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Latest News


Nov. 17, 2014 — Iran-Contra … Chemical Weapons…SALT 1 & 2 draft options

Some new doc’s….enjoy!

1. Secretary of Defense Weinberger’s daily schedule (segments released for the Walsh investigation).

2. Criminal Liability of President Bush. Memo prepared for Judge Walsh analyzing President Bush’s liability in the Iran-Contra affair. 

3. Jan. 19, 1982 — Draft Paper for Interagency Working Group on Chemical Weapons Modernization. 

4. Jan. 16, 1985, NSC draft SALT I and II U.S. dismantalement options. 


Aug. 5, 2014 –  “The Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan"


I sat down a few weeks ago with Rick Perlstein, author of Before the Storm and Nixonland, to discuss his latest, The Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan. The book, due out today, has already received glowing reviews.  My favorite so far: Frank Rich in The New York Times Sunday Book Review. I would add to that the excellent review by George Packer for The New Yorker.

(Click here to continue reading)


Aug. 3, 2014  The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cuban Missile Crisis

A special thanks to Dr. Diego Trinidad for his comments on the importance of the November 10, 1981 NSC meeting. It was widely reported in 1962 that as part of the general agreement ending the Cuban Missile Crisis President Kennedy pledged that the United States would not invade Cuba. Dr. Trinidad brought it  to my attention that, in his 45 years of research on Cuban-American relations, the Nov. 10, 1981 NSC meeting is the first time he found official confirmation of President Kennedy’s promise not to invade Cuba. Sec. Haig said in the Nov. 10, 1981 meeting: “The Soviet threshold on Cuba is clear: it is the 1962 Accords – the promise not to invade [Cuba] is the line. Invasion is the trigger for a serious Soviet response. Up to that point, there is a free play area.” Click here to go to the full meeting minutes. 

July 28, 2014 -- 

I’ve been reluctant to write about the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 because I have not been very comfortable with the comparison to the 1983 downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007. In my mind the two situations are so different that comparing the two disasters would not be helpful. Here is why:

(click here to continue reading)

June 5, 2014 — The Reagan Legacy at 10

The 40th President of the United States, the larger-than-life Ronald Reagan who left office 25 years ago with an impressive 63 percent approval rating among Americans, passed away 10 years ago this week. Amidst the celebrations this week for the man and his presidency, reflecting on the America Reagan left behind in 1989, in particular on the Americans Reagan left behind, should not be left out of the conversation.

While those in Simi Valley and at Eureka College will be talking about all of Reagan's domestic and foreign policy accomplishments...

May 14, 2014 — New Reviews!

The reviews are coming in! Here are few of the latest for the second edition of “The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council”. 

“Significant Addition to the Historical Record” — James Strock, Serve To Lead. 

“Opening Up the Reagan Files” — Marjorie Haun, for The American Thinker

“The Reagan Files” — Scott Whitmore

“The Reagan Files is … a treasure trove of information for those seeking a much deeper understanding of Reagan’s foreign policy." 

April 1, 2014 

New Documents: 

1. 1983 memos from Vice President Bush to President Reagan on his meetings with Chancellor Kohl and the upcoming Pershing II deployments. 

2. Oct. 2, 1984: ASAT Test Next Week.” Memo from John Douglass to McFarlane. Follow-up memo’s dated Nov. 14, 1984 and Feb. 1, 1985. 

(RL: Exec. Sec: NSC Subject Files Box 3.) 

The memo’s indicate that the U.S. Air Force conducted an unsuccessful ASAT test on Nov. 13, 1984 “designed to test the miniature homing vehicle’s ability to acquire and track against a light source in Space.” The Feb. 1, 1985 memo indicates that the Air Force is now recommending a test against a target satellite."

April 1, 2014 

Congrats to Bob T. (@Tbobx) for the correct guess of former DCI William Casey. The memo is now online and can be found by clicking here: May 24, 1983 memo from William Casey to President Reagan on the budget and the Soviet Union.

March 31, 2014 —

Free signed copy of any one of my books to the first person who correctly identifies the author of this quote from a letter to President Ronald Reagan dated May 24, 1983:

"On an even more fundamental level, I believe that we are at a historic watershed. We may be the last custodians who have a chance to turn back impending bankruptcy and permanent establishment of Soviet power at our front door. If we don't aggressively act on these dangers during the next 12 months we are not likely to have the credibility to get a sufficient mandate to deal with an even greater threat in the next four years."

*One entry per person. Document (and thus the winner) will be posted online tomorrow! Entries must be submited on “The Reagan Files Facebook page”. 

March 30, 2014 —

New page! I’ve started a collection of speech drafts, and have uploaded several drafts of President Reagan’s “Evil Empire”, “SDI” and “Ivan & Anya” speech. Check them out under speech drafts, and please email me any drafts you have that you would like to share so that I can add them to this new page. The page can be accessed under “Document Collections” or by clicking here: Selected Speech Drafts.

