBER OF THINLY VEILED STRAWS IN THE WIND SUGGESTING THAT ISRAEL WAS SOLELY TEMPTED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE COVER PROVIDED BY THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR TO CARRY OUT AN AIR STRIKE AGAINST THE IRANI NUCLEAR FACILITIES (TEL AVIV 17688).

WE CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS A 20 TO 40 PERCENT POSSIBILITY OF A STRIKE TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW
DATE 8/4/81
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  PAGE 61

WHF ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

BRI:
EDE:
WHF COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:
NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE MUENY 9139/82 160160
0 041402 JUN 81 ZER=2
FN AMBASSAD TEL AVIV

TO WHITEHOU WHITEHOU IRAN IMMEDIATE 7593
INFO WHITEHOUSE WHITEHOU DT

--SECTION 62 OF 83 TEL AVIV 89139

DAYS AND DESCRIBED HOW HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE CARRIED OUT:
IN THE EVENT, THERE WAS A STRIKE BY TWO FASCIS THE FOLLOWING
DAY, SEPTEMBER 28. IT TURNED OUT TO BE AN IRANIAN OPERA-
TION WHOSE ONLY "SUCCESS" WAS TO SCARE AWAY THE FRENCH AND
ITALIAN TECHNICIANS AT THE FACILITY FOR SEVERAL MONTHS.
WHEN I SAW BEGIN OCTOBER 5, HE VOLUNTEERED THAT IT WAS NOT
ISRAEL WHICH HAD ATTACKED THE BAGHDAD FACILITY. HE THEN
REMINDED US THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKING US TO DO EVERYTHING
POSSIBLE TO STOP FRENCH AND ITALIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE IRAQ
PROGRAM (TEL AVIV 16108). IN RETROSPECT, I AM EVEN MORE
CONVINCED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD INDEED PLANNED A STRIKE
BUT CALLED IT OFF WHEN THE IRANIANS GOT THERE FIRST. SINCE
THE TECHNICIANS IMMEDIATELY LEFT THE SITE FOR A PROLONGED
PERIOD, THEY PUT THEIR PLANS ON ICE UNTIL THE THREAT THEY
PERCEIVED OF THE REACTOR'S BECOMING OPERATIONAL WAS AGAIN
RENEWED AFTER THE RETURN OF TECHNICIANS EARLIER THIS YEAR.

7. DURING OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER

THE THEN-ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR OES,
AMBASSADOR TOM PICKERING, WAS THE CHIEF ACTION OFFICER IN

TEL AVIV 9139
DT616916S02 JUN 81 PSN4 656319
T0R: 1601/9801

**********E-T********
DATE 06/09/81
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

THE DEPARTMENT ON THIS PROBLEM.

HE PLANNED TO
VISIT ISRAEL IN LATE NOVEMBER TO BRIEF BEGIN IN DETAIL ON
THE PROGRESS OF OUR EFFORTS. HIS TRIP WAS CANCELLED OUT.
I WAS EVENTUALLY AUTHORIZED BY DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER
TO CARRY OUT THE BRIEFING FROM INSTRUCTIONS POUCHED TO ME
BY PICKERING,

I WAS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE
THE PRESENTATION BUT TO REPORT ON THE MEETING ONLY BY
LETTER TO YOU PICKERING.

5. I MET WITH BEGIN FINALLY DECEMBER 17 (AND REPORTED BY
LETTER ON DECEMBER 24 IN DETAIL). AT THAT MEETING INTER-
ALIA, I WENT THROUGH THE TALKING POINTS PROVIDED ME WHICH
INCLUDED SOME OF THE FOLLOWING:
A. THE UNITED STATES SHARES ISRAEL'S SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT
IRAQ'S NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.
B. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO HARD EVIDENCE THAT IRAQ INTENDS TO
BUILD NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE PACE AND SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM
SECRET
. . . EXCEEDS IRAQ'S APPARENT NEEDS AND, WE BELIEVE, ARE
INTENDED TO GIVE THAT COUNTRY'S GOVERNMENT THE OPTION OF
DEVELOPING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES IN THE FUTURE.
C. THE IRAQI MILITARY HAS TAKEN CONTROL OF THE NUCLEAR
SITE. THOSE FRENCH TECHNICIANS WHO REMAIN IN THE BAGHDA-
D AREA DO NOT HAVE ACCESS TO IT AT PRESENT, ALTHOUGH IT IS
THEIR OPINION THAT THE HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM HAS NOT BEEN
TAMPERED WITH.

D. IT IS OUR STRONG BELIEF THAT PRECIPITATE ACTION AGAINST
IRAQ'S NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS WOULD BE A SEVERE SET BACK TO
THE PROSPECTS FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE.
E. THE UNITED STATES IS UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE
SERIOUSNESS OF THE DANGER THAT IRAQ'S POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS WOULD POSE. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DEVOTE SIGNIFICANT
EFFORT TO MONITORING IRAQI NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS AND WILL
WELCOME VIEWS AND INFORMATION THAT YOU MAY HAVE TO SHARE
WITH US.

IN THAT CONVERSATION I ALSO NOTED FOR BEGIN THAT THE ASSESS-
MENTS OF THE SITUATION MADE BY OUR RESPECTIVE EXPERTS WERE
IN BASIC AGREEMENT, THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT ABOUT WHERE IRAQ'S STATE OF THE ART WAS AT THAT TIME, OR ABOUT THE GRAVE RISKS INHERENT IN ANY IRAQI ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THERE WERE SMALL DIFFERENCES IN OUR JUDGMENTS REGARDING THE DATE AFTER WHICH IRAQ COULD EXPLODE A NUCLEAR DEVICE. IN RESPONSE BEGIN THanked us FOR WHAT WE WERE DOING IN PARIS AND ROME BUT MADE CLEAR THAT WE WAS STILL DEEPLY WORRIED THAT THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK WAS NOT SUCCEEDING. I CONCLUDED MY REPORT OF THIS MEETING WITH THE FOLLOWING WORDS: 'THIS SESSION WILL SATISFY THE NEED HERE FOR A TIME, I SHOULD BE GIVEN THE INFORMATION AND AUTHORITY TO UPDATE BEGIN AT TWO-THREE MONTH INTERVALS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN CREDIBILITY. GENERAL GITAN WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS BEGIN HARD. HE RAISED THE SUBJECT YESTERDAY WITH GENERAL JONES.'
DATE 06/09/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

WHITE-ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOP:

WHEN COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE NUCENT #818866 1661862

0 091600Z JUN 81 ZFP #4

FM AMBASSADOR TEL AVIV

TO SUCURATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7594

INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC

BY

--- SECTIONS 85 OF 85 TEL AVIV 88100

CHARACTERIZING IT AS THE MOST SERIOUS THREAT ISRAEL FACES ANYWHERE, TO MAINTAIN ANY KIND OF INFLUENCE OVER THE VERY DANGEROUS POSSIBILITIES FOR DIRECT ISRAELI MILITARY PREVENTIVE MOVES, IT IS VITAL THAT WE CONTINUE TO CARRY ON A FRANK DIALOGUE WITH BEGIN OR HIS SUCCESSOR, AT SOME POINT, THE NEW ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE CAREFULLY BRIEFED, WITH THIS POINT UNDERSCORED.

S. THAT WAS THE LAST OF SUCH EXCHANGES BETWEEN BEGIN AND ME. HE HAS NOT Pressed FOR FURTHER MEETINGS ON THIS SUBJECT, AND WE HAVE NOT INITIATED THEM.

SEVERAL MONTHS PASSED, THEN THE STRIKE OCCURRED AT A MOMENT WHEN IT COULD scarcely HAVE BEEN MORE DAMAGING TO OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN THE REGION. BEGIN SAID PUBLICLY YESTERDAY THAT "THE DECISION TO ATTACK IRAQ'S NUCLEAR REACTOR WAS ADOPTED MANY MONTHS AGO, BUT THERE WERE HINDBRANCES, AND THERE WERE ALSO VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS AND A NUMBER OF DELAYS. He THEN ARIived AT A SITUATION WHERE IT WAS CLEAR TO US THAT IF WE DID NOT ACT NOW WE WOULD MISS THE PROPELIOUS TIME." I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THROUGHOUT THE MONTHS SineC DECEMBER, GENERAL EITAN AND AMIR SHARON IN PARTICULAR HAVE CONTINUED TO PRESS

TEL AVIV P136

DTB 0681886 1661862 JUN 81 FSN 856827

TOR 160/19197

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BEGIN WITH THE ARGUMENTS THAT THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT WAS INEFFECTUAL AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO ELIMINATE THE REACTOR WOULD BE LOST ONCE IT BECAME OPERATIONAL, BECAUSE OF THE DANGER OF RADIOACTIVE FALL OUT AFTER A STRIKE ON A "HOT REACTOR." THE PRECISE DECISION TO MAKE THE STRIKE THIS PAST WEEKEND COULD WELL HAVE REFLECTED THE OTHER CONSIDERATIONS OUTLINED SUNDAY NIGHT IN TEL AVIV 9583, ESPECIALLY THE DESIRE TO GIVE A CLEAR MESSAGE TO THE SYRIANS ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF NOT REMOVING THEIR MISSILES PEACEFULLY. ELECTORAL CONSIDERATIONS WERE NOT TOTALLY ABSENT.

THEMFORE, BEGIN'S ARGUMENT THAT THERE WAS ONLY A VERY NARROW WINDOW WHEN THE STRIKE COULD BE LAUNCHED HAS CREDIBILITY, ONCE YOU ACCEPT HIS PREMISE--THAT A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY IN IRAQ WOULD WITHIN ONE, TWO OR THREE YEARS PRESENT AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL, AND THAT CERTAINLY HAS BEEN BEGIN'S CLEARLY ARTICULATED PREMISE FROM THE MOMENT OF OUR FIRST CONVERSATION LAST JULY.

16. RELEVANT MESSAGES IN THIS SERIES OF EXCHANGES ARE LISTED AS FOLLOWS:

- 1985 STATE 199164
- 1986 STATE 198866
- 1986 STATE 197269
- 1986 STATE 192274
- 1986 STATE 214571
- 1986 STATE 215250
- 1986 STATE 225689
- 1986 STATE 226367
- 1987 STATE 226402
- OFFICIAL INFORMAL LETTER DATED DECEMBER 24, 1986, TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY PICKERING.