March 8, 2014 —

Thirty-one years ago today President Reagan gave his famous “evil empire” speech. Oddly, I couldn’t find the official speech draft online, although it has been released at the Reagan Library for several years. Well, here it is! Enjoy! This link is to the draft President Reagan edited days before this speech. 

Feb. 17, 2014 —

Now available!! A second edition of “The Reagan Files: Inside The National Security Council” is now available for purchase. The second edition includes the meeting minutes of several recently declassified NSC/NSPG meetings, as well as new information on over fifity other meetings. The book is an invaluable resource for those studying foreign policy during the Reagan years. The full table of contents can be viewed by clicking here! 


Feb. 10, 2014 —

by Jason Saltoun-Ebin

I recently read a piece on Foreign Policy arguing that President Reagan showed courage for his decision to cut-and-run in Beirut, which he made about thirty years ago this month.  I have spent way too much time on this subject not to respond. 

First, the writer argued that Reagan sent Americans to Beirut as part of a Multi-National Peacekeeping Force. That is of course correct, but there is so much more to it than that: behind the closed doors of the White House Situation Room, Reagan and his team saw an American presence in the Middle East both as an opportunity to keep the Soviets out of Lebanon  and as the chance he was looking for to show the world that the United States had moved beyond the "ghosts of Vietnam."

Second, the author argued that Reagan deserves a lot of credit for a "tough decision". I'm not so sure it was a tough decision or that Reagan came to the decision to abandon Beirut for the right reasons. In terms of saving American lives in the short term there is no question that it was the right decision. But why make that decision in January/February 1984? Why not in April 1983 after terrorists bombed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut killing over fifty of the best American Middle East analysts? At that point Reagan knew that there were going to be more American casualties - the reality was that the Marines stationed in Beirut just could not be protected, which of course proved out in October when 241 Americans were killed after a suicide truck bomber rammed into the American Barracks at the Beirut International Airport. Why not pull out then?

In my mind the only explanation for why Reagan pulled the Marines out of Beirut when he did was that he did not want to go through 1984, an election year, with the realization that the Marines in Beirut were sitting ducks. Had Reagan's approval ratings for most of 1983 been over fifty percent (they were in the mid forties), I suspect he would have stuck it out in Beirut longer. But with more Americans disapproving of his leadership than approving, Reagan could just not take the chance that American casualties in Beirut would jeopardize his reelection.

Third, and this goes to the heart of this piece, did Reagan really make a courageous decision to cut-and-run? If you believe, as I do, that his decision rested on the fact that it was an election year decision than I don't see how it could have been courageous. It was a safe decision. A courageous decision, in my mind, would have been a determination to let the MNF do their job at least through the 1984 election. Would sticking it out a little longer have changed anything? We know what pulling out led to - and yes, it did lead to emboldening terrorists (think of the hijackings of TWA 847, the Achille Laura, Pan Am Flight 73) - but what if Reagan had made the really hard choice and told his advisers, "I don't care if this is an election year, we have a job to do and we are going to do it!" I'm not arguing for an open-ended commitment, just suggesting that a decision to let the Marines do their job at least through the 1984 election would have set a better precedent while also accomplishing another of Reagan's goals: showing that the U.S. had moved beyond Vietnam. 

Last, if reelection did in fact sway Reagan's decision in 1984 to cut-and-run, why then did he not reintroduce troops in 1985? My feeling is that by 1985 Reagan realized that the Middle East was not as "vital" as he thought it was in 1981 and 1982. Reagan also had his hands full with the arms-for-hostages dealings in Iran and the numerous Middle East crises that just seemed to be never-ending. Then, by 1986, after his first one-on-one with Gorbachev, he knew that the cold war could be managed without American troops in the Middle East. So, Reagan may have actually backed into the right decision (though I think the timing did do damage to American prestige), but giving him credit for doing so misses the point that were it not an election year, and had his approval ratings been higher, he very likely would have kept American troops in Beirut for the near future.


In "Dear Mr. President...Reagan/Gorbachev and the Correspondences that Ended the Cold War", historian Jason Saltoun-Ebin sheds new light on the end of the Cold War by presenting, in many cases for the first time, the top-secret correspondence between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. Saltoun-Ebin shows, through this private correspondence, that the most important reason for the end of the Cold War was simply the trust that Reagan and Gorbachev built through their letters. Although Reagan and Gorbachev at first found little to agree upon, they started the path towards the end of the Cold War by agreeing that despite their differences, they would continue to correspond. From when Gorbachev took office on March 11, 1985 till Reagan left the presidency in January 1989, the two most powerful leaders in the world exchanged over forty letters. It was this dialogue -- this decision that they could individually make a difference -- more than anything that led to the cooling of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and then the end of the Cold War. Trusting did not come easy for either of them. The letters presented in "Dear Mr. President..." show, once again, that the pen is mightier than the sword.












© Jason Saltoun-Ebin 2012