LEWIS

TEL AVIV 9139
07/18/85 1432 JUN 31 RON: 936327
TONI 156/19182
FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY MUSKIE FROM LEWIS

E.O. 120651  RDS-1 7/19/00 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M
TAGS: HNUC, MILI, FR, IZ, IS, US

SUBJECT: BEGIN'S APPEAL TO PRESIDENT CARTER CONCERNING FRENCH ENRICHED URANIUM SHIPMENTS TO IRAQ

REF: A) STATE 189464, B) PARIS 22137

1. (S/EN TEXT)

2. DURING MY FIRST MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN
SINCE HE CAME OUT OF THE HOSPITAL, AN HOUR LONG SESSION
AT HIS RESIDENCE BEDROOM JULY 17, HE ASKED ME TO DELIVER
TO PRESIDENT CARTER A PERSONAL AND VERY EMOTIONAL MESSAGE
CONCERNING HIS FEARS THAT IRAQ WOULD SOON BE IN POSSESSION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BEGIN SAID THAT THE RECENT REPORTS
THAT THE FRENCH ARE GOING AHEAD TO SHIP HIGHLY ENRICHED
URANIUM TO IRAQ, IN A QUANTITY (22 KG.) WHICH WOULD PER-
MIT THE MANUFACTURE OF AT LEAST THREE NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
HAS GIVEN HIM AND HIS COLLEAGUES CONTINUES SLEEPLESS
NIGHTS. BEGIN STRESSED THAT THE IRAQIS ALREADY HAVE
soviet Tupolov-22 BLINDER BOMBERS WITH WHICH BOMBING RUNS
TO THE HEART OF ISRAEL AND RETURN TO BAGHDAD, CARRYING
SECRET
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ARE PERFECTLY POSSIBLE, EVEN ONE OR TWO
NUCLEAR WEAPONS DROPPED INTO THE CENTER OF ISRAEL'S
CIVILIAN POPULATION "WOULD WIPE OUT OUR CITIZENS."

3. BEGIN STRESSED THAT YOU SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT
IRAQ "IS THE BLOODIEST AND MOST IRRESPONSIBLE OF ALL
ARAB REGIMES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF KADDAFI IN LIBYA, HAS
SENT SUBSTANTIAL FORCES TO FIGHT AGAINST ISRAEL IN ALL OF
THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS, AND HAS NEVER AGREED TO SIGN ANY
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AFTER ANY OF THESE WARS, UNLIKE THE
OTHER ARAB STATES ALL OF WHICH DID SIGN ARMISTICES."

BEGIN THEN RECOUNTED A STORY

[Redacted]

ACCORDING TO WHICH
MUBARAK WAS SHAKEN UP CONSIDERABLY DURING A VISIT TO
PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S OFFICE IN BAGHDAD TO FIND HIM
WITH A LOADED PISTOL ON HIS DESK DURING THEIR CONVERSATION.
THIS, BEGIN SAID, ILLUSTRATES WHAT KIND OF IRAQI
LEADER WE ARE DEALING WITH.

4. BEGIN CONCLUDED HIS APPEAL BY ASKING ME TO PUT TO THE
PRESIDENT IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS HIS PERSONAL
REQUEST THAT THE PRESIDENT DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE WITH
THE FRENCH TO STOP FURTHER ENRICHED URANIUM SHIPMENTS TO
IRAQ. I TOLD HIM I WOULD CONVEY HIS APPEAL IMMEDIATELY.

5. COMMENT: IN RECENT DAYS, ISRAELI OFFICIALS, JOURNALISTS,
ACADEMIC EXPERTS, AND KNESSET MEMBERS HAVE BEEN
WORKING THEMSELVES UP INTO A STATE OF NEAR PANIC ABOUT THE
IRAQI NUCLEAR ISSUE. ISRAEL'S MOST WIDELY RESPECTED
NUCLEAR PHYSICIST, YUVAL NE'EMAN, HAS GIVEN SEVERAL INTER-
VIEWS STATING FLATLY THAT ISRAEL CANNOT AFFORD TO MAKE
ANY OTHER ASSUMPTION BUT THAT THE IRAQIS WILL TAKE ALL OR
SECRET
PART OF THE ENRICHED URANIUM WHICH THE FRENCH ARE SUPPLYING AND TURN IT INTO SEVERAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF ROUGHLY THE YIELD OF THE HIROSHIMA BOMB. THIS, HE AND OTHERS HAVE INSISTED, CAN CONFRONT ISRAEL WITH AN IRAQ ARMED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN ONE YEAR OR LESS, ALTHOUGH IRAQI NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IS A FEW YEARS FURTHER OFF, THEY CANNOT AND DO NOT DISMISS BY ANY MEANS NE'EMAN'S "WORSE CASE" SCENARIO. NOR, OBVIOUSLY, DOES BEGIN.

6. FROM DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE WITH BEGIN AND A NUMBER OF OTHERS HERE IN THE LAST FEW DAYS, I FIND THAT ANY ARGUMENTS ABOUT FRENCH INSPECTION OF THE USE OF THE NUCLEAR MATERIAL, OR INTERNATIONAL IAEA INSPECTION SAFEGUARDS FALL ON COMPLETELY DEAF EARS. THE ISRAELIS ASSUME FROM THEIR OWN EXPERIENCE THAT THE FRENCH CAN AND WILL TURN A BLIND EYE TO DIVERSION OF THE MATERIAL, AND THAT IN ANY CASE INSPECTORS ARE NOT THAT DIFFICULT TO FOOL. THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE IN SPIRITING WEAPONS OUT OF FRANCE IN EARLIER TIMES UNDER THE NOSE OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS ONE OF THE FACTORS IN THEIR LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN ANY FRENCH ASSURANCES THAT THE NUCLEAR MATERIAL, ONCE IN BAGHDAD, WILL BE KEPT UNDER EFFECTIVE OBSERVATION.

7. BEGIN'S APPEAL TO YOU SHOULD BE SEEN AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THIS RISING TIDE OF ANXIETY. FROM WELL-INFORMED JOURNALISTS WE KNOW THAT THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES ARE NOW LOOKING VERY SERIOUSLY AT HOW ISRAEL ITSELF CAN STOP THE IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAM, IF THE U.S. IS NOT EFFECTIVE IN "BRINGING THE FRENCH TO THEIR SENSES." WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE LAUNCHING DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN EUROPE TO TRY TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE FRENCH, AND THAT THEY ARE MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO FOCUS THE WEIGHT OF PUBLIC OPINION AND JEWISH INFLUENCE WITHIN FRANCE ON GISCARD D'ESTAING. SHIMON PERES TOLD ME JULY 18 THAT HE —SECRET
SECRET

0 191217Z JUL 80 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0277

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 13256

NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY MUSKIE FROM LEWIS

AND HIS FRIENDS IN THE LABOR PARTY WERE LAUNCHING PARALLEL
EFFORTS IN FRANCE, SINCE ON THIS ISSUE THERE IS NO DIF-
ERENCE OF VIEW BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION.

8. I AM UNAWARE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY
MADE STRONG EFFORTS WITH THE FRENCH ON THIS ISSUE, BUT
I AM CONVINCED THAT AS THINGS ARE NOW DEVELOPING IN THE
REGION, THERE IS NO MORE DANGEROUS ISSUE THAN THIS ONE.
UNLESS WE CAN SOMEHOW CHANGE THE COURSE OF FRENCH POLICY
AND REASSURE THE ISRAELIS, WE MUST ANTICIPATE THAT THEY
WILL FEEL COMPelled IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE TO TAKE
SOME KIND OF UNILATERAL ACTION TO THWART THE IRAQI NUCLEAR
PLANS WELL BEFORE THE IRAQIS ACTUALLY POSSESS A WEAPON.
AND BY THE "VERY NEAR FUTURE," I MEAN WITHIN THE NEXT SIX
MONTHS. INITIAL ISRAELI MOVES WOULD PROBABLY BE CLANDESTINE,
BUT WE COULD NOT AND SHOULD NOT RULE OUT ANY POSSI-
BILITIES, PARAMILITARY, OR EVEN PREEMPTIVE STRIKES WITH
CONVENTIAL WEAPONS AGAINST THE IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITIES,
REGARDLESS OF THE AWESOME CONSEQUENCES SUCH ACTS COULD
PRODUCE.

9. FOR THESE REASONS, I URGE YOU TO RESPOND AS CONVINC-
SECRET
Inglis and effectively as possible to Begin's appeal.
Lewis
SECRET

PAGE 01

TELE AV 13396 01 OF 02 221730Z

ACTION MEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-14 ADS-06 ESO-02 INRE-00 PM-05

SP-02 SS-15 CIAF-00 INF-10 NSAF-00 OES-09 SSN-02

ADAS-12 /COZ W

-----------------------------65252 221909Z 04-41-

O 221716Z JUL 80 7FF-4
PM AMBASSAD TEL AVIV
TO SEestate WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7350
INFO DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
WHIT hoe WASHDC PRIORITY

AMBASSAD AMMAN PRIORITY

AMBASSAD BEIRUT PRIORITY

AMBASSAD BONN PRIORITY

AMBASSAD CAIRO PRIORITY

AMBASSAD DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMBASSAD JERUSALEM PRIORITY

AMBASSAD JIDDA PRIORITY

AMBASSAD LONDON PRIORITY

AMBASSAD LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY

AMBASSAD PAPIS PRIORITY

AMBASSAD ROME PRIORITY

AMBASSAD VIENNA PRIORITY

USMISSION USN W NEW YORK PRIORITY

USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY

USCONSUL WASHINGTON PRIORITY

G E R: SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 13396

E.O. 12055: EDS-3 7/21/80 (BROWN, WILLIAM A.) OR-M

TAGS: MNCL, MNUC, IS, 12, FR

SUBJECT: ISRAELI CONCERNS OVER IRAQI NUCLEAR INTENTIONS

REF: (A) STATE 189224, (B) USDAO TEL AVIV 13162 (NOTAL)

1. (C) DIVERSE ELEMENTS OF ISRAELI SOCIETY, INCLUDING

PROMINENT POLITICAL FIGURES, ACADEMIC ANALYSTS, MEDIA

COMMENTATORS AND EVERYDAY EMBASSY CONTACTS, HAVE COALESCED

SECRET

PAGE 02

TELE AV 13396 01 OF 02 221730Z

INTO THE CLOSEST THING TO A FULL NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON


THE POSSIBLE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY IRAQ HAS

OCCASIONED HIGHLY ALARMIST SPECULATION IN THE MEDIA AND

ONLY A SLIGHTLY MORE MEASURED LEVEL OF CONCERN BY POLITICAL

LEADERS. A COMMON THREAD THROUGHOUT COMMENTARY IS THAT

A CONTINUING ADVANCEMENT BY IRAQ TOWARD NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

WILL PROVIDE MORAL JUSTIFICATION FOR VIRTUALLY ANY ACTIONS

ISRAELI MAY FEEL COMPULSIVE TO TAKE TO ERADICATE THIS NEW

AND OMINOUS THREAT. A SAMPLING OF COMMENTS OVER THE LAST

FEW DAYS FOLLOWS:

2. (U) --- LABOR PARTY LEADER SHIMON PERES STATED

THAT THE SITUATION IS A "SERIOUS THREAT
SECRET

TO HUMANITY.

--- DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER ZIPPORI, IN A
BLUNT MANNER, SAID, IF ISRAEL FAILS TO
SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THE IRAQI NUCLEAR
PLANT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC MEANS THE CABINET
WILL HAVE TO RECONSIDER ITS WAYS.

--- HAGGAI ESHED, IN A COMMENTARY IN DAVAR,
RECOMMENDED A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE. "IT
MUST BE CLEAR TO ANYONE IN HIS RIGHT
MIND THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT YIELD TO ANY
IRAQI EXPOSITION AND WILL REGARD IT AS
CASSUS BELLII."

--- MINISTER OF ENERGY MODA'I STATED THAT
"THIS DEVELOPMENT IS A DANGER FOR THE
WELFARE OF THE WHOLE WORLD, NOT ONLY OF
THE REGION."

--- A DAVAR EDITORIAL, USING SUCH LANGUAGE AS
"ANNIHILATION AND EXTERMINATION," FOCUSED
ON THE "MUSLIM BOMB" AND THE TIME ISRAEL
HAS TO REACT TO THIS DEVELOPMENT.

--- A HA'ARETZ EDITORIAL HAMMERED AWAY AT FRANCE
IRRESPONSIBILITY AND TERMED THE IRAQI NUCLEAR
SITUATION A NEW DANGER TO ISRAEL AND ARAB
STATES SOUTH AND EAST OF IRAQ. THE U.S. AND
soviet union HAD BEEN KEEPING NUCLEAR ARMS
OUT OF THE AREA, HA'ARETZ NOTED, BUT FRENCH
ACTIONS ARE NOW UPSETING BOTH THE MILITARY
AND POLITICAL STATUS QUO.

--- THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S
OFFICE, MATTI SHMULEVITZ, SAID PRODUCTION
OF AN ARAB BOMB WILL BE RESPONDED TO BY A
SIMILAR ACTION ON ISRAEL'S PART. ISRAEL
CANNOT AFFORD TO SIT AND WAIT FOR AN IRAQI
ATOM BOMB TO FALL ON HER HEAD.

--- AL HAMISHMAR STATED THAT "THE NUCLEAR SHADOW
IN OUR REGION IS LIABLE TO SPEED UP THE
OUTBREAK OF WAR" AND SPECULATED THAT IRAQ
WITH PAKISTANI HELP CAN HAVE A NUCLEAR
DEVICE IN 6-12 MONTHS. IF IT BECOMES CLEAR
THAT IRAQ IS PREPARING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE
PAPER SAYS, THEN ISRAEL WILL HAVE NO CHOICE
BUT TO SPEED UP ITS OWN WEAPONS PLANS.

3. (S) COMMENT: REF 3 ANALYZES HOW FORCED BUDGET CUTS
AND FEWER RUNWAYS AVAILABLE AS RESULT OF SINAI WITHDRAWAL.

ARE INCREASING PRESSURES IN ISRAELI AIR FORCE FOR A MORE
PREEMPTIVE-PRONE POLICY. THE POSSIBILITY OF IRAQ ATTACKING
ISRAEL WITH A NUCLEAR WEAPON WILL PLACE IRAQ'S NUCLEAR
FACILITY HIGH ON ISRAELI AIR FORCE PLANNERS LIST OF
PREEMPTIVE TARGETS. WITH ISRAELIS UNITED ON THIS ISSUE
IN A MANNER Seldom Seen in This Country, Almost Any Such
ACTION ISRAEL WOULD TAKE TO PREVENT IRAQ FROM OBTAINING

SECRET
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE CONDONED BY AN OVERWHLEMING
MAJORITY OF ITS CITIZENS. GIVEN THESE FACTORS WE URGE
THIS PROBLEM BY IRAQI NUCLEAR ACQUISITION BE
GIVEN SERIOUS AND URGENT HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION IN WASHINGTON.
AT PARIENT, FIRST STEP, REF A MIGHT BE SCRUTINIZED FOR
ELEMENTS WE MAY PASS TO SENIOR OFFICIALS HERE IN AN
EFFORT TO DISPLAY OUR INTEREST AND, WE HOPE, ALLAY THEIR
IMMEDIATE CONCERNS SOMEWHAT. LEWIS

SECRET
24 JUL 80Z  02 00

Department of State

SECRET

PAGE 01  STATE 195154

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

SECRET  NOD407

ORIGIN NODS-00
INFO OCT-00  ADS-00  /000 R
DRAFTED BY NEA:MDRAPERICF
APPROVED BY D:WCHRISTOPHER
NSC - MR BRZEZINSKI
NEA - MR SAUNDERS
OES - MR PICKERING
S/SILPBREMER
S/AS - AMB SMITH

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 4965

SECRET STATE 195154

NODIS
CHEROKEE - FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS

E.O. 12065  RDS 1-3, 7/23/2000 (DRAPER, MORRIS)

TAGS: MNUC, MILI, FR, IZ, IS, US

SUBJECT: FRENCH ENRICHED URANIUM SHIPMENTS TO IRAQ

REF: TEL AVIV 13256

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT,

2. AT YOUR MEETING WITH BEGIN ON THURSDAY, JULY 24, YOU
   SHOULD SAY THAT HIS APPEAL AS REGARDS FRENCH ENRICHED
   URANIUM SHIPMENTS TO IRAQ HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION
   OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.
FROM AMBASSADOR LEWIS

E.O. 12265: RDS-1, 3 7/25/80 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M
TAGS:民核, MIL, FR, IZ, IS, US

SUBJECT: FRENCH ENRICHED URANIUM SHIPMENTS TO IRAQ

REF: STATE 195154

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING MY MEETING WITH BEGIN MORNING OF JULY 24, I ASSURED HIM THAT HIS APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT IS UNDER SERIOUS CONSIDERATION BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY, AND THAT HE CAN EXPECT A FULL RESPONSE SOON.

I COULD NOT SAY MORE AT THIS POINT BUT WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH HIM AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

3. BEGIN SEEMED SATISFIED WITH THIS INTERIM REPLY. I HOPE THAT I CAN HAVE SOMETHING MORE TO SAY TO HIM WITHIN A WEEK AT THE LATEST. LEWIS

-SECRET

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NLS FG-12717/5

By [Redacted], NARA, Date 2/3/05

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SECRET

PAGE 01  STATE 196084
ORIGIN NODIS-00
INFO OCT-00  ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY OES/NEP: MGUHIN: J JW
APPROVED BY OES: TRPICKERING
S/AS: AMBASSADOR SMITH
NSC: RHUNTER, GOPLINGER
NEA: HSAUNDERS
DIR: DEITZ
EUR/WE: EBEIGEL
S/P: PIRGALLUCCI
INR/RMP: BFRISA
T/SALMON S/S: OSRSTEVEN 5WD

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMBASSADORE TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO AMBASSADORE PARIS PRIORITY
AMBASSADORE ROME PRIORITY
WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY 0000

S E R E T  STATE 196084

NODIS

80, 12065: ROS-1, 7/23/80 (GUHIN, MICHAEL) OES/NEP
TAGS: TECH, MNUC, RF, IZ, IS

SUBJECT: BEGIN’S APPEAL TO PRESIDENT CARTER CONCERNING
FRENCH ENRICHED URANIUM SHIPMENTS TO IRAQ

REF: TEL AVIV 13396

1. (8) ENTIRE TEXT.  SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS 79-1271/NC
By , NARA, Date 2/3/85

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
2. FOLLOWING ARE POINTS TOM PICKERING WILL BE USING IN DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR EVRON ON JULY 25. THESE ARE BEING FORWARDED FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION. INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING YOUR FOLLOW-ON PRESENTATION TO BEGIN WILL BE FORWARDED AS SOON AS OUR REVIEW COMPLETED.

(A) THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT IRAQI NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES FOR SOME TIME AND HAS BEEN WATCHING THE SITUATION THERE CLOSELY FOR SOME YEARS.
(J) THESE ARE OUR PRELIMINARY FINDINGS. WE ARE CONDUCTING A REVIEW OF THE SITUATION WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF PRESENTING A FULL RESPONSE TO THE CONCERNS BEGAN RECENTLY RAISED WITH LEWIS.
END TALKING POINTS

ABOVE IS CLEARED STATE VERSION NOW WAITING FINAL NSC SIGN OFF. MUSKIE
SECRET

PAGE 01

STATE 197260

ORIGIN NODS-00
INFO OCT-00 ADJS-00 /000 R
DRAFTED BY OES/NEP: MGUHN: RRS
APPROVED BY OES: TRPICKERING
NEA: MDRAPEP
S/S-O: STEVEN

C P: 260222Z JUL 80 ZFF6
FM: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: AMBASSADY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO: AMBASSADY PARIS PRIORITY
AMBASSADY ROME PRIORITY
C-E-C-F-E-T STATE 197260

NODIS

P/C: 12065: RDS-1: 7/25/00: (PICKERING, THOMAS R.): OES
TAGS: TEC, MNUC, IK, 12, IS
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR EVRON ON FRENCH ENRICHED
URANIUM SHIPMENTS TO IRAQ
REF: STATE 196684
1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT
2. AMBASSADOR EVRON, ACCOMPANIED BY MINISTER NEHUPTAN
AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS COUNSELR FRANK, CALLED ON ASSISTANT
SECRETARY PICKERING JULY 25 ON ABOVE SUBJECT. DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY DRAPER (NEA) AND MICHAEL GUBIN
(NEP/NEP) SAT IN.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02

STATE 197260

3. PICKERING PRESENTED POINTS AS SET FORTH REFTEL WITH
A FEW MODIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM DISCUSSIONS WITH NSC.
IN PRESENTING POINTS REFTEL, PICKERING:

— (A) UNEARLYD THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE VIEW THE
SITUATION AND THAT WE REGARD THIS AS ONLY PRELIMINARY
EXCHANGE, AND LOOK FORWARD TO PROVIDING FULL RESPONSE TO
BEGIN'S APPEAL;

— (B) STATED THAT OUR PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CURRENT
SITUATION (PARA 2.D REFTEL) WAS BASED ON INFORMATION WE
HAVE RECEIVED FROM

— (C) NOTED THAT ANY RETURN OF SPENT FUEL FROM NON-US-
SUPPLIED RESEARCH REACTOR WOULD REQUIRE SOME CONSULTA-
TIONS WITH THE CONGRESS;
Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

TEL AV 15691 2216572

INFO OCT-01  ADS-00  /001 W

0 2216502 AUG 80 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1192
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECRET

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 8/22/80 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) DR-M
TAGS: PARM, TECH, ENRG, MNUC, IS, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI NUCLEAR SITUATION

REF: A) STATE 209889, B) STATE 228917, C) STATE 197260,
- D) STATE 215253

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT

2. AT THE END OF MY LENGTHY MEETING WITH BEGIN THIS MORNING, AUGUST 22 (AVNER AND HILL ALSO WERE PRESENT), WE TURNED TO IRAQI NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES. ALTHOUGH BEGIN HAD OF COURSE RECEIVED A REPORT OF THE PICKERING-EVRON JULY 25 MEETING I WENT THROUGH SOME OF THE MATERIAL AGAIN AND DREW ON GUIDANCE IN REF A.

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NLS ENC-127/1 *13

By ________________  2/3/83

N O T E :
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4. THROUGHOUT OUR DISCUSSION BEGIN'S ATTITUDE WAS RESTRAINED AND UNDERSTANDING. HE CONCLUDED, HOWEVER, BY SAYING THAT ISRAEL "DOES NOT INTEND TO RELY ON PALLIATIVES" IN THIS MATTER. ISRAEL IS MOST SUSPICIOUS OF FRENCH MOTIVES. THEY KNOW, HE SAID, THAT THE HEU CAN BE TURNED INTO WEAPONS IN IRAQ AND THEY PREFER TO OVERLOOK THIS. IN ALL CANDOR, HE SAID, FRANCE IS FOLLOWING A CYNICAL AND AMORAL POLICY: ARMS FOR OIL. THE RESULT WILL BE A DANGER NOT ONLY TO ISRAEL BUT TO THE ENTIRE WORLD. IN FACE OF THIS DANGER, BEGIN SAID, "ISRAEL DOES NOT INTEND TO RELY ON PROMISES."

6. REQUEST DEPT PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR ROME AND AMBASSADOR ROME.
CONFIDENTIAL

R 261405Z AUG 60

USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
MISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
WFC AM EMBASSY TEL AVIV
MISSION US UK NEW YORK
EMBASSY PARIS
EMBASSY ROME

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 226934

CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

N. L. FRC-187/14

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BY 

NAME DATE 2/3/05

SECRET WASHDC

USG: IS, US, IZ, MNUC, ENRG, NPT, Parm

OBJECT: IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAM: IRAQ REQUESTS USG STATEMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

AGE 02

STATE 226934

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 226934

CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

DURING IRAQ COUNTRY OFFICER WIZNITZER'S CALL ON IRAQINT
HEAD SEIBAB ON AUGUST 22, SEIBAB RAISED QUESTION OF
IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN EXPRESSING THE GOI'S INTEREST IN
CONFIDENTIAL

AGE 02

STATE 226934

USG STATEMENT OF VIEW ON IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

SEIBAB MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- ISRAEL HAS REFUSED TO SIGN THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
- ISRAEL AND THE "ZIONIST; PRESS ARE TRYING TO CONVINCE
- ISRAEL IS BEHIND THE ATTACKS ON COMPANIES, EQUIPMENT AND
- PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAM
- SINCE 1948, ISRAEL AND IRAQ HAVE BEEN IN A STATE OF WAR.
- IRAQ BELIEVES IT MAY BE BOMBFED BY ISRAEL AS PART OF THAT
- COUNTRY'S EFFORT TO STOP IRAQ'S NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT
- IRAQ'S SUPPORT FOR NON-PROLIFERATION IS SINCERE. IT
- LIVES IN WHAT IT HAS SIGNED (THE NPT) RESPECTS
- HUMANITY. ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS PART OF ITS EFFORT TO
- ESTABLISH A SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY NOW, EVEN IF OTHER COUNTRIES
- WANT TO SEE THIS HAPPEN
- ISRAEL HAS SHOWN, AS IN ITS RECENT MOVES IN JERUSALEM,
AT IT WANTS TO DESTROY THE AREA
- IRAQ IS NOT SEEKING CONFLICT
- IRAQ WANTS TO DEVELOP ITS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY FOR ITS
INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT, NOT FOR USE OUTSIDE IRAQ

WIZNITZER SAID HE COULD NOT RESPOND IMMEDIATELY BUT
WANTED TO CONVEY SHIHB'S REQUEST TO THE DEPARTMENT. HE
POINTED OUT THAT THE US, AS THE FIRST AND ONLY COUNTRY TO
HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A WAR, WAS ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE TO
THE ISSUE OF PROLIFERATION. HE
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS DISCUSSION IN U.S.
CIRCLES, AND ABROAD, ABOUT THE IRAQI PROGRAM STIMULATED
A LARGE PART OF FRANCE'S DELIVERIES TO IRAQ FROM THE OSIRAK
FACTORY.

WIZNITZER TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASK IN THIS RELAYED
MOSHEFRE WHETHER THE GOI'S INTEREST INDICATED IT WAS
WILLING TO DISCUSS WITH U.S. ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND
OBJECTIVES. THIS COULD BE, HE POINTED OUT, A SCIENTIFIC
AND TECHNICAL DISCUSSION. SHIHB RESPONDED THAT, IN THE
ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, SUCH DISCUSSIONS WERE
LIKELY. HE REPEATED, HOWEVER, HIS COUNTRY'S INTEREST
IN OUR OPINION ON THE ISSUE. (SIHAB MENTIONED THE FACT
 THAT AN IRAQI WAS CHAIRING THE NPTRC, SUGGESTING THAT
DISCUSSIONS COULD BE HELD IN THE CONTEXT OF THAT BODY'S
LIBERATIONS. WIZNITZER REMINDED SHIHB THAT AMBASSADOR
(RURI, AS CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN, WAS LIMITED IN HIS
ABILITY TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF IRAQ AND THAT A MORE DIRECT
DIALOGUE WITH THE GOI WOULD BE MORE USEFUL.

COMMENT: WE SEE NOTHING TO BE GAINED BY AIRING OUR
CONCERNS ABOUT THE IRAQI PROGRAM IN AN OPEN SESSION OF
THE CURRENT NPTRC. OUR CANDID REMARKS (EVEN IN PRIVATE TO

(TTANI) IN THE REVIEW CONFERENCE WOULD ONLY FURTHER
GRAVATE THE DIVISIVE DEBATE OVER THE 'LIMITATIONS'
OFFERED BY THE LDC'S ADEQUATION TO THE NPT. THE ISSUE OF
HOW TO RESPOND IN THE FUTURE IS UNDER CONSIDERATION.
FROM DAS DRAPER FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS

E.O. 12065: RDS -1 9/15/00 (DRAPER, MORRIS)

TAGS: PARM, IS, US, IT, IZ

SUBJECT: ITALIAN-IRAQI NUCLEAR COOPERATION

1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOR YOUR MEETING TOMORROW WITH BEGIN, WE HAVE NOTHING BEYOND THE GUIDANCE YOU ALREADY HAVE.

MUSKIE

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NLS E96-127/1#15

B. May, SANF. JULY 3/65

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1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IT PROBABLY COMES AS NO SURPRISE TO THOSE IN WASHINGTON FAMILIAR WITH THE VERY GREAT WORRIES IN ISRAEL ABOUT IRAQ'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES TO LEARN THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION IN IRAQ PRESENTS TEMPTING VISTAS HERE. NO ONE IS TALKING OPENLY ABOUT THIS SUBJECT, BUT FROM JOURNALISTS, POLITICIANS, AND MILITARY OFFICIALS, WE HEAR VEILED REMARKS WONDERING WHY THE IRANIAN AIR RAIDS ON BAGHDAD HAVE NOT INCLUDED ATTACKS ON IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITIES A FEW MILES OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL.

3. IN THIS REGARD, A HIGHLY RELIABLE, WELL-INFORMED JOURNALIST TOLD ME ABOUT A SEMI-SOCIAL MEETING HELD SOME WEEKS BEFORE THE IRAQI-IRANIAN WAR BROKE OUT. ON THAT OCCASION, CHIEF OF STAFF EITAN WAS MEETING WITH ALL TOPPER ISRAELI CHIEFS OF STAFF TO BRING THEM UP TO DATE ON VARIOUS MILITARY ISSUES AND "KEEP THEM IN THE PICTURE." AT THAT GATHERING, EITAN REPORTEDLY DISCUSSED QUITE OPENLY THE POSSIBILITY OF MOUNTING A MILITARY OPERATION.
AGAInst THE IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITIES BEFORE IRAQ HAD A CHANCE TO PRODUCE A NUCLEAR WEAPON. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY IN FAVOR OF SUCH AN OPERATION, ALTHOUGH AT LEAST ONE OF THOSE PRESENT WHO TOLD THE JOURNALIST ABOUT THE MEETING, PROBABLY [REDACTED] said he thought that the journalist emphasized that this discussion took place well before the war broke out.

4. LAST NIGHT (SEPTEMBER 28) AT A PRIVATE DINNER, [REDACTED] confirmed to me that the possibility of carrying out an air strike against the Iraqi nuclear plant under cover of the current Iranian air attacks on Baghdad is indeed being seriously considered within the Ministry of Defense. [REDACTED] also said that with existing air refueling capabilities, such an operation "is feasible," added, however, that he would personally oppose it.

5. ONE ADDITIONAL STRAIN IN THE WIND, HA’ARETZ’S WELL-CONNECTED MILITARY CORRESPONDENT, ZEEV SCHIFF, HAS A FRONT PAGE STORY MONDAY (SEPTEMBER 29) ASSERTING THAT "FRANCE SENT IRAQ THE SECOND CONSIGNMENT OF 12 KG. OF ENRICHED URANIUM ONLY DAYS BEFORE THE FIGHTING WITH IRAN ERUPTED...FRANCE IS SCRPULOUS IN ADHERING TO THE AGREEMENT, DESPITE REPORTS OF GRAVE BORDER INCIDENTS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR IN THE REGION, PARIS WAS NOT DETERRED..."

6. WE HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING HOW SERIOUSLY TO TAKE THIS POSSIBILITY AT THIS MOMENT, BUT THE TEMPTATION MUST BE GREAT FOR ISRAELI OFFICIALS LIKE EITAN WHO HAVE NOTHING BUT DISDAIN FOR THE PROBABLE RESULTS OF ANY DIPLOMATIC

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